Though Russia cannot match the material offerings of the West or China in Southern Africa, Moscow’s appeal to states in the region goes beyond dollars and cents. Leaders view ties with Russia as part of a deeper embrace of multipolarity as geopolitics shifts away from the unipolar moment of the 1990s and early 2000s. This emerging world order gives African states new choices and leverage with external actors. Even if Russia’s economic and development footprint in Africa is not on par with the United States, China, leading European countries, and even some of the Gulf states, Moscow’s increased focus on the continent has given Southern African states greater autonomy and options on the global stage as they pursue a range of national interests.

Misreading Russia’s Appeal

As some African states resisted calls to isolate and condemn Russia in the wake of its full-fledged invasion of Ukraine in 2022, especially in votes at the UN General Assembly, Western officials responded with alarm and rebukes. French President Emmanuel Macron, for example, pointed to African “hypocrisy” for failing to condemn Russia’s invasion in summer 2022 while blaming Russian diplomatic pressure and “hybrid war,” including disinformation, for African ambivalence. Macron’s comments reflected a wider sentiment. Conversations with Western officials, scholars, journalists, and members of the business community in the wake of the Ukraine war pointed to simultaneous concern and confusion about Russia’s appeal.¹

This confusion stems in part from Russia’s economic limitations. Even a cursory review of economic indicators shows that Russia is no longer a major economic actor in Africa, at least not compared to the United States and leading European states that were pushing for stronger condemnations of Russia’s actions. Indeed, if African countries acted purely based on the magnitude of their economic and development relations with the United States and Europe, most would align with the West in the UN General Assembly.

Unable to point to an economic rationale underpinning Russia’s appeal, some Western observers concluded that African states were reluctant to condemn Russia because they were swayed by Russian disinformation. In March 2022, then EU high representative for foreign affairs Josep Borrell leaned into this argument, noting that

This battle of narratives is every day more important. Look at what is happening in Africa . . . People are influenced by what they are being told. And at the end it goes up to the political scale and finally it converts in votes in the international institutions.

While Russia certainly attempts to shape narratives, it is a mistake to understand Russia’s appeal as purely a function of disinformation. People within and outside decisionmaking structures in Southern Africa arrive at their conclusions about the pursuit of national interests independent of any Russian effort. Indeed, political and economic elites in Southern Africa, and in other parts of the continent, have agency in their relationships with Russia and shape them to their own ends.

Russia’s Legacy and the Return of Choices

During the Cold War, the role and influence of the Soviet Union in Southern Africa was significant. Moscow competed with the United States by supporting liberation movements that sought to overthrow colonialism and apartheid in the region, helping bring about independence and majority rule. When the Soviet Union collapsed, Russia’s position in Southern Africa and the broader continent was severely weakened as the country faced economic crises and political uncertainty. The initial years after the collapse of the Soviet Union thus saw a reduction in Russia’s economic and development footprint in Africa and other parts of the Global South. Despite this reduction, Russia maintained its diplomatic presence on the continent. Since most of the newly independent countries that emerged after the Soviet Union collapsed either did not build an extensive diplomatic presence in Africa or sought to establish a new identity closer to Western Europe and the United States, it was easier for Russia to position itself as the natural successor to the legacy of the Soviet Union. This legacy has been an important calling card for Russia as it renewed its focus on relations with African states beginning in the mid-2010s, spurred in part by growing tensions with the West in the aftermath of the initial phase of the war in Ukraine.

While the collapse of the Soviet Union and the so-called end of history was celebrated in the West, many Southern African states had a different reaction. Within the region, the Soviet Union’s collapse and Russia’s subsequent retrenchment ushered in an era of geopolitical imbalance that restricted the choices of Southern African countries. The unipolar moment led to the emergence of the so-called Washington Consensus, which promoted economic policies that Southern African states reluctantly followed. A dominant transatlantic partnership remained the center of global affairs, with Africa on the periphery.

Southern African countries have thus seen the rising power of China and Russia in recent years as a welcome part of a rebalancing of the geopolitical order that aligns with their interests. When U.S. president Barack Obama referred to Russia as a regional power, his views did not necessarily resonate in parts of the Global South. Countries in Southern Africa and parts of the Global South continue to see Russia as one of the great powers, alongside China and the United States. Such attitudes are not necessarily about the historic role of the Soviet Union but about the modern Russian state and how it has rebuilt its perceived hard and soft power.

Countries such as South Africa have embraced the concept of multipolarity, not because of deep affinity for Russia or China but because increases in the relative power of these countries means more policy choices and greater autonomy. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s rise to power in the 2000s, especially his success in rebuilding Russia’s economy and the central authority of the state, also carried obvious appeal for some African leaders. Putin conducted a state visit to South Africa and Morocco in 2006 as Russia sought to deepen ties on the continent. Putin’s rise and assertion of Russian sovereignty was a powerful example on the continent with the largest number of developing countries, with many states unable to exercise full sovereignty over their territories.

Africa’s Agency in Relations with Russia

Western analyses often point out that Africa remains peripheral to Russia’s core interests, arguing that Moscow uses mostly cheap and often symbolic gestures to achieve broader geopolitical goals. However, it is important to see Russia’s relationships with Southern African states through the opposite end of the lens as well. Russia is in many ways peripheral to these states’ core interests, and countries in the region often instrumentalize Russia to achieve their own objectives. These objectives can include enhancing bilateral economic relations with other international partners in the West, advancing strategic geopolitical objectives, as well as managing internal party-political dynamics or internal national politics.

Just as importantly, Southern African states are using Russia’s reemergence as a source of leverage to potentially get better deals and options from their largest economic and political partners. This is part of a larger strategy of diversifying international relations, which includes outreach to Brazil, China, India, and other parts of the Global South. When they feel ignored or under pressure from Europe or the United States, African leaders can enhance relations with Russia to attract the attention of the West or negotiate better terms from it.

Enhanced geopolitical competition following the war in Ukraine has made this strategy even more attractive. Despite its economic weakness, Russia has been relatively good at elevating itself to the point where European and American leaders perceive it as a competitor that can hurt some of their interests in Africa. This gives Southern African states opportunities to play both sides and gain leverage. Viewed through this wider lens, relations with Russia may not always bring about short-term economic benefits, but they can provide greater leverage with Western states focused on strategic competition.

Mozambique offers an example of this. Mozambique has long-standing ties to Moscow dating back to Soviet support for its liberation movement, the Mozambique Liberation Front. The front has now been in power for over fifty years, and Russia remains a key partner for military-technical support and weapons, especially as the government fights an insurgency in the northern part of the country. In 2019, Mozambique briefly welcomed Russian mercenaries, though a series of setbacks ended that mission within months.

In the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Mozambique has worked to avoid alienating Moscow while seeking leverage with Western partners. Despite Western pressure, Mozambique abstained from UN General Assembly votes on Ukraine, and then president Filipe Nyusi was one of the African leaders who attended the Russia-Africa Summit in St. Petersburg in 2023. At the same time, the EU has expanded its security support to Mozambique since the war in Ukraine began, in part because Mozambique’s gas supplies have become more strategically important as Europe reduced imports from Russia. Press reports also suggest that EU security support has expanded in part to prevent Mozambique from seeking expanded partnerships with Russia and China.

Adapting to the Multipolar World

For the West, it can be tempting to divide the world into camps, pitting countries perceived as pro-Russia and anti-West against those that are pro-Ukraine and pro-West. The reality is of course more nuanced, as states in Southern Africa and the broader Global South look to capitalize on the opportunities provided from a multipolar world. This world is no longer a theoretical one on the horizon. Even U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio acknowledged the rebalancing of the geopolitical landscape toward multipolarity in 2025. While multipolarity is not a central talking point for the current administration in Washington, the relative overstretch of U.S. power on the global stage and the need to prioritize interests is clearly a part of its worldview.

The West should expect states in Southern Africa to continue to value choices and leverage among partners. A refusal to condemn Russia for its actions in Ukraine is not necessarily an endorsement of Moscow; rather, it may be a way to maximalize options and choices in pursuit of interests in a complicated geopolitical landscape. Increased engagement by the great powers will be welcomed, with more developed states and regions like Southern Africa prepared to maximalize the benefits.

In this new geopolitical environment, the West must embrace rather than fight multipolarity and the greater autonomy it provides Southern African states. The West is no longer the only game in town, but it still has many strategic advantages in cultivating strong, stable partnerships in Southern Africa when it finds ways to address these states’ interests as true partners. Along the way, it will need to heed the advice of Nelson Mandela, who told an American journalist in 1990, “one of the mistakes which some political analysts make is to think that their enemies should be our enemies.”

About the Author

Philani Mthembu

Executive Director, Institute for Global Dialogue, associated with UNISA

Dr. Philani Mthembu is the executive director at the Institute for Global Dialogue, an independent foreign policy think tank based in Tshwane (Pretoria), South Africa.

This article was first published in a special issue on Russia in Africa by The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace here: https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2026/02/russia-role-west-southern-africa-junta-wagner-africa-corps#beyond-material-russias-appeal-to-southern-african-states