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Advancing co-operation and integration in southern Africa

Garth le Pere and Elling N Tjønneland

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Acronyms and abbreviations

ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific countries
AGOA	African Growth and Opportunity Act
ASF	African Standby Force
AU	African Union
BIDPA	Botswana Institute for Development Policy Analysis
BLNS	Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland
CMI	Chr Michelsen Institute
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CSIR	Council for Scientific and Industrial Research
DFI	development finance institutions
DFID	UK Department for International Development
DFRC	Development Finance Resource Centre
EBA	Everything but Arms
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EISA	Electoral Institute of Southern Africa
EPAS	Economic Partnership Agreements
EU	European Union
FANR	SADC Food, Agriculture & Natural Resources directorate
FDI	foreign direct investment
FLS	Frontline States
FIP	Finance and Investment Protocol
GDP	gross domestic product
GSP	General System of Preferences
GTZ	Deutsche Gesellshaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
ICM	SADC Integrated Committee of Ministers
ICPS	International Co-operating Partners
IGD	Institute for Global Dialogue
IS	SADC Infrastructure and Services directorate
ISDSC	SADC Inter-State Defence and Security Committee
ISPDC	SADC Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee
ISS	Institute for Security Studies

LDCS	least developed countries
MOU	memorandum of understanding
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NEPRU	Namibian Economic Policy Research Unit
NGO	non-governmental organisation
NOK	Norwegian kroner
NORAD	Norwegian Agency for Development Co-operation
NSJ	NSJ Southern African Media Training Trust
NTB	non-tariff barriers
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPDSC	SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PLANELM	Planning Element (Standby Force)
RECS	regional economic communities
RISDP	SADC Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan
RPTC	SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre
SA	South Africa
SACU	Southern African Customs Union
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADCBRIG	SADC Standby Force Brigade
SADCC	Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference
SADC PF	SADC Parliamentary Forum
SADSEM	Southern African Defence and Security Management Network
SAHRIT	Southern African Human Rights Trust
SAIIA	South African Institute of International Affairs
SAPP	Southern African Power Pool
SARDC	Southern African Research and Documentation Centre
SARPCCO	Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-ordination Conference
SQUAM	Standardisation, Quality Assurance, Accreditation and Metrology
SDI	spatial development initiative
SHD	SADC Social and Human Development and Special Programmes directorate
SHIRBRIG	Standing High Readiness Brigade
SIPO	SADC Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation

SNC	SADC national committee
STAP	(Infrastructure) short-term action plan (NEPAD)
TIFI	SADC Trade, Industry, Finance and Investment directorate
UN	United Nations
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
US$	United States dollar
WTO	World Trade Organisation

Preface

The future of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) is a subject of ongoing academic enquiry and analysis. It invites systematic treatment as a region because it has a variety of notable empirical realities and attributes that distinguish it from other regions in Africa and elsewhere. This indicates the interest that regionalism, which has been viewed as an important stimulus in Africa's developmental trajectory, inspires on the continent. Thus, as Soko Mills notes (2004:37), 'not only has regional integration been considered necessary to achieve meaningful industrialisation, develop intra-African trade and participate effectively in the evolving global linkages, it has also been regarded as central to building African unity, consolidating regional political structures in the post-colonial period, and creating regional blocs for effective use in international political forums and in negotiations with advanced industrial nations.'

SADC has experienced and been subject to the convulsive changes that have accompanied globalisation and trade liberalisation. Its regional integration agenda has been further complicated and shaped by the integration and expansion of the European Union (EU); the evolving but highly contested trade diplomacy in the World Trade Organisation (WTO); the free trade agreement between South Africa and the EU; institutional and programmatic developments in the African Union (AU) and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD); and the implications of the new trade and development framework with the EU under the Cotonou Agreement.

As if these weighty imponderables were not enough, uncertain political processes in its member countries continue to exert a profound impact on SADC's future, albeit with varying effects. These range from successful democratic transitions to continuing civil strife and communal violence. While parliamentary elections and open pluralism are becoming vectors of change, the region cannot escape poverty, underdevelopment, political turmoil, and the HIV/AIDS pandemic. It is against this background that SADC has had to redefine its raison d'etre. New and ongoing initiatives include rationalising the architecture of SADC, including its extensive review of development policies; streamlining its sectoral co-ordination approaches; restructuring the secretariat; and implementing a range of important protocols, especially those relating to politics, defence and security co-operation, trade, energy, water, small arms, and so on.

In all of this, the biggest weakness is a perceived lack of an overall political and strategic vision. This study thus attempts to examine the future direction of SADC and does so across a range of key strategic challenges and thematic dimensions. Important achievements are also highlighted.

The authors collected much of the data through extensive interviews with officials and other stakeholders in most SADC countries, including discussions with officials in all departments and directorates of the SADC secretariat. Interviews were carried out in

2003 and 2005 as part of consultancies commissioned by the Norwegian authorities. The first report for the technical department of the Norwegian Agency for Development Co-operation (NORAD) remains unpublished,[1] while the second report from 2005 was published in August 2005 (Tjønneland, Isaksen, & le Pere 2005). The reports contain full lists of persons interviewed.

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October 2005

1 SADC: establishment, and changing objectives

The current SADC was established in 1992, but its roots are much older. Its genesis has been closely linked to the struggle for independence from colonial powers and liberation from apartheid. Its origins lie in the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC), set up in 1980 as a development aid co-ordination mechanism. The Frontline States (FLS) also shaped important features of today's SADC. Set up in 1975 as an informally constituted political grouping, the FLS comprised Tanzania, Zambia, Angola, Mozambique, and – from 1980 – Zimbabwe, '…with the objective of forcing an end to white minority rule in Southern Africa' (Lee 2003:65).

1.1 From SADCC and FLS to SADC

The organisation originally known as SADCC was formed in Lusaka, Zambia in 1980. Its founding members were Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. The chief objectives outlined in the Lusaka declaration were to mobilise and co-ordinate development assistance; facilitate regional co-operation through joint development projects, especially in infrastructure such as transport and communications; and to reduce the dependence on apartheid South Africa.[2] Significantly, SADCC gave post-independence Southern African governments their first platform for regional economic co-operation.

SADCC was constituted as a rather loose form of co-operation built on concrete projects and programmes. A limited number of institutions was established and formalised according to a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed in 1981. SADCC was premised on functional integration and a highly decentralised organisational structure. Each member country was meant to experience tangible benefits from participation in the regional grouping. Each member was also given a sector to co-ordinate, and thus an equal stake in the organisation. SADCC did not legally own a project or its assets – in fact SADCC had no legal status – these remaining the property of the state in whose territory the projects were located. SADCC, through its small secretariat located in Gaborone, would assist in planning regional projects, facilitate meetings with external partners, and market the regional project. The bulk of the planning, together with funding and implementation, would be the responsibility of individual member states, which had to sign the funding agreement with donor agencies and lending institutions.

In the late 1980s regional policy-makers identified a need for a more effective organisation, with legal status and powers. They were also increasingly confident that Namibia and South Africa were moving towards democracy. Accordingly, they decided to formalise SADCC and to shift its focus from mere co-operation among member countries to a more far-reaching and ambitious regional integration agenda.

After four years of preparatory work, in 1992 regional heads of state and government signed a declaration and treaty in Windhoek, Namibia, that established SADC. Namibia had been incorporated into the old SADCC in 1990 and South Africa became a SADC member in 1994.

SADC's objectives or common agenda as outlined in the 1992 treaty revolved around:

- promoting development, poverty reduction, and economic growth through regional integration;
- consolidating, defending and maintaining democracy, peace, security, and stability;
- promoting common political values and institutions which are democratic, legitimate, and effective;
- strengthening links among the people of the region; and
- mobilising regional and international private and public resources for the development of the region.

The common agenda gave the new SADC a stronger focus on economic integration issues at the same time as it broadened its scope to embrace new political objectives. SADC did, however, struggle to find an appropriate institutional mechanism to handle its political and security objectives. It decided to set up a SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (OPDSC). First established in Harare in 1996 with president Robert Mugabe, the chair of the dissolved FLS, as its head, it operated quite independently of the rest of SADC. Only in 2001 did SADC finally agree to bring the OPDSC more firmly under its umbrella (see the discussion in the next section).

In the early days, the OPDSC operated much like a continuation and extension of the FLS. The FLS originated in the OAU Liberation Committee. Spearheaded by Tanzania and Zambia it became an important instrument in harmonising the policies of African countries to support the liberation struggle in Southern Africa. Following the liberation of Angola and Mozambique in 1975, the FLS functioned as an informally constituted political grouping, and operated primarily at the level of heads of state. It also helped forge a strong sense of political unity among the political leaders of the region.[3]

The FLS restructured after the liberation of Namibia and South Africa, and re-established itself as the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) at a conference in Cape Town in 1994. Nominally, it should have fallen under the OPDSC, but it operated quite independently of that body, continuing as an informal consultative mechanism for the political leaders in the region.

Malawi, Swaziland, and Lesotho also became members of the new political structure. They were later joined by Mauritius, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and the Seychelles. The Seychelles withdrew in 2003, leaving SADC with 13 members, but at the summit in Botswana in August 2005, Madagascar was admitted as a new 14th member. The ISDSC comprised the ministers responsible for defence, public security (policing) and state security (intelligence). Subcommittees and sub-subcommittees were established, bringing together a range of senior officials. Defence issues tended to dominate within the ISDSC, which was chaired by a member country on an annual and rotational basis and had no permanent structures or a secretariat. A partial exception was found within public policing where a permanent institution – the Southern African Police Chiefs Co-ordinating Conference (SARPCCO) – was established in Harare, also doubling as the sub-regional office of Interpol. Originally nominally part of the ISDSC, it soon de facto became an independent institution. Subsequently, the ISDSC effectively became the strongest component of the OPDSC.

The decentralised nature that characterised the SADCC was continued with the SADC. Each member state continued to have the responsibility for co-ordinating one or more sectors. This involved proposing policies, strategies and priorities, and processing projects for inclusion in the sector programme, monitoring progress and reporting to SADC's council of ministers. SADC's work programme was further consolidated within the secretariat located in Gaborone. The secretariat also hosted a separate unit responsible for gender – considered a cross-cutting issue in the SADC structure. From the late 1990s it also ran a series of special programmes, mainly dealing with drug trafficking, land mines and small arms.

Before SADC embarked on its restructuring in 2001 it had 21 sector co-ordinating units and commissions in 12 of the then 14 SADC countries. Commissions, assisted by commission secretariats, were sector co-ordinating units that had been upgraded to regional institutions, approved by summit and supported by all member states. The commission secretariats had a regional staff and were funded directly by member states through separate contributions. The sector co-ordinating units, on the other hand, were national institutions established in the appropriate line ministry by the member country responsible for co-ordinating the particular sector and staffed by civil servants of that country. Sectoral committees of ministers reporting to the council of ministers guided both the units and the commissions. Only the DRC and the Seychelles were without sector responsibilities (see table 1).

Table 1: SADC's sector co-ordinators

Angola	Energy Commission
Botswana	Agricultural research and training; livestock Production and animal disease control
Lesotho	Environment and land management; water
Malawi	Inland fisheries; forestry; wildlife
Mauritius	Tourism
Mozambique	Culture, information and sport; Transport and Communication Commission
Namibia	Marine fisheries; legal affairs
South Africa	Finance and investment; health
Swaziland	Human resources development
Tanzania	Industry and trade
Zambia	Employment and labour; mining
Zimbabwe	Crop production; food, agriculture and natural resources

The adoption of protocols has been central in SADC's efforts to develop common approaches and policies. A protocol is a legal instrument that commits member states to co-operate, co-ordinate, harmonise and integrate policies and strategies in one or more sectors. Sectoral actors in collaboration with SADC agencies develop protocols. Next, they are scrutinised by SADC's legal sector (Namibia) before being submitted to the council of ministers for approval. Following this, they need to be signed by the summit of heads of state or government. Finally, after being signed, they need to be ratified by two-thirds of member states – typically in a parliamentary process – before coming into force. Table 2 provides a full list of all the 33 protocols and other legal documents ratified by SADC. Of these 25 had entered into force by mid-2005.[4]

Table 2: SADC protocols and legal instruments

	Protocol and legal instruments	Tabled before Summit	Entered into force
1	Treaty	1992, August	1993
2	Immunities and privileges	1992, August	1993
3	Shared watercourse systems	1995, August	1998
4	Transport, communication and meteorology	1996, August	1998
5	Energy	1996, August	1998
6	Combating illicit drugs	1996, August	1999
7	Trade	1996, August	2000
8	Charter of the Regional Tourism Organisation of Southern Africa (RETOSA)	1997, September	1997
9	Education and training	1997, September	2000
10	Mining	1997, September	2000
11	Tourism	1998, September	2000
12	Wildlife conservation and law enforcement	1999, August	2003
13	Health	1999, August	2004
14	MOU on co-operation in standardisation, quality assurance, accreditation and metrology	1999, November	2000
15	Tribunal and the rules of procedure	2000, August	2001
16	Legal affairs	2000, August	–
17	Revised protocol on shared watercourses	2000, August	2003
18	Amendment protocol on trade	2000, August	2000
19	Notice of adoption agreement amending the Treaty of SADC	2001, August	2001
20	Politics, defence and security co-operation	2001, August	2004
21	Control of firearms, ammunition and other related materials	2001, August	2004
22	Fisheries	2001, August	2003
23	Corruption	2001, August	–
24	Culture, information and sports	2001, August	–
25	Extradition	2002, October	–
26	Forestry	2002, October	–
27	Mutual legal assistance in criminal matters	2002, October	–
28	Agreement amending the protocol on Tribunal	2002, October	2002
29	MOU on co-operation in taxation and related matters	2002, August	2002
30	MOU on macroeconomic convergence	2002, August	2002
31	Mutual defence pact	2003, August	–
32	Charter on fundamental social rights	2003, August	2003

Source: Derived from the SADC website (www.sadc.int).

In addition the SADC summits have also adopted a series of non-binding declarations that provide important policy guidelines. They are the declarations on Gender and Development; Productivity (1999); Information and Communication Technology (2001); HIV/AIDS (2003); Agriculture and Food Security (2004); and Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections (2004).

1.2 Achievements, and calls for change

The change from SADCC to SADC implied a major shift in focus. In the 1980s, the objectives were cutting links to South Africa, and mobilising the region against apartheid. In the 1990s, the organisation strove to ensure a reintegration of South Africa with the rest of Southern Africa, with a primary focus on economic integration. How successful has SADCC/SADC been in efforts to bring economic development and political stability to the region? And what does this tell us about the challenges ahead?

There are no simple answers to these questions. In the 1980s, SADCC successfully mobilised external development finance, facilitated some co-ordination of those aid flows, helped ensure a regional focus for such assistance, and made possible a number of important regional development projects, particularly related to infrastructure. A number of electricity, transport, and communication projects were made possible by SADCC. Most importantly, all member countries felt that they benefited from SADCC and its projects.

A second very important achievement was SADCC's role in fostering a regional identity and a common political outlook on important issues. The foundations were laid during the 1980s and the process continued throughout the 1990s.The policy frameworks developed by SADCC were also important in shaping policies and approaches in member countries.

The achievements were also mirrored by several failures and shortcomings which became increasingly manifest in the course of the 1990s. SADCC may have made important progress in implementing regional projects in infrastructure, but the bulk of its activities implemented through its over 20 sector co-ordinating units were national projects with limited regional impact. In many sectors there was little visible activity, and the work programme increasingly lacked a clear regional focus. This became particularly evident following the establishment of the new SADC and its intention to focus on deepening economic integration. This required a strong institutional and political capacity to drive the process, with a greater emphasis on regional policy formulation and harmonisation. An internal SADC study from the mid-1990s found that an estimated 80 per cent of the 470 projects listed in SADC's programme of action could be classified as primarily national projects and. Only 20 per cent of the project portfolio would meet the criteria of being proper regional projects.

Growing political divisions also became evident from the mid-1990s. The removal of the unifying external enemy (apartheid South Africa), the inclusion of new members (especially the DRC), and growing tensions between Zimbabwe and South Africa led to a situation where SADC effectively was divided into two camps in dealing with political and security issues. As a result, the OPDSC became incapacitated and unable to act. This was most dramatically illustrated in the attitude towards the war in the DRC – SADC's newest member – where SADC took sharply divided positions. One group, led by Zimbabwe, intervened militarily to assist the regime in Kinshasa, while another group, led by South Africa, actively pursued mediation and a more peaceful solution (Williams 2001:114– 23; Cilliers:1999).

These shortcomings and failures increasingly were being recognised by SADC. The emphasis was placed on the institutional capacity of the organisation. The SADC basically inherited the institutional framework of the SADCC, and the OPDSC and the ISDSC operated without a proper institutional framework. In the mid-1990s SADC appointed a team of consultants from the region, including also South Africa's Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR). They submitted a major review and rationalisation study (Chipeta et al:1997) that recommended a number of far-reaching changes in the way SADC was managed and operated. Its key recommendation was that the decentralised nature of SADC should be abolished. The sector co-ordinating units and commissions should be phased out and brought together in five planning and co-ordination directorates at the SADC secretariat in Gaborone. These directorates should be formed around:

1. human resource development, science, and technology;
2. agriculture, natural resources, and environment;
3. infrastructure, communication, and information technology;
4. trade, industry, investment, and finance; and
5. community development, culture, and information.

The report examined SADC in relation only to social and economic development programmes and did not look into the political and security issues falling under the OPDSC or the ISDSC. However, SADC failed to reach any immediate agreement on the proposed restructuring, in part because of opposition from some member countries reluctant to close down their co-ordinating units and thereby increase the power and functions of the secretariat. Problems therefore persisted, a situation pointed out also by senior officials in the SADC secretariat. The then acting executive secretary in the secretariat, Prega Ramsamy, in a speech delivered in June 2000, identified two critical issues for the organisation. The first was the inability of its present structure to adapt to changing circumstances and new challenges. The second was the need for a more focused approach, with targeted priorities for the next 10–15 years.[5]

The SADC heads of state and government returned to the 1997 study at the 1999 summit, which directed the SADC council of ministers to initiate a comprehensive review of the operations of SADC institutions, including the OPDSC. The review committee, composed of representatives from Namibia, Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa, and Zimbabwe, produced a comprehensive Report on the Review of Operations of SADC Institutions in 2000 and released it in 2001.[6]

Three important meetings dedicated to the restructuring exercise were then held. The first was an extraordinary meeting of the council of ministers in Gaborone in November 2000. The second was another extraordinary meeting of the council in Windhoek in March 2001, followed by the extraordinary summit in Windhoek on 9 March to approve the report. The outcome of these decisions and their implementation will be presented and discussed in the next section.

2 Institutional reform

The SADC summit decided in March 2001 on a series of far-reaching changes in SADC's institutional framework and the structure for executing its 1992 mandate. These included changes in the governing structures at regional and national levels. The most radical changes concerned the operations of the secretariat itself. The 21 sectoral committees and commissions located in 12 SADC member countries, and responsible for planning and implementing SADC's work in each sector, were to be closed down. The sector units were to be brought together in four clusters in an expanded and strengthened secretariat in Gaborone.

A major shift in the work of the secretariat and the directorates was also envisaged. The directorates were to focus their activities on regional integration and the mobilisation of financial resources, and concentrate on policy development, harmonisation, and assistance to member states. Little attention was paid to implementation at this stage, but the intention was that this – based on the principle of subsidiarity – should be undertaken at the lower levels, primarily by member states and specialised agencies. Each member state was also to establish a SADC National Committee (SNC) responsible for national co-ordination and implementation.

It was also decided that the review committee that made the recommendations leading to these decisions should continue to supervise and guide the secretariat in implementing and further developing these decisions.

In a separate but parallel process SADC also sought to resolve the role and operation of the OPDSC. The SADC Summit in August 2001 decided to bring the OPDSC firmly under the control of SADC. While the OPDSC retained its own set of regional structures and mechanisms for decision-making, henceforth it would report to the SADC summit. It was also decided to establish a small permanent secretariat or administrative unit of the OPDSC based at the SADC secretariat in Gaborone. The original proposal from the council of ministers was that the OPDSC should not have a permanent secretariat, and that the necessary administrative support should be provided by the state chairing it. At the summit itself, however, the heads of state and government decided to set up a permanent secretariat based at SADC headquarters in Gaborone.

The intention was to complete the institutional reforms over two years, beginning in March 2001. By then, it was hoped that an appropriate institutional framework for SADC operations would be in place.

These expectations were not fulfilled. The restructuring was not completed by 2003 as envisaged. By mid-2005, the institutional reforms were still not completed although the main components were in place. Important targets had, however, been met. In particular, SADC had succeeded in closing down all country-based sector units and in moving them into four directorates in Gaborone. It was also in a better organisational position to address key obstacles and challenges facing regional integration efforts. On the other hand, SADC had not yet succeeded in creating an efficient secretariat. There were still unresolved issues related to staffing and management, major capacity constraints were still visible, and the secretariat continued to suffer from bureaucratic inertia. New problems and obstacles had also emerged: these were associated with the performance of governing structures, difficulties in finalising work programmes, and in defining priorities. These issues will be examined below.

Annexure 1 provides an organogram of the current structure of the secretariat and SADC's governing structures.

2.1 Towards the new SADC structure

2.1.1 The Secretariat

Most of the institutional reforms centred on the changing role and functions of the secretariat in Gaborone. The secretariat is the principal executive institution of SADC and the reforms were intended to give it the power and authority to shape the form and content of the regional programme, and to be more effective in implementing it. The institutional reforms were also intended to ensure a more cost-efficient and cost-effective regional organisation. The new secretariat will inter alia:

- be responsible for strategic planning and management;
- implement decisions of the governing structures, including the OPDSC;
- co-ordinate and harmonise policies and strategies of member states;
- monitor and evaluate the implementation of regional policies and programmes;
- ensure gender mainstreaming in all programmes and projects;

- mobilise resources and co-ordinate programmes and projects with donors and co-operating partners; and
- research community-building and the integration process.

After the 21 country-based sector co-ordinating units and commissions were closed down, their activities moved into four clusters at the secretariat. The four clusters to be set up were the directorates for Trade, Industry, Finance and Investment (TIFI); Food, Agriculture & Natural Resources (FANR); Social & Human Development and Special Programmes (SHD); and Infrastructure & Services (IS). As a temporary measure member countries were requested to second personnel to the secretariat. Following the preparation of proper job descriptions and the finalisation of the transfer of functions from member countries, it was expected that the secretariat would appoint staff on a contract basis.

A chief director heads the four directorates. The office of the head of the secretariat – the executive secretary – will be strengthened by the appointment of a deputy executive secretary.[7]

By 2005 – two years after the original deadline – the process was not yet completed. More or less on time, SADC had succeeded in closing down the country-based units and commissions, setting up the directorates, and establishing other units. This included units in the chief director's office on the cross-cutting issues of HIV/AIDS, statistics and gender, policy and strategic planning, resource mobilisation, and legal affairs in the executive secretary's office (see the organogram in annexure 1).

However, these directorates and units were not strong and efficient. One major challenge has been staffing. All directorates and units still suffer from severe shortages of key technical staff. Only by the end of 2004 did the secretariat complete the process of appointing heads of the directorates. The heads of three of the four main directorates took up their positions from January 2005. (However, the candidate selected to head the important TIF directorate declined to take up the position and a new recruitment process will have to be launched.) The staffing of the directorates has still not been completed. The secretariat relied on seconded staff from member states with only very limited regional recruitment and external advisers. Most of the contracts for seconded staff were short-term and temporary. The council of ministers at its February 2005 meeting decided to retain the transitional arrangements of using both seconded and recruited staff until the end of March 2006, when regionally recruited staff are expected to be in place.[8]

The planned staff complement for the directorates is also being kept to a minimum. In 2001, before the restructuring, SADC had about 190 professionals. At the launch of the restructuring, it was estimated that that the new SADC might require under 100 professionals. At the February 2005 council of ministers it was decided to make further cuts in the 2005/6 budget. The planned staff complement of each of the four directorates is now between four and six. Besides this, there are some donor-funded technical advisers in the directorates.

Directorates are expected to operate with a skeleton staff and then 'organically expand', based on needs and available resources. The water division within the IS directorate illustrates this. It is probably among the strongest units in the secretariat, managing several major projects with a professional staff of six. Two of these are secondments on short-term contracts from Lesotho and Botswana, and four are technical advisers provided by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Switzerland, France, and Belgium.

Bureaucratic failures to make the required decisions account for some of the delays in staffing processes. However, the most important factor is that recruitment could not begin before proper job descriptions were in place. In turn, job descriptions could not be drawn up before a strategy and a programme of action had been devised. See more on this in the next section.

The secretariat also suffered from other problems. Internal management structures, the work environment, and the organisational culture appear to be in need of improvement if the secretariat is to develop as an efficient and lean institution able to drive the SADC's ambitious agenda. One challenge is to decentralise within the secretariat – essentially to give the directorates more power and freedom to manoeuvre. The ongoing restructuring, the poor work environment, and the staff shortages have all contributed to growing and visible frustrations among staff. Nonetheless, it is expected that a planned new building housing the secretariat will provide better facilities and lead to an improved work environment.

Another challenge relates to staff composition. Like most multilateral institutions, in recruiting staff the secretariat will have to ensure balanced representation from the member states and avoid allowing any countries to dominate. The new quota system as approved by the council of ministers in February 2005 is based on the principle that no member country should have more than one position in the top posts from director to executive secretary. Such principles may reduce efficiency, but this is probably unavoidable. The current salary packages offered by SADC are attractive for staff from most member countries, although perhaps less so for staff from countries such as South Africa and Botswana, which have the highest salary levels in the region.

The OPDSC has established a small administrative unit at the secretariat, but it remains in an even weaker position than the rest of the secretariat. While the OPDSC had ambitions of establishing itself as an entirely separate department, it was decided to develop it into a de facto fifth, political directorate, headed by a director, and with three subdivisions (politics/diplomacy, defence/security, and strategic analysis, including an early warning/situation room). Two officials were seconded from member states in 2002. They were originally expected to work on the secretariat's special programmes (especially small arms and landmines), but their task soon also included constituting the secretariat of the OPDSC. It has been running with a staff of two since its establishment; an additional secondment from South Africa (the 2004/05 chair of the OPDSC)[9] arrived in January 2005. The unit also has one external technical advisor, working on small arms, who filled the post from Germany in February 2005. Most staff, including the director, will have to be recruited, so the OPDSC directorate may not be fully operational before 2006.

Relations between the OPDSC directorate and the rest of the secretariat are also a bit unsettled. Formally, the OPDSC directorate is part of the secretariat, is serviced by the support staff of the secretariat, and reports to the executive secretary. However, it has an entirely different governing structure (see below) and tends to see itself as being separate. There is limited or no co-operation between the activities of the four social and economic directorates and the political directorate. The previous executive secretary, Prega Ramsamy, also appeared to pay little attention to the OPDSC secretariat and its work; it is hoped that this will change under his successor, Tomas Salamao. A proper division of labour between secretariat and OPDSC directorate still has to be worked out. There are potentially many overlaps and grey areas, especially in the governance field, and there is considerable scope for rationalising and merging certain functions.

The institutional reform has also revealed a number of other problems. One is implementation capacity. While the bulk of implementation under the new structure is expected to be handled by member states and specialised agencies (see below), the secretariat is intended to play an important role in facilitation, monitoring and assistance. It does not have sufficient capacity at this stage to address these issues. Therefore it has been proposed that a dedicated project management office be established within the secretariat. The terms of reference for a study to explore this further and prepare detailed proposals were finalised in early 2005. However, one should not expect such an office to be up and running before 2006 or, even more likely, 2007.

A related weakness is also an insufficient capacity at the secretariat to monitor and undertake strategic policy planning and research. By mid-2005, the unit in question was staffed by only one person. This is insufficient to proceed in any meaningful way with such tasks. The unit is also currently restricted in its focus and deals only with social and economic issues.

It will therefore still take some time before the secretariat becomes fully operational and evolves into an effective and efficient instrument for promoting regional co-operation and integration. At best, restructuring of the secretariat will be completed only some time in 2006.

The constraints discussed above are related mostly to managerial and administrative bottlenecks, which can be overcome. A potentially much bigger hurdle is the secretariat's restricted mandate. The tasks of the secretariat suggest that it should also have a strong mandate, and the freedom to promote and advance a deepening of the regional agenda, but its mandate limits it to being an administrative unit with no political decision-making powers. This raises the critically important issue of how to structure relations between the secretariat and member countries.

2.1.2 Governance

The summit of heads of state and government is SADC's supreme decision-making body. Decisions are made by consensus and are binding. Under the summit, there are different governing structures for the 'old SADC' dealing with the social and economic work, and the OPDSC dealing with politics and security issues. SADC is led by a troika system consisting of the chairperson, the incoming chairperson and the outgoing chairperson. There is one troika for the social and economic issues – which also chairs the SADC Summit – and one troika for the OPDSC. Troika members are selected by the summit from members of the summit with the proviso that the same country cannot chair both troikas at the same time.

Under the troika for the social and economic SADC is a council of ministers that oversees the functioning of SADC and – through a special 'review committee' – also supervises the implementation of institutional reform. The council consists of one minister from each member state, preferably the minister responsible for the SADC National Contact Point, which is either the ministry of finance/development planning or, in the majority of countries, the ministry of foreign affairs.

The establishment of the Integrated Committee of Ministers (ICM) is an important innovation in the governing structure of SADC. It replaces the many sectoral committees of ministers, which were established in most of the old SADC areas of operation. Composed of two ministers from each member state, the ICM makes decisions on the strategic direction, the integration agenda, and the work of the four social and economic directorates of the secretariat. There are no guidelines and indications about the composition of the ministers: they may vary, depending on items on the agenda and concerns of member states.

A standing committee of officials providing technical advice assists the ICM and consists of one permanent secretary or an official of equivalent rank from each member state. The ICM can also appoint subcommittees of ministers when the need arises. These subcommittees may be constituted at cluster level and serviced by the relevant secretariat directorate.

The ICM has been established and meets regularly, but several problems have become evident. One is the ICM's apparently weak capacity to provide proper guidance for the various sectors. Such a committee presupposes fairly strong policy coherence and information flows between government departments at the national level but this is not very developed in most countries. Therefore SADC decided in 2004 to revive some of the sectoral committees (eg within energy and trade) in order to provide the relevant directorate with better guidance and facilitate the development of policy frameworks. The new sectoral committee of ministers, however, does not have legal status.

The OPDSC has a separate governing structure, with its own troika that reports to the SADC summit. Below this level there is a ministerial committee comprising ministers of foreign affairs, defence, public security (policing) and state security (intelligence) from each of the member countries. Defence and security ministers also meet in the ISDSC and foreign affairs ministers convene in the Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC). Each of these sectoral committees has subcommittees. Because of the numbers involved, it has become difficult to make the ministerial committee functional: potentially it includes more than 50 ministers. In practice the troika and the current troika chair, South Africa, have been active in providing direction and taking initiatives. The ISDSC has also been very active, especially in relation to technical issues in the defence area (cf the discussion of the origins of the ISDSC in the previous section). The ISPDC, on the other hand, seems to have been less active.

SADC also has an autonomous institution relevant in this discussion of governing structures. The SADC Parliamentary Forum (SADC PF), established in 1996, and approved as an autonomous SADC institution by the SADC 1997 summit, has a permanent secretariat in Windhoek. The forum is made up of national delegations of four members of parliament, including the presiding officer and at least one member of the opposition. It meets twice a year.[10] Other than the DRC, all current members of SADC are members of the forum. In the long run the forum may become SADC's legislative arm, but the SADC summit has been reluctant to approve this (in contrast to, for example, the East African Community and their East African Parliamentary Assembly or the African Union and the Pan-African Parliament). These issues have not been addressed in any of the restructuring documents prepared by SADC.

The current chief objectives of the SADC PF are to promote democratisation in Southern Africa, involve parliamentarians in SADC activities, and facilitate implementation of SADC policies. Its main activities are focused on building capacities of parliamentarians through training and other means, and to facilitate free and fair elections through dispatching election observers to member countries.

In conclusion, SADC is faced by several challenges in making its governance regime effective. One is the relationship between the governing structures of the two legs of SADC, which would benefit from some rationalisation. Another challenge is the nature of decision-making within SADC. SADC operates on the basis of consensus but does not have any effective instrument to deal with member states failing to implement joint decisions. The SADC Treaty provides for the establishment of a tribunal to deal with such situations. The protocol providing for the tribunal has been ratified, but the tribunal is still to be established. Members of the tribunal were appointed by the SADC summit in August 2005.

By far the biggest challenge facing SADC at this level relates to political leadership, and the relations between the secretariat and the governing structures. Ministers spend too much time on administrative details and too little on leadership. This is partly due to a structural weakness within SADC: the secretariat remains an administrative body with no formal political power. Nor have SADC member countries been willing to establish a regional institution with supra-national powers. Another factor is that individual member countries have been unwilling to provide strong leadership. Most troika members seem to be reticent about providing leadership between meetings of the summit.

To improve communication between the secretariat and member countries, the council of ministers, at its meeting in February 2005, decided to establish a SADC Committee of Ambassadors in Gaborone. This committee will meet more frequently and potentially will also be in a position to provide guidance and direction (with a function similar to the heads of African missions in Addis in relation to the AU). However, the key issue is the need for strong political leadership of SADC, and the ability of the troika to provide the secretariat with the required political support and guidance.

2.1.3 Implementation and national committees

The institutional reform process also had significant implications for implementation and national participation. In the old SADC structure, the country-based sector co-ordinating units and commissions were responsible for resource mobilisation and implementation. This often implied strong national ownership and commitment. Under the new structure, each member state will be responsible for implementing SADC programmes and policies affecting their own country. To facilitate this, the amended treaty provided for the establishment of SADC National Committees (SNC) in each member country. In addition, a number of specialised regional subsidiary organisations (eg those bringing together public utilities in sectors such as energy or civil aviation) will also be charged with developing and implementing regional projects. The secretariat will provide assistance, support, and overall guidance and direction through regional policy frameworks.

All member states are obliged to establish such committees, which shall consist of all stakeholders. Apart from government, these are specified as the private sector, civil society, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and workers' and employers' organisations. The composition shall, according to the Treaty, reflect the core areas of integration and co-ordination (ie, the functions of the four directorates). According to the guidelines issued by the secretariat, the committees shall, inter alia:[11]

- provide input in the formulation of SADC policies, strategies and programme of action;
- co-ordinate and oversee the implementation of the SADC programme of action;
- promote and broaden stakeholder participation in SADC affairs in member states;
- facilitate information flows and communication between member states and the SADC Secretariat; and
- co-ordinate the provision of inputs for the development of the SADC Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) and monitor its implementation.

The early guidelines indicate that the national committees shall also deal with political and security issues falling under the OPDSC. However, there are diverging opinions in SADC about this at present. Thinking within the directorate servicing the OPDSC is that the national committees should not deal with such issues.

The national committees shall, according to the guidelines, have a steering committee and a secretariat. Furthermore, each national committee shall have subcommittees and technical committees, which may correspond to the directorates and its functions. Subcommittees and technical committees shall operate at ministerial and officials level although other stakeholders will also be involved at this level according to the guidelines issued by the SADC secretariat.

National committees had been nominally established in all member countries by 2005. However, in most countries they are still bureaucratic shells. Often they are nothing more than an interdepartmental working group serviced by the official contact point or focal point for SADC affairs, in most cases the foreign ministry. Most are yet to define their proper role and function, including how they should relate to stakeholders outside government. They may play a role in co-ordinating the positions of member states at SADC meetings, but have yet to define their role as an implementing agency. We also find that communication often continues to take place more effectively directly between relevant SADC directorates and line ministries or public utilities in individual countries.

Besides the national committees, SADC has also given birth to or facilitated the development of both permanent and ad hoc regional institutions. Some of these regional institutions may have a formal relationship with the SADC secretariat (often through an MOU giving them a legal subsidiary status). Some have even been turned into Treaty-based regional institutional delivery mechanisms. Others are autonomous, such as the parliamentary forum discussed above, or regard themselves as operating under the auspices of SADC. Many of these institutions play a formal role as delivery mechanisms and fulfill other important functions in implementing SADC policies.

Some of the strongest of these institutions can be found within infrastructure, based on associations of public utilities within energy, transport and communication such as the Harare-based Southern African Power Pool (sapp). Examples in other areas are the sadc Gene Bank (Lusaka), the Committee of Central Bank Governors in sadc (Pretoria), the Regional Tourism Organisation of Southern Africa (Midrand, between Johannesburg and Pretoria) and the sadc Development Finance Resource Centre (Gaborone). Within the area falling under the opdsc, a regional agency has been established with the Harare-based sadc Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre and in public security (policing) with sarpcco, also in Harare.

The implementation capacities of these regional institutions and agencies are sometimes robust, and their technical skills and capacities invaluable. The main bottlenecks have partly been insufficient provision of political guidelines and regulatory frameworks, and in some instances poor communication between the secretariat and the institution because of insufficient capacity within the secretariat.

While the secretariat has secured working relations with government departments, agencies and public utilities, both in member countries and at the regional level, the track record is at best more uneven in establishing relations with the private sector and civil society, or even parliaments. The secretariat appears to have been reluctant to engage with these groups, even though article 23 of the sadc Treaty enjoins it to do so. A lack of transparency and communication has been a feature of the institutional reform process. This has contributed to a situation where important stakeholders do not have sufficient ownership of the sadc project and are often ignorant about the community and its activities. This may have amplified the strong feeling of sensitivity and secrecy that often pervades the work of the secretariat. This is also reinforced by a tendency within the secretariat to refrain from communicating on particular issues until a final political decision has been made at the highest political level. This is most strongly pronounced where the opdsc is concerned, but is also very visible in other areas.

Some progress has, however, been made in improving relations with the private sector. The sadc Business Council, which brings together the important regional business associations, is now developing closer relations with the secretariat. Civil society, on the other hand, is still de facto kept at a distance, although working relations have been established in certain areas. ngo coalitions in sadc member countries have set up a sadc ngo council with a secretariat in Gaborone but it struggles to get access to the secretariat and in establishing a working relationship with the institution.

sadc still has a way to go before the appropriate institutional structures are in place. The foundations for a new sadc may have been established, but the institutional capacity to implement and deliver is not in place, and a number of obstacles will have to be overcome. Together with strong leadership, improved capacities at the secretariat will be required to accomplish the restructuring process begun in 2001.

The chief purpose of the restructuring, however, was to ensure a better regional approach, and a more sharply focused work programme. What policies and activities are emerging out of the restructured SADC?

3 Policies, strategies, and actions

Restructuring of SADC is complete only in a formal sense. A number of obstacles will have to be overcome before the proper institutional mechanisms are in place. Under the old SADCC structure, the work suffered from a lack of a proper focus, many of the activities were national development projects and did not really have any regional scope, and their implementation was at best uneven. The new SADC Treaty, adopted in 1992, attempted to give the organisation a new focus based on integration and good governance. Regional policies and guidelines for action were developed by adopting a series of protocols spelling out the aims and objectives for each sector or policy area, supplemented by less comprehensive declarations and MOUs in areas where no protocol had been developed.

SADC has put considerable effort into developing strategic programmes to ensure a proper regional focus for its activities. The main programme has been in the social and economic field with the development and adoption of the 2003 RISDP. This was followed by the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (SIPO), also approved in 2003.[12]

In assessing these documents and their ability to realign and refocus SADC policies and strategies, some issues are particularly important. Have RISDP and SIPO succeeded in giving SADC a proper regional focus for its activities? Have the two strategy documents managed to prioritise? What are the main obstacles and opportunities for implementation?

3.1 The Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP)

After much delay, RISDP was completed and approved in 2003. It identifies challenges and priorities in a wide range of areas, leading in turn to12 priority areas for intervention. The plan lists strategies and activities for each of these intervention areas. These are general and comprehensive, but do not provide SADC with clear regional and operational priorities. More guidelines to emerging priorities were developed through the 2004 RISDP Implementation Framework, which provides detailed implementation plans of 15 years, five years, and one year (2005–2006) for each of the four directorates. This was followed by the preparation, in the second half of 2004, of business plans for these directorates, a list of priorities, and ranking of existing and potential RISDP projects.[13]

The final approval of budgets and priorities may lead to some changes, but a fairly clear picture of SADC's intentions emerges from these documents, and is confirmed by interviews at the secretariat in February 2005. The overarching priorities for SADC over the next five years are as follows:

1. Integration of markets and economic development
   - trade facilitation mechanism
   - financial market integration
   - macroeconomic convergence
2. Infrastructure, including ICT
3. Statistics
4. Emergency services, including HIV/AIDS and food security

The intention is that all activities and projects shall be assessed according to these priorities, and how they contribute to SADC's overarching objectives. Furthermore, the documents make a distinction between 'soft' projects to be implemented by the secretariat and 'hard' projects to be implemented by member states and other regional institutions, where the secretariat will have only a monitoring and evaluation function. 'Soft' projects typically revolve around policy formulation, harmonisation and implementation; programme monitoring and implementation; and the co-ordination of regional integration. This often involves issues such as capacity building and institutional development, research, feasibility studies, and the like. 'Hard' projects are dominated by infrastructure and often include physical development such as transport networks, energy interconnectors, water resources, and IT infrastructure. 'Hard' projects will often relate to a subset of SADC countries, while 'soft' projects more often involve the whole SADC region.

SADC is in the process of finalising a priority portfolio of projects. Some 125 projects were identified and ranked in the current draft business plan from November 2004. Of these, 46 have been moved to a provisional priority list that, by February 2005, had still not been formally approved. The list comprises 15 'hard' projects and 31 'soft' projects. Fact sheets (project description, funding status, etc) have been developed for most of these priority projects. One of the 'hard' projects is particularly comprehensive and a rather special case: the spatial development initiatives (SDIs), or development corridors. The initiatives comprise a long list of different projects and different corridors, and fall within SADC's sphere of influence, but are developed and managed independently, primarily through the Regional SDI Support Unit, based at the Development Bank of Southern Africa in South Africa (see more below).[14]

These documents and emerging priorities show that the SADC secretariat is making serious efforts and progress in giving the organisation's social and economic agenda a sharper regional focus. The selected projects also correspond to overall priorities. Question marks may be attached to some of the projects, but overall the priorities convey an impression and image of regionalism and economic integration. Will SADC succeed in implementing these priorities? One obstacle is limited institutional capacity, which in particular could have an impact on the secretariat's ability to make progress on 'soft' projects. This ability presupposes strong directorates as well as functioning national committees (or at least strong focal points). Furthermore, the secretariat has very little capacity to monitor and evaluate project implementation, which is likely to cause delays in project planning, launching, and implementing. On the other hand, the number of projects is relatively small and the directorates, once fully staffed, should have sufficient capacity to oversee them.

The 'hard' projects partly struggle with a different set of problems. Where strong regional agencies or project management units are in place, implementation capacity may be stronger – particularly within certain areas of infrastructure. The main challenge is rather to develop proper regional policy frameworks which can provide clear guidelines for the development and implementation of projects. The directorates in the secretariat are critical to ensuring that such frameworks are in place. The energy sector is a typical example.[15] Several major projects in this area have been developed and implemented by regional agencies such as the SAPP, but these projects suffer from the absence of clear political guidelines and direction.

Capacity constraints will cause delays, but they can be overcome. The bigger challenge remains whether sufficient political will and commitment exist to ensure that SADC's ambitious social and economic objectives are achieved. Important insights into the obstacles and challenges facing the region are provided by SADC's trade policy, together with the implementation of its Trade Protocol, the promotion of its finance and investment strategies, and adoption of its Finance and Investment Protocol.

3.1.1 SADC's trade policy, and finance and investment strategy

When considering SADC's trade policy and finance and investment strategy, it is useful to situate this against the broad backdrop of its socioeconomic environment by examining some basic indicators and characteristics.[16] The countries of Southern Africa had a combined population of 211 million in 2003, and a gross domestic product (GDP) of US$230 billion. Of this, South Africa accounts for 70 per cent of the region's GDP. Economic performance varies widely across countries, reflecting the diversity of macroeconomic performance management. Recent economic performance has been sluggish, with real GDP growth at 2,6 per cent during 2000–2002, and improving slightly to 3,3 per cent in 2003 and 4,1 per cent in 2004. Per capita income has also deteriorated: in 2002, the average was US$812, down from US$1 004 in 2001. This is indicative of rising levels of poverty due the poor economic performance and this is associated, inter alia, with the debilitating effects of HIV/AIDS, the challenges of post-conflict reconstruction, malnutrition, unemployment, declining life expectancy, and low access to basic services and infrastructure. Zambia has the highest level of poverty with 86 per cent of the population estimated to be living below the poverty line, followed by Zimbabwe (74 per cent), Mozambique (69,5 per cent), Angola (67 per cent), Swaziland (66 per cent), Malawi (54 per cent) and Tanzania (51 per cent). Inequality within the region is also high, with a regional Gini coefficient of 0,58 (World Bank 2004:307ff).

Macroeconomic convergence has evolved unevenly in SADC. It has been faster among the five countries that make up the Southern African Customs Union (SACU, namely: Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland, and South Africa), and with the possible exception of Mauritius, has remained low for the rest of SADC countries. The average inflation for SACU countries in 2000–2003 was 8,2 per cent, compared with 46,5 per cent for non-SACU countries and 32,4 per cent for the region as a whole. Similarly, fiscal deficits are much lower among SACU countries at 1,6 per cent of GDP for 2000–2003, while the rest of SADC countries average 5,6 per cent. A number of countries, such as Mozambique and Tanzania, have been implementing economic reforms that have reduced inflation and fiscal deficits. However, there have been significant slippages in Zimbabwe, the DRC and Angola. Trends in the evolution of external debt show a similar picture of closer convergence within SACU and slow convergence among the rest. Mauritius and the other SACU countries (with the possible exception of Lesotho) have relatively low external debt ratios of below 25 per cent of GDP, while the remaining SADC countries have debt-to-GDP ratios of over 80 per cent, with Malawi being the most indebted country (World Bank 2004:153ff).

Economic activity in SADC is dominated by the services sector, which includes tourism, transport, and business services. In 2003, the sector accounted for 67 per cent of GDP, followed by industry and agriculture, which accounted respectively for 24 per cent and 9 per cent. The services (44 per cent) and agriculture (37 per cent) sectors are also the largest employers of labour.[17] The manufacturing sector accounts for a significant part of the economic base of South Africa, Mauritius, Swaziland, and although in rapid decline, Zimbabwe. Together with their agricultural and mining sectors, these countries produce most of the region's exports. The services and manufacturing sectors dominate the intra-regional import trade.

3.1.2 Trade integration

Trade integration is also erratic, with total intra-regional trade accounting for 22 per cent of SADC's total trade for 1999–2003. SACU countries, but particularly South Africa, account for a substantial share of intra-regional imports and exports. To compound matters, there is a disjuncture between trade and integration, both in regional and global terms. Although a number of countries now pursue export-oriented strategies as part of their economic reforms introduced in the 1980s and 1990s, intra-SADC tariffs remain high and uneven across countries. For example, Tanzania's exports to Zimbabwe face a tariff of up to 94 per cent. SACU presents an interesting case: while trade within it is fully liberalised, SACU as a whole has been highly protected. Although South Africa's average tariffs against other SADC countries are relatively low, ranging from 0 to 10 per cent, the tariff regime is highly protective of certain imports. For example, tariffs against other SADC countries range from 13–31 per cent for clothing, between 10-20 per cent for textiles, and between 49–100 per cent for food processing. This situation is exacerbated by negotiating bilateral agreements within the region that exclude others, such as that between SACU and a collective of Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia that allows for tariff-free access of textile products in SACU under a quota system.

Most of SADC trade is with the EU, the United States, Japan, and lately, increasingly with China. All SADC countries, including those in SACU, have large trade deficits with South Africa, principally because of South Africa's overall competitiveness but also due to its somewhat restrictive trade policies, for example, in the case of textiles and appliances. Much of the region still relies on primary exports, mainly agricultural and minerals, and are thus vulnerable to external shocks and vagaries of commodity prices. The challenge facing SADC is thus to diversify and increase intra-regional trade to levels similar to other developing country regional communities, such as in South America's MERCOSUR (el Mercado Comun del Sur, "the Common Market of the South") and Asia's Association of South-East Asian Nations, ASEAN. This will require that SADC countries deepen, harmonise and liberalise their trading regimes, while also seriously addressing the supply side constraints – particularly weak infrastructure, human capital, investment, and production platforms – that continue to impede intra-SADC trade.

Intra-SADC trade has benefited from the signing of the 1996 Trade Protocol, which came into effect in 2001. The objectives of the protocol are to:

- further liberalise intra-regional trade in goods and services on the basis of fair, mutually equitable, and beneficial arrangements;
- ensure efficient production within SADC reflecting the current and dynamic comparative advantages of its members;
- contribute towards the improvement of the climate for domestic, cross-border, and foreign investment;
- enhance the economic development, diversification and industrialisation of the region; and
- establish a free trade area in the region.

Given different levels of preparedness, a five-year special trade arrangement has been made that allows Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia to export textiles and clothing products under a 'single stage transformation' rule of origin into the SACU market duty free but, as noted, subject to quota limits. All other trade outside the special agreement will take place under the 'double stage transformation' rule of origin. Implementation of the protocol recognises the principle of asymmetry in order to reduce the negative trade balance other countries have with South Africa. Under this arrangement, SACU will phase down tariffs in eight years by 2008, while the rest of SADC will do so in 12 years by 2012. As such, non-SACU countries prepared two offers: one to South Africa and the rest to SADC. The SACU offer was made conditional in order to compensate the other members of SACU – Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland (BLNS) – which were liberalising their imports much faster than the other non-SACU countries. The offer was made conditional upon the BLNS countries being able to maintain the preferences they were enjoying in trading with non-SACU countries in SADC, even under other preferential arrangements not related to SADC. In pursuit of this, some of the BLNS insisted on getting enhanced market access for selected exports of significance to their economies.[18]

SADC is making some progress in its implementation but is lagging behind the set time schedules. In any case, the suggested target dates (free trade area by 2008, customs union by 2010 and common market by 2015) appear unrealistic. The design of the protocol and its implementation suffer from critical weaknesses that threaten to undermine potential benefits. In particular, the trade protocol has failed to ensure a phased elimination of non-tariff barriers (NTB). According to Hess, the most important NTB impediments are communication problems; customs procedures and charges; transport problems; lack of market information; lack of services such as financial, electricity and technical support; and standards and certification restrictions (Hess 2000). Some SADC member states are continuing to introduce such barriers, which undermine the credibility of the protocol and make it irrelevant in the eyes of traders and investors. The recently completed Mid-Term Review of the Trade Protocol – scheduled to be discussed by SADC in April 2005 – is a first important opportunity to address the critical implementation issues and shortcomings (Kalenga 2004).

A related challenge is the time and scarce resources SADC spends on responding to global developments and certain initiatives. This applies in particular to EU efforts to negotiate free- trade agreements with the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries through Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAS) by December 2007. (This will take place under the Cotonou Agreement which is the successor regime to the Lomé Convention, which governed trade and development co-operation between African, Caribbean and Pacific states for 25 years) (Lambrecht: 1999. From an EU perspective, EPAS are supposed to be vehicles for economic development and should promote the integration of ACP members into the global economy. They ought also to be compatible with WTO rules governing free trade agreements, and must cover substantially all trade, commonly understood to be more than 90 per cent of all trade.

SADC has not succeeded in taking a common stand in these negotiations. Member countries have pursued different interests and many have even opted to negotiate through the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and outside SADC. This has weakened SADC's integration agenda and undermined its ability to establish a SADC customs union.[19] Thus for purposes of EPA negotiations, SADC has been reduced to seven countries – the BLNS, Angola, Mozambique, and Tanzania. Some critics argue that this is symptomatic of the divisive nature of EPAs and that this shrinkage in numbers will have negative consequences for SADC's integration agenda, and further undermine it by reducing the policy and developmental space needed to address region-wide social and economic issues. The 'defection' of five countries with dual membership to COMESA has increased its ranks to 16 for purposes of EPA negotiations for which it has formed the eastern and southern Africa bloc. There are three major causes for concern about the lack of uniformity between the Southern and Eastern African configurations. First, neither of the two groupings has established a customs union nor have they fully implemented free trade areas. Second, in the SADC region, the BLNS countries form part of a customs union with South Africa that already has an agreement with the EU on free trade, development, and co-operation. Even though the BLNS countries were not part of the South Africa–EU negotiations, they have a common external tariff with South Africa, and thus the agreement is de facto between SACU and the EU. Third, most of the southern and eastern African countries are least developed countries (LDCs) and according to WTO rules, should not be obliged to conclude free trade agreements (Ochieng & Sharman 2005).

The most striking aspect of the SADC and COMESA groupings is that of the 23 countries that constitute them (and excluding South Africa), only seven are not LDCs: Botswana, Namibia, and Swaziland in SADC; Kenya, Mauritius, Seychelles, and Zimbabwe in COMESA. It is, therefore, doubtful whether full reciprocity will benefit LDCs and whether their economies are capable of standing up to the rigours and strains that trade liberalisation will impose on them.[20] Nevertheless, LDCs face a Hobson's choice: there are not many other options apart from negotiating EPAs with the EU. They could opt for the EU's Everything but Arms (EBA) initiative once Lomé trade preferences expire in December 2007. EBA extends duty-free, non-reciprocal access to the EU market to all LDCs, even those who are not signatories to the Cotonou Agreement. Accordingly such countries can export all originating products duty free and without any quantitative restrictions except arms and munitions and, over a transitional period, rice, sugar and bananas. In addition, there is no time restriction on the EBA initiative and preferences are set to last indefinitely. However, the EBA is not a contractual agreement but a special preference granted by the EU that could be withdrawn at any point and for whatever reason. Furthermore, the other ACP countries will then be placed on a level playing field with all LDCs, which could erode their current comparative advantage in the EU market (Stevens & Kennan 2005 and le Pere 2001).

Further complicating trade matters in SADC is America's unilateral African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) of 2000 which seeks to assist African countries in their regional integration efforts. It provides African countries with general duty and quota free access to the United States market and extends a general system of preferences (GSP).[21] The extension of AGOA to 2015 is widely interpreted as a United States attempt to lock African countries into a free trade agreement, not dissimilar to EPAs. In June 2003, the United States initiated discussions on a free trade agreement with SACU. Until these can be renegotiated, AGOA benefits are subject to highly restrictive eligibility criteria. These include establishing or making continuous progress towards a market-based economy; enacting legislation to protect private property; incorporating an open, rules-based trading system; minimising government interference through price controls, subsidies and public ownership. As a consequence, only 37 sub-Saharan African countries are eligible to export to the United States under AGOA. Although two-way trade between the United States and Africa has increased by 36 per cent in 2003, only a small number of countries such as South Africa, Angola and Nigeria have a large share of both imports and exports. Oil makes up the bulk of AGOA exports with Angola being the chief beneficiary. It is estimated that 85 per cent of non-oil AGOA exports to the United States originate in SADC in the form of textiles and clothing (the BLNS and South Africa), and automobiles, transport equipment, and agricultural products (South Africa) (Lee 2004). However, an assessment by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) questions the extent to which duty free access under AGOA has been a boon for African exporters and argues that there is no causal linkage between preferential tariffs and an increase in exports to the United States (UNCTAD 2003). In addition, the expiry of the Multi-Fibre Agreement this year means that the textile and clothing industries in China, India, and other Asian countries will be able to compete more freely with African products favoured by AGOA.

Whether a free trade arrangement between SACU and the United States will be more beneficial and less restrictive remains to be seen but the negotiations are bound to be long and arduous, and will challenge the ability of SACU countries to conduct technically and substantively complex multi-level negotiations. The menu of complicated and controversial negotiating issues will include 'US agricultural subsidies and trade remedies; government procurement; an investment agreement and associated dispute settling procedures; labour and environmental standards; and intellectual property rights' (Draper 2004:74). Besides the United States and EU, free trade agreements are also being contemplated between SADC and MERCOSUR, SADC and ASEAN, SACU and China, and SACU and India.[22] It strains the imagination whether such an intricate web of free trade agreements will be sensitive to the region's imperatives of poverty reduction, development, asymmetrical treatment, and differentiation.

Nevertheless, the sluggish implementation of the trade protocol, overlapping memberships in competing trade organisations, and the inability to take common positions in negotiations with third parties, does not necessarily imply that SADC member states are opposed to trade liberalisation and a deepening of economic integration. There may, however, be competing and different visions within SADC about the type of regional integration they wish to see. This is reinforced by the very wide differences between the member states in the size, structure, and strength of their economies.

SADC will at best move at a very uneven speed ('variable speed') in reaching the goals of integration, with some countries moving relatively fast towards realising them but others lagging behind ('variable geometry'). One scenario is a split of SADC on these issues, ending up with two or more economic groupings – one based on an expanded SACU, the other centred on one or two northern groups.

3.1.3 Financial integration and investment

The objectives of financial and investment integration are to accelerate movement towards regional macroeconomic stability and convergence through prudent fiscal and monetary policies. This includes providing a co-operative framework for finance; promoting the development of sound investment policies and encouraging savings; and stimulating investment flows and technology transfer. The targets set in the RISDP are very ambitious: increasing the level of saving to at least 25 per cent of GDP by 2008 and 30 per cent by 2012; increasing domestic investment to at least 30 per cent of GDP by 2008; finalising the legal and regulatory framework for dual and cross listing on the regional stock exchanges by 2008; and achieving inter-connection of payments and a clearing system by 2008.

A finance and investment protocol (FIP) has been under consideration for almost 10 years and is yet to be concluded. The key objective of the FIP is to establish a common market for facilitating the free movement of capital, labour, goods, and services. The FIP and the trade protocol are meant to be mutually reinforcing vehicles for regional economic integration. The FIP seeks to improve co-ordination between the finance and investment with a view to diversifying and expanding SADC's productive sectors, enhancing trade, and promoting development and poverty eradication. The protocol also covers institutional and administrative arrangements, and provides mechanisms for its implementation. The ICM plays a politically enabling role, while the committee of ministers for finance and investment, with the committee of central bank governors, are the key players in the implementation of the FIP, which is broadly based on the 'best endeavour' approach. The draft protocol consists of 13 MOUs that have been incorporated as annexes in the FIP. Annexure 3, for example, encourages member states to harmonise their tax regimes and to co-operate on tax matters. Importantly, Annexure 2 sets out macroeconomic targets for 'convergence'. These indicate that before 2008, public debt should fall below 60 per cent of GDP; current account deficits should reach an undefined 'sustainable' level; inflation should be down to single digits from 2004–2008, should be less than 5 per cent on average from 2009–2012, and should decrease to about 3 per cent during 2012–2018. In terms of implementation, a unit for macroeconomic monitoring and surveying target performance will be located within the secretariat, forming part of a monitoring and evaluation unit envisaged under the RISDP.

These challenges, therefore, anticipate an important role for the financial sector in mobilising long-term savings and channelling these into productive investment. Commercial banks are the most significant financial intermediaries in SADC. Other players in the financial sector include investment banks, insurance companies, leasing finance institutions, development banks, and the capital market. Foreign and state-ownership within the sector are very pronounced, though the private sector has made some inroads in recent years. Following financial-sector reforms that were introduced in the 1980s and 1990s as part of the overall structural adjustment programmes, noteworthy liberalisation of the sector has occurred. A number of South African banks have also made their presence felt in the SADC region, concentrating mainly on financial trade and investment rather than retail banking.

SADC has formed the committee of central bank governors to assist in broadening and deepening financial integration. The committee's mandate is to spearhead the harmonisation of financial-sector policies and ensure greater financial co-operation in the region, with an emphasis on enhancing the proficiency of payment systems of member countries and improving banking regulation and supervision.

The SADC Association of Stock Exchanges has been established as well, to promote dual listing procedures, reduce exchange control restrictions, and share information technology. SADC has also set up a regional Development Finance Resource Centre (DFRC), and the SADC-wide Development Finance Institutions Network made up of national development finance institutions (DFIs). The DFRC functions as the hub of the network and together with a proposed SADC Development Fund, would be critical for supporting DFIs in their efforts to address seriously and concretely the challenges of development and poverty reduction.

In relative terms, and compared to Africa's other regional economic communities, SADC has been successful in attracting foreign direct investment (FDI). Between 1999 and 2002, this amounted to US$22,1 billion, representing 44 per cent of FDI flows into Africa. South Africa has emerged as a critical 'growth pole' for attracting investment into the region, receiving US$10 billion in 1999–2002 (or 45 per cent of inflows into SADC and about 20 per cent into Africa).[23] Other major FDI destinations within SADC include Angola, Tanzania, and Mozambique. A distinctive development is the emergence of South Africa as a major investor in the region, especially in financial services, mining and quarrying, clothing and textiles, tourism, and retail trade in food and beverages (Grobbelaar 2004:98).The growth of FDI inflows into the SADC region reflects progress that has been made in removing investment restrictions and in attempts to create an environment that is conductive to a better functioning private sector. As a result, private-sector organisations such as the Association of SADC Chambers of Commerce, the Southern African Enterprise Network, and the Small Enterprise Advisory Council now play a key role in the processes of encouraging and promoting regional integration and co-operation.

Finally, SADC is striving towards establishing a common market by 2015, the overall goal of which will be to facilitate trade and financial liberalisation, competitive and diversified industrial development, and increased investment for more intensive regional integration and extensive poverty eradication. In this context SADC countries have all ratified the trade protocol, while paradoxically the FIP still lags behind. The preferred strategy in SADC is to begin with the free trade area, which is set to be implemented by 2008, and then begin negotiations to establish an SADC-wide customs union by 2012. It is hoped to bring about a common market by 2015. Using this logic, more than 85 per cent of products should be traded at zero tariff by 2008. In addition, the RISDP emphasises export diversification towards manufacturing and increasing intra-regional trade to at least 35 per cent by 2008. These objectives will be achieved by gradually eliminating tariffs, adopting common rules of origin, harmonising customs rules and procedures, removing non-tariff barriers, and liberalising trade in services. However, the ambition of a common market has to contend with a range of intractable constraints on regional integration in the SADC sphere. Therefore the long march to a common market will have to overcome numerous obstacles. These include the lack of macroeconomic convergence and stability; overlapping and contending regional memberships; the region's fragile social environment, including high levels of poverty and the HIV/AIDS pandemic; chronic food insecurity; political instability and poor governance; weak infrastructure linkages; and paralysing institutional constraints.

3.2 The Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (SIPO)

The RISDP was prepared under the auspices of the secretariat and written by a team made up of consultants and officials seconded from the secretariat and member countries. On the other hand government officials prepared SIPO by meeting under the auspices of the chair of the OPDSC. SIPO itself focuses on four sectors: politics, defence, state security, and public security. It identifies a series of objectives for each sector, listing 28 in total. For each objective, a number of general strategies and activities are given. Unlike RISDP, SIPO has not yet made major advances in operationalising its strategic goals and objectives.

The OPDSC has developed two additional policy documents. One is the Mutual Defence Pact, signed at the SADC summit in August 2003, which has not yet entered into force as only four countries had ratified it by the end of 2004. The other is the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections, approved by the SADC summit in August 2004.[24]

SIPO is comprehensive and covers a wide range of issues, but the objectives, strategies, and activities listed are very uneven. Some are broad and general while others are detailed. On the whole, the least developed objectives and activities can be found in the political sector, while the defence and public sectors contain more detail. The lines of division between the RISDP and SIPO are also unclear, especially regarding political and governance issues. This may also be the result of insufficient co-ordination and the different origins of the two strategy documents.

The OPDSC still has to operationalise, prioritise, and develop implementation mechanisms and business plans for its engagement with politics, defence, and security. In doing this, SADC has been and will continue to be confronted by the divergent political outlooks and priorities of its member states.[25] SIPO endorses a broad understanding of security through its focus on governance and democratisation issues as well as the 'hard' defence and security issues. However, behind the agreement we find divergent opinions and approaches to these issues. State security issues preoccupy some governments in the region, while others emphasise human security. Some favour a politico-military approach to external threats while others look to non-violent and diplomatic means. Governments have also adopted different approaches to dealing with internal challenges. The process of approving the mutual defence pact illustrates these tensions and differing approaches. The pact went through different drafts. The paragraph that delayed the document was the proposal that SADC member states would be legally obliged to come to the aid of a fellow SADC member in the case of a military attack by internal or external forces. The final pact was a significantly watered down version, which obliged a member country only to 'participate in such collective action in any matter it deems appropriate'.

Despite the lack of a shared outlook, the absence of a common enemy, and the insufficient operationalisation of its strategic documents, the OPDSC is making some progress on practical issues. Its work programme and priorities are de facto being shaped by some of the SADC institutions. The work on public security (policing) is strongly determined by the existence of SARPCCO, which is active in facilitating technical co-operation between police agencies in the region. The OPDSC's work is also influenced by the generally good technical co-operation between the defence forces in the region through the working groups of the ISDSC. Importantly, the OPDSC troika (and in particular its recent chair, South Africa) is actively attempting to move the OPDSC to the political centre stage and turn the OPDSC secretariat and SIPO into effective instruments.[26]

Three priority areas for the OPDSC may be emerging in addition to a strong South Africa-led engagement with the DRC. The major initiative revolves around peace support and efforts to operationalise the vision and plans of the AU to establish standby forces in each of Africa's regions. The OPDSC has decided to establish a SADC Peacekeeping Brigade as part of the AU standby force. Much effort has already gone into planning this brigade, building upon previous efforts by SADC to set up such a peace support capability. See more on this below.

Small arms are also receiving attention. SADC's protocol on fire arms has entered into force but regional efforts to facilitate implementation are lagging behind. The OPDSC secretariat has failed to set up the SADC Small Arms Committee, and regional activities have largely been left to SARPCCO, which has facilitated co-operation between national police agencies on some of the technical issues, using donor funds channelled through South African NGOs. SARPCCO and the OPDSC secretariat have not succeeded in establishing a working relationship, which has further weakened the implementation of the protocol. However, there is evidence of a renewed focus in the secretariat. Greater efforts in this area may flow from better resources and the presence of a technical advisor, funded by Deutsche Gesellshaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ, the German development agency), who took up the position in February 2005. Beyond this, the presence of SARPCCO suggests that technical co-operation in public security will continue to expand and deepen.[27]

A final area where more activity is envisaged – despite the shortcomings of SADC's engagement with Zimbabwe – is in the field of election monitoring and election institutions. Substantial work is required before SADC is in a position to proceed in any meaningful way with these guidelines. SADC is bound by its commitments and subject to political pressures but there is scope for further activities to increase its technical electoral capacities to assist member states. The August 2005 summit agreed to establish a SADC Electoral Advisory Council to advise SADC structures and member states. Further development may, however, require facilitation by other regional institutions, further operationalisation of the AU guidelines, and financial support from donors.[28]

SADC's ability to provide assistance in the DRC's forthcoming elections will be an important test of its capacity in this field. Most discussions have, however, centred on SADC's relations with Zimbabwe, and its handling of the polls there. The 31 March 2005 parliamentary elections were a first major test of SADC's resolve to give life to its 2004 guidelines for democratic elections. Zimbabwe did in fact use the guidelines, and incorporated several of them into its own law and practices. SADC also dispatched a 50-member delegation that began to arrive two weeks before the elections. The contingent concluded after the elections that although certain irregularities were observed, the election results basically reflected the will of the people. South Africa, which was chair of the OPDSC at the time and also chaired the SADC team, dispatched its own 20-member parliamentary delegation that basically reached the same conclusion.

The findings of the observer missions from SADC and South Africa were a disappointment to many outside observers.[29] This sense of let-down was reinforced by the unclear mandate of the SADC missions, delays and frustration in getting observer teams on the ground, and a general lack of enthusiasm for getting observers into Zimbabwe. SADC handling of the Zimbabwe crisis illustrates SADC's weaknesses in dealing with governance and democratisation issues: SADC has no enforcement mechanisms, is reluctant to put pressure on member states, and does not really know how to engage with blatant violations of its own rules and guidelines.

A final note must, nevertheless, be made on the relationship between SIPO and the RISDP. There is a need to define further the relations between them. This includes managerial and organisational issues such as the rationalisation of governing bodies, the proper integration of the administrative unit of the OPDSC with the rest of the secretariat, and clearly establishing the role of national committees (cf. the discussion in the previous section).

Most importantly, however, it requires more clarification of the relations between SADC's operational activities in the socioeconomic and political arena. This is especially evident regarding governance issues, where it appears that neither the RISDP nor SIPO are keen to intervene. SADC's implementation of the anti-corruption protocol is an example of an area which suffers from this reticence.

3.2.1 The standby force

The main advances of the OPDSC have been in the field of developing polices, plans, and capacities for establishing a standby peacekeeping force in the region, the SADC brigade. Under the leadership of the OPDSC chair and under the auspices of the ISDSC, military planners met regularly in 2004 and 2005 to work out the strategic details on force composition, training, finances, logistics, and operations.

Preparations to establish a brigade are directly linked to AU decisions. The AU protocol on the Peace and Security Council mandated the AU commission to establish an African Standby Force (ASF). The policy framework of the ASF was approved in July 2004. The standby force is to consist of standby brigades – incorporating a police and civilian capacity – in each of Africa's five regions (West, North, East, Central and Southern Africa).[30]

The approved AU framework provides guidelines for the composition of the five brigades; a plan for phased establishment; a brigade headquarters including a planning, preparation, and training institution (PLANELM); logistics and deployment timetables; and the development and implementation of a training plan. Furthermore, the AU also intends to expand and deepen relations with donor countries and agencies.

The OPDSC has prioritised the establishment of what it has termed the SADC Standby Force Brigade (SADCBRIG). In many respects, however, SADC's preparations predate the AU's current initiatives. In 1996 a Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC) was set up in Harare with extensive Danish financial and technical assistance. It was located within a military barracks next to the Zimbabwe Staff College. It nominally fell under the ISDSC, but was managed by the Zimbabwe ministry of defence. Its staff became multinational in 2001. A further major step was taken in 1999, when the ISDSC – following a 1998 SADC visit to Denmark and the headquarters of the Standing High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) – approved a plan for establishing a multinational SADC standby peacekeeping brigade. It was to be established over a period of five years, and required permanent headquarters to be set up. This plan was reiterated in the 2001 SADC protocol on politics, defence and security co-operation. The 2003 strategic plan for the OPDSC further specifies that it will develop the peacekeeping capacity of national defence forces and co-ordinate the participation of state parties in international and regional peacekeeping operations. Furthermore the OPDSC shall, according to SIPO, co-ordinate the region's involvement in peacekeeping missions and mobilise resources and enhance regional capacity for peace support missions.

The proposed SADC standby system is based on the concept of prior arrangement whereby total troops earmarked for participation in the various troop-sending member countries will provide sufficient capacity to ensure the full availability of a brigade at any one time. The SADCBRIG commander will then compose his/her force during mission planning and from the standby pool. All SADC member states have pledged contributions to the standby pool. This also includes Angola, which is contributes to the brigade in the Central African region as well, as it is a dual member of both regions. Tanzania and Mauritius also decided to stay with SADC and have withdrawn from the planned East brigade – both countries were originally classified by the AU as being part of the East Africa region.[31]

At the technical level SADC has also agreed to establish PLANELM.[32] The planning element is intended to manage the standby system and have responsibility for monitoring force preparation in member countries contributing troops. It will be based at the SADC secretariat, composed of staff on secondment from member states for a period of two years; the AU roadmap stipulates an initial staff requirement of five. The PLANELM would be required during a phase 1 to establish a regional standby force of up to brigade size. This force would provide military advice to political missions, and deploy military observer missions alone or with the UN, and should execute its tasks within 30 days of a mandate resolution. In the next phase SADCBRIG should develop the capacity to deploy a peacekeeping force within 30 days for chapter VI and preventive deployment missions, including peacebuilding.

In addition SADC has also decided to revive the RPTC, which collapsed de facto with the end of Danish support and funding in 2002. The RPTC is now being reconfigured as a SADC institution that will lead in providing training through courses, and as a facility for exchanging lessons learnt and sharing experiences. The centre will fall under the OPDSC and report to the SADC secretariat. An agreement to the effect that Zimbabwe will act as host institution has been signed. The first regional training courses under the new SADC RPTC were scheduled to take place in the second half of 2005.

There are several challenges in finalising and implementing the policies for a standby force, and already things are lagging behind the original timetable drawn up by the AU. One problem is related to establishing the planning element at the secretariat.

SADC decided at its council of ministers' meeting in February 2005 to freeze a number of positions, including those belonging to PLANELM. That decision implied that those posts should not be filled at this stage, but that they could be filled later.

That 'later stage' may be in late 2005 or much later. Considering that a head of the OPDSC secretariat has not been appointed, and that a recruitment and appointment process for both the secretariat and PLANELM is bound to take some time, one should not expect any immediate solutions or results.

Other challenges remain. A number of important dimensions needs further elaboration and require political decisions. One is how deployment of the SADCBRIG should be mandated. Another is the issue of securing funding. Neither SADC nor any of its member countries will be in a position to finance the costs of a mission for deployment. SADC also requires external funding for at least some of the costs involved in preparing and planning for the establishment of the force. External donors will probably be able to provide the required funding for planning and preparation, including training activities through the RPTC. The main precondition here seems to be for SADC to make the required decisions and provide some initial funding from member countries for some of the core staff positions. There may be some reluctance and hesitance relating to the RPTC because of its location within a Zimbabwe Defence Force compound, but such hurdles can be overcome. It will be much more difficult to secure funding for actual deployment and peacekeeping operations, partly because such operations tend to be extremely costly, and partly because such expenses cannot be classified as official development assistance as defined by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). New facilities will therefore have to be found. However, the new EU-funded peace facility, together with funding available for UN peace support missions, may provide at least some temporary solutions.

A final challenge must also be mentioned. The operational framework being developed by SADC and the AU is first and foremost a military approach. The documents make only brief and passing references to the role of civilian police or civilian actors in the standby force, and in their discussions of peacebuilding. This is somewhat surprising considering the prominent role of the police component and civil–military co-operation in the current peacebuilding efforts and in the debate about UN peace missions. On the other hand, the SADC's capacity in this area is very limited and it may be advisable to confine this to military operations and leave more complex and multifunctional areas to the United Nations.[33]

There is a related dimension to this strong emphasis on a military operational framework: the secrecy, sensitivity, and lack of information regarding SADC's work in this area. It is often much easier to access information about developments with the standby force taking shape in West Africa or East Africa. This may not be surprising considering SADC's tradition, culture, and style of operation, but it runs counter to the aspiration and the intention of SADC's institutional reform programme which calls for greater openness and improved collaboration with civil society and external partners.

4 Conclusion: advancing co-operation, and challenges ahead

SADC is an old institution – it turned 25 in 2005 and is thus one of the oldest regional communities on the continent. But SADC is still very much a regional community in the making. It has progressed rapidly at the formal levels of policies and agreements, but its institutions are still weak and the organisation has not made significant advances in the implementation of protocols and regional decisions.

In 2001, SADC approved an ambitious programme for a major overhaul of the organisation. Through institutional reform SADC hoped to be able to establish a more efficient and effective head office and secretariat which could provide stronger leadership, ensure a more regionally focused programme of action, and close the gap between policies and implementation.

4.1 Achievements

The conclusion emerging from the discussion above is that the institutional restructuring has only been completed in a very formal sense. SADC has successfully managed to close down the decentralised and country-based sector co-ordinating units, the head office secretariat has been expanded, re-organised and strengthened, and new governing structures have been put in place. In 2005 the organisation is thus expected to be in a better and stronger position to address the major development challenges facing the region. However, there are still major shortcomings and weaknesses. The SADC secretariat – the engine room of the organisation – is still a weak institution and is struggling with bureaucratic inefficiencies, shortages of staff, and limited capacity to monitor and propose policy solutions. The re-organisation is taking much more time than expected and – at best – the secretariat will be fully operational only sometime in 2006. The institutional reform process has also been characterised by a lack of transparency, poor communication, and a failure to engage properly with key stakeholders in civil society and the private sector.

The secretariat has also been expanded to provide administrative support to the OPDSC. This unit remains particularly weak and it will take some time before it is in a position to provide strong support to SADC's work in this area. The division of labour, co-ordination, and communication between the SADC secretariat's work in the social and economic field and in politics and security are also particularly weak and undeveloped.

The restructuring of SADC was not intended to increase the political power and authority of the secretariat. The secretariat is still in a legal sense an administrative unit, with all policy decisions being made by its governing structures. Because SADC has a hierarchy of such structures, one problem is duplication and an unclear division of labour between its two parallel governing structures – one for social and economic issues and one for political and security issues.

A second and far bigger challenge stems from the fact that SADC decisions are based on the principles of consensus. SADC's governing structures do not have supra-national decision-making powers and have no real enforcement powers if a member country fails to adhere to or implement a decision. This has also contributed to a situation where the leaders of the organisation – the two SADC troikas – have been unable to provide strong leadership.

The new restructuring has facilitated the emergence of specialised regional implementation bodies outside the secretariat, but they labour under insufficient political frameworks and guidance from the secretariat. The efforts to set up implementation mechanisms in member countries through SNCs have so far been only partly successful. While SNCs have been established, in most cases they have not emerged as efficient national vehicles for a deepening of regional co-operation and integration.

SADC has, however, made a number of important decisions in establishing a programme of action that can be implemented, and which will help the organisation forge a stronger regional focus and ensure prioritisation. The two key documents are the RISDP, covering social and economic issues, and the SIPO. These documents attempt to address many of the key challenges facing the organisation and its vision of promoting a development community.

The emerging social and economic programme of action is based on the overarching objective of deepening economic integration through trade liberalisation and financial integration. The secretariat has succeeded in drawing up work programmes to ensure a stronger regional focus and prioritisation. The implementation of policies still lags behind and the move towards economic integration is progressing at an uneven and slow pace. This is a reflection of overlapping memberships in competing trade organisations and the inability to take common positions in negotiations with third parties. The poor implementation may also reflect competing and different visions within SADC about the type of regional integration members wish to realise and make manifest.

By comparison, the operationalisation of SIPO has been desultory at best. SADC still has to operationalise, prioritise, and develop implementation mechanisms for its engagement with politics, defence, and security. In doing this SADC will be confronted by the divergent political outlooks and priorities of its member states.

The operationalisation of RISDP and SIPO also suffers from insufficient attention to a number of overlapping areas. This relates in particular to a number of governance issues, with the implementation of SADC's anti-corruption protocol being a major example.

4.2 Moving forward?

For SADC a key challenge is to become more effective and to begin to close the gaps between protocols and implementation, between rhetoric and action. SADC is in a better shape to do so in 2005 than 2001 – the foundations have been laid through institutional reform and through the process of identifying key priorities for action and intervention. For this potential to be realised, it is crucial that the political will and commitment from member states are transformed into strong and unequivocal support for SADC and underpinned by the progressive implementation of its regional co-operation and integration agenda under the RISDP and SIPO. Will this be forthcoming?

The OPDSC and its track history illustrate these challenges. For SADC to move forward in the governance and security fields there may be lessons to be learned from the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The institutional mechanisms and toolboxes used by the OSCE in pursuing particular goals are also highly relevant to any efforts to operationalise the OPDSC and its strategic plan. A main lesson from the OSCE, however, is that although organisational development and institutional reform are important requirements, they are far from sufficient preconditions for effectiveness. Institutional reform cannot replace political commitment.[34]

It can reasonably safely be concluded that there is the required political support for the SADC project from the member states. However, the support and commitment are probably much stronger from some of SADC's original core members such as South Africa than from some of more recent members. Core member countries such as Mozambique, Botswana, Zambia, Mauritius, and South Africa are deeply concerned about the organisation. They appear to be taking a strong interest in the restructuring and would like the reform process to be successful. This is also emphasised by their generally very strong participation at SADC summits.

However, the basic political commitment to SADC also masks the often very different political outlooks and interests among member countries, and the huge disparities in development challenges in the region. There is an absence of common political positions and common values among member states which impacts on the ability of SADC to develop common policies and unified approaches. This is also very evident in the two main issues discussed above – economic integration and political-security integration – where member states may not share the same perspectives about the desired path to integration.

In particular, member states are reluctant to give up some of their national sovereignty for a future common good. The SADC summit and the meetings of its governing bodies are still primarily 'talking clubs' where political leaders meet and exchange views, rather than supranational decision-making organs. The secretariat itself remains small and characterised by bureaucratic paralysis, with little power or resources to implement regional decisions, and its capacity to research and propose policy solutions is limited. Outside the arena of formal institutions and policies, the level of integration leaves much to be desired: the level of SADC identity among the populations of the region is underdeveloped – many are not even aware of SADC – and intra-regional trade is negligible.

SADC's future crucially depends on the role of South Africa as the regional power. South Africa has remained strongly committed to SADC, but has struggled to translate this into action.[35] This may partly be the result of its search to define its proper role as a regional power. Nevertheless, multilateralism is emerging as a strong component in its Africa policy. The limited capacity of South African government departments is another problem, which has also become evident with the country's strong emphasis on making the AU and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) more effective and results-oriented. This has reduced its capacity to engage with sub-regional issues. On technical aspects, several South African government institutions, perhaps especially the Development Bank, have played and are continuing to play an important role. A final issue to be mentioned is the often limited co-ordination between government institutions. Many South African government departments and agencies have engaged with SADC, but the lessons learnt from this may not have been sufficiently processed and translated into coherent policy responses and solutions.

A renewed South African commitment may now be emerging, as illustrated by both president Thabo Mbeki's state of the nation address in February 2005 and its strong focus on the OPDSC during its tenure as chair.[36] A successful outcome will also to some degree depend on the extent to which South Africa manages to build an alliance with other SADC member states. Its potentially strongest political allies here remain Mozambique, Botswana, Zambia, Mauritius, and Lesotho. Namibia and Angola, on the other hand, have not been equally close, and in the case of the former this may have some impact on the activities of the OPDSC now that it has taken over as chair, although South Africa will remain part of the troika for another year.

A final note should also be made regarding the role of NEPAD. The partnership has a range of activities, which occur at the continental, regional and national levels.[37] Do they undermine and weaken or do they reinforce and strengthen SADC's programmes and projects? NEPAD formally relies on SADC and the regional economic communities for implementation. Although there was an element of 'institutional rivalry' between the SADC and NEPAD secretariats, mechanisms to facilitate communication, dialogue, and a division of labour are now coming into place. More importantly, SADC's new strategies and emerging programmes of action (RISDP and SIPO) are harmonised with the strategic plans and priorities of NEPAD and the AU. NEPAD's 'comparative advantage' and areas where it may assist in moving SADC forward include, firstly, its role as continental advocate and fundraiser. It is in a better position to negotiate with the world, sensitising it to African problems, and in identifying external blockages to development and mobilising external funding for major programmes. A second area where NEPAD interventions may help SADC is its role as an agent of pressure on national governments. Its chief instrument here is the African peer review mechanism and its ability to address governance issues. This work is potentially of great benefit in assisting the OPDSC's efforts to operationalise its strategic objectives, especially in relation to politics and governance issues. NEPAD's important contribution in the sphere of peace and security – it spawned the idea of the AU's peace and security council – may be less relevant in the sense that SADC is already relatively far advanced in developing policies for peacekeeping and peace building. It should also be added that NEPAD and the AU are far ahead of SADC in developing modalities for engaging with civil society, and for securing transparency and good communication.

The final and most challenging area is the relationship between SADC and NEPAD in developing and delivering social and economic development projects. An interesting pattern is developing at the level of project development and implementation. NEPAD is not an implementation agency, but it is becoming fairly efficient as a facilitator and planner. NEPAD has been strong in bringing in other specialised agencies and consultancy companies to offer solutions and provide project proposals. In some areas they have been far more efficient than SADC. This includes, in particular, priority areas such as information and communications technology where SADC still has to engage effectively, or in areas where it currently has weak capacity, such as tourism or higher education and research. In the field of trade and financial integration, on the other hand, NEPAD has left most activities relating to Southern Africa to SADC. The closest interaction appears to be in the field of infrastructure development, particularly in the transport and energy sectors. SADC submitted its proposal – basically a list of old and new SADC projects – to NEPAD for inclusion in NEPAD's continent-wide Infrastructure Short-term Action Plan (STAP) from 2002. NEPAD picked some of these for inclusion in STAP.[38] For these priority projects NEPAD is expected to be able to provide additional resources and facilitate fast-track implementation, with the African Development Bank acting as the lead agency. A similar development is taking place relating to the 'spatial development initiatives' (SDI) or development corridors, which are highlighted and prioritised in both NEPAD and SADC documents. The development of SDI projects is essentially run by South Africa's Development Bank (see more on SDIs in the section on RISDP above).

The SADC/NEPAD interaction has helped to fast-track some priority projects. However, the current status of the projects also illustrates familiar constraints. Among these, the capacity to implement remains a bottleneck, and the contributions of these projects to regional economic development suffer from the absence of clear policy guidelines and regional frameworks.

The future of SADC seems open and contingent, on the basis of a range of reflective considerations in this paper about SADC, its historical genesis, and contemporary institutional and political evolution. That future will depend critically on how it manages the multiple agendas relating to its integration imperatives, and security and governance challenges. However, the sparks that will create the necessary impulses for a successful SADC originate in its foundational values as a development community. As Vale has observed, 'the notion of Southern Africa – like the notion of Europe – is a single and indivisible one'.[39] How SADC's future as an indivisible region evolves will ultimately be determined a number of factors. First is the will and leadership of its members; second, the extent to which democratic pluralism becomes embedded in and across countries; third, whether a strong coalition of members and societies emerges which can drive the SADC project. Lastly, there is the extent to which policy learning and institutions become consequential in improving the quality of life of the region's citizens.

Annexure 1: SADC's institutional structure

Major institutions



The SADC Secretariat



Explanation

The SADC **Parliamentary Forum** is recognised as an autonomous institution of SADC, but it has no legal standing of functional relationship to the secretariat or summit.

The SADC **Tribunal** is an autonomous legal body that deals with matters referred to it by the summit of the council for adjudication and advice. The protocol providing for the tribunal's establishment has been ratified, but it has not yet been established.

The **Sectoral Committee of Ministers** was abolished with the establishment of the Integrated Committee of Ministers (ICM). The ICM has since mandated the re-establishment of certain sectoral committees to facilitate improved communication. The new committees have no legal mandate or status.

Regional Institutions and Associations in this figure comprise a range of often very different institutions. Some are fully-fledged SADC institutions established by the previous SADC sector co-ordinating units (such as the Lusaka-based SADC Plant Genetic Resource Centre, the Regional Tourism Organisation based in South Africa or the Drought Monitoring Centre in Harare). Others are more independent, but operate within SADC's sphere of influence, such as the many regional bodies bringing together public utilities in the region (eg the Southern African Power Pool in the Harare) or other public agencies (eg Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-ordination Conference in Harare). Some are ad hoc institutions established to carry out regional projects (such as facilitation of cross-borders development corridors). Some are expected to become an implementing agency once the relevant protocol has entered into force (such as the Gaborone-based SADC Development Finance Resource Centre). The most recent SADC institution is the Harare-based SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre which falls directly under the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation.

The SADC **Committee of Ambassadors and High Commissioners** in Gaborone is a new body to be set up following a decision by the Council of Ministers in February 2005. It has no legal status, but shall facilitate communication between the Secretariat and member countries.

Endnotes

1 The first report was entitled Proposed strategy for regional NORAD support to promote good governance in Southern Africa and was finalised in October 2003.

2 Compare the overview and analysis of the history of SADCC in Mandaza & Tostensen 1994 and Lambrecht 2001: 17–28.

3 Not much has been written about the Frontline States but see the account of the FLS and the liberation of Zimbabwe (Thompson 1986) and especially an unpublished Ph.D. dissertation on the rise and decline of the FLS (Omari 1991). Some of Omari's arguments are also available in his paper on FLS regional security (Omari 1995). See also the background chapters in a paper published by the Institute of Security Studies on the prospects for a security community in southern Africa (Ngoma 2005).

4 Compare parts 4 and 5 in The IGD Guide to the Southern African Development Community 2001 for a presentation of the protocols and work plans of each of the sector co-ordinating units and commissions (covering the period up to the year 2000). All legal instruments and information about their status can be downloaded from the SADC homepage (www.sadc.int).

5 Elaborated in Ramsamy's paper on the way forward for SADC (Ramsamy 200: 33-41). See also the discussions on the SADC human regional development report (SADC 2000) and on political economy in the region (Lee 2003); and an assessment of SADC restructuring (Isaksen & Tjønneland 2001).

6 See the Report on the Review of Operations of SADC Institutions March 2001, n.pl. (Gaborone): n.publ. (SADC Secretariat), April 2001.

7 At the August 2005 summit, Tomas Augusto Salamao of Mozambique succeeded Prega Ramsamy as executive secretary. Salamao previously held two cabinet positions: minister of planning and finance, and minister of transport and communications. His new deputy is Joao Samuel Caholo of Angola, who served as director of SADC's energy commission.

8 Information related to the meeting of the council of ministers in February 2005 is derived from the homepage of the SADC secretariat (www.sadc.int).

9 South Africa has been succeeded by Namibia as chair of the OPDSC for 2005/06.

10 The SADC parliamentary forum maintains a particularly informative website, www.sadcpf.org.

11 Compare the SADC secretariat's Draft Guidelines on SADC National Committees (n.d. (2001)). The draft guidelines were approved by the council of ministers meeting in August 2001.

12 These two documents have been published and can be downloaded from the SADC homepage. See Southern African Development Community. Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan, n.pl. (Gaborone), n.publ., (SADC), n.d. (2003), (xviii + 150 pages), and Southern African Development Community. Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation, n.pl. (Gaborone), n.publ. (SADC), n.d. (2003, but only released a year later), (86 pages – the document also includes the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation, and the Mutual Defence Pact).

13 These documents are all unpublished and restricted. They are: SADC Secretariat. 2004. RISDP Implementation Framework (178 pages); Deloitte & Touche. November 2003. Business Plan for the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Directorates and Units; and Imani De-

velopment. December 2004. Scoping, prioritisation and ranking of existing and potential SADC RISDP projects, Final Report (98 pages + annex 3-4 in separate files). The last document was prepared for the SADC secretariat and the Development Bank of Southern Africa.

14 For a full presentation of the regional spatial development initiatives see the official website of South Africa's SDI support programme.

15 See of these issues of reforming and integrating the SADC power sector are discussed by Margareth Matinga Njiramba in Pooling African power: Issues, developments and outlook of a reforming and integrating Southern African power sector (Nirajamba 2004). Much information was also provided by Tore Horvei, chief executive, Southern African Development Through Electricity (SAD-ELEC), a consultancy company with particularly close working relations with the main actors and stakeholders in the energy sector in the region.

16 See also Endjala R and Tutalife C. 2004. Macro-economic Trends in SADC. In Hansohm D et al. (eds).

17 See The Official SADC Trade, Industry, and Investment Review, Southern African Marketing co. (Pty.) Ltd., 8th edition, 2004.

18 For an insightful and informed discusssion, see Kalenga P. Implementation of the SADC Trade Protocol: A Preliminary Review. In Hansohm D et al. (eds). 2004: 17-28.

19 See also the discussion in M Meyn. Are economic partnership agreements likely to promote or constrain regional integration in Southern Africa? In Hansohm D et al. (eds). 2004: 29-58.

20 For an extended treatment of this argument, see: UNECA. 2004. Africa Economic Report 2004. New York: UNECA. See also Rodrik D. 2001. The global governance of trade as if development really mattered. UNDP.

21 Last year George Bush signed the AGOA Acceleration Act of 2004 (AGOA III) which extends the benefits of AGOA from 2008 to 2015 (AGOA I: 2000-2004; AGOA II:2004-2008). AGOA III also provides preferential access to 4650 product categories by adding 2458 product categories.

22 For a useful analysis, see Lewis JD et al.. 2002. Free trade agreements and the SADC economies. In The World Bank: Africa Region Working Paper Series 27.

23 UNCTAD. 2004. World investment report: The shift towards services. New York, Geneva: United Nations. South Africa's investment regime is carefully analysed in: Vickers B. 2003. Investment Policy in South Africa: Performance and Perceptions. CUTS/IGD Discussion Paper.

24 Both are available from the SADC website (www.sadc.int).

25 See also the discussions of the OPDSC in Solomon H (ed). 2004. Towards a common defence and security policy in the Southern African Development Community. Pretoria: Africa Institute, especially the contribution by Hammerstad A. on pages 211-44: Is SADC heading in the wrong direction? Two approaches to Security Integration for Southern Africa. Compare also Nathan L.2004. The absence of common values and failure of common security in Southern Africa, 1992-2003. London: Crisis States Programme, Development Research Centre, LSE (Working Paper Series No 1, July). See also another article by Hammerstad A. 2003. Defending the state or protecting the people? SADC security integration at a crossroads. Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA Report No 39). See also van Schalkwyk G and Cilliers J. 2004. Civil society and the SADC security agenda. In Hansohm D et al. (eds). 106-130. The recent major study by Naison Ngoma (2005) argues strongly that a regional security community is being established in SADC by examining common goals and objectives as they are

outlined in protocols and policy documents. He pays limited attention to the institutional and implementation issues discussed here.

26 See also the report from a policy advisory group meeting on South Africa's role as chair of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security, hosted by the Centre for Conflict Resolution at the Burger's Park Hotel, Pretoria, 30 November 2004 (rapporteur: Guy Lamb).

27 See more on the implementation of the small arms protocol in Gould C and Lamb G (eds). 2004. Hide and seek. Taking account of small arms in Southern Africa. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.

28 Compare also a background discussion in Matlosa K. 2005. SADC's electoral guidelines: what's new?. Global Dialogue Vol. 10 1: 15-17.

29 See here also the report from the International Crisis Group, Post-election Zimbabwe: What next? (Africa Report No 93, 7 June 2005). The report includes a review of all the major observer groups.

30 The key AU document here is the Roadmap for the operationalisation of the African standby force, from the experts' meeting on the relationship between the AU and regional mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution, Addis Ababa, 22-23 March 2005 (EXP/AU-Recs/ASF/4(I)). This section also draws on Cilliers J and Malan M. 2005. Progress with the African Standby Force. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies (ISS Paper 107, May 2005) and de Coning C. 2004. Towards a common Southern African peacekeeping system. In Solomon H (ed). 183-196.

31 The AU still has to clarify its position in cases of overlapping memberships or where it remains unclear in which region a particular country belongs. The AU is supposed to build on the regional economic communities, but the boundaries of these communities do not always correspond with the AU's own geographical demarcations. Furthermore, there are many overlapping memberships in the regional economic communities.

32 See also papers prepared for SADC's first conference on defence and security co-operation in Maputo 6-7 December 2004, eg Challenges, strategies and approaches for enhancing SADC's relationship and response to the African Standby Force.

33 This contrasts with an important June 2005 policy document from NEPAD that strongly emphasises the need to bring all actors together. See NEPAD secretariat, governance, peace and security programme. 2005. African post-conflict reconstruction policy framework. Midrand: NEPAD (Available from www.NEPAD.org).

34 See also Møller B. 2004. NATO, the OSCE, and the AU: role models for Africa In Field S. (ed) Peace in Africa. Towards a collaborative security regime. Johannesburg: Institute for Global Dialogue.

35 See also Alden C and Le Pere G. 2003. South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy – from reconciliation to revival. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies (Adelphi Paper 362).

36 See also page 19 of Department: Foreign Affairs, Strategic Plan 2005-2008. (Available from www.dfa.gov.za).

37 The literature on NEPAD is huge. NEPAD maintains an informative homepage (www.NEPAD.org) and a good introduction to the debate and issues is provided in South African Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 11, 2004, No 1 (a special issue on NEPAD).

38 See a presentation of SADC's original proposals with a progress report in SADC Today, Vol. 7, 2004, No 5 (December). NEPAD's STAP and progress report on implementation can be downloaded from www.NEPAD.org.

39 See Vale P. 2001. Dissenting tale: Southern Africa's search for theory. In Vale P, Swatuk L, and Oden B (eds). Theory, Change and Southern Africa's Future. Hampshire: Palgrave.

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