



Summary of the Policy Forum on South Africa and the Responsibility to Protect

Pretoria, 6-7 July 2015

Compiled by Faith Mabera

**GLOBAL CENTRE
FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY
TO PROTECT**



associated with
UNISA | 
university of south africa



**international relations
& cooperation**
Department:
International Relations and Cooperation
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA



© Institute for Global Dialogue, 2015
Published in November 2015 by the Institute for Global Dialogue

Institute for Global Dialogue
3rd Floor Robert Sobukwe Building
263 Nana Sita Street
Pretoria
Tel: +27 12 337 6082
Fax: +27 86 212 9442
info@igd.org.za
www.igd.org.za

All rights reserved. The material in this publication may not be reproduced, stored, or transmitted without the prior permission of the publisher. Short extracts may be quoted, provided the source is fully acknowledged.



CONTENTS

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATION	1
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	2
BACKGROUND TO THE POLICY FORUM	2
PARTICIPATION OVERVIEW	3
1. PERSPECTIVES FROM SOUTH AFRICA	4
2. AFRICA'S PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE	8
3. PERSPECTIVES FROM OTHER EMERGING POWERS	9
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS	10
ANNEXES	
Agenda	11
List of Participants	12
About the Institute for Global Dialogue	13



LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATION

ACIRC	African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises
AFISMA	African-led International Support Mission to Mali
AMISOM	African Union Mission to Somalia
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
ASF	African Standby Force
AU	African Union
CEWS	Continental Early Warning System
DIRCO	Department of International Relations and Cooperation
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
GCR2P	Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
GPPI	Global Public Policy Institute
ICC	International Criminal Court
PSC	Peace and Security Council
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADPA	South African Development Partnership Agency
UNSC	United Nations Security Council

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Institute for Global Dialogue, the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect and the Department of International Relations and Cooperation held a policy forum in Pretoria on the 7th of July 2015 on the theme of 'South Africa and the Responsibility to Protect.'

The policy forum was part of several initiatives led by the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect to engage the governments of emerging powers in understanding their positions on the Responsibility to Protect as well as their role and commitment towards the development of the emerging norm of the Responsibility to Protect or R2P.

The policy forum comprised about 30 participants including senior government officials from the Republic of South Africa, academics and representatives of various civil society organisations and think tanks in the region. The aim of the policy forum was to facilitate a comprehensive examination of the prevention of mass atrocities in the context of South African domestic and foreign policy. Participants deliberated on challenges in mobilizing capacities to build resilience to atrocities in a national context as well as engage in regional and international efforts to respond to atrocity situations. The forum also explored possible measures to strengthen South Africa's commitment to the prevention of mass atrocities, as well as an exchange of ideas amongst participants about how emerging powers can continue to engage in the development and implementation of R2P. In light of the fact that September 2015 marks 10 years since the endorsement of R2P by states at the 2005 UN World Summit, a retrospective analysis of South Africa's R2P agenda could not have come at a more opportune time.

BACKGROUND TO THE POLICY FORUM

The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect is engaged in a program of work aimed at building partnerships with emerging powers. Over the last three years the Global Centre has developed relationships with the Foreign Ministries and Permanent Missions to the UN of South Africa, Brazil and India on issues related to civilian protection and mass atrocity prevention. This engagement has included mutually beneficial and policy-relevant discussions to examine the individual and collective roles of emerging powers in the development and implementation of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P).

The role of emerging powers in the prevention of mass atrocities and the implementation of R2P has generated substantive discussion in recent years. This is a symptom of an increasingly important trend in global affairs: the growing international clout of these emerging powers. As power in the global arena continues to become more diffuse, countries like South Africa, Brazil and India will play an increasingly critical role in the maintenance of international peace and security, which includes responding to inter- and intra-state crises where populations are threatened by the commission of mass atrocities. This is particularly evident for South Africa, which, as a leading regional power, is translating its growing clout to greater global influence.

PARTICIPATION OVERVIEW

Launching the forum, *Amb. E.M Saley* spoke on behalf of the office of the Director General of the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO). He noted that the policy forum was timely and important in view of 2015 marking 10 years since the endorsement of R2P by world states. He acknowledged that the annual informal debates on R2P have helped in the cascading of the norm and in mainstreaming it at the UN and regional levels. Politically, Amb Saley highlighted the importance of guarding against the abuse of R2P for the narrow self-interests of a very few.

Delivering the keynote address, *Dr Simon Adams*, Executive Director of the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (GCR2P), pointed out that the policy forum coincided with the 20th anniversary of the genocide in Srebrenica which saw more than 8000 Bosnian boys and men systematically annihilated and buried in mass graves. He highlighted the fact that mass atrocities are a human evil that are not going away sooner hence the paradox of our lives: the world's population has never been wealthier yet the number of people displaced by conflict has never been higher. The civil war in Syria has been ongoing for 4 years and has produced 230 000 casualties, 8 million IDPs, and 4 million refugees. Iraq has become an extension of the Syrian situation and we can add Nigeria, South Sudan, Central African Republic and many other hot spots to the growing list of conflicts perpetuated by sectarian poison.

Dr Adams remarked that in spite of numerous challenges, in the 10 years since R2P was adopted in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, the international community has strengthened the methods and means to undermine the politics of the machete, the death squad and the mass grave, and as we churn the way forward for R2P, we need to note the reminder that we are experiencing a period of increased instability in the international system, the United Nations Security Council is a 20th century organisation tackling 21st century problems. Syria has exposed the weakness of the UNSC especially when it comes to vetoes, so what is needed is a revised UNSC structure and a statement around the use of the veto in situations where mass atrocities are being committed.

Reflecting on the overall health of R2P 10 years later, Dr Adams made several notable observations:

First, we have won the battle of ideas and the universal consensus around R2P shows that we have moved beyond abstract ideas and made the global South versus global North debate redundant as far as R2P is concerned. However, we still need to guard against misuse and abuse and to remember that we are not immune to failure. The real issue remains how to support states in meeting their responsibilities of sovereignty as responsibility and the most appropriate means of implementation.

Second, prevention remains the cardinal point of R2P. Individual states need to invest in institutional preparedness and early warning for instance in 2008 and 2013 Kenya saw reduced widespread violence as a result of engagements in prevention through constitutional change, local peacebuilding initiatives by civil society. Important lessons can be drawn from Kenya for the Eastern African region and beyond.

Third, relevant to the post-2015 development agenda, we need to understand the role of development initiatives in the fight against poverty and resource distribution as a structural catalyst for violence and mass atrocities.

Fourth, strengthening human rights structures locally can help feed into R2P. The Human Rights Council in Geneva is a smoke detector than a fire extinguisher as such we cannot understate the indispensable role of local and regional early warning systems in atrocity prevention.

Fifth, he noted that the Global network of R2P focal points, consisting of 47 states, is a key initiative in the war against mass atrocities. He expressed concern that South Africa has not appointed an R2P focal point ambassador yet and urged the government to look into the matter.

Sixth, in relation to peacekeeping and protection, there is need to see an improvement in our ability to expeditiously respond.

Finally, the international community needs to amplify engagement on rebuilding states in the aftermath of atrocities.

In conclusion, Dr Adams reiterated that all the fights that are worth fighting involve long-term battles such as the fight against apartheid, battle against impunity and also the fight against mass atrocities. R2P is here to stay, because it remains a broadly accepted political tool to protect people. However, R2P will only remain as effective and as powerful as practitioners make it. The onus thus remains on us: A norm cannot implement itself.

Key themes

The panel discussions were focused on three key themes:

- Perspectives from South Africa
- Africa's Peace and Security Architecture
- Perspectives from other emerging powers

1. PERSPECTIVES FROM SOUTH AFRICA

1.1. South African Foreign Policy – 20 years- its role in conflict prevention, management and mediation in the continent: *Dr Siphamandla Zondi , Institute for Global Dialogue associated with Unisa*

Dr Zondi raised the point that as the world deliberates the sustainable development goals in 2015, what comes to the fore once more is the importance of security for development. In contextualizing R2P in South Africa's stream of history, one makes reference to Mandela's proclamation that human rights would be the lone star that guides South Africa's foreign policy. At the core of this truism is the African agenda, the notion that South Africa's destiny is inextricably linked to the African destiny and that the vision was a better, peaceful, progressive and prosperous Africa.

South Africa is part of Africa, not by choice but by manifest geographical positioning. Furthermore, South Africa's destiny is inextricably linked to that of the continent writ large. As such the African agenda as a key tenet of SA foreign policy can be deemed as the pinnacle of its role and identity as an African powerhouse. The commitment to Africa's agenda can be seen in South Africa's tenure on the UNSC where it has actively pursued key issues pertinent to the African continent such as the advocacy for UN reform; the return to multilateral rules-based governance set on pursuing universal principles such as promotion of human rights, democracy, justice and the international rule of law; and the key ingredient of legitimacy around the institutions and mechanisms that are meant to implement these universal principles. South Africa's role in promoting R2P can also be seen in its two terms on the UNSC where it focused on cooperation between the UN and regional and sub-regional organisations, particularly the AU.

Another key issue for South Africa is development assistance, which has largely been driven through the African Renaissance Fund. Although the proposed South African Development Partnership Agency, SADPA is yet to become functional, SA's provision of development assistance in areas such as post-conflict reconstruction and development, technology transfer, peer learning etc has shown that Africa is indeed the sphere of its influence.

South Africa has often aligned itself with Common African positions; an idea which is useful particularly for those states seeking to stake a claim of leadership in African interests. The question arises: is there a common position on R2P? Can South Africa and other African powers rely on Article 4(h) as the sole equivalent of R2P on the continent, notwithstanding the fact that Article has a provision, which is contingent on the adoption by the Assembly?

The trouble with concepts that intersect international law and international justice is that such notions are dependent on interest; sustained momentum for review of relevance and the drive to dominate a cross-sectoral agenda. On the sidelines of the 2015 AU summit, the Al-Bashir/ICC issue illustrates the complexity of these issues, SA found itself in a precarious position, whether to violate the controversial ICC stance which was unpopular among AU circles or to violate the AU position of non-cooperation with the ICC. At the end of the day South Africa chose to side with the AU; and while the legality of its position is still a subject for debate, the challenge has remained how to resolve the issue of adherence to the Rome statute and the ICC and how to deal with impunity.

Therefore in an effort to answer the question of what Africa and South Africa's role is in promoting R2P, one answer would be to strengthen the regional, continental and international justice mechanisms to enable them to act without fear or favour and hence see to it that the ICC is the last resort rather than the first resort. Practically, in order to unpack South Africa's contribution to the development of R2P as an emerging norm; one must look to government and foreign policy practitioners for answers.

1.2. South Africa and R2P: *Adv. Doc Mashabane, DIRCO*

South Africa's engagement with R2P can be traced to the role it played in the transformation of the OAU to the AU.

Under Mbeki, South Africa promoted the embrace of a security culture that saw the continental body shift from a culture of non-interference to one of non-indifference. Consequently, South Africa played a central role in the crafting of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) including the PSC which has the authority to oversee continental engagements under the premise of R2P. In the build-up to 2005, South Africa was instrumental in garnering African states' support for endorsement of R2P at the World Summit.

More recently, it was through South Africa's shoveling that the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis (ACIRC) was formed in May 2013. The ACIRC was envisaged as a military capacity with high reactivity to respond swiftly to emergency situations upon political decisions to intervene in conflict situations within the continent.

On the UN Security Council, South Africa has also called for more effective partnership between the UN and regional organisations. As chair of the UNSC in January 2012, South Africa oversaw debate that led to the adoption of Resolution 2033 of 2012 which urges for enhanced cooperation between the UNSC and sub-regional organisations, particularly the African Union (AU), in peace and security matters. South Africa is also party to the Ezulwini Consensus of 2005 which highlighted the empowerment of regional organizations' intervention in urgent conflict situations with *ex post facto* UNSC approval.

The hosting of the policy forum in South Africa, with the participation of government officials is a major indication that South Africa is cognizant of the importance of R2P as an emerging norm in international affairs and remains keen in the promotion of the norm in line with its foreign policy principles and priorities.

1.3. Africa's experience of implementation of R2P: *Dr. Adekeye Adebajo* , *Center for Conflict Resolution*

Dr Adebajo's discussion focused on the role of two regional hegemony in Africa, namely South Africa and Nigeria, and their implementation of pillars two and three of R2P.¹

R2P is not new to Africa and has been practiced by states like South Africa and Nigeria and promoted by prominent statesmen and scholars. Indeed the African experience of R2P can be referenced to the truism that we should be our brothers' keeper. The AU is one of the few regional organisations that have explicitly enshrined R2P in its founding documents. Article 4 (h) of the AU's Constitutive Act indicates 'the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.

¹ *Pillar two*: The international community has a responsibility to encourage and assist states in exercising their responsibility to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. *Pillar three* : The international community has a responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other means to protect populations from these crimes. If a state is manifestly failing to protect its population, the international community must be prepared to take collective action to protect that population, in co-operation with regional organisations and in accordance with the UN Charter.

Reference was made to the 2011 UN Secretary-General's Report on R2P, *The role of regional and sub-regional arrangements in implementing the responsibility to protect*, in which the Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon called for collaboration between regional organisations and the UN in the implementation of R2P. South Africa and Nigeria have pushed for enhanced collaboration between regional and international organisation in peacemaking and peacekeeping missions such as Burundi, Darfur and Somalia.

Dr Adebajo pointed out that Nigeria has shown more willingness to use force in the implementation of R2P than South Africa, indeed in Nigeria we have seen 3 military leaders pursue *Pax Nigeriana* whereas in South Africa, *Pax South Africana* has been pursued by Presidents Mandela, Mbeki and Zuma.

Nigeria's active contribution to peacekeeping has placed it as the 9th largest contribution to UN peace missions with troops deployed in ten UN peacekeeping missions and the AU mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Nigeria has also been the biggest provider of military resources for the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). Of particular note are the Nigeria-led interventions in Liberia (1993) and Sierra Leone (1999) under General Babaginda and Abacha respectively. Adebajo contends that these interventions were a timely opportunity for Nigeria to showcase its 'responsibility to protect' and play the role of big-brother to its younger African siblings. In both instances, the success of the interventions was heavily dependent on Nigeria's military and despite arguments around the motivations and credibility of the interventions; Nigeria was well on the path of practically demonstrating what an African-led R2P intervention entailed. Under President Olusegun Obasanjo, Nigeria also sent troops to the AU mission in Darfur 2004 until the UN took over in 2007. Recently in 2013, Nigeria sent troops to the The African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA), however in recent times; Nigeria's military zeal for peacekeeping has been hampered by domestic challenges particularly the fight against terrorist group Boko Haram.

On the part of South Africa, the Mandela doctrine was a key moment for South Africa's norm entrepreneurship role when Mandela stated in Ouagadougou in 1998 that 'Africa has a right and a duty to intervene to root out tyranny...we must all accept that we cannot abuse the concept of national sovereignty to deny the rest of the continent the right and duty to intervene when behind those sovereign boundaries, people are being slaughtered to protect tyranny.' Mbeki followed suit in his pursuit of the African Renaissance, demonstrating his innate understanding of the notion that every man is a keeper of his brother. More recently, under President Zuma, South Africa sent troops to DRC as part of the SADC intervention to root out M23 forces in eastern DRC. The move sent out a strong message that the international community can muster strong countervailing forces to protect civilians. Overall, South Africa has been less reluctant to employ force, preferring an approach premised on conflict resolution through political dialogue and negotiation.

Both Nigeria and South Africa voted for Resolution 1973 allowing for the intervention in Libya but in the aftermath of Libya and the deliberations around the Syrian crisis, both have expressed caution against selective application of R2P and called against misuse and abuse of the norm in the interests of powerful states. Overall, the emphasis has drawn back to the role of regional organisations in the implementation of R2P and the pivotal role envisaged for Nigeria and South Africa.

In conclusion, an examination of Africa's experience and implementation draws out several key points. One, more effective peacebuilding interventions are needed in view of realising the prevention aspect of R2P. Two, more effective cooperation between regional organisations and the UN means that the emphasis should be on burden-sharing rather than burden-shifting in a bid to incentivise African states to commit blood and treasure in the protection of populations on the African soil. Three, the implementation of R2P in Africa has been happening without necessarily being termed as R2P which brings up the question to what extent the norm has been institutionalised in African institutions and structures.

2. AFRICA'S PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

2.1. African Stand-by Force, African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC) and the role of African Union Peace and Security Council; Representative DIRCO

The AU's mechanisms and institutions pertinent to peace and security matters are encapsulated in the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) which consists of five pillars namely The Peace and Security Council (PSC), the Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the African Standby Force (ASF), and the Peace Fund. The PSC is the 'standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution

of conflicts. It is mandated to anticipate and prevent conflicts; promote peace, security and stability and recommend intervention to the Assembly in the event of grave circumstances.

The African Standby Force (ASF) was envisaged to be the culmination of collective security, providing the AU with military deployment in peacekeeping operations and to conduct interventions in line with Article 4 (h) of the AU Constitutive Act. The ASF is yet to become operational due to a number of challenges including lack of clear operational guidelines on how Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms (RMs) are to manage and deploy ASF operations. Furthermore, the ASF has been heavily reliant on external donor funding which casts doubt on the extent to which there is African ownership.

As a result of the dysfunctionality of the ASF, the idea to create ACIRC was brought up in 2013, as a way of beefing up the AU's rapid deployment capacity. The idea behind ACIRC is that it would be a voluntary initiative with troops sourced from willing member states. The mandate of ACIRC would cover stabilization, peace enforcement and intervention missions; neutralization of terrorist groups, other cross-border criminal entities, armed rebellions; and emergency assistance to member states within the framework of the principle of non-indifference for protection of civilians.

There have been concerns that the ACIRC is essentially a duplicate of the ASF and that too much focus on it will derail ongoing efforts to ensure that the ASF realizes full operational capacity. The challenge across the board has remained that of funding, with the AU's heavy reliance on foreign donors for its peace and security budget. There is need for the AU to re-examine its institutions particularly those concerned with peace and security and to streamline and manage effective working relationships with the RECs and RMs.

2.2. How to strengthen the relationship between UNSC and AU PSC in preventing future mass atrocities, challenges and opportunities, Representative DIRCO

Various initiatives have been made towards strengthening the partnership between the two bodies including yearly consultative meetings between the AU PSC and the UNSC, collaboration on capacity building through the 'Ten Year Capacity Building Programme for the AU', desk to desk exchanges and meetings between the bureaucracies of the two

institutions, establishment and expansion of UN representation to the AU through the UN Office to the AU, coordination between senior leaders of relevant departments through the Joint Task Force.

However several challenges continue to militate against an effective working relationship between the UNSC and the PSC. These include lack of coherence around the division of labour and lack of clarity on the burden sharing in the running and implementation of peace support missions (PSOs).

Addressing these and many more challenges would mean that greater emphasis is placed on African ownership and priority setting, including the recognition of the principle of subsidiarity around consultative decision making, burden-sharing and division of labour. It is also important to take into account the principle of comparative advantage, that African sub-regional and regional organisations are better positioned to act first to conflict hotspots on the continent.

The AU was played off against the League of Arab States regarding the Libya situation – The competition and disunity among regional organisations complicate matters as the P5 opt to shop for proposals and initiatives that serve their interests best. The complementarity aspect needs to be emphasized in a bid to improve coherency and limit competition.

Reporting is also crucial: the PSC should introduce concrete recommendations to the UNSC for circulation among Council members. Linked to this is the recommendation that both Councils should appoint Joint AUPSC/UNSC envoys who will be able to take the lead in fact-finding missions in possible areas of deployment for peace operations and R2P-based interventions.

3. PERSPECTIVES FROM OTHER EMERGING POWERS

Mr Gerrit Kurtz, GPPI

The achievements of the international community in the advancement of R2P inspire a profound sense of humility.

Analysis of the perspectives of different emerging powers on R2P reveals nuances in their approach based on a range of considerations including distinct histories, identities and interests in a multi-polar world. For instance China has focused more on the first pillar of R2P which puts an emphasis on the notion of sovereignty as responsibility. Brazil's emphasis has been on Responsibility while protecting. Emerging powers have been apprehensive about the employment of force and the tacit linkages with notions of regime change and imperialism that come with it.

What is more important is to move away from the focus on 'the West versus the Rest' debate and focus more on the debates that matter. Two key themes are relevant in this regard, one is the matter *responsible protection* (guarding against misappropriation of R2P) and the other is *effective protection* (the 'how' of implementing R2P). Ensuring the fulfilment of both responsible and effective protection will require deeper engagement across the board involving governments, institutions, civil society and academia as there are no tried-and-tested answers.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Responsibility to Protect has come a long way since its endorsement at the 2005 World Summit. Essentially, the battle of ideas has been won; no state can challenge the principle that the international community has an obligation to protect populations faced with mass atrocity crimes. We must be on the guard to ensure that R2P is not misappropriated and left open for abuse and misuse.

At the end of the day, given the lessons learned from Rwanda and Libya and many other cases, R2P cannot implement itself as a norm, its core tenets can only be as strong and as effective as policy makers and practitioners make it.

Several recommendations emerged from the Policy Forum:

1. South Africa has an indispensable role to play in the advancement of R2P. Government should look into the appointment of a R2P focal point to join the Global Network of R2P focal points.
2. In the African context, the implementation of R2P can be enhanced through strengthening of regional organisations and examination of the institutionalisation of R2P in the various structures. One way of doing this is through the re-iteration of the notion that every African is his brother's keeper.
3. The ICC has an important role to play in the prosecution-protection agenda. International justice is a central part of the battle against impunity and atrocity crimes. A resolution of the impasse between Africa and the ICC is imminent in ensuring that perpetrators of atrocity crimes are prosecuted and that the ICC is not doomed to be politically dead in Africa.
4. Measures should be taken to ensure that the relationship between the AUPSC and the UNSC are built around principles of complementarity, subsidiarity and comparative advantage. There should be less *burden-shifting* and more *burden-sharing* when it comes to protection from mass atrocities.
5. Africa and South Africa should not be caught up in old debates about sovereignty but should focus more on working with the rest of the international community towards realising *effective* and *responsible* protection.

ANNEX 1 : AGENDA

Day 1: Monday, 06 July 2015

Venue: DIRCO, OR Tambo Building, Soutpansberg Road, Pretoria

18:00: Welcome Reception

Day 2: Tuesday, 07 July 2015

Venue: DIRCO, OR Tambo Building, Soutpansberg Road, Pretoria

09:00 Arrivals and Registration

09:30 Opening remarks: *Amb E. Saley*, COO, DIRCO
Opening: **Dr. Simon Adams**, Executive Director, Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Opening remarks: **Dr. Siphamandla Zondi**, Executive Director, Institute for Global Dialogue associated with Unisa

10:30- 10:50 **Setting the scene** Key note: R2P AT 10: Opportunities and Challenges,
Dr. Simon Adams, Executive Director, Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect

11:00- 13:00 Chair: Dr Siphamandla Zondi
Perspectives from South Africa
- South African Foreign Policy – 20 years- its role in conflict prevention, management and mediation in the continent

- South Africa and R2P
Adv. Doc Mashabane, DIRCO,

- Africa's experience of implementation of R2P
Dr. Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Center for Conflict Resolution

13:00- 14:30: Lunch

14:30- 16:30 Chair: Savita Pawnday
Africa's Peace and Security Architecture
- African Stand-by Force, African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC) and the role of African Union Peace and Security Council
Representative, DIRCO African Union Desk

- How to strengthen the relationship the between UNSC and AU PSC in preventing future mass atrocities, challenges and opportunities
Representative, DIRCO

16:30-17:00: Perspectives from other emerging powers, **Mr Gerrit Kurtz**, GPPi

17:00-17:30: **Way forward and concluding remarks**

End Programme

ANNEX 2 : LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

Adebajo Adekeye, CCR
Doc Mashabane, DIRCO
Sedwyn Anthony, DIRCO
Fadl Nacerodien, DIRCO
Yandisa Mpumza, DIRCO
Keneiloe Komane, DIRCO
B Maharg, DIRCO
Molieli Sehloho, DIRCO
Stephen Mtsoane, DIRCO
Nti Mxalo, DIRCO
Lulama Phlumeni, DIRCO
Savita Pawnday, GCR2P
Simon Adams, GCR2P
Gerrit Kurtz, GPPI
Ntandazo Sifolo, Isisele Confidential Consultancy
Faith Mabera, IGD
Andrea Royeppen, IGD
Philani Mthembu, IGD
Naledi Plaatjies, IGD
Lona Gqiza, IGD
Wayne Jumat, IGD
Francis Kornegay, IGD
Sanusha Naidu, IGD
Yu-hsuan Wu, SAIIA
Rudolf Du Plessis, SAIIA
Japhta Makgwakgwa, SANGOCO
Natalie Zahringer, WITS
Anthony Bizos, University of Pretoria
Martin Rupiya, UNISA
Lehlogonolo Leshalabe

ANNEX 3: ABOUT THE INSTITUTE FOR GLOBAL DIALOGUE



The IGD is an independent foreign policy think tank dedicated to the analysis of and dialogue on the evolving international political and economic environment, and the role of Africa and South Africa. It advances a balanced, relevant and policy-oriented analysis, debate and documentation of South Africa's role in international relations and diplomacy.

The IGD strives for a prosperous and peaceful Africa in a progressive global order through cutting edge policy research and analysis, catalytic dialogue and stakeholder interface on global dynamics that have an impact on South Africa and Africa.

3rd Floor Robert Sobukwe Building
263 Nana Sita Street
Pretoria South Africa

PO Box 14349
The Tramshed,
0126
Pretoria South Africa
+27123376082
+27862129442
info@igd.org.za
www.igd.org.za