



south africa in the un security council 2011-2012

A Report on the Government-Civil Society Strategy Dialogue



international relations
& cooperation
Department:
International Relations and Cooperation
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA



Compiled by Lesley Masters



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South Africa in the UN Security Council 2011-2012: A Report on the Government-Civil Society Strategy Dialogue.

Preparation for South Africa's 2011–2012 United Nations Security Council Non-Permanent Seat

OR Tambo Building, 460 Soutpansberg Road, Rietondale, Pretoria
18 November 2010

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Published in March 2011 by the Institute for Global Dialogue

ISBN 978-1-920216-30-6

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Printer: Business Print, Pretoria

Images: Clix and D. Kritsotakis

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This publication was made possible by generous support from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Funds at the UK High Commission in Pretoria.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), the Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD), and the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) co-hosted a Strategy Dialogue on 18 November 2010 in Pretoria, in preparation for South Africa's tenure as a non-permanent member of the UNSC for 2011–2012.

Following the election of South Africa (by 182 votes) for a second term on the UN Security Council, the Strategy Dialogue, which brought together key members of government and civil society, drew out critical reflections on South Africa's first term and considered policies, strategies and responses for the country's second tenure. As the international environment in which international actors operate is ever-changing, there needs to be an appreciation of both the opportunities and challenges for a non-permanent member of the UNSC. In addition, cognisance needs to be taken to ensure that there is an informed view in the analysis of South Africa's positions within the Council.

1. SETTING THE SCENE: REFLECTIONS ON SOUTH AFRICA'S TENURE 2007–2008

As South Africa begins its second term as an elected member of the UNSC, Session One of the Strategy Dialogue provided the opportunity for reflections on as well as analysis of the country's tenure in 2007–2008. This allowed for discussion on the actions and challenges associated with the positions South Africa adopted, in particular the controversial votes on Myanmar and Zimbabwe, as well as South Africa's position on the resolutions on rape, climate change and Lebanon.

The importance of communication in effectively setting out government's positions was a key point of debate. Here it was noted that while an effort was made, towards the end of the first term, to brief the domestic constituency through regular media briefings, there continues to be a shortfall in the focus on communication not only at a governmental level (the mission, head office, the Minister and the Presidency), but with civil society and the media. The challenges in relaying the official message to

South Africa's domestic constituencies has often left the government in a position where it is playing catch-up and reacting to the backlash from the 'rhetorical war of words'.

In addition to communication, South Africa's experience on the Council points to the importance of coordination in support of Pretoria's role. As the UNSC recognises only the President and the Foreign Minister as the official representatives of the state, the relationship between these principals and the Mission is pivotal. Moreover, divisions within South Africa's own society will necessitate better coordination in developing a common position from which to pursue interests and principles as the country seeks to project itself internationally.

While there has been ardent criticism of South Africa's role in the UNSC during 2007–2008, it needs to be remembered that Pretoria did play a positive role in linking the UNSC with regional organisations, particularly the African Union (AU). Promoting the Africa agenda remains a central component of South Africa's foreign policy, and the continent has demonstrated its support for South Africa in its rapid return to the UNSC. Nevertheless, divisions remain between Pretoria and some of Africa's states on positions adopted. Questions have also been raised concerning the coordination between South Africa and other members of the UNSC, particularly in addressing the internal power plays of the P5, and especially the P3, in affecting issues on the UNSC agenda. The development of a better understanding of the workings of the Council by both government and civil society is important in positioning South Africa as a responsible global citizen.

2. TOWARDS SOUTH AFRICA IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL 2011–2012

As South Africa undertakes its second term as a non-permanent member of the UNSC its position will be informed by the key pillars of foreign policy as well as a focus on the objectives of the peaceful resolution of conflicts, maintenance of international peace and security, and the stabilisation of post-conflict situations, particularly on the continent. To this end more attention needs to be given to Chapter VI of the UN Charter (Pacific Settlement of Disputes), particularly in supporting pre-emptive action in international peace and security. This will be imperative as a number of critical issues appear on the UNSC agenda, including Sudan, Somalia, the DRC, Western Sahara, and the Middle East (Syria, Lebanon). In addition, the country will face the issues of nuclear proliferation, counter-terrorism, Kosovo, and UN reform, as well as thematic debates on the agenda of the Council, which will have a particular impact on Africa.

While the UNSC offers South Africa an opportunity to play a part in shaping the international peace and security agenda, expectations of what can be done, and what can be achieved, need to be moderated. The challenge will be how to position the country as a responsible actor within the context of its own principles and interests (short, medium and long-term) and within the confines of the UNSC mandate. South Africa's tenure also comes at a time of growing 'interpolarity', or 'multipolarity in an age of interdependence', and challenges to multilateralism itself through the coalitions of interested parties. Yet opportunities exist in the composition of the Council and South Africa's simultaneous occupancy of a position within the UNSC and the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security, and on the AU Peace and Security Council.

Since 2007-2008 there has been an emphasis on the improvement of communication, internal coordination, and interface with civil society. However, caution needs to be exercised in over-emphasizing the communication problem and painting it too narrowly as weak messaging by government. The challenge is also the very nature of decisions taken and how they are arrived at. Other important challenges include the building of issue-based alliances and partnerships, especially those that do not tilt the balance between the promotion of south-south cooperation and the leveraging of north-south relations. The pursuit of the African agenda will benefit from the strengthening of strategic bilateral relations with key African powers and an interface with African civil society. South Africa will also have to enhance its technical capacity to make good use of working groups and the complex working methods in the Council.

LIST OF ACRONYMS

ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU	African Union
AUPSC	African Union Peace and Security Council
BASIC	Brazil, China, India and South Africa
BRIC	Brazil, Russia, India and China (since January 2011 BRICS, which includes South Africa)
CAR	Central African Republic
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
DFA	Department of Foreign Affairs (former name of the DIRCO)
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DIRCO	Department of International Relations and Cooperation
E10	Elected 10 (of the UNSC)
EAC	East African Community
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council (UN)
FTA	free trade agreement
GDP	gross domestic product
G77	Group of 77
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IBSA	India, Brazil and South Africa
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGD	Institute for Global Dialogue
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
OPDSC	Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (SADC)
P3	Permanent Three (France, UK, USA)
P5	Permanent Five (China, France, Russia, UK, USA)
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAIIA	South African Institute of International Affairs
TDCA	trade, development and cooperation agreement
UN	United Nations
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UK	United Kingdom
US(A)	United States of America

INTRODUCTION

On 12 October 2010, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), with 182 votes out of a possible 190, elected South Africa as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) for a period of two years beginning on 1 January 2011. Along with South Africa, Colombia, Germany, India and Portugal were also elected to serve on the Security Council for the same period. Preceding the UNGA vote, both the African Union (AU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) had endorsed South Africa's candidature for the vacant seat reserved for the African continent in the United Nations Security Council for 2011–2012. As evident from South Africa's first tenure on the Security Council (2007–2008), which saw a number of instances of controversy, membership presents both opportunities and challenges.

Embarking on a second period as a non-permanent member of the Security Council within such a short time will place the spotlight on the country's foreign policy and international actions as well as create expectations from both domestic and international audiences. On the one hand, membership brings with it the opportunity to play an enhanced role in contributing to international peace and security, especially in Africa. On the other hand, the country needs to be cognisant of the responsibility and challenges that face members of the Council in being at the forefront of the international community's efforts to resolve some of the most pressing issues on the international agenda. For the period 2011–2012, these will include, amongst others, the holding of a referendum in Southern Sudan, debates on the Iranian nuclear programme, the deteriorating situation in Somalia, the fluid situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question, and the imminent draw-down or exit of key UN peacekeeping operations. In addition, the country is expected to chair at least one subsidiary body and serve as a lead nation in one of the country-specific issues on the agenda of the UNSC.

It is within this context that the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), the Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD), and the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), convened a Strategy Dialogue on 18 November 2010, in preparation for South Africa's tenure as a non-permanent member of the UNSC for the following two years.

SOUTH AFRICA AND THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL IN PERSPECTIVE

In his opening remarks, Dr Ayanda Ntsaluba, the DG of DIRCO, noted that with South Africa returning as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council within a relatively brief period of time, given that the country was there in 2007–2008, the significance of an early return needs further reflection. In addition, Dr Ntsaluba indicated that questions should be asked regarding the motives for such an early return and how, as a country, South Africa can justify the confidence of those countries that supported South Africa's tenure. As such there needs to be an appreciation of the challenges the country will face and how these challenges will be navigated.

As this is the second time the country will hold a non-permanent seat, the point of reference will be the country's role in the Security Council during its first term (2007–2008). This legacy has received significant attention, although there is not one single view that characterises it, nor will there be a single view following the conclusion of South Africa's second incumbency in December 2011. What needs to be ensured is that there is an *informed* view in determining the successes and shortfalls in South Africa's international positions. It was indicated that in order to ensure that the foreign ministry has a good sense of its own view on South Africa's conduct during 2007–2008, a review of the process has been completed and produced. As the country moves forward it was posited that there is a need for further reflection on the existing analysis, considering how it will inform the future. The Director General went on to highlight that the global environment in which we engage is dynamic and as such there will be changes and new developments that will impact on our positions. For example, within a few days of assuming the seat, South Africa will be confronted with the outcomes of the referendum in Sudan, where the challenges will be stark and real, and South Africa will be expected to take a position.

It was noted that the value of this *Strategy Dialogue* is in its focused approach, allowing for an open exchange between the Department and civil society stakeholders on the opportunities and challenges that will confront the country in the coming two years. This follows from the Department's own inter-departmental consultation (during November 2010) aimed at bringing greater alignment to the work of Government as it assumes its seat.

Not only had there been discussion within and between government departments already, but a Heads of Mission Conference scheduled for February 2011 was expected to discuss South Africa's approach to the Security Council, drawing on P5 missions and the other countries

represented on the Security Council. Of particular importance would also be the coordination between the New York Mission and Head Office. Consultations with members of the Security Council also began after the vote. It was noted that the Minister would be in New York in December 2010 to consult with Council members, especially other African states, that will serve in the Council together with South Africa. All this activity was intended to ensure that South Africa acquit itself well, with due importance attributed to ensuring open discussions with key stakeholders.

Dr Ntsaluba went on to indicate that the context within which South Africa will fulfill its mandate will differ from that of 2007–2008. Indeed, the country will simultaneously be Chair of the AU Peace and Security Council. During 2007–2008, South Africa's focus was on the alignment between the Security Council and the regional organisations, especially the AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC). This remains central in South Africa's current engagement in the Security Council.



REFLECTIONS ON SOUTH AFRICA'S TENURE 2007–2008

This session was predicated on the basis of reflections by a senior diplomat and a foreign policy analyst, using this to discuss issues and perspectives that have come to define analyses of South Africa's first tenure in the UN Security Council. The presentations and discussions that followed reflected in detail on the challenges confronted in 2007–2008 and the lessons learned.

SOUTH AFRICA IN THE UNSC 2007–2008: AN INSIDER'S APPRAISAL

Ambassador Dumisani Kumalo, the former South African ambassador to the UN and current Special Representative to the Great Lakes, emphasised that as we assume our position as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, it is necessary to reflect on the lessons learnt during the period 2007–2008. There are ten points that will be used in guiding the thoughts and reflections of a practitioner engaged as South Africa's representative at the UN. Our record of conduct during this period is in the public domain and open to debate. In the first instance the obvious needs to be stated. Occupying a position on the Security Council is a serious responsibility not to be taken lightly. The gravity of this position is particularly apparent when you are sitting there as representative of the country. Joining the Security Council, which has been functioning non-stop for the past sixty years, is like jumping onto a moving train. In contrast, the two-year time span of the non-permanent position is very short, especially when entering an organ that has been working well on a continuous basis. Moreover, since the Security Council only recognises two people from a country (the minister and President), there needs to be dynamic contact between the Mission and these High Offices to promote excellent coordination.

The second salient point is that it is important to remember that decisions taken in these meetings resound around the world, making communication key. When it comes to communication, however, South Africa seems to be playing catch-up. The world's media based at the UN are among the first to

put out the story of South Africa's role in the UNSC. In other words, when the story comes out with a particular perspective, which does not accurately reflect official positions, it is difficult for government's communications to amend this. The challenge is that there is a permanent media presence at the UN – mostly representatives from the P5. It then becomes a case of not what South Africa says, but who says what first.

The third point of reflection is that despite debate on the country's performance, the first term on the UNSC did achieve the goals that were set out. Minister Zuma said about our then membership, "We do so conscious and convinced that the multilateral system of global governance remains the only hope for challenges facing humanity today. And in pursuit thereof, South Africa will strive in conjunction with the AU to create synergies between the work of the AUPSC and UNSC with a view to the prevention of outbreak of violence and conflict in the continent." With that statement, Minister Zuma captured the dilemma South Africa would face in balancing differing expectations whilst trying to uphold the dictates of the UN Charter and the AU Constitutive Act. Nevertheless, South Africa took on the challenge while many of the other members from Africa did not.

A fourth point to make is that one of the key lessons learned was that it was taken for granted that people in South Africa would understand the role of different UN organs – the Security Council, Human Rights Council, ECOSOC and the UNGA. It was not anticipated that powerful UNSC members would be able to communicate the positions they promoted in any of these organs, especially the UNSC, not only in their own countries, but in those of the elected member states in the UNSC. A further lesson learnt was that communication rarely entailed what positions South Africa took, and more often focused on what others (especially the powerful members of the UNSC) said about the positions taken. For instance, members of the P5, and even other countries like Germany, can communicate positions in their own country as well as wider afield. Indeed, while the US domestic constituency may not be aware of positions adopted at the UN, the US position is effectively communicated to the rest of the world.

This raises the fifth point, which is to point out that the P5 members set the agenda for the UNSC as they knew how they were going to pursue these issues. Those that introduced the most resolutions have been the P3 (USA, France and UK). In this context, South Africa, as an elected member, is always reacting to events. The permanent members call the game. However, when it comes to the AU and the Security Council, it was South Africa that called the plays including co-leading trips to Ethiopia, Ghana and the Sudan. This proved to be a surprise to some of the members of the P5 and proved a particular challenge, especially in relation to the DRC where the French would not accept co-leadership.

The sixth point to make is that in reflecting back on the first term, of the 121 decisions taken, 118 saw South Africa voting with the rest, differing only on three: Zimbabwe, Myanmar and Lebanon. For this, the country has been deemed a maverick with commentators proclaiming its membership a failure. In the case of Lebanon the decision was taken to abstain out of respect for the people of South Africa (and that engagement should be with the Parliament of Lebanon and not overruled by the USA), a position on which Lebanon eventually agreed. When it came to the violence that erupted in Kenya following the disputed elections in 2007, the P3 supported different positions so there was no discussion or briefings, with the UN producing only a watered-down statement that the Secretary General (then Kofi Annan) should stay involved.

The seventh point is that there must be coordination in decision-making between the UNSC and the AU Peace and Security Council. Point eight is linked to this, which is to note that the monthly Secretary-General working luncheons with Members of the UNSC are also an opportunity to raise sensitive issues outside of the SC Chambers. The final two points are concerned with the major challenges facing South Africa during its second tenure. These include the Sudan, Iran, Zimbabwe, and finally the DRC. The USA and the UK have already indicated that they do not want the UNSC involved on behalf of Rwanda, and how South Africa responds will be significant. In addition, the country will face decisions concerning the matter of Western Sahara and non-proliferation.

The context of the second term is remarkably different from the first, particularly as all the members of IBSA as well as Nigeria are there. While there has been optimism surrounding the impact that this may have in pushing forward discussions on UN reform, it should be remembered that during 2003–2004, with the impetus from Germany, the E10 (elected 10) worked closely on issues of reform but the power of the P5 ensured that little was achieved.

SOUTH AFRICA'S FIRST TENURE IN THE UNSC: AN OBSERVER'S VIEW

In his presentation, Dr Siphamandla Zondi of the Institute for Global Dialogue provided a short review of South Africa's first tenure and analysed controversies over some of South Africa's voting positions in the UNSC. He began by pointing out that the first year of South Africa's two-year tenure as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council shows that, in spite of the current global power imbalances, norm entrepreneurs like South Africa can make a limited but significant contribution to the cause of the UN and multilateralism broadly. This is partly because membership of the UNSC affords a UN member state an opportunity to make direct

contributions to the maintenance and promotion of international peace and security. South Africa brought two elements to the Council: the first is a commitment to enhancing the integrity of the UN and its organs; the second is to put Africa and the global South at the centre of the UN agenda.

To be effective in the UNSC, a member requires capacity to understand and handle the Council's complex agenda. It must figure out how to respond to the disproportionate power of the Permanent 5 – China, France, Russia, UK, and USA – and their willingness to use this power to ram through issues of self-interest. South Africa was concerned about the P5's ability to arrogate the right to determine or define threats to international peace and how the Council should then respond.^[1] This has given rise to tensions between South Africa and some of the P5 over what South Africa considers the abuse of power.

Under these conditions, South Africa needed to use coalitions of like-minded members. Indeed, South Africa and six other non-permanent members of the Security Council, who are also members of the Non-Aligned Movement (Congo Republic, Ghana, Indonesia, Panama, Peru and Qatar), reconstituted the NAM Security Council Caucus to develop unified positions on major issues before the Council and protect the interests of the developing countries. Although they hold no veto powers, their united positions have certainly affected the outcomes of major decisions of the Council. South Africa virtually acted as a spokesperson and champion of the group, making good use of its election as the chairperson of the broader G77 +China group for 2007 and drawing on its own moral authority.

South Africa's voting behaviour in the Security Council

The manner in which South Africa used the power of its vote has caused a great deal of controversy and murmurs of dismay at positions seen by some as inconsistent with the country's exemplary constitution and foreign policy principles.

The first such controversial voting position was on Myanmar. On 12 January 2007, a US-sponsored draft resolution condemning human rights violations and oppression in Myanmar came before the Security Council. South Africa indicated that it would vote against the resolution for three reasons. First, South Africa believed that the resolution would undermine the work of the 'good offices' of the Secretary-General, which in the person of a prominent African diplomat and the UN's Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Ebrahim Gambari, was already making headway in finding a political solution to the crisis in Myanmar. The second was that the resolution would undermine the recently established Human Rights Council, where discussions on Myanmar properly belonged. The third,

and most fundamental motivation, was that the resolution departed from the UN Charter mandate because events in Myanmar did not constitute a threat to international peace and security. This was further reinforced by the ASEAN region declaring that the situation was not a regional threat. The move exposed the fact that the P5 do not consult before tabling their proposals.

The second vote was on a proposal sponsored by the UK on the crisis in and brutality of the state in Zimbabwe. This followed state brutality against the opposition, media and civil society. Hoping to capitalise on universal unhappiness about this, the UK asked the UNSC to strongly condemn President Mugabe and his government. South Africa responded by reminding the Council that the Zimbabwe situation, while regrettable, was not a threat to international peace and security and so did not belong in the Security Council. It also feared that a heavy-handed intervention by the UNSC could undermine the ongoing SADC mediation process, incidentally led by South Africa. There was also fear that the UK was using the suffering of ordinary Zimbabweans to gain political mileage.

Thirdly, the USA proposed a resolution to condemn the use of rape by governments for political and military purposes. South Africa and the African Group opposed the resolution because it omitted other kinds of rape, including rape during occupation and invasion, which would have implicated US soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan. Indeed, the USA backed down and produced a more balanced resolution that condemned rape in all its manifestations, including that by governments, military formations and other instances. Thus, South Africa and the African Group managed to place pressure on the USA to change its original intention and to respect the will of the majority. This was a significant demonstration of the power of collective action by small and weak states against a global giant.

Fourthly, the vote against a resolution condemning Iran's nuclear ambitions and proposing sanctions was on the basis that the resolution could undermine the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and related confidence-building processes. The country also wanted a resolution that supported a negotiated settlement. Former Deputy Foreign Minister, Aziz Pahad, argued that "[w]e would not be worthy of membership of any multilateral grouping if it has to be that we must simply accept any document that is put before us."

Finally, another draft resolution rushed through the UNSC, again by the UK, was to recognise climate change as a global threat. The UK hoped to pursue its own positions on the matter without making concessions in the Kyoto Protocol discussions. Again, South Africa opposed the resolution on technical lines; that the proposal would be best dealt with in the relevant technical organs of the UN. The view was that reducing the climate change

issue to a security threat is a luxury that developed countries could afford, but for poor countries it has dire developmental impacts. South Africa also had a problem with the wording of the proposal that suggested that all countries have equal responsibility for carbon emissions, an approach that is not consistent with the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).

Voting positions and public diplomacy

In the main, reactions have been negative regarding South Africa's positions and conduct. Indeed, even among analysts it was unclear what South Africa stood for or what the country was going to achieve. A general weakness in South Africa's conduct of international relations and a glaring deficiency with regards to its positions in the UNSC is the failure to communicate effectively. On each of the occasions where its vote turned controversial, the government failed to anticipate the shift in the rhetorical war of words from the chambers of the UN to influential media spaces. In this instance, it underestimated the power of the media as a marketplace of ideas and in shaping public perceptions. The communications machinery in the South African state in general, and the then Department of Foreign Affairs in particular, needs to be considerably strengthened and its capacity and quality improved. It is often weak in articulating the country's foreign policy imperatives in normal circumstances, let alone in complex matters relating to their application in international relations.

This communication gap has been addressed somewhat by the useful regular briefings to the media by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Chief Director for UN at the then DFA. These provided useful insights into how the government arrives at key positions. But the reach of these briefings remains limited in scope and reach. Community media structures could have been used. Opinion makers, like analysts, could have been engaged more as interlocutors of information. As we have seen in the US and UK manipulation of the South African votes, the opinions of analysts and observers are often crucial in informing certain judgements and perceptions in public consciousness about South Africa's actions on the global stage. Furthermore it has come out in the analysis that South Africa may not have fully understood the power of the P5. It is common diplomatic practice to hit below base through proxy brokers and informal channels. As such, South Africa found itself playing on one track (formal) with the courage of its convictions, but was being hit in other channels, including by its own media.

In 2006, the (former) DFA kick-started its rolling *izimbizo* programme with a successful meeting in Cape Town, the purpose of which was to engage the South African public to better understand its work. However,

this programme was discontinued after just one meeting without explanation. As a result, there is no structured public dialogue between the citizens and government on South Africa's foreign policy. Even the relevant parliamentary committees have not addressed this matter in any significant way.

Challenges and considerations

Generally, in the medium term the pressure for more meaningful reforms in the global system will increase, as will the role that key developing states play economically and politically. This will throw up new challenges for South Africa and its strategic partners in the global South. Its relationship with the global North, largely shaped by the history of apartheid and the economic linkages that went with it, will most likely evolve in new ways. South Africa's great asset in global politics, which is moral authority, will not last very long; thus the need for the country to look for other sources of power and influence globally. Such sources of soft power may lie in a neat balance between political and economic diplomacy, on the one hand, and between these and public diplomacy, on the other.

Cross-cutting concerns and challenges

- South Africa needs a stronger investment and emphasis on **public diplomacy** where this means winning the minds and hearts of the peoples and influencing public opinion of South Africa. Currently, this is weak, being limited to media liaison by DIRCO and The Presidency. Policy articulation and engaging in the market place of ideas is fundamental to the success of policies, especially where they are based on principles and, therefore, tend to generate controversies that play out in public forums and the media. South Africa needs a special agency for this purpose.
- South Africa needs also to clarify its role as a development partner in Africa due to difficulties that donors generally face in Africa. There is a need to establish a special agency to pull together discrete initiatives like the African Renaissance Fund and departmental investments in post-conflict situations.
- The country also needs to give a clearer meaning to the idea of partnership to ensure that a healthy balance is achieved between national and collective interests. South Africa cannot afford to be too altruistic, but will need at times to aggressively pursue its interests in Africa and abroad.
- South Africa has to develop a common policy framework to regulate increasing and sometimes damaging international relations by sub-

national entities such as provinces and municipalities. The idea is not to stop these activities, but rather to ensure harmony with national priorities and imperatives in international activities by sub-national states. One way of doing this is to ensure that the current consultations on this matter produce a global framework of coordination and encourage provinces and municipalities to develop coherent international relations strategies to give effect to such coordination.

Global governance

- Although participation in all major global forums and dialogues does not of itself translate into tangible outcomes, the pursuit of the reform of global governance in its different forms will not be achieved if South Africa fails to actively participate in these forums, at least to influence debates that transform relations.
- As it reinforces its strategies for achieving transformation of global governance, South Africa will need to realise that sometimes its principled position on thorny global issues will appear uncompromising by the North and will only be grudgingly accepted by Africa's partners.
- South Africa will need to deepen both formal and informal dialogue or consultations and avoid taking for granted that its positions are correct because they are based on universal principles and an honest commitment to the African agenda.

POINTS OF DISCUSSION

During the interactive discussion, four key points were raised. In the first instance, concern was voiced regarding South Africa's ability to influence the agenda of an organ that has been running continuously for over 60 years. This is compounded by the relatively brief time period (two years) in which those elected as non-permanent members occupy their positions. For South Africa, the ability to play a pivotal role on the Council will be, in part, supported or hampered by the country's own domestic constituency. This is itself divided, and these divisions (ideological, historical, changing demographics) will impact on how the country is projected internationally. In countries like India, for instance, there is greater cohesion and where there is disagreement this is typically on smaller matters and not fundamental issues. In light of this, it was posited that South Africa's participation in the Security Council should be viewed as a national project with the contribution of ideas encouraged. Yet, at the same time, expectations regarding South Africa's performance during 2011–2012 should be moderated, including the country's ability to change the approach within the Security Council.

In the second instance, the challenge of presenting a coordinated position was raised. This includes coordination at both a national and international level. Nationally, coordination between the different levels and departments within the foreign policy bureaucracy will be paramount. This includes coordination within the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), as well as coordination between the Department and the Minister, and the Minister and the Presidency. The importance of coordination will also play out in the country's relations with both the permanent (P5) and non-permanent members of the Council.

Thirdly, points were raised concerning the appropriate channels for communication at both a domestic and international level. This is particularly important in light of the first mover story. One of the challenges linked to communication has been in recording discussions. Before South Africa assumed its position in 2007, there was an agreement that there should be a reflection on the experience to develop a record for future reference. This needs to be put in place. There has also been a shortfall in building an understanding and articulating the pursuit of an anti-imperialist agenda, which has seen elements within civil society (especially from the left) coming out against it.

Nevertheless, arguments were made that caution should be exercised in painting the challenges of the previous term as predominantly a communication problem. It is wider than this. The issue turns on well-principled positions. By understanding what these positions are, the appropriate responses can be pursued. However, when it comes to communication, ambassadors need to communicate the same message from the desks and Head Office rather than letting the media rely on information from within the wider diplomatic corps in New York. The challenge when it comes to communication is that the P3 know what position they are going to adopt and brief journalists in advance. In contrast, South Africa has been reactive concerning its positions within the UN.

Fourthly, there needs to be an understanding of the African agenda, sanctioned by the AU summit, and how this should be pursued within the UN Security Council. Toeing the African consensus line will be a subtext in terms of stated intentions to take up a permanent seat (Nigeria is currently there, the G4, BRICS, and BASIC). So when it comes to the issue of reform, the future of the Ezulwini Consensus is open to debate. If South Africa is to be seen as a leading player in the African context, a greater leadership role will need to be adopted first and foremost within our immediate neighbourhood. When it comes to the support of Africa and the African agenda, South Africa has sought to include the continent, through briefings to the AU and SADC, on the issues on the UNSC agenda. However, Pretoria has often found itself isolated from Africa on issues raised before the Council, with support instead coming from states like

Vietnam, Indonesia, and China. It was noted, furthermore, that relations between Africa and emerging powers such as India, Brazil and China have undergone perceptible changes. For instance there has been a significant increase in the number of missions from Brazil, while India and China also have a significant presence. This will in turn impact on contestations within the Council.

One of the dilemmas facing South Africa in the multilateral context of the Security Council will be managing the African agenda. For instance, Brazil does not need to seek the support of Latin America in order for it to pursue issues on the agenda, or to assert its presence in the global arena. For South Africa, as a member of regional organisations like SADC and the AU, there are constraints shaping the country's position. This raises questions concerning Pretoria's promotion of regional integration and how this can be used as the apex of the African agenda. This is the argument in recognition of the small size of South Africa's economy and that, alone, South Africa is not a major player. As such Pretoria needs to ride the wave of an advancing Africa, and cannot afford to ignore an African position especially in balancing power relations in global affairs.



TOWARDS SOUTH AFRICA IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL 2011–2012

Session Two dealt with issues and challenges that South Africa will have to deal with during its 'second coming' in the UNSC. An attempt was made to ensure that proposed approaches to the tenure and specific agenda items demonstrated that South Africa had learned some valuable lessons from its failures and successes during the first term. Led by a presentations made by the current South African ambassador to the UN, Ambassador Baso Sangqu, Professor Anthonie van Nieuwkerk, Dr Jakkie Cilliers and a senior foreign affairs correspondent, Mr Peter Fabricius, the session dealt with matters of approach, style and content and how these could make or break South Africa's multilateral diplomacy.

SOUTH AFRICA'S NON-PERMANENT MEMBERSHIP OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL FOR 2011–2012: PROPOSED APPROACH TO THE ISSUES ON THE UNSC AGENDA

Ambassador Sangqu recalled that the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Minister Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, had promised during her campaign for the seat that our role in the Security Council would be informed by the central thrust of our foreign policy which stands on four pillars, namely:

- Promoting and advancing the interests of our continent, including the SADC sub-region;
- Working with countries of the South to promote its voice on issues of international peace and security in the international system and the promotion of equity and social justice globally;
- Working with countries of the North to develop a true and effective partnership for a peaceful world;
- Contributing to the strengthening of the multilateral system, and promoting a rules-based global governance system, including its reform, to reflect the diversity of our nations, and ensure its centrality.

South Africa's primary objective on the UNSC is to contribute to the resolution of conflicts and the maintenance of international peace and security, and the stabilisation of post-conflict situations, in particular on the African continent. In this context, South Africa will actively engage with all issues on the UNSC agenda pursuant to the global mandate associated with Council membership.

This would, *inter alia*, include,

- focusing on conflict and post-conflict situations in Africa and in particular the situations in Sudan, Somalia, the DRC, Côte d'Ivoire, Burundi, Guinea-Bissau, Ethiopia and Eritrea, and Western Sahara;
- paying particular attention to the Middle East peace process (Israeli-Palestinian and Lebanese-Syrian tracks);
- playing a constructive role in other important agenda items, such as disarmament and non-proliferation (Iran, DPRK and 1540), counter-terrorism (CTC, Al Qaeda and Taliban);
- focusing on other important agenda items, such as Timor-Leste, Kosovo, Georgia, Haiti, and so on;
- targeting those thematic debates that are of importance to Africa and have a specific outcome (for example, children in armed conflict; violence against women in armed conflicts, women, peace and security, protection of civilians, and the related resolutions that confer mandates on the Secretariat and peacekeeping missions);
- synergising peacebuilding priorities within peacekeeping missions;
- being transparent and accountable to the wider UN membership;
- helping to improve the working methods of the Security Council to enhance its legitimacy, representivity and effectiveness.

During its previous tenure on the Security Council, South Africa sought to advance closer cooperation between the UNSC and the African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC). As a current member of the PSC and an incoming member of the UNSC, this would be an ideal opportunity to maintain and further enhance this strategic and mutually reinforcing relationship.

South Africa, working with other African countries, should pursue what further could be done to achieve better synergies between the two institutions and the implementation of the Prodi Report, especially the need to achieve predictable, sustainable and flexible financing for AU peacekeeping missions, such as the AU Mission in Somalia.

Opportunities and Challenges

In taking up the non-permanent seat, South Africa could face several challenges, including the following:

- Positioning South Africa as a responsible member of the international community that is able to play a leading role in contributing to the maintenance of international peace and security.
- Maximising the opportunities to form alliances and to strengthen cooperation among the elected members, especially the Non-Aligned Movement caucus, the G3 African countries (South Africa, Nigeria and Gabon), the India, Brazil and South Africa grouping (IBSA) and the Brazil, Russia, India and China BRIC(now BRICS) grouping, given that South Africa has shared a close working relationship with the P2 (Russia and China) in the past.
- Better managing South Africa's constraints as an elected member for two years which limits our ability to substantially make a meaningful impact on the Council;
- Always keeping in mind the power configuration within the Security Council, particularly the role of the permanent five and leverage on the configuration of the Council in 2011 by aspiring permanent members for the reform of the Council.
- Remaining cognisant of the Charter mandate of the UNSC and the tendency of the Council to encroach on the mandates of other UN Organs, e.g. in human rights matters;
- Improving on our public diplomacy and communication functions, in general. This includes outreach to the public, non-members of the Council and civil society.

Positioning South Africa

South Africa would have to play a delicate balancing act in asserting its national positions as well as its broader strategic objective of illustrating that it can be a reliable partner in addressing threats to international peace and security. This will be necessary to demonstrate that South Africa has the capability and capacity of assuming a permanent seat on a reformed UNSC. By our actions, we have to assert our positions while at the same time remaining cognisant that a divisive Council does not achieve anything efficacious.

Equally important would be to indicate that an enlarged Council composed of strong regional players may not enhance the efficacy of the UNSC and is likely to enhance the Council's stature, legitimacy and credibility. Given the composition of the UNSC in 2011, with aspiring permanent members such as Brazil, India, Germany, Nigeria and South Africa, there will be

increased focus and attention on the participation and cooperation of these member states on the Council.

South Africa will be expected to play a leadership role on African issues on the UNSC agenda. In the Permanent Mission's outreach engagements thus far, this message was relayed to South Africa by all delegations consulted. This requires South Africa to have clearly articulated policy positions on African issues that reflect AU decisions. This would necessitate effective coordination and communication between the Mission in New York, Head Office, and the Missions in Addis Ababa, in the P5 and other UNSC member states, as well as in the countries on the agenda of the Security Council.

The first major issue that would confront South Africa within a few days of assuming its seat would be the situation in the Sudan as the referendum in South Sudan is scheduled to take place on 9 January 2011. South Africa's response to this issue would be an immediate test case for performance, coordination and leadership on African UNSC matters. It should be recalled that the vote on the Myanmar resolution during South Africa's previous tenure on the Council occurred almost immediately after South Africa assumed its seat on the Council. South Africa's perceived posture on this matter was played out in the public domain as characteristic of the country's performance for the remainder of the two years. It is thus imperative that we have a well-oiled mechanism in place to respond to critical issues such as the anticipated matter of Sudan immediately upon assumption of the non-permanent seat.

Partnerships, Alliances and Cooperation

South Africa's first term on the Council illustrated the challenge to establish and maintain unity amongst developing countries that were members of the Security Council. South Africa sometimes found itself alone in advancing African common positions adopted at Summit level by the African Union. The membership of Nigeria and Gabon in the Council should be strengthened to reinforce Africa's voice in the Council. Deliberate and close engagement with these countries should be nurtured to accentuate better cooperation and coordination, bilaterally and through the African Union machinery.

Furthermore, the joint membership of IBSA countries in the UNSC in 2011 has already recorded positive reviews as countries of the South with shared values and principles. The IBSA Ministers have already agreed certain steps and activities to be undertaken to strengthen their cooperation in the Council, especially as aspiring permanent members. IBSA countries

recognise that there is more they could cooperate on whilst carefully managing whatever differences and nuances that may arise.

South Africa also shared principled and close consultative relationship with China and Russia (P2) during its previous tenure, and these relations would also need to be further enhanced. Similarly, solidarity within the NAM on issues of key importance to the developing world should be pursued and enhanced, even though it did not always translate into a common platform for action in the Security Council.

The challenge will be to establish these partnerships and maintain them. It may however not be possible to agree with partners on all matters on the agenda of the Council. Thus alliances would have to be established more loosely and specific cooperation and alignment would be issue based. It would, however, be important to manage our differences with strategic allies. Alliances and cooperation would require initiatives and greater involvement at capital level including by principals in their bilateral engagements.

Despite the importance of alliances and cooperation, it should be emphasised that UNSC membership is, in the first instance, a national one. Ultimately, despite group allegiance, positions are taken based on national interest and priorities.

Mandate of the UNSC and Encroachment on Other UN Organs

In terms of the UN Charter, the UNSC has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. There are occasions when some members would bring matters to the agenda of the UNSC, which do not fall within this Charter mandate. These actions are usually politically motivated. South Africa would have to decide on how it wishes to address this matter should it arise. During our previous tenure on the Council, the matter of human rights often became contentious, particularly relating to the situation in Myanmar and Zimbabwe.

The test for whether the Council should take up any issue, including human rights issues, should be whether the situation poses a threat to international peace and security under Article 39 of the Charter. The UNSC does address human rights matters in as far as the human rights situation in question poses a threat to international peace and security and in the context of peacekeeping operations. Currently, 39 tasks across 16 Council-mandated UN missions have human rights mandates.

South Africa has strongly advocated a human rights mandate within the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO). There could be an accusation of double standards and contradiction if we were to

maintain this view yet argue that human rights abuses in other situations should not be addressed by the UNSC. The manner in which human rights matters are approached should be in line with the principle that a matter lies within the UNSC domain if it poses a threat to international peace and security. Thus human rights abuses that do not pose such a threat cannot be addressed by the Council. In the case of Western Sahara, the matter is already on the Council's agenda as the conflict poses such a threat and is therefore not inconsistent with South Africa's principled position on human rights matters in the UNSC.

Human rights continue to be a priority of South Africa's foreign policy. It is recommended that should a human rights matter arise in the UNSC, which does not present a threat to international peace and security (and therefore does not fall within the charter mandated role of the UNSC), South Africa should actively pursue these human rights matters in the appropriate forums such as the Geneva-based Human Rights Council. This would reinforce the argument that issues should be addressed in the correct forum and that we are pursuing a principled and rules-based multilateral foreign policy.

UNSC Toolbox

Over the last six decades, the UNSC role has been limited to maintaining international peace and security after conflict has erupted. Council response has been usually through Chapter VII measures such as the imposition of sanctions and the authorisation of the use of force. The conflict prevention role of the Council under Article 33 and 34 of Chapter VI relating to the Pacific Settlement of Disputes has been under-utilised. In the maintenance of international peace and security, the Council should develop appropriate measures such as seeking solutions by negotiation, mediation, judicial settlement or resorting to regional arrangements as part of its toolbox for settling disputes.

There have been attempts by some Council members, in particular the United Kingdom, to have the Secretariat provide the Council with a horizon scan on a variety of countries (both Council and non-Council agenda items). The rationale put forward for this is to enhance the early warning and preventative capacity of the Council. However, this exercise is viewed by some, such as China and Russia, as potentially bringing to the Council matters not on its agenda and thus satisfying the national interests of some members of the Council (particularly the P3, France the UK and the US) who wish to target certain member states.

Communications Strategy

The necessity of establishing a communications strategy to relay national positions on Council matters is vital. This strategy includes internal DIRCO communication, inter-governmental communication, communication with civil society and the public at large through local and international media. The purpose would be to ensure that South Africa's positions are adequately explained to the international community and in particular the public at home.

Based on past experience, the media is often used by the permanent five to pressurise elected members of the Council by influencing public opinion, particularly in their home constituencies. It is therefore crucial to develop an effective communications strategy at Head Office geared particularly for the home audience.

Working Groups

As an elected member of the Security Council, South Africa would be expected to chair UNSC subsidiary bodies. The decision on who should chair these bodies is made by the P5. To pre-empt being allocated subsidiary bodies that we would prefer not to chair, the DIRCO has prioritised its preferences for chairing these subsidiary bodies. The criteria for selection for these preferences were based on either political and/or capacity reasons.

Working Methods

The role of the elected members within the Security Council is at times limited and this could lead to frustration and confrontation among elected Council members and permanent members. This is particularly true when resolutions are negotiated outside of the Council, among the P5 and among the Group of Friends, and then presented to elected members as a *fait accompli*, for example, the resolutions on Western Sahara, the Middle East and non-proliferation. South Africa has, as a matter of principle, protested this undemocratic procedure and at times this has put the country at odds with the P5 members. The challenge will be to assert the principle of inclusiveness for all Council members and not only the select few who are members of these smaller contact groups. Coordination between departments during South Africa's membership of the UNSC will also be paramount to our success.

Lastly, what we do and how we behave in the UNSC during this term will have an impact on the future role South Africa could play on the reformed Council with permanent membership extended to Africa.

SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND NATIONAL INTEREST

In his presentation, Prof van Nieuwkerk argued that against the background of the overwhelming and corruptive impact of power rivalry amongst the P5, South Africa's role on the UN Security Council from 2011 to 2012 should be determined principally by its national interest. This is in line with the statement made by our minister of international relations and cooperation who recently said: "Our election (to this Council as a non-permanent member) is ... consistent with our national interests and our vision for a better Africa and a better world".

The national interest is a country's goals and ambitions, whether economic, military or cultural. It is not a concept without its difficulties. As Vladimir Lenin noted in 1920, the general concept of national interests implies the interests of the ruling class. Whilst correct, in contemporary democratic settings, elected representatives interpret a society's needs for security, prosperity and independence; in short, members of government and parliament determine a country's interests. We should also acknowledge that senior officials in bureaucratic settings contribute to decision-making on the national agenda.

Currently, South Africa is in the grip of a polarising debate regarding the definition of its public, national and security interests.⁽²⁾ Riveting and important as this is, it should not preclude us from sketching out, in broad and general terms, our approach to the national interest (and its sibling, national security)⁽³⁾ and why it should determine our positions on the UNSC. Our democratic order determines our approach to the national interest. The preamble to the 1996 constitution speaks of the tasks ahead: healing the divisions of the past; establishing a society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights; improving the quality of life of all citizens; and building a united and democratic South Africa able to take its rightful place as a sovereign state in the family of nations. These are the core elements of our national interest (complemented by the identification of our national values, in Chapter One of the Constitution).

The framing of the preamble suggests a dynamic, not static, process of progressive realisation of these objectives. It is the responsibility of government to give effect to these expectations. It does so through crafting policy frameworks and implementing these by means of programmes and projects. Our national interests therefore shape our policy priorities. Prof. van Nieuwkerk posits that, given our socio-economic profile, public policies focusing on the human security agenda (poverty alleviation, job creation, economic growth, development, personal security – in short, freedom from want and freedom from fear) should constitute the core of South Africa's national interest. The National Planning Commission will

hopefully soon suggest how to address the country's short, medium and long-term policy challenges.

International Relations scholar O.R. Holsti developed what he called a hierarchy of foreign policy objectives. To shape our thinking regarding the broad contours of our national interests, and how it ought to determine our Security Council role, we can adapt Holsti's basic idea to obtain a hierarchy of foreign and security policy objectives that in turn is based on the country's national interests. Table 1 represents some initial thinking around this idea.

TABLE 1: Matrix of South Africa's National Interests

<i>Core interests</i>	<i>Strategic objectives</i>
Economic welfare	Reduce inequality, poverty and underdevelopment
National security	Protect citizens and the state from threats
Protect and enhance 'own way of life'	Deepen democracy and national unity; Enhance human security
<i>Middle-range interests</i>	<i>Strategic objectives</i>
Support allies	Work with key partners in SADC; global South; and elsewhere via BNCs
Promote human rights and democracy	African Peace Diplomacy (PM, PK, PB)
Pursue trade opportunities	SADC FTA, SADC/EAC/COMESA FTA, SA-EU TDCA (value of BRIC(S), IBSA?)
Support regional and continental bodies	SADC and AU (Commitment to Commonwealth, NAM, G77, G20, BRIC(S), IBSA?)
<i>Long-range interests</i>	<i>Strategic objectives</i>
A just and equitable global order	African peace and development; Reform of multilateral bodies and procedures

South Africa's core interests and strategic objectives must be protected and promoted by the judicious pursuit of these middle- and long-range interests and objectives. Despite its fault lines, the United Nations organisation remains the premier multilateral mechanism through which myriad complex world affairs are administered and resolved. In this sense, the UN is the preferred vehicle for South Africa's pursuit of its middle- and long-range interests. Incidentally, South Africa has much to gain from this

multilateral regime – and at the same time, it has much to share. This is why its candidacy as the African representative for non-permanent membership of the UN Security Council was readily endorsed.

The challenges we face at the Security Council were well summarised by our foreign minister when she said:

The country will have to contend with the formidable limitations that exist within the Security Council including a pre-determined agenda, and the reality of power and influence that are unevenly distributed within the Council. We will be serving on the Council at a time of many challenges, such as the holding of a referendum in Southern Sudan, debates on the Iranian nuclear programme, the deteriorating condition in Somalia, the long-standing crisis in the Middle East, including the Palestinian Question, and the eminent draw-down or exit of key UN peacekeeping operations in the DRC and Chad/CAR. Countering terrorism is another priority in the international arena.(4)

In addition to these challenges (and there are others, including the climate change issue), there is the question of how the exercise of our power and influence is understood and received by the continent – a complex factor that will no doubt affect our Security Council activities.

To promote and protect our core interests, South Africa must pursue its middle and long-range interests *via* the UN family – the principal multilateral vehicle. Precisely because of our well-articulated short and long-term vision for ourselves, the region and the continent, we have leadership obligations at the level of the UNSC. Put the other way around, our core, middle and long-range interests, our related strategic objectives and the partners we prefer to work with, must shape the positions we take on the range of issues on the UNSC agenda.(5) The choices we make, and the way we manage these processes, must not endanger our national interests, and if anything should be geared to advance and where necessary, protect it.

How to give effect to this macro-perspective? Several inter-related strategies come to mind. The first is using the strategic window of opportunity created by the fact that membership of the 2011 Security Council will include key countries of the global South (apart from China which is a permanent member, India, Brazil, Nigeria and South Africa will be on the Council). Another strategic window relates to South Africa's concurrent membership of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDSC), the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the UN Security Council (SC). This is a critical moment to shape and advance the African agenda and in particular the question of effective and efficient peace-making, peacekeeping and peace building. Incidentally, the time is right

for us to rededicate ourselves to the regional integration project – beyond trade and economic opportunity.

A third strategic opportunity lies with our links with Germany, a country with whom we have a strong bilateral relationship, which will serve on the Security Council next year, and which might attempt to shape the UN peacekeeping reform agenda (the ‘New Horizon’ process driven by DPKO) in ways that will favour Africa.

In general, though, it is not the purpose of this short presentation to propose strategic and tactical moves to counter, overcome, or win support of UN Security Council members in pursuing our interests and those of the global South. It is rather to create space for the argument that whatever we do on the international stage should serve our national interests, whether core or long-term. Leaving the last words on strategy to Machiavelli, who commented on – if not determined the approach to – the national interest. He said: “Let no state believe that it can always follow a safe policy, rather let it think that all are doubtful. This is found in the nature of things, that one never tries to avoid one difficulty without running into another, but prudence consists in being able to know the nature of the difficulties, and taking the least harmful as good”.

SOUTH AFRICA AT THE UN: THE MEDIA

Reflecting on the role of media and communication in the success or failure of South Africa’s tenure on the UNSC, Peter Fabricius, a foreign policy correspondent for various newspapers, contended that he did not believe that the challenge is essentially about communication, as the department would like to believe. He recalled that the minister told an AFP reporter at the University of Pretoria, “We are going to get to you first to give you our side of the story before anyone else” or words to that effect. He went on to question whether the challenges facing communication is about the speed of the message. Our minds are not blank pieces of blotting paper ready to soak up the first impression that comes along – leaving no room for the next. That may be more true of some journalists covering a welter of issues at the UN and therefore unable to give much attention to any one issue. But journalists who cover the issue more attentively are going to form their own impressions after weighing up various views.

With reference to South Africa’s first term on the UNSC, he noted that efforts had been taken to address communication with South Africa’s domestic constituency. This included Ambassador Dumisani Kumalo’s open talk with reporters following Security Council meetings. Foreign correspondent at the UN, Joe Laurie, probably wrote more favourably in his initial news reports about some of our controversial stances than

subsequent media commentary, or than other academic and human rights advocates did even later. This is the difference between a good reporter and an analyst, which should be kept separate and might (and sometimes did) come to different conclusions. It is this difference that the South African government should respect and not continue to make the assumption that those who disagree with it are ignorant, badly informed, or inadequately briefed or – even worse – unpatriotic. This view has often been uttered, and perhaps underpins the more energetic communication strategy that is said to be devised in time for 2011.

The fact that so much emphasis is being placed on communication conveys a message to the media and other key stakeholders – that the South African government intends to take the same line in 2011 and 2012 as it did in 2007 and 2008 on human rights issues. If this is so, the government should expect similar reactions to those displayed during its first tenure. Of course the issues will not be entirely the same and so the votes and decisions may differ, as will the reactions. The basic premise is that a vote against a human rights resolution will be deemed to be voting against human rights – regardless of the motives of the sponsors of the resolution or of South Africa.

Why government adopted certain positions on UNSC resolutions was more widely understood by the media than government may have perceived. Indeed, those who criticised Pretoria's position on Burma's behaviour understood that government did not support the junta's behaviour. Nevertheless, it is legitimate to interpret a vote against a human rights resolution as an indication that human rights are not a major priority. Recalling a conversation with an ambassador of another country that shares most of South Africa's positions at the UN, it was noted that they believe as South Africa does, that the big powers have too much power and should be curbed. This country also gives high theoretical priority to human rights in its foreign policy, as South Africa does. However, this ambassador indicated that his country would never simply vote against a human rights resolution at the UN, precisely for fear of losing its cherished reputation as a champion of human rights. As we, unfortunately, did to a significant degree in 2007. And some may recall that even the State legal advisers expressed that opinion when they advised the government not to defy the International Criminal Court by allowing Omar al-Bashir to visit South Africa in 2009.

When all is said and done, and when all the nitpicking about procedures has been peeled away, voting against a human rights resolution *is* in fact voting against human rights, from the perspective of those who should count the most – the victims. The long-suffering ordinary people of Burma (Myanmar) and Zimbabwe were caught in the crossfire of the proxy wars between the P3 and P2 plus South Africa, or whatever the geopolitical

stand-off of the moment was. To them our votes must have seemed simply like a betrayal, and in the end it is their thoughts and feelings which count.

Making our geo-political points about mandate creep need not be inconsistent with nurturing our human rights reputation. It is partly about choosing the issue. Walking straight into the glaring limelight of the UNSC and voting immediately against a resolution condemning the human rights abuses of a junta that is universally held in about the same esteem as the apartheid government was, is inevitably asking for trouble. Operating in the complex and sophisticated terrain of the Council requires us to be much more adroit than that. Just because the US or UK may sponsor a resolution, and may have an ulterior motive for doing so, does not oblige us to vote against it. Their motives are never going to be in the public record and no amount of spin is doing to convince the world that their motives were bad. What is going to be in the public record is that they condemned human rights abuses and South Africa wouldn't.

Another way of reconciling our geo-strategic concerns and our human rights reputation is to take an accumulative approach. This idea is borrowed from Nicole Fritz, national director of the Southern Africa Litigation Centre. The South African government feels, probably legitimately, that the US, UK and France bring certain human rights abuses to the Security Council and deliberately ignore others, such as Israel – and of course even some of their own misdemeanours such as Guantanamo Bay. That being so, let South African ambassadors propose resolutions on these other subjects. Granted, such proposals will probably get nowhere because one or more of the P5 members will veto or otherwise block them. But that is not the point. The notorious Burma (Myanmar) resolution was also blocked by China. That did not diminish the damage our – as it happened superfluous – vote did to our reputation. Likewise, any effort by South Africa, thwarted or otherwise, to advance the cause of human rights in the world will enhance our reputation.

In summary, to take a narrow view of the media aspects of the challenges facing South Africa on the UNSC would not be useful. By emphasising that it will pursue a more energetic media strategy this time, the South African government is acknowledging that our human rights reputation suffered the last time round. If preserving our human rights reputation is therefore an important objective, it is going to take more than speedier communication of the government's position or even a more sophisticated and comprehensive PR strategy to achieve that aim. It is going to take a more sophisticated strategy for how our representative actually behaves on the Council.

THE CHALLENGES OF A CHANGING WORLD AND SOUTH AFRICA IN THE UNSC

In his presentation, Dr Jakkie Cilliers of the Institute for Security Studies argued that, rather than a new era of non-polarity – of diffuse power – we may be seeing the rise of what some call ‘interpolarity’. Interpolarity can be described as ‘multipolarity in an age of interdependence’.

After the brief moment of US unipolarity, competitive global centres of power are developing. This is the result of the accelerated shift away from Western cultural, political and economic dominance towards a more heterogeneous and complicated world. Such a world is almost by definition more difficult to manage. Instead of a single organisation such as the United Nations being able to help manage and coordinate, the trend is towards issue-based, multilateral diplomacy. Hence coalitions of interested countries and non-state actors coalesce on specific matters as part of a complex system of networked global diplomacy. This trend is accentuated by the shift in power away from governments to non-state actors – civil society, business and technical agencies, supranational institutions and transnational networks. In the process, the latitude of governments, their freedom of action, is increasingly constrained by the requirement to meet various technical inter-governmental standards, and respond to financial markets and the global media. This is part of the hot, flat and crowded world (as depicted so graphically by Thomas Friedman).

So, while more multi-polar, the world will also be more interdependent than ever before through its trade, financial systems, energy interdependence and global communication systems. The extent to which globalisation is driving development is evident when one considers that Global GDP, in nominal terms, has increased from US\$32,1 trillion in 2000 to US\$61,2 trillion in 2008, i.e. almost doubling. Simultaneously, world trade, also in nominal terms, has increased from US\$13,1 trillion to US\$32,2 trillion over the same period – an increase of 245 per cent. Clearly, trade growth has outstripped GDP growth by a substantial margin. Meanwhile, global exports have tripled. But it is not only the global economy and trade that is driving interdependence, but also the complexity discussed earlier and the need to respond to global challenges such as climate change and organised crime that defy national solutions.

In this world of networked diplomacy the requirement is to ‘work the system’, to mobilise the media, civil society, think-tanks and the business community behind a particular cause. In the past, South Africa has often appeared to succumb to the temptation to seek a single issue explanation, often in the form of some specific source or reason for a particular development. The world is more complicated than that, and requires a

flexible, nimble and networked response that is able to shape the debate and respond with corrective action on an ongoing basis.

South Africa retains the glow and the achievements from a foreign policy presidency under President Mbeki and DIRCO will have to work hard to retain the country's previous momentum and the space that his interventions created globally. The new presidency has different priorities, but its global ambitions will not be realised without a sustained and concerted diplomatic push.

Cilliers concluded by indicating that papers are being developed on various themes that could inform South Africa's tenure, which will be made available at a later stage. These include recommendations relating to the following:

- The UNSC-AU-PSC relationship on conflict prevention, management and peacebuilding;
- International criminal justice and the role of the UN Security Council in the work of the International Criminal Court (ICC);
- Terrorism and counter-terrorism;
- Nuclear non-proliferation;
- Conventional arms control including small arms and light weapons;
- Issues relating to women in peace and security.

POINTS OF DISCUSSION

In looking towards South Africa's second term as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council (2011–2012), the discussion that followed the presentations highlighted the role of identity and principles in shaping South Africa's approach. In the first instance it was pointed out that the principle of human rights is but one of the principles enshrined in the Constitution. Pretoria's approach cannot be guided by the principle of human rights alone, despite its media appeal. All four of the constitutional principles need to be considered. These principles derive from the identity of the country, 'who we are', and as such should be pursued in our international relations. In other words, South Africa is a principled, normative society, looking to exist in a world where these values prevail. This cannot be determined by national interests alone as this is not just about interests, but about principles.

It is against this context the vote on Myanmar raised considerable criticism as it did not reflect 'who South Africa is' in terms of its identity and historical experience. If the country was seeking to defend its position that the vote was taken to stop the encroachment of the Security Council on the

work of the Human Rights Council, more attention should have been paid to the work carried out in the Human Rights Council. However, as Pretoria undertakes its second term within the Council it is important not to get stuck on the positions taken during 2007–2008. South Africa has less of an ideological tone in its approach to international relations today. At the same time there is acknowledgement that South Africa is not a homogenous society, but rather comprises a diverse society with diverse interests.

While there has been discussion of the challenges facing the world in terms of climate change, the economic and financial crisis, terrorism and national security, it was noted that this is also a period of opportunity for a global social movement, which should be articulated in the Council. Yet expectation for what can be done and what can be achieved in two years needs to be moderated, particularly when it comes to the reform of the Security Council, and government should play a role in moderating these expectations. While there may be a move towards interpolarity, the old power plays are still entrenched and this lends itself to an interest-driven agenda. In this regard, reference was made to the period 2003–2004, which saw Germany take the lead in pushing for reform with little success in effecting change. In addition, while it has been pointed out that the composition of the Security Council includes the BRIC, BASIC and IBSA groups, it was noted that states like Brazil have been a non-permanent member of the Security Council previously without making significant inroads in pushing for reform.

As South Africa assumes its position within the Council, the Strategy Dialogue drew attention to a number of key points. In the first instance it was noted that when it comes to engagement with the media the voice of the Department must be part of the public debate and as such contributions to the media could come from the Ambassador at the UN, the DG, and the Minister. This would go some way in reaching out to and informing South Africa's domestic constituencies. The use of the Department's website in setting out the work of South Africa at the UN would also prove invaluable.

Secondly, the importance of Africa to South Africa's position on the Security Council was noted, although the discussion went further to indicate that it should not be assumed that African countries will always support South Africa on particular positions. There is a need for a better understanding of how the Security Council works. This is a collection of individual countries, each with their own national expediencies. As such South Africa must project its own position as a country, although this should align with the position of the African Union. It was also posited that one of the defining features of South Africa's international relations is that it works both within groups and across groups. For instance, in 1995 the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was against the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). South Africa held a

different position, but by the end of the negotiations the NAM agreed and the extension was granted. South Africa also retains respect within the international community as it brings a certain amount of legitimacy, finding support for its positions from within foreign constituencies.

Thirdly, when it comes to the functioning of the UN Security Council, more attention could be given to Chapter 6 (Pacific Settlement of Disputes) and Chapter 8 (Regional Arrangements) with a focus on mediation. As South Africa resolved its own conflict through mediation there is the possibility to capitalise on this internationally. In addition, Chapter 6 should be considered in informing the country's approach to agenda setting within the Council. This comes against the background of the government's declining ability (and willingness) to contribute to the African peace and security architecture, and a shift away from conflict management to conflict prevention with its focus on good governance, human rights and democracy.

Finally, concern was raised regarding the position of South Africa as a 'reliable' member of the Security Council. South Africa aims to be a responsible global citizen, but if there is compliance with positions in order to be 'reliable', then legitimacy and credibility will be lost. It is as a responsible global citizen that South Africa is able to play a role in bridging international divides. As the country undertakes its second term as a non-permanent member on the Council, Pretoria will need to project a South African agenda on the issues that will come before the Council, as well as facilitate a familiarity with these positions and what the country aims to achieve.

CONCLUSION

In the concluding remarks, it was noted that South Africa is returning to a Council that has not fundamentally changed since the country's first tenure in terms of the power plays and agenda setting; however, within government the debate on 'what's in it for us' has been gathering momentum. This includes questions concerning South Africa's membership of multilateral fora and the advantages this may accrue and the implications of these decisions for our relations with other countries of the South. This is a discussion that needs to be handled very carefully. Adopting a pragmatic approach may advance the domestic agenda, but there is the danger of becoming too inward looking. In addition, whether South Africa's foreign policy is less ideological and more pragmatic needs further discussion, especially in tempering pragmatism in terms of identity (who we are) and principles (what we stand for).

In closing the Strategy Dialogue, the following pointers were made. Firstly, questions concerning principles and values need to be returned to, with reference to some of the points made throughout the discussion. Furthermore, the starting point around the characterisation of South African society is a difficult project, reflecting the contestations around who we are, although some progress has been made.

Secondly, expectations need to be moderated in terms of what can be achieved during the country's 2011–2012 tenure on the Security Council. South Africa can aspire to contribute to changing the world, but how this will be defined is a different issue. Discussions also need to continue as to whether the presence of countries from BASIC, BRIC and IBSA will have significant implications for the Security Council.

Thirdly, there needs to be clarity of thought in what the country wants to achieve, as well as what it is willing to give in order to carry out its undertakings. And finally, there is a tendency to restrict analysis to brief time-frames. The ability to look forward and link issues across a longitudinal time-frame will be important in ensuring consistency in government's decision-making processes. It was noted that the UNSC offers an opportunity with many challenges. South Africa's position on the Security Council is not to be taken lightly and there is an acknowledgement of the responsibility on behalf of the people of South Africa. Engaging with society in critical discussion on the country's performance is an approach that the government sets out to follow.

ANNEXES

APPENDIX 1

Speech by Minister Maite Nkoana-Mashabane at the Institute for Strategic and Political Affairs (ISPA) and the Department of Political Sciences (University of Pretoria) Seminar on 'South Africa's Second Term as a Non-Permanent Member of the UN Security Council', 15 October 2010.

Programme Director,
Vice Chancellor,
Staff and students of the University of Pretoria,
Ladies and Gentlemen.

"I look upon the United Nations as the only organization that holds out any hope for the future of mankind." These were the words of Kwame Nkrumah in his address to the United Nations General Assembly in September 1960. At that time, our continent was emerging from the dark years of colonialism as one African country after another was gaining its independence.

Nkrumah described that moment in his own way in the same speech, that: "This is a new day in Africa and as I speak now, thirteen new African nations have taken their seats this year in this august Assembly as independent sovereign states.... There are now twenty-two of us in this Assembly and there are yet more to come".

Today, the number of African countries who are members of the United Nations has more than doubled from the twenty-two in September 1960 as Nkrumah had predicted. But one fact that remains unchanged is that as Africans we look upon the United Nations, as Nkrumah did, as the central pillar of our international system – as a multilateral organization that holds out any hope for the future of humanity and our planet.

It is for this reason that we are members of the United Nations. It is this faith that we have in this organisation that gives us every reason to support and promote its work, including serving in its key organs such as

the Security Council. Our election to this Council on Tuesday as a non-permanent member is therefore consistent with our national interests and our vision for a better Africa and a better world.

I must therefore thank the University of Pretoria for organising this seminar and extending the invitation to us. We see this seminar as an example of true partnership between our Department, DIRCO, and our research community. By organising this seminar through the Institute for Strategic and Political Affairs and the Department of Political Sciences, this university is sending out a clear message that it wants to assist our country to succeed in its second tenure in the Security Council. It is giving meaning to our belief that “working together we can do more”.

Programme Director,

South Africa is honoured to have been once again elected by the United Nations General Assembly to serve on the organisation’s Security Council. We would like to express our utmost thanks to the international community for the 182 votes we received. By electing us, the international community has once again acknowledged our ability, capacity and commitment to contribute to the advancement of the cause of international peace and security.

As a country, South Africa is humbled, and at the same time delighted by the overwhelming support it received from the member states of the United Nations during these elections. We cannot afford to betray the confidence of the UN member states and the international community at large in our ability to contribute and further advance the cause of international peace and security and international law during our tenure on the Security Council.

We come back into the UNSC emboldened, and sincerely hope we will be able to contribute to peace, security and development.

In making our contribution as UNSC member for 2011–2012, we will build on our achievements and the lessons learnt during our previous tenure in the Security Council in 2007–2008. There must be continuity to consolidate our gains, but also change to improve on our work and respond effectively to emerging global issues and challenges.

South Africa is cognizant of the enormous challenges associated with serving on the Council. You will recall that the UNSC bears primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, in accordance with Article 24 of the Charter of the United Nations. It is the only international body entitled to authorise the use of force in situations not involving individual or collective self-defence, as defined in Article 51

of the Charter. Accordingly, the Council is designed to address threats to international peace and security exclusively and to function continuously.

Therefore the Charter of the United Nations bestows on the Security Council the high responsibility “for the maintenance of international peace and security” and South Africa will, in the execution of these responsibilities, play her part, as a responsible member, in answering this high calling by giving effect to the purpose and principles of the UN Charter.

Also, the UN Charter, in Article 29, establishes subsidiary bodies of the UNSC and also empowers the Council to establish additional subsidiary bodies as it deems necessary. As such, these bodies are designed to enable the Council to explore some issues in greater depth, to monitor and facilitate implementation of some of its decisions, and to oversee the implementation of sanctions. More often than not, work conducted in these bodies is often under-reported.

It should therefore come as no surprise that the membership of the Council brings with it heavy responsibilities and challenges as UNSC members find themselves at the forefront of the international community’s efforts to resolve some of the most pressing peace and security issues facing the world.

South Africa is expected to chair at least one subsidiary body and be a lead nation on one of the country-specific agenda items of the UNSC. Thus, the country will need to balance the often divergent expectations of domestic constituencies and international audiences. As such, the country will have to contend with the formidable limitations that exist within the Security Council including a pre-determined agenda, and the reality of power and influence that are unevenly distributed within the Council.

We will be serving on the Council at a time of many challenges, such as the holding of a referendum in Southern Sudan, debates on the Iranian nuclear program, the deteriorating condition in Somalia, the long-standing crisis in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question, and the eminent draw-down or exit of key UN peacekeeping operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Chad/Central African Republic. Countering terrorism is another priority in the international arena.

Notwithstanding these realities and challenges, we believe that South Africa’s continued commitment and track-record on the peaceful resolution of conflicts on the African continent and globally, have prepared us for the task at hand. Internationally, South Africa is among the top twenty contributors to UN police and peacekeeping operations and has deployed personnel to major UN peacekeeping missions in the Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Our role in the Security Council will be informed by the central thrust of our foreign policy which stands on four pillars – that is:

- Promoting and advancing the interests of our continent, including the SADC sub-region;
- Working with countries of the South to address challenges of underdevelopment, our marginalisation in the international system, and the promotion of equity and social justice globally;
- Work with countries of the North to develop a true and effective partnership for a better world;
- Do our part to strengthen the multilateral system, including its transformation, to reflect the diversity of our nations, and ensure its centrality in global governance.

In this regard, we will continue our efforts aimed at bringing greater alignment to the work of the Security Council and that of the African Union, especially the AU Peace and Security Council of which South Africa is currently a member. Concerted and dedicated efforts will be made to achieve stability and security in our continent and all other regions of the world.

This will be the continuation of our firm resolve to strengthening effective partnerships between the UN and regional organisations in the maintenance of international peace and security. It will also help intensify the work South Africa has already undertaken in conflict prevention and resolution, peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction in many African countries.

Closer cooperation between the UN Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council will contribute to enhancing the convergence of perspectives and approaches of the two bodies in tackling and responding to peace and security challenges in Africa – be it in the Sudan or in Somalia.

Our presence in the Security Council should afford us the opportunity to build on the capacity demonstrated by South Africa during its first term in the Council in 2007 and 2008 and further enhance our commitment to being a responsible member of the international community.

We will endeavour to utilise membership of the UNSC in a manner that will add value to the work of the Council. In this context, South Africa will play an active role in the activities of the Security Council committees, working groups, commissions and other structures. We will endeavour to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security by *inter alia* participating in the Council's conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction agenda.

Our membership of the Council for 2011–2012 will be guided by our commitment to strengthening the multilateral system and our support for a broader multilateral approach to questions of international peace and security.

Guided by our own national experience in transforming peacefully from apartheid and isolation to democracy, South Africa hopes to utilize its own experience in the prioritisation of diplomacy, broad consultation, transparency, and reconciliation. Bearing in mind that a substantial focus of UNSC activities and agenda items are on the African continent, South Africa will continue to champion and advance the African agenda and collaborate with other African member states (Gabon and Nigeria) currently serving on the UNSC in pursuing issues of mutual benefit.

Crucially, the country's strategy will also entail promoting a culture of collective responsibility and collective responses in dealing with challenges of the contemporary world.

Ladies and gentlemen

The work of the Security Council, important as it is, is but a portion of the mandate that our nations have given to the United Nations. In addition to working for peace and security in the world, the United Nations is a leader in advancing development at the global level, promoting human rights, and protecting our planet and its people.

Indeed, for us, peace and security, development, and good governance, go hand in hand. This is a thinking that informs our approach to the integration of our continent for greater unity. This is the thinking that led us to transform the Organisation for African Unity into the African Union. This is the thinking that gave birth to the NEPAD, and its African Peer Review Mechanism.

As South Africa, we are privileged to have been and continue to be an active part of these initiatives aimed at contributing to the global effort to promote peace and security, development, and human rights. We were also given the rare honour by the African Union to host the secretariats of the NEPAD and the APRM as well as the Pan-African Parliament. We will continue to provide whatever support we can to ensure that these institutions succeed in the mandate given to them by the African Union.

South Africa's vision of the African continent is one that is prosperous, peaceful, democratic, non-racial, non-sexist and united and which contributes to a world that is just and equitable.

As you all know, we will be participating, and actively so, at COP 16 to be held in Mexico in December [2010]. The success of this conference

is critical to the global endeavour to protect our environment, especially against the threat of climate change. When we host COP17 on our shores next year [in 2011], we will build on the achievements we will work hard for in Mexico.

Furthermore, South African – its government and people - has not hesitated to join the international community in the global humanitarian effort. For instance, we did our part, and we will continue to do so, be it in Haiti in the wake of the earthquake or in Pakistan in face of the floods. I must also use this opportunity to recognise and thank South Africans who made a contribution to the rescue of the thirty-three miners in Chile. This was a nail-biting rescue effort that kept us glued to our TV screens. This was so because we care for the lives of others. We care for each other... we care for our planet.

Our membership of the Security Council will not take our attention away from our pressing domestic challenges. Nor is it wastage of our limited fiscal resources. No! Global peace and security has direct impact on us. It can affect the price of our strategic imports such as oil, or even weaken the demand for our own exports. It can destabilise our neighbours, and engender a humanitarian crisis with a serious bearing on our national security. It can trigger global economic collapse, including the collapse of our own economy. The biggest expense to the South African taxpayers, in our view, is the lack of peace and continued conflict.

Our presence within the Council, we believe, will help the country in building up institutional and substantive knowledge of the Council, and the entire UN system.

We remain committed to the five priorities determined by our government of job creation, education, health, crime prevention, rural and land reform. Our responsibility is to constantly ensure that these national priorities find expression in our work at the regional, continental and international level. In this context our membership of international organisations, including that of the United Nations Security Council, should mutually reinforce what we want to achieve in our country.

Accordingly, in anticipation of our election to the Security Council, we have taken necessary measures as a country to ensure that we indeed learn from our 2007–2008 experience. We are going to need a strong coordination effort on the part of government to enable us to improve on our capacity to respond rapidly and effectively when required to do so.

We will be communicating more, better and faster with our people, every step of the way, especially regarding positions we will take on debates within the Security Council. We will not trade our constitutional values and the

rich tradition of struggle against injustice for political point-scoring. South Africans have to trust our judgment and never doubt our loyalty to our Constitution.

I wish to remind you here of what former President Nelson Mandela said in his farewell speech to the United Nations in September 1998 about our country's commitment to human rights in the pursuit of our foreign policy. He said that: "For those who had to fight for their emancipation, such as ourselves who, with your help, had to free ourselves from the criminal apartheid system, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights served as the vindication of the justice of our cause".

He then went on in the same speech to identify challenges for the future with the following words, that:

"Thus can we say that the challenge posed by the next 50 years of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, by the next century whose character it must help to fashion, consists in whether humanity, and especially those who will occupy positions of leadership, will have the courage to ensure that, at last, we build a human world consistent with the provisions of that historic Declaration and other human rights instruments that have been adopted since 1948".

Ladies and gentlemen, President Jacob Zuma's Administration will not depart from this vision that Madiba outlined of an international system that is firmly grounded on human rights values and principles as espoused in relevant legal instruments.

Furthermore, we also aware that effective coordination with the five permanent members of the Security Council is key to constructive participation in the Security Council, and we are indeed giving this some attention. We intend to work with the P5 members in a manner that will enhance the mandate and agenda of the Security Council and that of the UN in general.

Additionally, the fact that we will be in the Council at the same time with the IBSA and BRIC countries should help benefit the work of the Council in advancing the broad agenda of the United Nations and the enhancement of a rules-based international system.

Our membership of the Council will also benefit enormously from good coordination with African countries on the Council as well as the continental peace and security architecture of the AU, including those at sub-regional level such as the SADC Organ.

All in all, South Africa recognizes the importance of continuing to work together with all members of the AU and the UN in pursuit of an effective system of global governance. We will forge partnerships with Security Council and non-Council members from across the spectrum on important socio-economic developmental matters, as well as on areas such as security sector reform, and disarmament and non-proliferation issues.

Programme Director,

Today we are standing at the crossroad of the dawn of another era for Africa. African countries that were taking their seats at the United Nations General Assembly in 1960 when Nkrumah made his address, this year celebrated the 50th anniversary of their independence. Africa is now finding her way out of the predicament that set us back in the past fifty years which entailed our failure to address challenges of peace and security, development, and democratic governance.

The United Nations is an important partner for Africa in working with us to overcome these critical challenges.

In his address to the UN General Assembly last year September [2009], President Zuma spoke to the core focus of our engagement with the United Nations as a country and continent when he said that:

We must act now, together, to halt the degradation of the environment ... The eradication of poverty must remain central to the work of the United Nations. It must continue to work harder to unite the world to work to alleviate the suffering of the world's poor and marginalised ... The United Nations must play a significant role in finding solutions to the global economic crisis. The crisis should not be an excuse to delay further action on the delivery of the Millennium Development Goals. Rather, it should urge us to double our efforts to achieve greater and faster progress ... The crisis has further highlighted the urgent need for the fundamental reform of the Bretton Woods institutions ... These institutions have been unrepresentative since their formation a half century ago ... Similarly, if we are to eradicate poverty there is an urgent need to conclude the Doha Round of trade negotiations in a manner that prioritises development.

President Zuma emphasised in the same speech that “We continue to work for an African renewal, and welcome the ongoing support of the UN system in addressing the challenges facing the continent. Now more than ever, it is necessary for the United Nations to ensure that the international community collectively implements the commitments made to Africa.”

The United Nations itself is also at the dawn of a new era. Negotiations for its reform, including the expansion of its Security Council, are at an advanced stage – there should be no turning back.

Our world is in need of a Security Council of the United Nations that has been expanded in both the permanent and non-permanent categories, and with improved working methods. This will make the Security Council more legitimate, representative and effective as a body – so that it can become more transparent and accountable.

The successful conclusion of these negotiations and the consequent implementation of the reforms will ensure that indeed the United Nations is well and better positioned to play its role as a multilateral organization that holds out any hope for the future of our planet and its people.

As government, we will not achieve the objectives of our Security Council membership on our own. We can only do well and better when we work together with our people. We will need to forge and consolidate a common understanding with various stakeholders in our country. We will therefore be in constant contact with you as academics, students, media and the people of South Africa for feedback and advice on how we could enhance our participation in the Security Council. It is our fervent hope that we will collectively work together to make our two-year tenure in the Security Council a success.

Remember that the opening lines of the Preamble of the Charter of the United Nations speak of “We the Peoples of the United Nations” – not “We the States or Governments of the United Nations”.

The United Nations belongs to the people ... to all of us!

I thank you!

(Available online at <http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/2010/mash1015.html>)

APPENDIX 2

‘South Africa takes up its Seat on the United Nations Security Council’. Media briefing: Minister Nkoana-Mashabane, 5 January 2011.

South Africa on 1 January 2011 began its second term as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council for the period 2011 and 2012. South Africa will serve alongside the Permanent Five members, China, France, the Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States, and elected members Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Colombia, Gabon, Germany, India, Lebanon, Nigeria and Portugal.

South Africa in the conduct of its international relations is committed to garner support for our domestic priorities; to promote the interests of the African continent; to promote democracy and human rights; uphold justice and international law in relations between nations; seek the peaceful resolution of conflicts; and promote economic development through regional and international co-operation in an inter-dependent world. We also strongly believe in the concept and practice of good governance, as one of several important tools and instruments at the disposal of nations in their conduct of world affairs.

In pursuance of these principles, the South African government adheres to and strongly supports a multilateral, rules-based system. We approach our membership of the Security Council from the premise that the United Nations remains the most appropriate forum for addressing international challenges in the maintenance of international peace and security, which are best served through collective co-operation.

These principles will guide our actions, as we discharge our responsibility, alongside the other members of the Security Council, to make a meaningful contribution to peace, security and development, not only on our continent, but globally. To this end South Africa will forge close partnerships and promote greater consultation with the other members of the Security Council in the conduct of its work.

Whilst the above principles and values that guide our international work are strong and sustainable we are cognizant of the fact that actual implementation is sometimes not straight forward. The environment in which we will be operating namely the Security Council is the body which has powers beyond any other. The power configuration is not in favour of the non-permanent members and national interests sometimes override international commitments. The unfair use or abuse of diplomatic tools at members’ discretion can make the work of the Security Council very difficult.

For the first time the configuration of the Council in 2011 will reflect the membership of a potentially reformed Council. In addition to the Permanent Five, we will have the so-called Emerging Powers, some of which aspire to permanent membership, as well as IBSA and BRICS represented in the Council. South Africa and Nigeria will at the same time also be members of the African Union Peace and Security Council, presenting a unique opportunity to bring greater alignment to the work of these two bodies regarding conflict on our continent. South Africa will seek to strengthen co-operation between the G3 (Gabon, Nigeria and South Africa) in the Council, with the aim of elevating the African agenda and the achievement of peace and security on our continent and to coordinate efforts in this regard more efficiently. This is important in a Council where influence is unevenly distributed and certain members play a dominant role.

South Africa will continue its efforts to promote and enhance the Security Council's cooperation with regional organizations, particularly the African Union's Peace and Security Council. Closer co-operation between these two bodies will contribute to enhancing the convergence of perspectives and approaches in dealing with and responding to peace and security challenges on our continent.

South Africa will actively contribute to the work of the Security Council by participating in its committees, working groups and other structures. These bodies assist the Council to explore issues in greater depth and to monitor and facilitate implementation of its decisions. In 2011, South Africa in line with its foreign policy priorities, will chair the 1540 Committee dealing with weapons of mass destruction and non-state actors and the Working Group on Conflict Prevention in Africa. South Africa will also serve as Vice-Chair of the Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia Sanctions Committees.

Security Council membership will also present an opportunity to contribute to reforming the working methods of the Security Council and to work towards the achievement of a representative, legitimate and more effective Security Council. Through our daily interactions with the P5 and other Council members, we will attempt to persuade and convince them of the need for the early conclusion of the reform process.

During our membership of the Security Council we will be cognizant of the Charter mandated roles of the different UN principal organs. We will continue to assert that the Security Council, which is entrusted with the maintenance of international peace and security, is but one of these albeit the most important one, because it may authorize the use of force. We will continue to assert the role of the other principal organs, such as the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and the International Court of Justice and argue for vigilance in the Security Council usurping

the mandates of these other organs. We remain aware that the formation of major power groupings will contribute to the quality of work that the Security Council will produce.

In our membership of the Council for 2011 and 2012, we will build on our achievements and lessons learned during our first term in 2007 and 2008. We will use the opportunity to consolidate the gains made during this term, but also be aware of the changes we need to make to improve our work to respond effectively to the global issues and challenges facing us.

South Africa will be serving in the Council at a time of great challenges, amongst them the holding of a referendum in Southern Sudan, the crisis in Somalia and Côte d'Ivoire, debates on the Iranian nuclear programme, the situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question and the drawdown or exit of UN peacekeeping operations.


In the attainment of its objectives in the Security Council, Government will be consulting widely with all stakeholders on how South Africa's participation at the Security Council can be enhanced and will take steps to ensure that our public is kept informed.

The following is the list of countries that will lead the main subsidiary bodies of the Security Council:

<i>Subsidiary Bodies</i>	<i>Chair</i>	<i>Vice-Chair</i>
Documentation and Procedural Questions	Bosnia & Herzegovina	
DRC	Brazil	Gabon Lebanon
Côte d'Ivoire	Brazil	Germany South Africa
Timor-Leste	Brazil	
Lebanon	Gabon	Germany Bosnia & Herzegovina
Liberia	Lebanon	Portugal South Africa
Iraq	Nigeria	India
Peacekeeping	Nigeria	
Sudan	Colombia	Bosnia and Herzegovina India
Iran	Colombia	Nigeria
1267 Committee	Germany	Brazil Russian Federation

Children and Armed Conflict (CAAC)	Germany	
Afghanistan	Germany	
Somalia/Eritrea	India	Lebanon Nigeria
Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC)	India	France Gabon Russian Federation
1566 Working Group	India	
DPRK	Portugal	Lebanon Nigeria
International Tribunals	Portugal	
1540 Committee	South Africa	Lebanon Portugal United Kingdom
Conflict Prevention in Africa	South Africa	

(Available online, at <http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/2011/mash0105.html>)





SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT-CIVIL SOCIETY STRATEGY DIALOGUE IN PREPARATION FOR SOUTH AFRICA'S 2011-2012 UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL NON-PERMANENT SEAT

18 November 2010

DIRCO, Pretoria

08:30 WELCOME

OPENING OF STRATEGY DIALOGUE

08:30 – 08:45 Dr. Ayanda Ntsaluba (Director General, DIRCO)

SETTING THE SCENE: REFLECTION 2007-2008

Chair: Dr. Ngwenya (SAIIA)

08:45 – 09:15 SPEAKER:

Ambassador Dumisani Kumalo (DIRCO)

09:15 – 09:20 DISCUSSANT:

Dr Siphamandla Zondi (IGD)

09:20 – 10:00 DISCUSSION

10:00 – 10:10 TEA

TOWARDS SA IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL 2011-2012

Chair: Ambassador AS Minty (Deputy Director-General, DIRCO)

SPEAKERS:

10:10 – 10:20 Ambassador Baso Sangqu (DIRCO)

10:20 – 10:30 Prof. Anthoni van Nieuwkerk (Wits)

10:30 – 10:40 Mr Peter Fabricius (The Star)

DISCUSSANT:

10:40 – 10:50 Dr Jakkie Cilliers (ISS)

10:50 – 12:00 DISCUSSION

CLOSING REFLECTIONS

12:00 – 12:30 Dr Ayanda Ntsaluba (Director General, DIRCO)

12:30 – 13:30 LUNCH

NOTES

- 1 D. Kumalo (2006) The UN: a personal appreciation. The UN at 60: A new spin on an old hub. (Eds) G. le Pere and N. Samasuwo. Institute for Global Dialogue, Midrand., pp. 35-36.
- 2 This relates to the Protection of Information Bill and the Promotion of Access to Information Act (PAIA).
- 3 The official South African interpretation of national security is informed by the human security paradigm. Its current defence and intelligence policy frameworks state that that “[i]n the new South Africa national security is no longer viewed as a predominantly military and police problem. It has broadened to incorporate political, economic, social and environmental matters. At the heart of this new approach is the paramount concern with the security of the people. Security is an all-encompassing condition in which individual citizens live in freedom, peace and safety; participate fully in the process of governance; enjoy the protection of fundamental rights; have access to resources and the basic necessities of life; and inhabit an environment which is not detrimental to their health and well-being.”
- 4 Speech by Minister Maite Nkoana-Mashabane on “South Africa’s Second Term as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council”, 15 October 2010.
- 5 Thematic issues on the Security Council’s agenda include: Children and Armed Conflict; Cooperation with Regional Organisations; Energy, Security and Climate; Justice, Impunity and Rule of Law Issues; Natural Resources and Conflict; Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict; Security Council Working Methods; Security Sector Reform; Sexual Exploitation; Small Arms; Terrorism; and Women, Peace and Security.



ISBN 978 -1-920216-30-6



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