

## The shifting nature of peacekeeping in Africa

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Africa faces a multiplicity of 'old' and 'new' security challenges – perennial armed conflicts on the one hand, and communicable diseases, massive migration, transnational organised crime, famine, hunger, and the impact of climate change on the other. What is interesting is that the 'new' challenges seem to be nourished by the same 'old' security problems.<sup>1</sup> Both have particularly been prevalent in the regional 'security complexes' or multi-linked conflict systems, of the Great Lakes, West Africa, and the Horn of Africa. The interconnected nature of these security challenges in these regions makes it particularly difficult for UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs) to be effective or properly targeted. Not surprisingly, in the past decade, the nature of peacekeeping in Africa has had to change radically to meet these challenges. This is particularly true of the way in which new missions are now comprised, funded, driven or controlled, and legitimised.

### Hybrid arrangements

What can be observed is the emergence of greater security co-operation and hybrid arrangements, variously involving combinations of both regional and global players, such as the EU and the African Union (AU), and regional economic communities (RECs), such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). In the sequencing of these emerging co-operative peacekeeping arrangements, the UN is usually brought in to legitimise peacekeeping operations. It is worrying, however, that the UN is involved at the end of the process of putting together hybrid missions – in some cases, when the major funders of the missions (for example, the United States and Britain) have already decided on how resources committed will be utilised.

However, such emerging peacekeeping and peace-building strategies are a reflection of the shifting and complex nature of responses to security challenges on the African continent. Thus, in situations where they make a difference by preventing genocide, for example, hybrid or co-operative arrangements should be welcome. At the same time, questions need to be raised with particular reference to issues of international legitimacy, and the long-term impact they have on the already fragile continental and global multilateral security architecture. Do new or hybrid approaches to peacekeeping operations mean that the UN has finally lost its traditional comparative advantage to new actors or formations? Do Africa's new experiments in co-operative security represent the face of the future of peacekeeping in light of the UN's failure to act, say, in Rwanda and Sierra Leone in the 1990s? If not, what are the solutions for the continent's 'old' and 'new' security challenges? This brief attempts to grapple with these questions.

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Figure 1: African conflict systems, September 2007



As of September 2007 there were ten wars or regional conflicts in Africa. These were the Ugandan civil war and the conflict in the eastern DRC; the interlinked conflicts in Darfur, Chad, and the Central African Republic; the Somali civil war; Ogaden conflict, and Eritrea-Ethiopia border conflict; the Tuareg rebellion on the borders of Niger and Mali; the Casamance conflict in Senegal; and the Niger Delta conflict in Nigeria. The latter two are 'stand-alone' conflicts and are not interlinked.

### The nature of African conflicts

We need to understand the nature of conflicts in Africa in order to get a sense of how they are to be addressed. African conflicts result mainly from a complex set of interlinked issues in a given setting. Most conflicts are explained by the failure to manage intra-state tensions due to the inability of weak states, such as Somalia, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and the Comoros, and, sometimes, strong states, such as South Africa, Nigeria, and Uganda,

to act as a neutral arbiter between protagonists fighting for political space or access to resources. Most of these conflicts, therefore, have also tended to take on an ethnic dimension. In cases where violent ethnic conflicts have broken out, those in control of the state or those in power have tended to fuel violence rather than diffuse existing tensions.

The tendency has been for localised ethnic conflicts to spread quickly across borders, thereby resulting in the emergence of conflict systems that draw in neighbouring countries. The problem has been that most conflict interven-

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tions have come too late, often after the conflicts have already developed into a larger conflict system. Thus, the main challenge for the UN and the AU has been how to manage and even separate multiple protagonists in a larger conflict system which involves several countries. It is in this regard that the predictable prospects of failure of peacekeeping intervention in recent years have raised doubts about the effectiveness of traditional peacekeeping.

### The death of 'old' UN peacekeeping?

The prevalence of conflict in Africa explains why there is a preponderance of UN peacekeeping operations on the continent. This was especially true of the 1990s, when spending on peacekeeping swelled from US\$266 million in 1988 to US\$3.1 billion by 1993.<sup>2</sup> Traditionally, such peacekeeping has been used by the UN to assist countries ravaged by war and conflicts to create conditions for sustainable peace. In this regard, the UN has played the role of both monitor and observer in peace processes. It has been a critical player in assisting ex-combatants in implementing peace agreements. The UN role takes many forms, including putting confidence-building measures and power-sharing arrangements in place, electoral support, strengthening the rule of law, and more importantly, helping to build economic and social infrastructure. UN personnel or 'blue helmets' deployed on peacekeeping missions are mostly armed soldiers who do not have to engage in combat. However, in recent times 'blue helmets' have been drawn into conflict, albeit in self-defence. Furthermore, as a general rule, UN troops have been deployed only when ceasefire arrangements are in place, and when the parties to the conflict give their consent to deployment. The peacekeepers' role has been to observe the situation on the ground, and report impartially any infringements to the ceasefire, or violations of other elements of the peace agreement or mandate given to them.

The UN charter, under its chapter VII provisions, gives the Security Council the authority and responsibility to take collective action to maintain international peace and security. Traditionally, all UNPKOs have been placed under a UN operational command, even though peacekeepers remained members of their respective armed forces. There have been some exceptions to this rule where UN involvement was not considered appropriate or feasible, thereby prompting the Security Council, under chapter VIII of the charter, to authorise regional organisations or continental bodies such as

ECOWAS or the AU, or a combination of 'coalitions of the willing', to undertake peacekeeping or peace-enforcement tasks. In all, Africa has had its mixed share of difficult but relatively successful UNPKOs. These include UNAMSIL (Sierra Leone), MONUC (DRC), UNMIL (Liberia), UNOCI (Ivory Coast), MINURSO (Western Sahara), and UNMEE (Ethiopia and Eritrea). However, in Somalia, the UN operations UNOSOM I and II, and the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), resulted in total failures for the UN as peacekeepers in those countries. It became the target of the protagonists when the original UNISOM mandates to keep the peace changed to disarming the protagonists. This resulted in the peacekeepers engaging the protagonists with force in order to disarm them.

Despite some notable successes, UNPKOs in Africa have been faced with massive challenges. While some of the operations on the continent simply failed to protect civilians from genocide or to sustain peace, others have tended to drag on for years, seemingly with no end in sight. The problem of open-ended peacekeeping mandates has in recent years led to calls by major donor countries for the closure or scrapping of some of the older missions on financial grounds, or as a way of reducing the peacekeeping budget. Some of the most vehement calls to scrap old mandates have come from the United States, which contributed 26 per cent of the UNPKO budget in 2006. Over the years, the country's contributions to the UNPKOs have largely been financial, and not actual personnel. This is because a presidential directive of May 1994 forbids the United States military from being deployed on peace-enforcement missions; however, the United States government has the prerogative to decide which 'peace missions' it will undertake and which ones it will not.<sup>3</sup> This refers more to UN-led peace missions which do not affect unilateral United States missions. This policy dates back to the early 1990s, when UN troops were drawn into a conflict with Mohamed Farah Aideed in Somalia, thereby forcing their mission to shift from its original humanitarian objectives to a broader strategy of peace enforcement and disarmament. Not least, in October 1993, this culminated in the deaths of 18 United States Army Rangers who were not under UN control.

Since the events of 1993 in Somalia, other Western nations have also been reluctant to send troops to Africa's conflict zones. Canada is a good example of this increasing Western reluctance to contribute troops. The country was formerly a reliable troop contributor, and a leader in peacekeeping up to 1994. In the early 1990s, Canada contributed more than 10 per cent of all peacekeeping troops to the UN. Approximately 4 500 Canadian troops were deployed at one

time to more than 12 UN missions in 1994–1995. Canada's seriousness of purpose in peacekeeping duties has further been demonstrated with the development, since 1994, of the Lester B Pearson Peacekeeping Training Centre, which signalled a commitment to assist other UN member states with diverse training courses, both on site and abroad. As of February 2007, however, Canada has had only 14 troops and 41 military observers on UN peacekeeping duty. From being at the forefront of participating member states in the early 1990s, Canada now ranks 62nd in UN troop contributions. The reason is that the country now views its 'interests' as best served through deep harmonisation and integration with American forces; further participation in the 'war on terror'; and preparing to fight wars rather than keeping peace. This narrow, anti-internationalist agenda is strongly supported by Canada's conservative government, the Bush administration, the Pentagon, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and an increasingly influential military-industrial (academic, media, and corporate) complex in developed countries.<sup>4</sup>

Thus, while Western countries now tend to provide money, poor developing countries have been left to contribute personnel for UNPKOs. This is especially true when one looks at the fact that the ten main troop-contributing countries to UN peacekeeping operations as of March 2007, for example, were Pakistan (10 173), Bangladesh (9 675), India (9 471), Nepal (3 626), Jordan (3 564), Uruguay (2 583), Italy (2 539), Ghana, Nigeria, and France. Interestingly, in 2005 four of the top ten contributors of troops to UN peacekeeping missions were African countries that the United States considers as strategic partners, namely, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Ghana, and South Africa.<sup>5</sup> To some extent, troops from developing countries have been welcome because of the perception among some nervous UN member countries that they are more neutral and less threatening than those from the United States.

Current thinking in the West, as well as within the AU itself, also contributes to this skewed situation in troop contributions. Increasingly, the AU's view is that Africa's conflicts need to be solved by Africans themselves, even though they lack the capacity to do so. This is despite the fact that peacekeeping has been traditionally the domain of the UN. By virtue of their membership in this supranational body, all member countries are supposed to be involved. Not surprisingly, some commentators accuse the West of promoting 'apartheid' in UN peacekeeping. According to one such commentator, under the current system of peacekeeping 'apartheid', 'Africans are expected to spill blood while [rich states] pay some of the bills in a macabre aristocracy of death.'<sup>6</sup>

This situation has not been helped by the fact that several old UN peacekeeping missions have left some conflicts unresolved, such as in Somalia and Western Sahara. Indeed, while some missions have seemed interminable, others have had the effect of sustaining unstable *status quo* situations that have tended to collapse over the long term, particularly following the departure of UN troops. It has been suggested that the only way to deal with the inherent failure of the UN to respond rapidly to dangerous situations, as was the case in Rwanda, is to create hybrid, rapid-reaction forces, possibly led by 'coalitions of the willing'. The argument is that rapid deployments could easily be facilitated outside the auspices of the UN, in situations where powerful countries, such as the United States, can take the lead in providing funding, equipment, and training to 'lead states' or regional powers. Furthermore, it is argued that where stakes are high enough, countries such as the United States will usually not hesitate to send in their own troops for short periods and then withdraw them, while phasing in a 'lead state', the UN, or the AU to stay on for longer periods.

The widespread failures of UN peacekeeping in the mid-1990s prompted Kofi Annan to commission a panel in 2000, led by the Algerian diplomat, Lakhdar Brahimi, to carry out an assessment of all UNPKOs. In turn, the 'Brahimi report' recommended sweeping changes in peacekeeping strategy, doctrine, and operations.<sup>7</sup> Still, the UN's role as a peacekeeper suffered further damage as allegations surfaced of sexual exploitation and abuse by UN staff and its agencies in the field. Subsequent measures to create conduct and discipline units for the UN department for peacekeeping operations (DPKO) at both headquarters and field missions, to monitor and act on allegations of sexual abuse and corruption, seem to have done little to restore lost confidence in the efficacy of 'old' peacekeeping in general.

### Africa's new experiments in co-operative security

Complementary to the UN efforts under chapter VIII of its charter, the AU itself has tried to put in place its own security architecture to deal with the continent's massive security demands and problems. For example, the AU has set up its own Peace and Security Council (PSC) as a collective security mechanism to facilitate timely and quick response to conflicts, as well as to promote and implement peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction.<sup>8</sup> As an organisation, the AU has also undergone a normative shift towards preventive

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diplomacy by adopting a position that non-interference in the internal affairs of another state should not be equated with indifference. Its chairman, Alpha Oumar Konare, has pointed out that 'the notion of non-interference must be revised because it must be never associated with indifference. And this non-indifference must lead to coercive measures, to well adapted and active policies.'<sup>9</sup> The AU is also in the process of strengthening frameworks on a continental early-warning system (CEWS), to facilitate the collection of accurate and timely data before conflicts erupt. However, the problem is that the AU's emerging security architecture still does not have supporting structures or sufficient resources to enable such bodies to work effectively.

Whether as a deliberate strategy or the result of its own structural weaknesses, the AU has leaned towards co-operative security arrangements, with regional powers and RECs playing a far greater role in conflict prevention, peace-enforcement, and peace-building. For example, ECOWAS has played an important role in conflict prevention and peace-enforcement in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Likewise, in the Horn, IGAD has, on numerous occasions, tried to resolve conflicts in Somalia and Ethiopia, albeit with little success. More importantly, the AU has been forced to rely more on the legitimising role of the UN and other external partners, such as the United States and the EU, to deal with Africa's multiple internal security challenges. Although, traditionally, the UN was the only organisation authorised to carry out peacekeeping missions on the continent, its failures in the mid-1990s have spawned 'new thinking' on co-operative security. However, a special division of labour ensures that the UN continues to play a critical role by utilising its comparative advantage in setting standards, and providing technical support, logistics, and equipment. More importantly, the various components of the UN, such as the DPKO and other humanitarian and development agencies, interface with the AU in peace-support operations (PSOs) to prepare for 'an eventual transition to a UN mission.'<sup>10</sup> In this way, the role of the UN and its various arms not only serves to legitimise the emerging co-operative security arrangements, but also provides 'a possible exit strategy for AU peace-support operations' in general.

In several of Africa's many interlinked conflict systems, it has also been demonstrated that 'benevolent hegemonic leadership can under particular circumstances contribute solutions to some of these challenges, though with some structural and operational difficulties.'<sup>11</sup> In recent times, both South Africa and Nigeria have played key roles in Burundi and Liberia. In particular, 'Nigeria's contribution in the form

of fuel, finance, troops and logistic support for operations of the ECOWAS cease-fire monitoring (ECOMOG)' [ECOWAS Monitoring Group] is often cited as one example of how 'hegemonic contributions can underpin [new] collective security responses.'<sup>12</sup> However, observers such as Kwesi Aning are quick to point out that Nigeria's hegemonic potential may be seriously undermined by its own domestic political instability, and 'the feasibility of its own collapse if the present divisive politics are not resolved.'<sup>13</sup> Also, South Africa has 'been similarly influential in determining collective responses to security challenges, reflecting its political willingness, institutional strengths, and resource availability' in places such as Ivory Coast, Burundi, and the DRC. However, the risk in relying on these two regional powers (Nigeria and South Africa) is that both countries are severely constrained by competing internal demands and consolidating their own 'domestic democratic processes.'<sup>14</sup>

Beyond its reliance on these two 'benevolent' powers, the AU has, out of necessity, been forced to lean on the support of so-called 'lead states' or regional military powers, such as Ethiopia and Uganda, in dealing with conflicts in the Horn. This is despite the fact that some of these states have no clean human-rights records or democratic credentials to speak of. Still, with the support of the United States, Ethiopia's military machine helped the transitional federal government (TFG) in Somalia to expel the Union of Islamic Courts in December 2006. This 'victory', however, has since been short-lived, thereby forcing the AU to intervene. While a proposed AU force of 8 000 African troops has failed to materialise, Uganda has so far deployed 1 200 troops as part of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

Since the capacities of both Ethiopia and Uganda to sustain the effort are obviously in doubt, in the short to medium term, Somalia is likely to descend into the kind of instability similar to that which it experienced in the past decade and a half. The situation in the Horn, and further afield in West Africa and the Sahel, therefore, presents the AU with the 'devil's choice' of riding the tiger by joining forces with United States in its global war on terror. In the post-9/11 era, Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Uganda have become the United States' main strategic partners on the continent. Ethiopia, for example, is increasingly being spoken of as being on the frontline in efforts to root out al-Qaeda's infrastructure in Africa. Indications are that the United States funded, trained, and equipped the Ethiopian 'invasion' of Somalia in 2007. In other words, the United States effectively and indirectly funded the precursor to the AMISOM, and is subsequently funding Uganda's participation

in Somalia (the only other contributing country to AMISOM).

On the other hand, Nigeria's oil wealth, coupled with its complex blend of communal tensions and regional power status in West Africa, made the country the United States' obvious partner in the war against terror in West Africa.<sup>15</sup> In this regard, the threat of terror networks embedding themselves in Africa's conflict systems has led the United States to mount counter-terrorist initiatives such as the Pan Sahelian Initiative (PSI) and Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorist Initiatives (TSCTI). In all these situations, the United States has shown greater willingness to fund, train, and equip 'lead states' that align themselves with its anti-terror initiatives. For better or worse, the AU and, of course, the UN, have both been left to co-operate with and provide legitimacy to unilateral initiatives in the interests of continental stability.

The problem is that lack of resources and capacity on the part of the UN and the AU has created space or opportunities for global powers such as the United States to advance their own foreign-policy interests, in the name of Africa's peace-enforcement and peace-building. A good example of this is the United States government's announcement in 2007 of its plan to create a new military and security command centre for Africa – the Africa Command (AFRICOM) – to strengthen United States security co-operation with Africa, and create new opportunities to bolster the capabilities of its African partners. Even though the project is said to be a security command centre, the United States claims that AFRICOM will work to promote democracy, health, education, economic growth, and development. Observers are, however, highly sceptical of the United States' intentions, with some suggesting that the idea is to set up a command centre in the Horn of Africa, possibly in Ethiopia, to provide a base from which to launch attacks against terrorist groups in the area and the rest of the Middle East. In fact, one such observer argues that AFRICOM will not only act as a conduit for entrenching United States interests on the continent, but will also act as both a source and magnet for Africa's destabilisation.<sup>16</sup> The fact of the matter is that the AFRICOM project will ensure that Africans unwittingly fight the United States' unilateralist 'war on terror'. As usual, the United States will provide financing, equipment, and intelligence.

The sheer scale of PSOs needed to deal with Africa's known security challenges has also forced the AU to accept the supportive or co-operative role of other Western external partners. One good example of this is that of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), which is to be replaced by a hybrid peacekeeping force in Darfur. The AU was never going

to cope on its own in Darfur, and entry of the UN became critical in addressing the deficiencies of AMIS. In fact, the situation in Sudan has generated so much Western interest that donors have been accused of being 'more anxious than African leaders to get into Darfur'.<sup>17</sup> According to new thinking on co-operative peacekeeping, a joint UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) and AMIS operation demonstrates that the concept of a hybrid force has become a reality for the future. The argument is that before the hybrid force eventually becomes a full-blown UN multi-functional peacekeeping and peace-building mission, it will, in the interim, enable the UN, the AU, and the EU to complement each other with different sets of skills, expertise, and experiences. However, the idea of introducing a Western-staffed hybrid force in Darfur, even as a contingency measure, has caused a lot of uneasiness, not least on the part of the Sudanese government. Khartoum's acceptance in principle of the hybrid initiative was a move to ward off pressure from outside, as it deliberates over the next stage in the implementation of the hybrid force, which involves timelines and specific responsibilities of the AU and UN in Darfur. The other challenge, however, is the question of how the UN and AU will work together. On 7 June 2007, the UN and AU agreed on a command structure of a joint peacekeeping force to be deployed in Darfur. Under the plan, the AU will run the day-to-day operations, while the UN will have overall command of the mission.

### Audit of the progress of the African Standby Force

The African Standby Force (ASF) is intended to be an international, continental African military force, with both a civilian and police component, under the direction of the AU. It is to be deployed in times of crisis in Africa. It is planned that by 2010 the force will be operational. The genesis of the ASF is contained in a document that provides a framework for its structure. This document was adopted by the third meeting of African chiefs of defence staff on 15–16 May 2003, in Addis Ababa. The establishment of the ASF has been envisioned in two parts:

1. RECs would complement the AU by establishing regional standby forces up to brigade size.
2. In time, the idea is that the AU will be good enough at peacekeeping activities to handle missions with varying degrees of complexity, thereby allowing the ASF to maintain a purely supplemental role.

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Currently, Africa's five regions are in the process of setting up their regional brigades and agreeing on issues of harmonisation and standardisation between them. The headquarters of the ASF are in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The status of regional brigades as of 30 September 2005 was that the ECOWAS Standby Brigade (ECOBRIg) was the only brigade that had gone through its planning phase, and was fully functional. The least functional is the North African Standby Brigade (NASBRIg), which is under the control of the Arab Maghreb Union. Slow progress in the establishment of NASBRIg is explained by festering rivalries among the various countries in the regions. Some of the tensions hinge on the Western Sahara crisis. Overall, the major problem affecting the establishment of other regional brigades – such as the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) Standby Brigade, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Standby Brigade (SASBRIg), and Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIg) – has been the failure of countries in respective regions to honour their pledges to contribute troops towards the brigades. Some progress, however, has been made by most RECs in incorporating continental planning into regional force arrangements, signing of memoranda of understanding and host nation agreements, and drafting of the necessary policy framework.

### A critique of new peacekeeping paradigms

The rise of the 'new' peacekeeping as an alternative to the 'old' could potentially create more problems than provide solutions. One of the problems with hybrid force arrangements is the risk of tensions emerging between the UN and AU. This is because the UN not only has the moral authority, but also has certain clear comparative advantages in setting global security standards, and providing humanitarian assistance and development. Besides, as with the case of the Darfur situation in Sudan, questions of the legitimacy of hybrid arrangements have been raised by some African governments. For example, the Sudanese government has on many occasions challenged the authority or legality of hybrid force deployments in Darfur. This is because Khartoum would not like to see Western troops form part of the hybrid force, since Khartoum does not trust the intentions of Western countries in light of some senior Sudanese cabinet members being indicted by the international criminal court for human-rights atrocities. Consequently, the case of Darfur shows that, even if hybrid arrangements may enjoy the support of the AU or

the UN, they are potentially subject to dispute by host countries. Furthermore, we may well see new disputes emerge between donors and regional organisations over who should play a bigger role in a particular region, or in a peacekeeping or peace-enforcement mission in general. By virtue of their financial muscle, some members of the UN Security Council's 'permanent five' (United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China) may also wish to smuggle into hybrid missions their own political or foreign policy agendas. Secondly, more questions arise from new missions where the UN plays second fiddle, or is only brought in to legitimise unilaterally initiated operations. Who will have the authority to implement future peace agreements or ceasefires? What happens if the belligerents or countries refuse to agree to the deployment of hybrid forces on their soil (as happened, at least until recently, in Sudan), and how should countries or parties that refuse to co-operate be sanctioned? These are indeed complex issues that need to be clearly thought through before hybrid-force mechanisms are adopted as a matter of practice. It is our hope that adopting rapid and unilateral response mechanisms does not undermine the UN, and simply suit the whims of powerful countries.

### Policy recommendations

- **To the AU:** to impress on the 'fund states', or donors, that long-term positions in African missions should be filled by African staff, especially in sensitive portfolios such as intelligence, logistics, and communications. The AU should also seek to increase its say, particularly in setting mission agendas or plans of action, and not let Western governments dictate the terms of engagement.
- **To donor countries:** to take into cognizance that bureaucratic red tape, and the effects of domestic politics in donor countries, lead to serious delays in disbursements or equipment being delivered, and result in crisis situations worsening in countries that need assistance. Decisions to assist African missions should not be made to respond to a political priority of a donor; rather the aim of such decisions should be to support the mandate of a particular mission.
- **To peacekeeping partners:** to note that their presence in field missions at times has negative political consequences, and makes a particular mission vulnerable to political signals emanating from the capitals of partners, or headquarters of their organisations. For example,

the government of Sudan became more obstructive in March–April 2006 as Western governments and the UN made strong pronouncements advocating for a greater NATO role in supporting AMIS.

- **To the UN:** to consider the establishment of a UN emergency service (UNES) based on the old idea of a 'UN standing army'. This would have broader appeal, while providing an array of useful services seeking, among other things, to expand legitimate, reliable emergency services, already widely expected and provided for in few countries. As a permanent UN formation, the service would be maintained at a high state of readiness with pre-trained, well-equipped personnel, and would be available for immediate deployment upon authorisation by the UN Security Council. The service would also be both multi-dimensional and multifunctional, composed of military, police, and civilian elements, prepared for rapid deployment to diverse UN operations.<sup>18</sup>
- **To civil society:** to understand that it can play a critical role in conflict resolution, and in preventing conflicts before they occur, by helping to strengthen the AU's early-warning system through interface with the PSC and ECOSOC branches of the AU.
- **To RECs and respective governments:** to honour their pledges to contribute troops, to enable the functioning of the standby forces. There is a critical need for forces to be equipped for deployment in light of the inability of the UN to respond expeditiously to crisis situations, owing to budgetary constraints.

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ISSN 1607 2375

Produced by Acumen Publishing Solutions, Johannesburg.