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Political change in Uganda and Kenya:
problematising the Western validation of African democratic politics

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The past two years have seen a series of accusations of corruption and undemocratic governance against the regimes of presidents Yoweri Museveni of Kenya and Mwai Kibaki of Uganda. What makes these accusations worth noting is that, when Museveni and Kibaki came to power, Western countries in particular expected them to usher in a new era of democratic governance and economic development. According to Western observers, both Museveni and Kibaki represented a 'new' kind of African politics, led by a new breed of African leaders, who would finally lead their countries to prosperity, and away from the autocratic and kleptocratic legacies of their predecessors. However, after several years in power it is becoming clear that the governments in Kampala and Nairobi both share a similar political culture to those of their predecessors. Many Western observers have since regretted their haste in validating political change in Uganda and Kenya, and have begun to question the future prospects of these two states. Questions are also now being raised about the likely impact of a lack of real political change on the integration process of the East African Community (EAC) in general.[1]

There is no doubt that the apparent political crises in the two countries may hinder progress towards further integration in the region. They are also likely to discourage potential members, such as Burundi and Rwanda, which are negotiating to join the EAC in July 2007, and delay plans to introduce a common currency, the East African shilling, by 2009. This brief, therefore, puts the policies of Mwai Kibaki and Yoweri Museveni under the microscope, and tries to problematise uncritical Western notions of real democratic change in Uganda and Kenya by exposing the underlying crisis of corruption, graft, and the absence of democratic governance.

It is worth briefly focusing on Tanzania, the other EAC member, because much unlike Uganda and Kenya, Tanzania has made significant progress towards political and economic reform due to the relative security enjoyed in the country. Hence, Dar-es-Salaam does not suffer from the setbacks faced by Uganda and Kenya, some of which will be discussed in this brief.

TANZANIA: AN EAST AFRICAN ANOMALY

Global Insight aims to provide members of the policy community with concise but insightful analyses of topical issues. Comments and suggestions are invited.

Unlike Kenya and Uganda, Tanzania can claim a history of peaceful, predictable elections and transitions, especially in the last decade. Tanzania's transition from a one-party socialist state to a multiparty democracy and capitalist economy has been relatively peaceful. This is not to suggest that the transition from socialism to capitalism was all smooth. But this section will attempt to show that, although there have been a few obstacles, in the overall analysis, Tanzania is indeed the exception rather than the rule when it comes to issues of democratic governance in East Africa.



Although Tanzania had constitutionally been a one-party state since 1965, the pressure for political change was considerably less than in Kenya and Uganda. Nyang'oro (2006) has ascribed this situation to the political 'accommodationist' nature of the regime, where the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) allowed considerable participation within the framework of the one-party system. Hence, with the ruling CCM maintaining its hold on national politics, political power has been transferred with ease from one candidate to another. The succession, from Hassan Mwinyi to Benjamin Mkapa, and, finally, to Jakaya Kikwete, has been relatively smooth, with the ruling CCM winning all the multiparty elections with relative ease. The exception is the Zanzibar islands, where the CCM has managed only marginal victories in successive elections. Suffice it to say, however, that the CCM is still the most popular political party in Tanzania.

In the first multiparty elections in Tanzania, in October 1995, the CCM scored a resounding victory, garnering 78,1 per cent of the total seats in parliament. In October 2000, Tanzania held its second multiparty general election, and CCM candidate Benjamin Mkapa defeated his three main rivals to win the presidential election with 71 per cent of the vote. The CCM took 202 of the 232 elected seats. In the Zanzibar presidential election, Abeid Amani Karume, the son of former president Abeid Karume, defeated Civic United Front (CUF) candidate Seif Sharif Hamad. The election was, however, marred by irregularities, and subsequent political violence claimed at least 23 lives in January 2001, mostly on Pemba Island.

In the presidential and parliamentary elections of 2005, the CCM took about 86 per cent of the seats in the assembly, while Kikwete emerged victorious with 80,2 per cent of the popular vote in comparison to his nearest challenger, Ibrahim Lipumba of the CUF, who got 11,6 per cent. With such overwhelming victories for the CCM, the obvious question, often asked, is whether democracy is being well served in Tanzania. The answer is that the presence of multiple voices is healthy for any democracy. Despite the CCM's dominance, the ability of the system to accommodate and entertain alternative political voices has not been undermined.

As mentioned above, the CCM's dominance has not extended to Zanzibar, where it has faced strong opposition from Arab political parties, currently comprising followers of the former Afro-Shiraz Party (ASP) in Unguja (the main island), and those of the Pemba-based Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP), and the Zanzibar and Pemba Peoples' Party (ZPPP). Mohammed Bakari (2000) argues that the post-1992 period in Zanzibar should not be understood in terms of ethnic/racial politics, which are now being promoted by the CCM government in Zanzibar. Rather, he states, the political discontent on the islands emanates from an incomplete democratisation process, and the alienation of the opposition in Pemba by the ruling party, CCM-Zanzibar, which has won all three elections in Zanzibar in the multiparty era (1995, 2000, and 2005).

Despite these obstacles in Zanzibar, however, there has been a great improvement in opening political space since 2000, which has resulted in a reorganised electoral commission, a more transparent voting process with party agents, and secret balloting.

Economic reform

Economically, Tanzania has instituted public-sector and banking reforms, and revamped legislative frameworks, which have helped to increase private-sector growth and investment. However, short-term economic progress also depends on curbing corruption and cutting back on unnecessary public spending. Significant measures have been taken to liberalise the Tanzanian economy along free-market lines, and encourage both foreign and domestic private investment. It is more than 20 years since the government of Tanzania embarked on an adjustment programme to dismantle socialist economic structures and support more active participation of the private sector in the economy. The programme included a comprehensive package of policies which reduced the budget deficit and improved monetary control, substantially depreciated the overvalued exchange rate, liberalised the trade regime, removed most price controls, eased restrictions on the marketing of food crops, freed interest rates, and initiated a restructuring of the financial sector. The government of Zanzibar, however, has been even more aggressive in instituting economic reforms. All in all, the political and economic environment in Tanzania has been facilitated by the sense of security in the country.

Security management

The large margin by which Kikwete was elected as president of Tanzania in 2005, and the associated absence of any challenge to the legitimacy of the regime in Tanzania, have provided the region with an opportunity to build a security structure based on democratic and legitimate regimes. Domestically, there is a general sense of security in Tanzania and most people feel safe, with petty corruption and crime at very low levels, especially in the capital. In terms of crime, the government has improved and tightened controls on firearms, and crime and the availability of firearms do not as yet constitute a crisis, in spite of a proliferation of firearms from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

Tanzania has become the 'anomaly' of East Africa in that, despite minor political challenges, it has made significant progress towards democratic governance

So there are no serious security threats, and Tanzania is not involved in armed conflict. Consequently, Tanzania has become the 'anomaly' of East Africa in that, despite minor political challenges, it has made significant progress towards democratic governance.

UGANDA'S INITIAL SUCCESSES

The ascendance of Yoweri Museveni's National Resistance Army/Movement (NRA/M) to power in January 1986 brought a semblance of peace, order, and stability to Uganda. Museveni pledged to undertake economic reform and boost the economy, improve respect for human rights, end tribal rivalry, and conduct free and fair elections, as well as deal decisively with corruption, both within and outside government. His NRM quickly reorganised the government, despite the immense problems of reconstruction that awaited the new regime.

Economically, a system of Resistance Councils, directly elected at the parish level, was established to manage local affairs, including the equitable distribution of fixed-price commodities. Furthermore, the government introduced broad economic reforms in consultation with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and donor governments. The new government enjoyed widespread international support, and the economy, which had been damaged by the civil war, began to recover. Abandoning his Marxist ideals, Museveni embraced the neo-liberal structural adjustments advocated by the World Bank and the IMF. Uganda began participating in an IMF economic recovery programme (ERP) in 1987 in order to encourage growth, investment, employment, and exports; the promotion and diversification of trade, with particular emphasis on export promotion; the removal of bureaucratic constraints and divestment from ailing public enterprises, so as to enhance sustainable economic growth and development through the private sector; and the liberalisation of trade at all levels. For this, Museveni won praise from Western nations.

Museveni's most widely noted accomplishment has been his government's successful campaign against AIDS

Much to its credit, President Museveni's government also managed to put an end to the bad governance, undemocratic practices, and human-rights abuses of earlier governments. The election of the Resistance Councils' representatives was the first direct experience many Ugandans had with democracy after many decades of authoritarianism; and the replication of the structure up to the district level has been credited with helping even people at the local level understand higher-level political structures. In a controversial measure, ostensibly designed to reduce sectarian violence, political parties were restricted in their activities from 1986 onwards. Notwithstanding the non-party 'Movement' system instituted by Museveni, political parties continued to exist, but they could not campaign in the elections or field candidates directly (although electoral candidates could belong to political parties). The rationale for this was that for his new government to survive, Museveni needed to avoid repeating the mistakes of his predecessors, who allowed corruption and factionalism to fester. In 1986, the NRM declared a four-year interim government, composed of a broader ethnic base than its predecessors. The sectarian violence which had overshadowed Uganda's history was used as a justification for restricting the activities of the political parties and their ethnically distinct supporter bases. The so-called 'Movement' system, which, according to Museveni, claimed the loyalty of every Ugandan, would be a cornerstone of Ugandan politics for nearly 20 years. In addition, the NRM/A developed a 'ten-point programme' for an eventual government, covering democracy, security, consolidation of national unity, elimination of corruption and the misuse of power, and redressing inequality (Nyeko & Lucima 2002).

President Museveni also permitted a free atmosphere within which the media could operate, and as a result, private radio stations flourished during the late 1990s. However, Museveni's most widely noted accomplishment has been his government's successful campaign against AIDS. During the 1980s, Uganda had one of the highest rates of HIV infection in the world, but the infection rate is now comparatively low, and the country stands out as a rare success story in the global battle against the virus. In April 1998, Uganda became the first country to be declared eligible for debt relief under the heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) initiative, receiving some US$700 million in aid.

Museveni's slide into authoritarianism

The real test for Museveni's Movement system and his democratic credentials was to come nearly 20 years after its institution. In March 2000, a referendum was held to determine whether Uganda should retain the Movement system or move to true multiparty politics. Although 70 per cent of voters endorsed the retention of the Movement system, the referendum was marred by a low voter turnout and unfair restrictions on president Museveni's opponents. Still, Museveni was re-elected to a second five-year term in March 2001 on the basis of the referendum's findings. Parliamentary elections were held in June 2001, in which more than 50 per cent of the contested seats were won by the opposition. However, the Movement's supporters retained control of the legislature. Even in the absence of political competition, Western observers pointed out that the 2001 presidential and parliamentary elections generally reflected the will of the electorate. The irony was that the elections were marred by serious irregularities (particularly in the period leading up to them) – restrictions on opposition political party activities, violence, voter intimidation, and even fraud (Human Rights Watch 2004).

Also in 2001, Uganda's Constitutional Review Commission (CRC) began soliciting opinions and holding public hearings on proposals to amend the 1995 constitution, with particular attention to the two-term limit on the presidential term of office. More generally, the CRC solicited views on constitutional provisions relating to sovereignty, political systems, democracy, and good governance. At the time of writing this brief, its report, originally scheduled for release by October 2003, had not yet been delivered to cabinet or made public. The Ugandan cabinet, however, presented its list of suggestions for constitutional change to the CRC in September 2003. Its suggestions included the introduction of a full multiparty system and an increase in executive authority vis-à-vis other branches of government, and called for the lifting of presidential term limits. The cabinet's recommendations were widely regarded as an attempt to prolong Museveni's stay in office. In yet another referendum, held in July 2005, 92,5 per cent of voters registered their support for the restoration of multiparty politics and the end of the no-party or Movement system. In August 2005, parliament voted to change the constitution to lift presidential term limits, thereby allowing Museveni to run for a third term.

These latest political developments took place against the background of the persecution of Kizza Besigye, Uganda's leading opposition leader. He was given a short period to campaign, as his return from exile in South Africa was delayed, and the state kept him occupied with defending a case of rape and treason. In late 2005, Besigye was arrested on these charges. The most serious charge was to do with contacting rebels with the intent of overthrowing the government. Many observers believed that the charges were fabricated to make him ineligible for the 2006 elections. They were, in fact, later dropped on the grounds of insufficient evidence. Not surprisingly, in the presidential elections held in February 2006, Museveni was declared the winner. Again, the international community regarded them as predominantly free and fair – this despite the fact that the opposition was not given space to campaign freely. Even before the voting had started, there were numerous reported cases of disruption of opposition campaigns, detention of activists, rape, and the blatant use of state funds by the Movement in its campaign.

This turn of events contradicts the West's validation of Museveni's regime as 'democratic'. Since coming to power in 1986, he has shown growing tendencies towards authoritarian rule. On a number of occasions, he has threatened to shut down radio stations and newspapers that violated the government's ban on reporting the Besigye treason trial. The ban also covered those newspapers that are regarded as anti-government. Museveni also made attempts to curb judicial independence by trying to influence the outcome of the Besigye case.

Moreover, since Museveni came to power, the military has been used as the president's personal fiefdom. Reports suggest that the size of his presidential guard brigade (headed by his son, Muhoozi Kainerugaba) now dwarfs other independent state security agencies, standing at more than 10 000 soldiers. While some view this as a necessary security measure to protect him in a troubled region, others view the presidential guard as Museveni's own private army, meant to strengthen his image as the regional strongman.

> Since coming to power in 1986, Museveni has shown growing tendencies towards authoritarian rule

The Movement's questionable record on 'clean governance'

Under Museveni, the Ugandan Peoples' Defence Force (UPDF) has become the pillar of his regime's corrupt practices and personal enrichment. For example, there have been reports that General Salim Saleh (Museveni's brother) has been involved in selling 'junk helicopters' to the army. In 1998, Saleh's company reportedly purchased helicopters for the UPDF, for which Saleh himself received a commission of US$800 000 (*The East African* 2006). Mounting domestic and international pressure caused by the reports on the matter forced Museveni to institute a commission of inquiry[3] to look into it. Although the commission completed its findings on Saleh's activities and his role in the scandal in July 2001, these have neither been made public nor has there been any follow-up since they were submitted to the government in August 2001.

General Saleh also made headlines for being involved in the illegal export of gold, coltan and other minerals from the DRC since the start of the second Congo war in 1998. In this case, he was directly implicated in a UN Security Council (2002) report for being involved in the illegal exploitation of natural resources in the DRC. The government of Uganda dismissed the UN report's findings, and no punitive action was taken against any military officers involved (*Daily Monitor*

2005). According to the report of the UN panel of experts on the illegal exploitation of natural resources and other forms of wealth of the DRC, the UPDF used its control of the north eastern Congo to exercise 'monopolistic control over the area's principal natural resources, cross-border trade, and tax revenues for the purpose of enriching members of the elite network … which consists of a core group of members including high-ranking UPDF officers, private businessmen and selected rebel leaders/administrators'. The report further

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indicated that 'UPDF Lieutenant General (Ret) Salim Saleh and Major James Kazini are the key figures … Salim Saleh and his wife, Jovia Akandwanaho are at the core of the illegal exploitation of natural resources in areas controlled by Uganda' (UN Security Council 2002).

As if these scandals were not enough, in 1998 Saleh was forced to resign from his post as presidential advisor, following allegations that Greenland Investments, a company in which he was a major stakeholder, had used a Malaysian company, Westmont, to purchase shares illegally in Uganda's largest (but now defunct) bank, Uganda Commercial Bank (UCB) (Human Rights Watch 1999; *Horn of Africa: The Monthly Review* 1998).

His brother, president Museveni, later said he had dismissed Saleh, not for his involvement in the scandal, but for 'indiscipline and drunkenness' in the army.

Perhaps the most significant event, which shocked even Museveni's Western allies, was his decision to change the constitution and stand for a third term. The issue of the third term completely tarnished his image in the eyes of the West. What his attempts at changing the constitution revealed was Museveni's own desire to extend his stay at the helm. It would seem, therefore, that his conversion to political pluralism was merely a strategy to appease donors – in a way meant to acclimatise the West into acquiescence when he finally announced his intention to stay on for a third term. The move backfired both locally and in the West,[3] more so because he had promised that the 2001 elections would be his last.[4] Expectations had been raised because the 23 February 2006 elections were Uganda's first multiparty elections in 25 years, and were seen as a test of its democratic maturity.

Stalemate in Northern Uganda

Furthermore, despite his bid to stay at the helm for a longer period, Museveni has been unable to deal with the war in Northern Uganda. This conflict reached a stalemate when the Ugandan government forces were unable to achieve a decisive victory over the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). As a result, the government and the LRA began talks (the so-called 'Juba talks') and signed a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CHA) on 26 August 2006. Under the terms of the agreement, the LRA forces would leave Uganda and gather at two assembly points where the UPDF would not attack them, while the government of Southern Sudan would guarantee their safety. Only when this had been achieved, would talks on a comprehensive peace agreement begin.

However, the realisation of such an agreement is unlikely for a number of reasons: the assembly of LRA forces has not taken place due to the LRA claiming they have been attacked by the UPDF, and demanding that the composition of Ugandan government be changed, and International Criminal Court (ICC) warrants be voided, before any agreement is reached. Other spoilers are the Acholi diaspora,[6] which is putting pressure on the LRA not to negotiate with Museveni until a concrete settlement is reached; and the government of Sudan, which is threatening to fight the LRA. Moreover, the UPDF has not withdrawn from South Sudan, and the government of Uganda wants the LRA to sign a final peace agreement before ICC warrants can be discussed. The impartiality of the mediator, vice-president Riak Machar of Sudan, is also being questioned by the LRA.

It is clear that Museveni has gone back on a number of ideals and the agenda that he himself instituted at the beginning of his rule. His rule now borders on a dictatorship, with little if any democracy being evident in the country that was once viewed as 'Africa's success story'. Museveni will have to allow fundamental reforms to take place, and let Uganda 'democratise', if he is to have any legacy. The sooner these reforms are instituted, the better it will be for him and his people.

KENYA UNDER KIBAKI

Daniel Arap Moi's departure from politics in December 2002 ushered in a change of leadership in Kenyan politics. For the first time in Kenya's multiparty politics, the opposition successfully mobilised itself to form a united front that sought to oust the ruling Kenya African National Union (KANU) party from power. Constitutionally barred from contesting the December 2002 presidential elections, Moi unsuccessfully attempted to head off the opposition threat by appointing Uhuru Kenyatta, the son of Kenya's first president, as his KANU successor. The gamble failed to pay off as the coalition of opposition parties, the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC), still managed to win 56 per cent of the total vote, while KANU received 29 per cent. As a result, NARC's leader, Moi's former vice-president, Mwai Kibaki, was elected president.

A development-oriented Kenya under Kibaki

Under the leadership of president Kibaki, the government of Kenya began an ambitious economic reform programme and resumed its co-operation with the World Bank and the IMF. The new NARC government enacted the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act and the Public Officers Ethics Act in May 2003, aimed at fighting graft in public office. In addition, reforms of the judiciary and public procurement led to donors resuming aid disbursement, which renewed hope for economic revival. In November 2003, following the adoption of key anti-corruption laws and other reforms by the new government, donors re-engaged as the IMF approved a three-year US$250 million poverty-reduction and growth facility, and donors such as the United States and the European Union committed US$4,2 billion in support over four years. The renewal of donor involvement provided a much-needed boost to investor confidence.

The Kibaki administration also abolished primary-school fees, thereby providing free and compulsory primary education. The free education programme saw nearly 1,7 million more pupils enrol in school by the end of 2003. During Kibaki's tenure, the country has experienced unprecedented economic growth. He is also credited with reviving industries, and industrial and infrastructural projects, that failed during the Moi era.

Corruption scandals

The Kibaki government was soon rocked by serious cases of corruption (both political and economic), kleptocratic governance, and creeping authoritarianism. These have since become the hallmarks of the NARC regime. Although political corruption[7] in post-colonial Kenya has a longer historical genesis, corruption under Kibaki's NARC government appears to have reached levels unseen in Kenya's most recent political history. In fact, during its first 18 months in power the Kibaki administration misappropriated government funds equivalent to those misappropriated during Moi's entire quarter of a century of rule!

In the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) of 2005, Kenya is ranked 144th out of 159 countries. Currently, Transparency International Kenya estimates that the average urban Kenyan offers bribes to government officials up to 16 times per month. Most of these bribes are fairly small, but large ones are also taken. According to the CPI, bribes worth over 50 000 Kenyan shillings (€600 or US$700) account for 41 per cent of the total value (Transparency International Kenya Chapter). However, it is the enormous levels of corruption at the higher levels of government that have tarnished the image of the Kibaki administration.

The Kibaki government was soon rocked by serious cases of corruption (both political and economic), kleptocratic governance, and creeping authoritarianism

Such high levels of corruption have seen equally enormous domestic and external pressures placed on the Kibaki regime to come clean. These pressures forced Kibaki to appoint John Githongo, a former journalist and Transparency International director, as permanent secretary for governance and ethics in January 2003, to investigate bribery and fraud. Githongo resigned from this position in February 2005 while on an official visit to the United Kingdom, citing lack of government commitment to deal effectively with massive corruption. Subsequently, Githongo revealed that president Kibaki and vice-president Moody Awori, among other cabinet members, were involved in a major scam worth US$600 million – known as the Anglo Leasing scandal (BBC 2006). These allegations were quickly denied by the government, and subsequent promises of an investigation into the matter had not been met at the time of writing.

Since making the disclosures, and fearing for his safety, Githongo has effectively been in self-imposed exile in the United Kingdom. In an interview with the BBC's *Newsnight* programme in February 2006, Githongo revealed that he had taped evidence proving that the former justice minister, Kiraitu Murungi, attempted to impede the ethics office investigations into the Anglo Leasing case. He also revealed that his investigations showed that the Anglo Leasing scandal could possibly implicate the president himself. This scandal reportedly involved plans to import a sophisticated €29 million passport equipment system from France. The quotation for the system was originally put at €6 million by François Charles Oberthur of Paris – the world's leading supplier of Visa and MasterCards. The tender was eventually awarded to a British firm, the Anglo Leasing and Finance Company Limited, at €30 million. Anglo-Leasing and Finance would in turn have subcontracted the French company, François Charles Oberthur, to do the work. Despite the lack of a competitive tendering process, Anglo Leasing and Finance was paid a 'commitment fee' of more than €870 000. After the scandal broke, the British company later made a repayment of €956 700 through a telegraphic transfer to the government of Kenya from Schroeder & Co Bank AG, Switzerland, on 17 May 2004. The repayment of the money was obviously a desperate attempt to cover the scandal up in the face of domestic and international pressures on the government (see BBC 2006).

> Kibaki's government has tried to use heavy-handed methods in dealing with internal political dissent

Githongo also alleged that there were many other similar deals which, in part, involved back-door financing to pay for NARC's re-election bid in 2007. This includes a ship deal for the Kenya navy. In this case, the tender, worth US$60 million, to build a war ship for the navy was irregularly awarded to Euromarine, a company linked with Kibaki's associates. Furthermore, the costs involved were highly inflated; military analysts argue that a vessel of a similar size could have been built for less than half the quoted price (*East African Standard* 2006). This is evidently a case of inflating prices for the benefit of politically connected tenderers.

As if these scandals were not bad enough, further damaging evidence of more corruption in Kenya emerged from the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR) in a report of February 2006, which showed that between January 2003 and September 2004, the NARC government had spent about US$12 million on cars meant for the personal use of senior government officials, and not for official government business!

Moi regime reincarnated – business as usual

Much like the Moi government, the Kibaki regime now scores dismally on clean political governance. Attempts at damage control have seen a visible slide towards authoritarianism. For example, Kibaki's government has tried to use heavy-handed methods in dealing with internal political dissent in Kenya. On 23 November 2005, president Mwai Kibaki dissolved his cabinet following a humiliating defeat on a referendum on the proposed new Kenyan constitution. The defeat came amid corruption scandals and allegations that corruption was rampant in the government. Following that, Kibaki then suspended parliament indefinitely. At the heart of the problem over the proposed new Kenyan constitution was the review of those aspects of the constitution that would in essence substantially curtail the president's extensive powers, and share those powers with a prime minister, while at the same time creating strong checks and balances by the legislature and judiciary.

In another case of creeping authoritarianism and political intimidation, on 2 March 2006, masked gunmen carrying AK-47s raided the newspaper offices of a daily newspaper, *The Standard*, and of its television station, KTN. They took computers and transmission equipment, burned all the copies of the 2 March edition of the newspaper, and damaged the printing presses. At KTN, the same intruders shut down the power supply, thereby putting the station off the air for hours. The raids followed a story published in *The Standard* that alleged that president Kibaki and a senior opposition figure, Kalonzo Musyoka, had held secret meetings.

CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS FOR UGANDA AND KENYA

Since the departure of Moi, things have become worse in Kenya. Uganda under Museveni has suffered a similar fate. What many analysts in the West thought was a 'new' era led by a 'new breed' of African leaders has left such observers stunned. In the process, Museveni and Kibaki, once the darlings of the West, have lost their democratic credentials.

The generous financial packages of Western aid that turned Uganda into a 'miracle' have since been drastically reduced, or are in the process of being cut altogether. Even Human Rights Watch (2005) took the Ugandan government to task over the arrest in 2005 of two opposition MPs from the Forum for Democratic Change, which it said were 'politically motivated and smacked of political opportunism.' A leaked confidential World Bank report (May 2005) indicated that the international lender might cut its support for non-humanitarian programmes in the Uganda. The report went on the add that the bank regretted the current political situation in Uganda, and it could no longer be supportive in light of the government's failure to be the vanguard of democracy in the country, and that this was further undermined by Museveni's aspiration for a third term (Busharizi 2005).

Kenya under Kibaki has also suffered from negative sanctions due to bad political and economic governance. Donors have expressed concern over governance and are threatening to withdraw or cut back their aid packages. They are concerned about what they call 'grand corruption,' and are demanding more visible action by government. The United Kingdom, Ireland, and Norway are some of the donors that are cutting back aid to Uganda.

However, the double standards of the West have been demonstrated by its handling of the Anglo Leasing scandal, for instance. Although it was brought to light by the then British high commissioner to Kenya, Sir Edward Clay, Western governments have not shown robust interest in dealing with scandals involving their own companies. Thus they, too, have been responsible for the crisis of good governance now seen in Kenya. For example, nothing has been done about two British banks, Barclays PLC and Standard Chartered PLC, that control over 50 per cent of the Kenyan commercial banking market. In the past three years, and in a scandal of unmatched proportions, Barclays and Standard Chartered PLC have repatriated 80 per cent and 96 per cent, respectively, of their annual Kenyan 'income' to London as 'dividends.' Such loopholes in the banking system have no doubt allowed ill-gotten wealth to find its way into British banks. Corrupt officials, including elements in the Kibaki regime, in collusion with foreign banks, have managed to send vast amounts of funds abroad as 'dividends.' Thus, despite their condemnation of corruption in the Kibaki government, Western governments have also been participants in the corruption. The illegal export of much-needed capital from Kenya has not prompted the West to force or even help the Kenyan government to strengthen its weak financial system.

The Ugandan and Kenyan cases clearly indicate how Western validation of African political processes remains largely self-interested and hypocritical

The Ugandan and Kenyan cases clearly indicate how Western validation of African political processes remains largely self-interested and hypocritical. African leaders who follow Western-friendly policies have been cast as progressive, while others are quickly dismissed and ostracised. The question that needs to be asked is whether Africans should not start to question the Western characterisation of African politics in general. Africans should themselves decide who 'progressive leaders' are, and what free elections and good governance mean. The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), to which Kenya and Uganda have acceded, is concerned about issues that have been mentioned in this brief, that constitute bad political and economic governance. Moreover, the APRM has requested the Ugandan and Kenyan governments to address some of those concerns, as pointed out in the respective country reports. Given the turn of events in Kenya and Uganda, and in the interest of NEPAD and regional integration, Africa should remain vigilant to ensure that there are no reversals in the area of governance and democracy.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- **To the international community:** Impress upon the Ugandan government and the LRA, through the UN, that they should not violate their agreement; avoid double standards and complacency when its own companies are involved in graft in other countries.
- **To the African Union:** Apply pressure on both the Kibaki and Museveni regimes to respect press freedom and basic human rights, and institute the political and economic reforms they promised in their electoral manifestos. Likewise, NEPAD and the APRM programme of action must be respected for the Museveni and Kibaki governments to conform to NEPAD governance standards.
- **The government of Southern Sudan:** Restructure the Juba talks, pegging them on a strong institutional frame-

work, with a heads-of-state summit to form a source of peer influence on presidents Museveni, Al Bashir of Sudan, and Salva Kiir of Southern Sudan. This would insulate the process from actions by the leaders that would escalate tensions.

- **To the EAC:** If a fully fledged federal system in the East African region is to be realised, the persistent crisis of political and economic misgovernance in both Kenya and Uganda will have to be addressed by both states as soon as possible. The EAC could play an intermediary role in realising this.

Other actors:

- **African civil society** needs to come up with a new concept that would characterise the 'new breed of African leaders', and not rely on Western notions of leadership which are detrimental to Africans, but benefit Western countries;
- **the government of Kenya** needs to put into action its commitment towards the fight against graft by instituting mechanisms for the prosecution of perpetrators and follow-up of unresolved cases;
- **the government of Uganda** needs to refrain from imposing unrealistic pre-conditions on the LRA before a final peace agreement is reached;
- t**he government of Sudan** needs restrain itself from interfering in the Juba peace talks;
- **the LRA** needs to be pressured to resume the Juba peace talks in the greater interest of the Ugandan people; and
- **Western companies** that collude with corrupt governments should be exposed and mentioned in reporting on corruption scandals.

ENDNOTES

1 The EAC is a customs union consisting of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania. It was established by treaty in March 2004 and commenced operations on 1 January 2005.

2 Justice Julia Sebutinde Commission of Inquiry of 2001.

3 Senior officials such as the former United States ambassador to Uganda and Kenya, Johnnie Carson (2005), are of the view that there is a creeping dictatorship by Museveni.

4 Museveni had previously stated that he considered the idea of clinging to office for '15 or more' years ill-advised (Okumu 2002).

5 These include members of the former Milton Obote government in exile, as well as Acholi speakers and professionals in Europe and North America who finance and support the LRA. They are believed to number more than 100 000.

6 In broad terms, political corruption is the misuse by government officials of their governmental powers for illegitimate, usually secret, private gain. Forms of corruption vary, but include bribery, extortion, cronyism, nepotism, patronage, graft, and embezzlement. The end-point of political corruption is a kleptocracy, literally 'rule by thieves'.

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