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The Democratic Republic of Congo:
Diagnosis of the prospects for peace

by
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Introduction

What many termed the 'First African World war'[1] ended with Congolese belligerents forming a government of national unity. Foreign troops from Zimbabwe, Angola Namibia, Rwanda and Uganda which fought alongside the Congolese have withdrawn their troops from the DRC. It is a war, which could have been avoided. Post-Mobutu DRC and its people constituted zero-threat to its neighbours.

In the eastern part of the country, the war destroyed what little infrastructure was left behind by the deposed Mobutu. Statistics put the number of people killed in the DRC at over two million; this is three times the number of people killed in the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. The irony is that the war finished where it started. The main the reason advanced for launching the war was that the militias of the Interahamwe had evaporated in the great DRC and beyond. Rwanda which has just organised its first ever democratic elections, with President Kagame transforming himself from a military ruler to a civilian, has promised to invade the DRC anytime he feels that the security of his country is threatened.

The South African driven peace accord that brought about the much celebrated transitional government in Kinshasa was hammered out in a situation of uncertainty of whether peace would ever come to the DRC as a united state. It needed the negotiation skills of a committed President Mbeki and his team and the patience of the facilitator, Sir Ketumire Masire. Equally important, international pressure, especially in view of what happened on September 11 2001 in the USA played a key role. The USA, despite its support for Rwandan and Ugandan intervention in the DRC, was not prepared to risk a vast territory with strategic resources such uranium and coltan, as well as diamonds and gold to be used as a staging post for terrorism. The September 11 terrorist attacks might have been a blessing in disguise for Congolese since it indirectly helped speed up the process of ending the war.

1. The Lusaka Peace Agreement (LPA)

The first war of 1996 pitted the forces of the late President Laurent Kabila, organised, armed and commanded by the Rwandan and Ugandan troops, against the forces of President Mobutu, ending in victory for Kabila's forces. Negotiations initiated by the former President of South Africa, Nelson Mandela, failed to convince Kabila of the need for a peaceful resolution as his troops met no resistance in their march towards Kinshasa. Hostilities erupted again in 1997, this time between the troops of President Kabila and countries that supported him in the first war against Mobutu. The emergence of Congolese rebel groups fighting alongside Rwandan and Ugandan troops convinced the rest of the world that the problem of the DRC was internal and not external. An internal solution was therefore needed. It was this that led to the first negotiations between the Congolese government and the two main rebel groups operating at that time. The governments of Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe signed a peace agreement in Lusaka which came to be known as the 'Lusaka Peace Accord' mediated by Zambian President, Frederick Chiluba with great support from South Africa.

The major criticism of the peace accord was that it was more protective of Rwandan, Burundian and Ugandan interests than it was of President Kabila's government. The peace accord signed on 10 July 1999, after "numerous meetings and summits"[2]

was
never implemented since it was negotiated on wrong premises. It seems that at that particular time there was no agreement on the causes of the war. For the United States and certain countries (through an effective lobby of Rwanda and Uganda), Kabila was the cause of the problem because of the support he supposedly gave to the 'genocidaires' hiding in his country. On the other hand, Kabila and his government, and most Congolese citizens argued that the war was orchestrated by outsiders in an effort to balkanise the country and exploit its natural resources. The reading into the causes of the war changed drastically with the UN resolution 1341, drafted by the French, that condemned the Rwandan and Ugandan invasion of the Congo. It stipulated that the invasion was "as akin to the 1991 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and in spite of his foibles, it recognised Laurent Kabila as the legitimate national leader of his country."[3]

Despite signing the Lusaka Peace Accord (LPA), until his death, President Kabila blocked every move to see it implemented. The format for the talks outlined in the Lusaka ceasefire was expressly designed to unseat his regime by forcing him to negotiate on an equal basis with his many opponents. Observers of the DRC conflict argue that since the war of August 1998 failed to unseat President Kabila, the Lusaka accords were another attempt to impose the rebels as equal partners to the negotiations. One key positive element in the Lusaka Peace Agreement was the recognition of the territorial integrity of the DRC. This destroyed any hope of those who were pushing for the balkanisation of the third largest country on the continent. Another positive outcome was the inclusive nature of the negotiations. This was an important change in the political thinking of the Congolese. For the first time Congolese were coming to terms with the fact that an inclusive system might bring peace to the country. The LPA underlined the importance of the inter-Congolese dialogue.

While attempting to end the hostilities, the LPA advocated a democratic, inclusive government in the DRC, with civil society playing a key role. It also advocated a common security regime among countries in the region by halting any assistance to, and collaborating with, 'negative forces.'[4] The LPA proposed the formation of a Joint Military Commission (JMC) to facilitate the disarmament of all armed groups and the formation of a national army. The JMC was to receive assistance from the United Nations and the AU.

2. From the Lusaka accords to the Inter-Congolese Dialogue

In Lusaka, President Chiluba of Zambia reached a stage where he could not push the process forward anymore after multiple violations of the Lusaka Peace Accords by the belligerents who failed to observe the cease-fire. A new effort was needed to advance the peace process. President Chiluba was replaced by President Mbeki of South Africa, as the chief mediator. As soon as South Africa took the lead in the mediation process, it found itself in a difficult position following accusations by President Kabila's government for supporting Rwanda and Uganda and their Congolese surrogates. Zimbabwe added its weight by obstructing any South African initiative because of what Harare considered Pretoria's opportunistic tendencies in view of what happened in Mozambique.[5]

Clearly Harare's position was a complicating factor to Pretoria, since South Africa saw Zimbabwe as a strategic partner in the quest to resolve conflicts in the SADC region. Even more frustrating was President Kabila's expressed lack of trust in Pretoria's even-handedness in approaching the conflict. This added to the frustration already expressed by President Mandela as he tried to cajole Kabila into a peaceful transition to democracy. It is therefore not surprising that (although then covertly expressed) South Africa increasingly saw Kabila as a major impediment to the peace process. While the death of Laurent Kabila on 16 January 2001 was a watershed for the DRC, the international community held its breath to hear the name of his successor. When Laurent Kabila's junta announced that Major-General Joseph Kabila (son of Laurent Kabila) was the successor, a wave of anxiety swept through the international community, as Kabila Jr was considered young and too inexperienced. South Africa's major concern was to detect if Joseph was any different from his bellicose father. The fact that in his inaugural speech Kabila Jr emphasised the need to move faster on the road to peace, and that a week following his inauguration he met President Paul Kagame of Rwanda (Laurent Kabila's arch enemy), gave Pretoria fresh energy to mediate the peace process in the DRC.

2.1 Setting the stage: the Gaborone meeting

Despite accusations against it, South Africa persisted and persuaded belligerents, including civil society groups, to meet and agree on the agenda for negotiations. The preparatory meeting for the Inter Congolese Dialogue took place in Gaborone between 20 and 25 August 2001. It brought together a proportionally high number of representatives: 13 representatives of Kabila's government, 13 members of civil society, 13 members of the rebel Congolese Rally for Democracy, 13 of the rebel Front for the Liberation of Congo and four of the RCD-ML (a break away group of the RCD), and 14 members of the non-armed opposition. This reflected the spirit of the LPA which wanted the negotiation to be as inclusive as possible, and the need for groups to negotiate as equals. The Gaborone meeting agreed on the agenda for negotiations and on the number of delegates to the inter-Congolese dialogue which was between 330 and 400. It also agreed that Addis Ababa would be the host city of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue. It is important to mention that three countries – Ethiopia, Mauritius and South Africa – were competing to host the meeting. The Kinshasa government and Zimbabwe did not favour South Africa, which was seen as pro-rebel after it refused to join the coalition-of-the-willing to fight alongside the army of President Kabila[6].

2.2 Addis Ababa: Not the real thing but setting the stage for future negotiations

The first attempt to hold the Inter-Congolese dialogue in Addis Ababa was unsuccessful, with only a few key stakeholders turning up for the meeting and other delegations sending low-level delegates. The absence of President Kabila and the leaders of the two main rebel groups reduced the importance of the meeting. In Addis, the government's legitimacy was questioned by the two main rebel groups, the RCD and MLC. This came soon after the facilitator, Sir Ketumire Masire, announced that he had insufficient funds to cater for 400 delegates. The lack of funds became a serious threat to the peace process. The facilitator, in an effort not to allow a lack of finances to block the peace process, proposed a two track approach: first to organise a meeting of a small core group from the five commissions agreed upon in Gaborone (political and constitutional, defence and security, economic and finance, social and cultural, and national reconciliation). The second track would be followed by the plenary of all the 400 participants.

The Addis Ababa meeting was significant only insofar as delegates agreed on South Africa as the country to host the next round of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue. This was a major foreign policy victory for South Africa and it would use the opportunity to position itself as a pivotal player in the search for a solution to the crisis in the Great Lakes. Obviously this position comes with responsibilities. South Africa moved very quickly to organise the first real Inter-Congolese Dialogue at Sun City, injecting considerable financial, logistic and human resources into the process.

2.3 Sun City April 2002: slow start, confusion and progress

After a shaky start, with numerous attempts to derail the negotiations, under South African supervision, Congolese delegates were forced almost throughout to remain at the negotiation table at Sun City. The Lusaka accord refers to a National Dialogue which is to last 45 days with an agreement on a new political dispensation. All different stakeholders – rebel groups, the government, non-armed opposition and civil society – were represented equally as prescribed in the LPA. Since the beginning of the negotiation process in Lusaka, the major obstacles were about who would to lead the transition and control the army. While progress was made on different issues, parties disagreed on these two issues. The final agreement gave the control of the army to the RCD-Goma, the rebel group backed by Rwanda. The government and the MLC rejected that proposition. That situation created room for a rapprochement between the government and the MLC.

The government, MLC, RCD/ML, RCD/N and certain non-armed and civil society groups coalesced and signed an agreement which excluded the RCD-Goma. In the agreement, President Joseph Kabila was to remain the president of the transition and Jean Pierre Bemba would be, an executive prime minister. This coalition was mainly driven by the need to weaken Rwandan control over the rebel movement RCD. Despite rejections of the accord on which the alliance was based from some quarters and especially South Africa, the new alliance of convenience proceeded and formed a commission for drafting the transitional constitution. This obviously was an escape mechanism for the government of President Kabila from what it saw as a biased process when South Africa produced an agreement which conferred control of the army to the RCD-Goma. The new alliance constitutional commission met in Matadi, the DRC port city, and after weeks of work, it produced a draft constitution for the transitional government and institutions.[7]

The meeting was suspended following pressure from the international community, the AU, and South Africa while the facilitator (who was lobbied by the RCD-Goma and Tshisekedi's opposition group). The alliance progressively collapsed and the need for a second round of negotiations became necessary. After many meetings between the South African negotiation

team and the different Congolese groups, a new round of negotiations was planned, this time in Pretoria.

3. Pretoria 1, 20 October - 1 November, 15 November 2002: Inclusive agreement with 1+4 power sharing formula

Before the Pretoria meeting, Rwanda and Uganda, to show their commitment to peace, signed peace agreements with the DRC government in Pretoria and Luanda, respectively. During the Pretoria peace agreement of 1 August 2002, Presidents Kabila and Kagame met and the latter acknowledged the involvement of his troops in the DRC (not for the first time) and signed an accord committing to withdraw his troops from the DRC. In Luanda, on 15 August 2002, President Museveni of Uganda also committed to withdraw his troops from the DRC by signing a peace accord with Kinshasa. Now that it was clear that these two countries were prepared to get out of the DRC, the government allies – Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe – also met on 25 October with the Kinshasa government to sign a modality for troop withdrawal. These agreements also put pressure on the Congolese to seriously consider moving forward.

At the second Pretoria Inter-Congolese Dialogue, a draft constitution was reviewed by all stakeholders identified in the LPA, with significant South African input. Under strong supervision by Mr Mustapha Niasse, the special envoy of the UN Secretary-General, the Pretoria deal legitimised Joseph Kabila's leadership as president of the DRC to lead the transitional government. The 1+4 power sharing formula implies that there should be one president or national leader assisted by four vice-presidents. This formula was not adopted unanimously; and delegates rather requested full power-sharing involving the equitable distribution of all the executive, legislative, judicial, diplomatic and military portfolios. In keeping with the spirit of the LPA, delegates also insisted that civil society organisations be represented. Another round of negotiations had to be scheduled to deal with the distribution of positions.

4. Pretoria 2, 9-16 December 2002: Signing of the Inclusive and Comprehensive Agreement (Total Accord)

In December, negotiations were tense and difficult to resolve, especially with regard to how to redistribute positions in the government of transition. The stalemate was mostly in the political committee, where progress was slow on power-sharing in the provinces and the division of embassies and state enterprises. The two main rebel movements were pushing for power-sharing down to village level, as well as a role in running the police, the army, the intelligence service and the diplomatic service in the planned two-year run-up to the first elections. The agreement was signed in Pretoria on 17 December with outstanding issues still to be resolved around the military and security of leaders during the transition process in the capital and elsewhere in the DRC. But it included agreements on the methods of appointment, participation and representivity. A follow-up committee was established, divided into national sub-commissions and an international sub-commission.

The Accord has four pillars:

- Reunification, pacification, reconstruction and re-establishment of the state authority all over the national territory.
- National reconciliation.
- Formation of an integrated national army.
- Establishment of transitional institutions – the presidency, the government, the national assembly, the senate, the courts and tribunal.

Institutions for democratic support were also to be established.[7] These include:

- an Independent Electoral Commission,
- high authority in the media,
- the Truth and Reconciliation Commission,
- national observation of human rights,
- Ethical Commission to fight against corruption.

5. Transitional Government: Would it work?

The transitional government is now in place and seems to be working, with Joseph Kabila as President, supported by four vice-Presidents representing all the groups – two rebel groups, the opposition and government. Although all vice-Presidents are entitled to personal security of at least 108 bodyguards, they are not allowed to have them when meeting with the President. Ministers are entitled to 13 bodyguards and vice-Ministers to 8. Observers of the Congolese political scene – inside

and beyond its borders – agree that the establishment of the transitional government holds out promising prospects for reconciliation after five years of war.[8]

Most meetings between the President and leaders of the rebel movements have been taking place in peaceful and cordial conditions. The distribution of military positions has also been successfully achieved on the surface at least.

There are two problems, however, that need to be addressed. The first is whether Congo can rid itself of external, especially regional involvement in its internal affairs, as one of the central factors contributing to political instability in the country since independence. There is no doubt that the Peace Accord in the DRC is far from being an indigenous product, as was CODESA in South Africa. In many instances external pressure was brought to bear and technical advice was given to the different groups. And in certain instances, it was the position of an external ally which was more important in the negotiation, as was the case of the RCD-Goma and Rwanda. The concern about external interference should not be underestimated. In fact, it is one of the major sources of the DRC's problems since independence, second only to problems of leadership. This concern is compounded by the fact there there is no clear-cut historical precedent for the kind of transition the Congolese have put in place. There is no doubt that groups like the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) and Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) are creations of external forces and the question is how would they negotiate the current transition and at the same time protect the interests of their external allies. We must remember that the real problem for Rwanda is that it experiences overpopulation and hence the need for access to Congolese resources for its own survival.

Another problem is whether the institutions put in place would function normally. This raises the question of whether Congo can become a functioning democracy. There appears, however, to be a growing convergence amongst most protagonists on the basic elements of democratic government in the DRC as entrenched in the Sun City accords. Despite the fact that they all took part in the negotiations starting with the Lusaka summit in 1999 up to the Sun City Accords, it is not clear whether the parties will be able to create a climate within which their efforts towards developing democracy will be sustained. Obviously there might be militant, radical or reactionary exceptions to this convergence of the basic elements and needs of democratic government for the DRC. One can talk about the DRC as having entered a "new era" because its major political groupings have accepted the idea of power-sharing, democratic government, economic prosperity, social justice, and so on. However, one is not suggesting an unproblematic "common ground" between all parties, but at least a correspondence of interests, which makes the possibility of working together during the transition feasible. The problem today in the DRC is not the convergence of ends between political opponents, but the confusion of means to reach them. It is this confusion that may pose an enduring threat to the DRC becoming a democracy even if bitter enemies have been convinced to work together.

One critical factor that needs attention is the weakness of political parties, which in many ways is synonymous with weak leadership. This presents perhaps the biggest challenge for the transitional period. Most political parties remain ethnically-based. None of the Congolese political parties can claim an organised following. Judgment about the respective support of each party must remain speculative. In general, opposition groups are weak. Personalities tend to dominate these parties and have difficulty cooperating with each other. The transitional arrangmenet might be compromised by the absence of credible leadership. Most Congolese who were involved in the negotiations were figures jockeying for positions. The danger is that in an effort to secure their own political survival, these personalities might prefer to sacrifice the interest of the Congolese people by trying to prolong the transitional arrangement or strike deals to share power.

In this context if one looks, for example, at the articulation of policies among the major parties in the transitional government, one thing is quite apparent. No one has evolved a coherent policy or strategy to cope with the kind of transition to which they have committed themselves. For almost a decade now the rebel groups, MLC and RCD, with the support of Rwanda and Uganda, respectively, and the government in Kinshasa, presented and concentrated on a policy of war as a means of transition. This policy prepared them very poorly for the kind of transitional demands they now have to cope with. There is no guarantee that a society undergoing transition from war will become a fully-fledged democracy. Indications from around the world are that the chances are slim. The DRC would not be an exception. The success of this transition would require a total paradigm shift by the Congolese leadership from war and narrow interests to that of promoting peace and the national interest.

This is why there would be a need for strong and diversified civil society organisations to monitor the behaviour of government and other state institutions.

Everything that has been achieved to date in the DRC would need strong financial and technical support. There is no doubt that the USA and Britain, together with France and Belgium, are countries expected to contribute financially to building a

sustainable peace in the DRC. The US has already made it clear that in the short and medium term its attention would be on the war and the rebuilding of Iraq. There are only a few countries on the US list – Israel, Egypt and Jordan – that would receive substantial financial aid because of their support of the war in Iraq. Obviously, Africa will not count much for the US after the continent's strong opposition to President Bush's foreign policy towards Iraq. Although president Bush is committed to helping resolve conflict on the continent and has made commitments to President Mbeki, the reality is that even if support is given it would not alleviate the problems on the ground. The challenge, therefore, for the new Congolese leadership is how to turn this opportunity into a success story that the continent can be proud of. Somaliland, although still not recognised, is a country from which the Congolese could draw lessons on how to rebuild a country from a meagre resource base. Since it declared its independence in the early 1990s, it has not secured any international support. Yet, it has been able to kick-start the economy, manage the reconstruction of the country from the export of beef and contributions from its diaspora. It has the fastest growing economy on the continent at 15% a year. Although dynamics are different, Congo with all its resources can do better. Politically, if the new leadership behaves in a manner to protect self- interests, the transition can go terribly wrong. Put differently, if the new political leadership in the DRC continues to underestimate the complexity of the process of transition that it has subjected the country to, we should expect a major crisis ahead.

While external support and funding is a necessity for peace-building and for fostering a democratic transition, it is not the most important element. What would maintain peace in the DRC is an approach to politics that transcends the limits inherent in a style of governance that is largely informal, private and highly centralised. All Congolese must first accept that democracy must be paramount. This presupposes a notion of justice that centres on the principle of impartiality. Rules must become ends in themselves and cannot be bent or ignored without penalties. This is a call for the creation of a Congolese state based on strong values and transparent procedures. This is why, for the challenges facing the DRC to be best understood, they must be understood primarily as the crisis of the state. However, the adoption of a constitution that takes account of DRC political sensitivities, there is every possibility that it can shake off the stigma of being the heart of darkness.

Careful attention must be given to the manner of resolving the issue of nationality of the Congolese people of Rwandan origin. If badly dealt with, it might come back to haunt the Congo. The army deserves careful attention. Despite having agreed on the structure of the army, the integration of the armed forces and the control of the army are crucial determinants of peace and stability in the DRC. The political culture in the DRC, as with many other countries on the continent, is that whoever controls the armed forces has political advantage over its opponents. Mobutu's using of the armed forces to neutralise his opponents is still very much present in the minds of Congolese politicians. In the foreseeable future, the army will remain very politicised and it is necessary that the issue be treated with the attention it deserves. The chaos that paralysed the DRC soon after independence started within the army. History could repeat itself if there are fractures within the army, with different groups servicing different patrons.

There is definitely hope that the transitional period could produce democratic elections and subsequently a legitimate government. This hope is based on the content of the new constitution. Many of the constitutional arrangements that were made in the DRC since independence have been "tactical retreats" rather than commitments to principles of justice and democracy that transcend political self-interest. There is enough evidence in the new constitution adopted in Pretoria to suggests that its fragile foundation has been consolidated. The hope is also based on the fact that the Congolese have a chance to unite for the first time and as a people and nation, defend the integrity and interest of their country against external predators who are more interested in its resources.

What role for South Africa?

The question that is being asked is, "what is South Africa's role in the transitional period?" After helping getting the transition under way, South Africa seems to have withdrawn in order to give the Congolese the space to engage one another without interference. While this is appreciated, South Africa must continue to look at the weakness of the current set up and provide advice and even support. There are two things that South Africa must do. Firstly, it must not lose track of what is going on in Kinshasa. South Africa must help the Congolese leadership in the implementation of the resolutions of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue. It would be unrealistic to assume that Congelese are ready to move to a democratic dispensation by themselves. In the Congo, the idea of a Congolese state does not exist. The Congolese leadership that came to Sun City to negotiate a transitional government did so to achieve two things: to preserve and distribute political power among themselves. They behave as if the state they are trying to reconstruct is an imposition from outside. They do not seem to have a conception of public interest, belief in a common belonging or even love for the people they say they fought for.

South Africa must continue to mobilise the international community to take a decisive step to root out individuals and groups that are an obstacle to peace. With NEPAD and the AU already in full swing, it is not an impossible task.

Policy Considerations

The Congolese national actors

- Should build an inclusive political culture in which political parties can mature.
- The government should give support to the Independent Electoral Commission to ensure that an electoral infrastructure is put in place.
- A presidential committee should be established, possibly comprising the four Vice-Presidents to monitor the implementation of the peace process.
- Should ensure sufficient space for civil society to play a role in decision-making processes.

South Africa

- Should share with the transitional government the South African model and experience of the truth and reconciliation commission, and assist the government in establishing a similar commission that will meet the needs of the Congolese in their own context.
- The South African parliament should assist the new parliament of the DRC through exchanges of parliamentarians and hold seminars to share experiences. Both the DRC senate and parliament need to develop mechanisms to combat corruption and promote good governance.

The region

- Militaries based in progressive democratic states on the continent should be encouraged to hold joint training exercises with the armed forces of the DRC. The hope is that such interaction will influence the thnking of military officers in a positive way regarding their role in the maintenance of peace and security.
- Civil society organisations in the region should engage with civil society in the DRC and assist with peacebuilding, empowerment, electoral and developmental programmes. The objective should be the strengthening of grassroots groupings that represent local communities.
- Progressive political parties on the continent should interact with the political parties in the DRC and organise exchanges of members. It would be useful for mass based political movements on the continent to share their experiences with the Congolese in order to expose them to grassroots mobilisation strategy and tactics.
- Once the Third Party Verification Mission officially withdraws from the DRC, the AU should organise an AU monitoring mechanism on the ground in the DRC to monitor progress in the implementation of the Pretoria agreement.
- An official AU envoy to the DRC should be appointed to monitor internal dynamics, facilitate dialogue, and report on progress.

The international community

- Must encourage the positive relations that have been reaffirmed between the DRC and Rwanda, and encourage the government of DRC to continue efforts to achieve the total neutralisation of ex-FAR and Interahamwe.
- Continue to actively monitor progress in the implementation of the Pretoria agreement between the DRC and Rwanda.
- Increased financial assistance should be provided to the transitional government of the DRC for its institutions of governance, and developmental needs.
- Should assist the government in developing a population census, and offer expertise in voter education programmes. Given that an independent electoral commission is now in existence but yet to be operationalised, technical assistance could also be provided to the commission to carry out its mandate.

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Endnotes:

1. International Crisis Group Africa Report No 27, Nairobi, 2001.
2. Claude Kabemba: 'Dialogue about Dialogue in Southern Africa' *Political and Economic Monthly*, Vol. 14 No 7.
3. The interpretation of the concept 'negative forces', as articulated in the LPA, has evolved. Initially, Rwandan genocidaires and any armed groups opposing or fighting Burundian, Rwandan and Ugandan forces in the DRC were called negative forces. Congolese rebels fighting Kabila forces were implicitly considered positive forces. Currently, the term negative forces refers to any group involved in any human rights violations, mass killings and crimes against humanity.
4. Zimbabwe claims that it fought to bring peace in Mozambique but it is South Africa that is reaping the benefits through its investments there.
5. It must be said that the rebels were in favour of having the meeting in South Africa.
6. The draft constitution is a modified version of the National Conference's draft constitution. The Matadi workshop thus has the advantage of bringing the 1991-96 National Conference assets into the LPA. If the alliance was solidified it would have unified 85% of the national territory.
7. See Labana Lasay" Abar, "Dialogue Inter-Congolais or Palabre Ensorcelee", in *Alternative*, No 008-009, Kinshasa, June-November 2002, pp. 2-4.
8. Claude Kabemba, Sowetan, 2003.