

Africa and the International Politics of Climate Change

Proceedings Report of the International Workshop:
Negotiating Africa and the Global South's Interests on Climate Change

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■ Executive Summary

On 25 November, 2011, the Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD), the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) and Ingabadi Group hosted the second in a series of dialogues on climate change in Durban, prior to the formal opening of the 17th Conference of the Parties (COP 17). This all-day workshop gave consideration to *Negotiating Africa and the Global South's Interests on Climate Change*. This proceedings report captures the second half of the discussion on the role of Africa within the international climate change negotiations. Panelists were drawn from across Africa to share their expertise on building an African Common Position, what Africa could expect from the outcome of COP 17, and the role of civil society in climate change negotiations. The session brought representatives together (from the diplomatic corps, academia, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), media and national, provincial and local governments) to construct a better understanding of the ways in which Africa could improve its negotiating capacity, by approaching its common negotiating position in a principled, nuanced and pragmatic manner.

In her contribution, Masego Madzwamuse examined the inequalities of the global system that have led to Africa calling for negotiations centred on 'common but differentiated responsibilities'. Madzwamuse also discussed the impact of southern Africa's so-called 'dual and enclave' economies within the context of the *Fundamental Social and Economic Rights Framework* produced by the Labour and Economic Development Research Institute of Zimbabwe. She asserts that governance of climate adaptation in itself provides a breeding ground for inequality, and Africa must guard against this in negotiations at COP 17.

In her presentation on 'Climate Change Negotiations: What Outcome for Africa?' Estherine Lisinge-Fotabong discussed the dynamic of Africa's role within climate change negotiations, and suggested that if Africa seeks to have all its demands met at the conference, it will need to adopt a robust approach against the many challenges that still face the continent in these negotiations, including issues of power and political economy. Lisinge-Fotabong asserts that Africa should push for concessions from developed countries on a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, and focus on internal policy challenges when confronting and effecting action on climate change, particularly in the area of adaptation.

Nancy Kachingwe focused on the role of African civil society in climate change negotiations, questioning whether their role can be defined as 'game changers', 'players' or 'spectators'. She asserts that due to Africa being so disastrously exposed to the impacts of climate change, a radical shift in its positioning in the negotiations process is imperative. Within this context, civil society has a significant role to

play in representing the interests of marginalised peoples who are usually unable to see their concerns promoted or protected in high-level negotiations. Stronger partnerships between African governments and civil society must be promoted, through knowledge-based collaboration and the understanding of climate change as a development and rights issue.

■ Acknowledgements

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■ Acronyms and Abbreviations

AfDB	African Development Bank
AU	African Union
AFASA	African Farmers Association of South Africa
AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
AMCEN	African Ministerial Conference on the Environment
BASIC	Brazil, South Africa, India and China
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CAF	Cancún Adaptation Framework
CAHOSCC	Conference of African Heads of State and Government on Climate Change
CMP 7	Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol
COP	Conference of the Parties
COP 15	15 th Conference of the Parties
COP 17	17 th Conference of the Parties
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions
CSO	Combined Sewer Overflow
CSO	civil society organisation
CTCN	Climate Technology Centre and Network
DAFF	Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries
DBN-LC	Durban Department of Labour
DGEF	Division of Global Environment Facility Coordination
DIRCO	Department of International Relations and Cooperation
DSW	Durban Solid Waste
ECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
EU	European Union
EU-ACP	European Union and African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States
G20	Group of Twenty
G-77+China	Group of 77 and China
GCF	Green Climate Fund
GHG	greenhouse gas
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
IBSA	India, Brazil, South Africa
IGD	Institute for Global Dialogue
INK ABM/URP	Inanda, Ntuzuma and KwaMashu Area-Based Management/Urban Renewal Programme

IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IR	International Relations
IUCN	International Union for Conservation of Nature
KZN DAEA	KwaZulu-Natal Department of Agriculture & Environmental Affairs
KZN DOE	KwaZulu-Natal Department of Education
LAMOSA	Land Access Movement of South Africa
LCA	life cycle assessment
MDB	multilateral development banks
NAPAs	National Adaptation Programmes of Action
NCCRS	National Climate Change Response Strategy
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGO	non-governmental organisation
NPCA	NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency
OSISA	Open Society Initiative of Southern Africa
PRAU	Policy Research and Analysis Unit
REC	Regional Economic Communities
SIDS	Small Island Developing States
TERI	The Energy and Resources Institute
UK	United Kingdom
UKZN	University of KwaZulu-Natal
UN	United Nations
U.S.	United States
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNISA	University of South Africa
WCRP	World Conference on Religion for Peace
WTO	World Trade Organization
WWF	World Wide Fund for Nature

■ Notes on the Contributors

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Ms Madzwamuse is the Economic Justice Programme Manager at the Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa (OSISA). Prior to joining OSISA, she worked as a freelance consultant in the areas of environment and development, as a Programme Manager for the United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP's) TerrAfrica initiative, as a Regional Programmes Development Officer for the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) Eastern and Southern Africa Regional Office (ESARO) in Pretoria, and before that, as a Country Programme Coordinator for the IUCN in Botswana. She holds a Master's degree in Environmental Sciences and a Bachelor's degree in Sociology.

□ **LISINGE-FOTABONG, Estherine**

Mrs Lisinge-Fotabong is currently Head of the Programme Implementation and Coordination Directorate of the NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency (NPCA). Formerly the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) Country Liaison Officer for South Africa and the Environment Adviser to the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) Secretariat, Mrs Lisinge-Fotabong has worked in academia, civil society, governmental and intergovernmental organisations. She has held several positions, including: Assistant Lecturer in Law at the University of Soa (Yaoundé, Cameroon); Director of Policy and Strategy; World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) Central African Regional Programme Office, Biodiversity and NEPAD Programme Officer with UNEP-Division of Global Environment Facility Coordination (DGEF). Mrs Lisinge-Fotabong has Masters' degrees in Law and International Affairs (specialising in International Policy and Practice), and she has acquired expansive experience in multi-scope programme and policy formulation, planning and management.

□ **KACHINGWE, Nancy**

Ms Kachingwe currently works as Policy and Advocacy Strategy Advisor with the Land Access Movement of South Africa (LAMOSA). Previously, she worked with

ActionAid International as an International Policy Manager, as a freelance Technical Advisor on women's land rights and as an Advocacy Programme Officer with Third World Network Africa (TWN-Africa) in Accra and MWENGO (a regional centre for non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in east and southern Africa). Her work experience has covered European Union and African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (EU-ACP) development cooperation, civil society and advocacy in east and southern Africa, trade, globalisation and African regional integration, social movements and agrarian reform and women's land rights. Ms Kachingwe went into development policy after earning a Bachelor of Arts degree in Modern Languages from the University of Zimbabwe; she is now completing a Master's degree in Public Policy and Management with the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS).

■ COP 17, Climate Change and Africa: The Dilemma between Flexibility and Rigidity

□ Siphamandla Zondi

Arguably, the biggest challenge that faced African negotiators at the 17th Conference of the Parties (COP 17) was not necessarily the intricacies of negotiating a complex deal, but satisfying the high aspirations of African citizens, ably represented by civil society organisations (CSOs) without proposing inflexible, zero-sum positions during negotiations. They were expected to maintain a mix between flexibility and rigidity that few are able to, if at all. Like early African diplomats in multilateral organisations after independence, they were expected to conduct 'revolutionary' diplomacy in a complex environment. Like them, negotiators were held to standards they could only fail to meet.¹ Thus, our assessment of the outcomes of COP 17 should be mindful of the gap between popular aspirations and the exigencies of multilateral negotiations that negotiators needed to navigate.



Ms Masego Madzwamuse, Head of the Economic Justice Programme at Open Society Institute for Southern Africa and Ms Estherine Fotabong, NEPAD Agency of the African Union, Professor Hamilton Sipho Simelane, UKZN and Research Associate, Ingabadi, Ms Nancy Kachingwe, LAMOSA, Professor Mike Muller, Visiting Adjunct Professor, University of the Witwatersrand Graduate School of Public and Development Management and Commissioner, National Planning Commission.

Speaking at the conclusion of the complex COP 17 to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations in Durban in December 2011, South African President, Jacob Zuma, declared, 'The outcome in Durban is a coup for Africa.' He also proclaimed, 'This is a moment of glory for South Africa and Africa.' He went on further to explain his high spirits, saying: 'Issues that had taken so long to resolve have been resolved on our soil.' He thought the African Group and the South African government, as hosts, were thus vindicated for their hard work and high ambitions.²

The chairperson of the African Union Commission (AUC), H.E. Dr Jean Ping, declared COP 17 a success on the part of Africa, praising the African negotiations group for working coherently throughout the long negotiations process. Speaking during the opening session of the African Union (AU) summit in January 2012, Dr Ping saw this as evidence of the improved capacity of the AU to promote Africa's interests internationally.³

Speaking at the opening session of COP 17, Africa's chief negotiator and the Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Mr Meles Zenawi outlined Africa's approach to the negotiations and how it saw critical outcomes emerging from the Durban conference – as the basis on which we ought to measure the success of Durban – by saying,

We in Africa have concrete suggestions as to how we can do that. It is the view of the African Union that we should as a matter of top priority concentrate on the operationalisation of the agreements we reached in Cancún. We believe we can in Durban agree on the governance mechanisms of the fund and operationalise the adaptation among many other important issues of the operationalisation.

After pointing out the importance of agreement on the funding mechanisms and that these should not harm Africa's development interests, through the diversion of already-committed development funding, Zenawi went on to underline the need to ensure certainty about the continued existence of the Kyoto Protocol. He said,

We in Africa recognize that the protocol needs to be updated so that it becomes more comprehensive in coverage and more effective in delivering results with regards to emission reduction consistent with of course with the principles of common but differentiated responsibility.

On this basis, Africa, he said, opposed attempts to back-off from the Kyoto Protocol and negotiate something completely new, for

We [Africa] cannot move forward by moving backward after every progress we make... Keeping Kyoto alive until we have something

better is too important for the credibility of the whole process to be sacrificed for the tactical advantages at the negotiating table.⁴

However, major CSOs dismissed the plans towards the Durban meeting, and later its outcomes, as a major failure. Alliances of CSOs dedicated to climate change-related issues lambasted the AU position for being 'flexible' on the Kyoto Protocol, for example. The reason was that Zenawi, being mindful of the divergent views on the Kyoto Protocol, had told the conference of African states on climate change that: 'We are eager to engage all those actors on the Kyoto Protocol, with the purpose of at least salvaging the essence of the Kyoto Protocol.' In response, the Pan African Climate Justice Alliance (PACJA) retorted, 'It is indeed a cruel irony that as stronger droughts are punishing the people of the Horn of Africa, African leaders are already signalling their intention to weaken African demands in Durban.' The same disagreements would be registered on other aspects of the common position, making it very difficult for African negotiators to navigate the line between a pragmatic negotiating position and a zero-sum game. This meant they could hold a popular position, but precipitate the failure of Durban or compromise and produce a weak outcome. Either way, the negotiators were always going to lose in the eyes of civil society.

The World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) described it as 'nothing but more hot air.' It said,

Unfortunately, governments here have spent the last two crucial final days of negotiations focused on only a handful of specific words in the negotiating texts, instead of spending their political capital on committing to more and real action to address climate change.

But Zenawi did not blame Africa for this; instead, he pointed fingers at the U.S., Japan, China, Russia and Canada for lacking ambition for a serious agreement.

The United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) saw COP 17 as a success for Africa. Its Executive Director, Achim Steiner, averred that,

The outcomes of Durban provide a welcome boost for global climate action. They reflect the growing, and in some quarters unexpected, determination of countries to act collectively. This provides a clear signal and predictability to economic planners, businesses and investors about the future of low-carbon economies. A number of specific commitments agreed in Durban also indicate that previous decisions on financing, technology and Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) are moving to implementation.

Key outcomes from the Durban meeting include the new commitment period for the Kyoto Protocol, the launch of the Green Climate Fund (GCF), and the commitment to implement Cancún agreements. For the first time, countries also agreed to adopt a universal and legal agreement on climate change by 2015, which is to come into force by no later than five years thereafter. They also established a mechanism to work on the implementation of these undertakings, which is commonly known as the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action.

It was generally thought, therefore, that the package that makes up the deal in Durban was a step forward from the progress registered in Cancún, but that these outcomes were still far from satisfactory on two grounds: one is that they did not go far enough, especially given growing evidence of the deleterious effects of climate change on countries – poor countries in particular. The second is related to doubts about whether the outcomes achieved would be implemented, or would translate into concrete reductions in emissions, a rise in the ability of vulnerable countries to adapt to the changes needed, and growth in the overall political will to act for the good of the planet.

It is hard to tell if Zuma's exclamation was misguided optimism and a sense of pride in the abilities shown by Africa, or a sober reflection of the outcomes achieved in the context in which they were. The context was one of serious divisions involving major global powers that occupied positions which alienated and marginalised small and vulnerable states. The divisions had grown and worsened in the months and weeks before COP 17. The expectations from civil society had declined with every civil society consultation witnessed. Africa's civil society – having hoped for a deal that is based on 'common but differentiated responsibilities', that is developmental and poverty-attacking in nature, and that aids Africa's acquisition of new technologies – stood to be much more disappointment than any other, if Durban failed.

This report provides a synthesis of what civil society and other stakeholders anticipated as the key outcomes of COP 17, and how they expected the African negotiating group to manage the advancement of African ambitions during the negotiations. It details the points put forward by experts, namely Ms Masego Madzwamuse of the Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa (OSISA), Ms Nancy Kachingwe, an independent consultant with extensive experience in civil society solidarity work, and Ms Estherine Lisinge-Fotabong of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) agency of the AU. This report is useful in indicating the feel of the pre-COP 17 discussions, so as to match this with the outcomes described above, to assess whether Zuma and other African leaders are justified in declaring Durban a success and in proclaiming that Africa did well. With the focus on the high politics of negotiations, this does not attempt to address the point whether the

outcomes have any positive bearing on ordinary Africans and individual countries. To determine this, long periods of longitudinal empirical studies would be required.

■ Africa at COP 17: Building a Common Position on Adaptation against a Backdrop of Inequality

□ Masego Madzwamuse

■ Introduction

COP 17 provided Africa an opportunity to champion the adaptation agenda within climate change negotiations, particularly when considering the palpable vulnerabilities to climate change that the continent faces. The COP presented a big opportunity to resolve critical pieces of the Cancún Adaptation Framework (CAF) and to integrate many strands of adaptation negotiations, and to move forward on helping vulnerable countries to adapt.

This paper seeks to answer the question: 'What are the ingredients of a favourable adaptation agenda?' It focuses on areas that African governments need to pay attention to at the national level. The main argument places adaptation responses within a context of growing poverty and inequality, arguing that a favourable adaptation agenda ought to be inclusive and pro-poor and one that enables African countries and other developing countries to integrate adaptation into development planning



Ms Masego Madzwamuse, Head of the Economic Justice Programme at Open Society Institute for Southern Africa and Ms Estherine Fotabong, NEPAD Agency of the African Union.

processes. The question of equity within the climate change negotiations has largely focused on issues of economic justice between nations; between the North and South; developed countries versus developing countries and Africa's right to development. At the global policy level, this is necessary and in line with key principles of equity as a redistributive social justice issue, considering the disproportionate human impacts and associated adaptation costs that Africa and other developing countries face as a result of climate change. At a global level, the question of economic justice in a geo-political context is furthermore in line with the UNFCCC's notion of 'common but differentiated responsibilities' and respective capacities.

However, once the focus of shaping an adaptation agenda shifts to a national and local level, it becomes important to unpack the links between climate change vulnerability and adaptation needs and economic justice from a class-based perspective. This angle helps to assess the scale of efforts required for adaptation and provides pointers for the most responsive priorities required at a national level.

■ A just case for a pro-poor adaptation agenda

A favourable outcome to climate change negotiations would be one that enables Africa to integrate climate change into key economic and social development frameworks, and addresses socio-economic vulnerabilities that threaten sustainable development in the continent. It would be one that allows African countries to address the structural drivers of vulnerability. When considering the causes of climate change and economic systems that have led to the current situation, it becomes obvious that, to weather the impacts of climate change, the current economic and social development path needs to be reconsidered. It should be queried: What kind of development will enable adaptation and who should benefit? The pursuit of an appropriate development approach is dependent on an in-depth understanding of the political economy of climate change and action. Ultimately, adaptation strategies that are considered to be most effective are those that focus on underlying drivers of vulnerability, rather than climate change alone.⁵

Climate change impacts in Africa will put considerable pressure on livelihoods and economies across the continent. Climate change will undermine the continent's sustainable development efforts with the most vulnerable sectors of society; developing countries and least developed countries will experience the greatest impact. Poverty and inequality are the largest drivers of vulnerability in Africa, significantly undermining adaptive capacity. Climate change has the potential to exacerbate poverty and inequality. Since 1990, the number of poor

people globally has increased by an average of 10 billion a year, mostly in Africa.⁶ In southern Africa, poverty and inequality have deepened. Life expectancy has reduced by 60 years to 33 years because of HIV/Aids infection rates, and an adoption of development paradigms which have not been able to redress historical inequalities based on race, gender, ethnicity, class and region.⁷ Such is the case in southern Africa. In Namibia, the wealthiest 20% of the population control 78.7% of all income in the country, while the poorest 20% have to make a living on a mere 1.4% of the national income.⁸ The majority of the poor are rural communities living on marginal lands. Despite twelve years of Millenium Development Goals (MDGs) and over a decade of the implementation of poverty reduction strategies, many African countries have failed to deliver on a systematic transformation of economic structures. Most countries continue to be characterised by dual economies with a relatively small resource well, i.e. a resourced formal sector that operates in isolation from a large growing and poverty-stricken informal economy and subsistence economy.^{9,10} It is this informal sector of the economy that requires the most attention in Africa's efforts to build adaptive capacity and integrate climate responses into national development strategies.

Key economic and social sectors (such as agricultural production, wildlife and tourism, water, health) and efforts towards poverty reduction will be negatively impacted. Agricultural production is predicted to decline by 50% with land suitable for agriculture reducing by 6%, ultimately resulting in a predicted decline of agricultural GDP by 9% in sub-Saharan Africa. The export sector, such as coffee-growing areas in Uganda and maize production in South Africa, and the associated labour force, will be negatively impacted. This is mainly because mean rainfall is expected to fall in most parts of the sub-region, particularly in southern Africa. In regions such as east Africa where an increase in rainfall is expected, high temperatures will shorten growing periods. Food security in a continent that is already struggling to feed itself will be undermined. The negative consequences of these impacts will be mostly felt by small-scale farmers, particularly women. The majority of African states will be faced with water scarcity and stress by 2050. Southern Africa will be faced with water scarcity by 2015 with serious implications for key industries, such as mining and irrigation-dependent commercial agriculture. Wildlife-based tourism, health and efforts towards poverty reduction will be negatively impacted. Ultimately, the continent is highly vulnerable to climate change, due to high levels of poverty, a heavy dependence on climate-sensitive resources for livelihoods and national economies, and a lack of financial, institutional and technological capacity to adapt.

■ What would be the ingredients of a favourable adaptation agenda for Africa?

It is increasingly accepted that effective responses to climate change challenges and building resilience need to happen in alignment with national and regional strategies for development, poverty eradication, economic growth and the enhancement of human well-being. In order to integrate climate change responses into development strategies, it is imperative that socio-economic vulnerabilities are unpacked and understood. Furthermore, for development to be climate-resilient, policy instruments to reduce poverty and enable adaptation must be integrated and designed in a way that includes the climate-vulnerable poor.¹¹ Adaptive capacity is dependent on policies and strategies that respond to the needs of the most susceptible systems and enhances their resilience to the impact of climate change.

A shaded reflection of the ingredients of a favourable adaptation agenda needs to echo the characteristics and profiles of those who are most vulnerable, and therefore where adaptation needs to take place. Not everyone is at risk to the same degree, and this needs to be reflected in Africa's climate change responses. Vulnerability is socially differentiated; exposure to climate risk poses different challenges to different people, and the ability to withstand climate extremes or disasters is shaped by a host of social factors. These include social inequality, access to resources, poverty, status, lack of representation and effectiveness in social security.^{12 13 14} As a result of these factors the elderly, the poor, women, children, ethnic minority groups, indigenous peoples, migrants and people who are directly dependent on natural resources for their livelihoods, such as pastoralists, are highly vulnerable.

■ Mainstreaming climate change responses and rethinking economic development frameworks

The section on poverty and inequality above demonstrates the need to reconsider the quality of the development frameworks upon which adaptation must be mainstreamed. Over 40 years' of development experience in southern Africa make it clear that neo-liberal strategies, that foster economic growth, and focus on macro-economic stability and market-friendly reforms, are insufficient to redress poverty and inequality.¹⁵ The current economic crisis is a further indication that this market-based and growth-led economic model cannot be relied upon to build adaptive capacities for the poor. Alternative models are required that will facilitate structural changes, systematic redistribution of resources and African states reconfiguring themselves into developmental states.

Macro-economic policy reform will be a critical entry point, crucial for mainstreaming climate change into development planning at a national level. Macro-economic policies can be a driving force behind efforts to consolidate good environmental stewardship, or an obstacle towards sustainable economies and building resilience.¹⁶ Macro-economic frameworks have been said to effectively deny the poor development opportunities, marginalise them from the economy and undermine their adaptive capacity. This is mainly because most African governments – in their capacity to attract foreign direct investment, higher domestic savings and industrial competitiveness – have further marginalised the poor and failed to reduce poverty. One of the fundamental pro-poor responses to climate change is to ensure that macro-economic policies reduce poor people's vulnerability. Current indications reveal major gaps in this regard. A review of agricultural policies in Africa and the extent to which they enable adaptive capacity traced the vulnerability of this sector back to a macro-economic framework that is heavily biased towards commercial agriculture at the expense of subsistence and small-scale farming. This pattern repeats itself in other sectoral policies.

Therefore, building adaptive capacity to climate change and integrating climate change into national economic development, essentially requires African states to revisit their development models. Pro-poor economic development strategies that promote economic growth with equity are required, and economic opportunities for the majority with targeted interventions to support the needs of those who are poor and vulnerable to climate change. This requires the state in its climate response strategies to be downwardly accountable and to link climate policy with social protection. Thus, macro-economic policies need to be reviewed to ensure they build resilience of the poor and are aligned to micro-level needs. A holistic and integrated approach that is inclusive and pro-poor is required to achieve this.

■ Promoting pro-poor responses in key sectoral policies

In addition to enabling macro-economic policy frameworks, sectoral policies must facilitate adaptation to climate change and address vulnerabilities. Water and agriculture are among the key sectors that are highly vulnerable to climate change, and yet central to the basic rights of the poor. Building **resilience of the agricultural sector** ought to be at the forefront of the climate change adaptation agenda, particularly support to small-scale agriculture. Investing in this sector will fulfil the twin objective of building resilience to climate change, while at the same

time facilitating the attainment of MDG 1 of halving poverty by 2015. In order to enhance adaptive capacity, an agricultural reform policy framework is critical for addressing the structural inequalities that undermine adaptive capacities of small-scale and subsistence farmers. Experiences from east Africa (specifically Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania) illustrate that policies aimed at increased access to irrigation, early warning systems for farmers, and drought mitigation measures are, on their own, inadequate for enhancing adaptive capacity. These need to be accompanied by tenure security for marginalised populations, gender mainstreaming and the development of agro-industries in rural areas, and most importantly, finance for agricultural development. The agricultural sector has fallen into the trap of focusing on external investors. The needs of the most vulnerable are overlooked. For instance, pastoralists in east Africa have lost tracts of land through externally-promoted agricultural investment schemes, which have taken away many of the communities' most important dry season pastures. Land and agrarian reform offer a critical entry point for climate change adaptation strategies. Landlessness and insecure tenure continues to compound poverty and inequality and impede communities, especially in rural areas, from having recourse to a source of livelihood through farming and other land-based activities.

Land and agrarian reform remains a priority and must form part of the macro-economic policy frameworks, while putting an emphasis on structural inequalities which exist and continue to hamper access to land for the poor, women and small-scale farmers. Equally important are efforts to promote sustainable land management, technology transfer, improve crop varieties, access to finance and other adaptation enablers.

The AU must be commended for developing an Agriculture Adaptation and Mitigation Framework, which is aimed at supporting 'country and regional initiatives to integrate "climate change in agriculture development" and agriculture development objectives in climate change initiatives'. The framework will enhance and scale-up agriculture productivity, while at the same time realizing the environmental resilience and biodiversity protection objectives. Amongst a number of policy intentions, this framework provides a clear and compelling investment programme for African agriculture that delivers on the twin objectives of meeting current food security needs, whilst building the capacity of rural systems and agricultural assets (e.g. soils) to offset or respond to climate change effects. It is inherently designed to foster integration between mitigation and adaptation, and highlights the complementary value of the adaptation actions. Linkages with the mitigation agenda include exploring the potential of soil carbon as a way of accessing mitigation finance instruments for adaptation. But the question of soil carbon is a problematic one which exposes rural farmers (with insecure tenure rights) to the

volatile market system and enables foreign entities to gain rights over communal, arable lands, particularly if pro-poor and rights-based approaches are not used as guiding principles for engagement.

Water is central to sustainable social and economic development, and as highlighted earlier, is one of the most sensitive climate change sectors. Irrespective of climate change, the number of people in water-stressed countries will multiply, due to increases in demand from agriculture, industry, domestic use, and the degradation of watersheds. Climate change will only make the problem worse and exacerbate the water stress. Changes in climate will have implications on the availability of water. Currently, more than one billion people lack access to safe and affordable water, and this reality is not so much about shortages of physical supply but about poverty and unequal power relationships, and unsound water management policies that exacerbate scarcity. The majority of countries classified as water-stressed are in Africa – more than in any other region.

A favourable adaptation agenda for Africa is one that enables Africa to build resilience in the water sector. Most of the water sector policies do not adequately factor in climate change impacts, such as climate-related conflicts, due to increased water scarcity, water shortages and related challenges in balancing water demand with water availability, meeting the competing needs of large- and small-scale water users, and the impacts of privatisation policies on the water rights of the poor. For instance, although South Africa is facing water scarcity by 2015, the country is yet to develop a robust strategy that balances water demand with water availability. The country has invested a great deal in the development of water resources, mainly through inter-basin transfer projects. But the sustainability of this approach is questionable, considering that the region is likely to face water stress which would reduce the availability of water, despite sustained levels of infrastructural development. Furthermore, experience from the Lesotho Highlands Water transfer project indicates that, if not properly planned, such water transfer schemes can have negative impacts on local communities in the countries supplying the water. Lack of access to water, relocation and denial of water rights may reduce the adaptive capacity of the local communities, who were resettled as a result of the project. This is particularly true, if the benefits from the transfer schemes are not integrated into local economies by forging linkages and multiplier effects with the rest of the livelihood strategies of the dam-impacted communities, to ensure sustainable livelihoods of the impacted households.¹⁷

■ Climate change adaptation policy must overcome gender marginalisation

Another area that needs urgent attention is mainstreaming gender into the formulation and implementation of adaptation strategies. Existing adaptation strategies in Africa do not adequately address aspects of gender inequality. Most of the economically-active females in rural areas are engaged in agriculture. This is owing to the rapid decline in male populations in rural areas, due to urbanisation and economic migration. Despite this trend, women are typically not empowered in policy-making processes, and property rights continue to marginalise women from gaining access to key economic assets. Thus, women are amongst the most vulnerable to climate change impacts, particularly female-headed households.

Adaptation for most of the vulnerable sectors, such as agriculture, biodiversity and water, has major gaps in terms of making provisions for gender-differentiated impacts. Enabling provisions that include, among others, security of tenure, provision of technical information (such as meteorological forecasts), disaster mitigation, and access to micro finance and opportunities for productive employment, need to be packaged in a manner that makes them equally accessible to women. The capacities of households to adapt to climate change will ultimately be undermined, if social inequalities facing women are not considered in climate change adaptation interventions.

■ Strengthen adaptation governance by amplifying the voice of vulnerable sectors of society

While climate change is a global problem requiring global solutions, the nature of the problem and its impacts – particularly on vulnerable sectors of society – require the active participation of multiple stakeholder's, including local-level stakeholders where adaptation needs to take place. Governance becomes central as it provides mechanisms through which decisions about climate change adaptation are made, and citizens and other stakeholders, (particularly the most vulnerable) participation is defined. The manner in which power and responsibility is exercised in shaping the adaptation agenda, as well as interactions between structures, becomes important. The role of various actors in negotiations and influencing priorities in national climate change responses is critical.

Climate change response strategies and efforts to mainstream adaptation into economic and nation development strategies are likely to be contested, due to competing interests, needs and unequal access to policy spaces. Currently, the most

vulnerable sectors of society remain largely excluded from participation and decision-making in the global governance regimes and international institutions, such as the UNFCCC or multilateral development banks (MDBs), which will determine their future livelihood and survival in a rapidly warming world.¹⁸ In Africa, civil society organisations (CSOs) and local communities have so far played a limited role in the formulation of national adaptation policies and strategies.

A recent study looking at adaptation governance in Africa revealed that stakeholder needs are not adequately reflected in the adaptation agenda, due to the processes followed. Participation in the formulation of climate change responses has been skewed towards national and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) with very little involvement of community-based organisations. Despite this, NGOs are relatively weak in the climate change policy formulation space in Africa. Their political space to engage is limited by a lack of political power and financial and human capacity constraints. NGOs have been calling for broader inclusiveness in the formulation of climate change policy. Few countries, such as Uganda, Ghana and Tanzania, followed a participatory approach where civil society led public awareness campaigns and parliamentary forums during the formulations of National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs) and National Climate Change Response Strategies (NCCRs). Despite this approach, communication was



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not fed by information needs and awareness raising which narrowly targeted urban cliques.

The effective participation of local communities and vulnerable sectors of society in shaping national climate change responses and feeding into the global climate policy process is constrained by limited access to information. Apart from reiterating the importance of communication, information and awareness-raising in NAPAs and NCCRs, most African countries do not have a coherent communication strategy for climate change issues and national responses. Communication on climate policy tends to be one way and falls short of an effective strategy to reach low-end users (rural dwellers, farmers and the poor) who are most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. This situation thereby undermines key governance principles such as equity, stakeholder participation, representation, accountability and transparency.

There is a need to invest in mechanisms that strengthen the participation of the most vulnerable sectors of society in climate change formulation processes. Their representation in policy spaces needs to be strengthened and a mechanism for feedback throughout the policy cycle developed.

□ Conclusion:

Climate change will have differentiated impacts across different social and economic layers of society. It will accentuate pre-existing inequalities that impact the most on people that already contend with multiple inequalities, and thus have lower capacities to adapt to climate change impacts. These include the poor, indigenous peoples and other ethnic minorities, women, and small-scale farmers, among others. National climate change adaptation policies in Africa must respond to the needs of these groups in the processes of mainstreaming adaptation into development strategies. The structural drivers of vulnerability need to be unpacked and addressed, and pro-poor and inclusive processes for adaptation priority setting at national level adopted. Currently, existing national climate change response strategies have fundamental shortcomings in this regard, leaving vulnerable communities exposed to the negative impacts of climate change.

Appropriate climate-resilient development needs to be centred around a pro-poor climate architecture to balance climate change and development concerns. The processes of climate policy formulation must be broad-based and focused on giving a voice to the voiceless in these highly political processes. The self-representation of women, indigenous peoples, small-scale farmers and poor communities in platforms (where priorities for national climate change responses and decisions around the

allocation of climate finance are set and monitored) must be strengthened. These efforts need to be accompanied by improving access to climate policy and strategy information in formats that are easily understandable to all stakeholders, thus enabling them to engage from an informed perspective. Future African positions must be informed by the views and needs of these groups. The role that CSOs can play in this area cannot be emphasised enough.

Adaptation capacity depends on policies and strategies that respond to the needs of the most vulnerable systems and sectors of society. Major reforms are required in macro-economic policy frameworks, agricultural policies and water resource management policies, amongst others. Secure access to land for the poor, small-scale farmers, women, and indigenous peoples is critical for building capacity. Thus, false and unjust solutions, such as soil carbon schemes, should be avoided at all costs as they threaten to transfer the rights of the poorest farmers in developing countries to external financial institutions and corporations from the biggest polluting countries. In addition, affordable access to markets, a diverse range of improved technologies that are appropriate to their needs and aspirations, and compensation for the impacts of climate change, must be ensured.

Access to water is a basic human right; the needs of the poor and other vulnerable communities at micro-level must be catered for in regional and national climate change water sector adaptation strategies. Vulnerable groups must be represented in multi-stakeholders where adaptation priorities are set and water resource development initiatives should not leave communities in a worse-off position.

Last, but not least, is the need to respond to the gender-differentiated impacts of climate change.

■ Climate Change Negotiations: What Outcome for Africa?

□ Estherine Lisinge-Fotabong

■ Impact and global challenges of climate change

Climate change and variability is a global problem of potentially devastating proportions. The literature from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) suggests that, if the global temperature rise is not kept below 2 °C, the world will experience major problems, such as the melting of ice caps on higher altitudes, rising sea levels, changes in ecosystems and seasons with resultant changes in crop growth (with consequences for all four dimensions of food security: availability, accessibility, utilisation and system stability). Furthermore, changes in temperature and precipitation result in favourable conditions for disease vectors and parasites that are aggravating incidences of disease and morbidity.

In Africa, environmental disasters such as floods and droughts are becoming more frequent and more severe. The situation in the Horn of Africa is a case in point with ripple effects, such as food insecurity, displacement of populations, potential for conflict and general security threats. In the Lake Chad region, temporal and spatial changes in the surface area of the lake have resulted in many



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fishing communities migrating across national borders in search of alternative fishing grounds.

Climate change has become a critical determinant for socio-economic development, making it one of the most pressing political issues of our time needing urgent attention.

■ Climate change negotiations: Background to climate change negotiations

The background to the negotiations on climate change can be found on the website of the UNFCCC.

In 1992, countries joined an international treaty, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, to cooperatively consider what they could do to limit average global temperature increases and the resulting climate change, and to cope with whatever impacts were, by then, inevitable.

By 1995, countries realised that emission reductions provisions in the Convention were inadequate. They launched negotiations to strengthen the global response to climate change, and, two years later, adopted the Kyoto Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol legally binds developed countries to emission reduction targets. The [Kyoto] Protocol's first commitment period started in 2008 and ends in 2012.

All institutions and countries are involved in the international climate change negotiations, under the Conference of the Parties (COP).

However, progress to come up with a globally-accepted agreement has been slow. The UNFCCC has the role of bringing states together to collectively address issues that are global in character. However, while the UNFCCC process presents an opportunity for cooperation in addressing the climate change problem, the political and economic interests of states, regions and recognised interest groups in the policy process cannot be ignored, therefore rendering the process complex. The global consensus of setting up the process of negotiations is unquestionable, because it arises from the contextual underpinning of the necessity to have all affected parties involved in the process of deriving solutions to address the impact of climate change. However, the patterns of the parties' interactions and the outcomes have been variable. The politics behind international policy-making on climate change can be explained from a conceptual framework of power and interest, and how power and interest are distributed among the various parties (or actors).

To understand how power and interest influence climate change negotiations, the 'power cube' analytical framework has been used. The concept of power has been deemed appropriate in the analysis of governance (Njaya & Bene 2011). Power has been defined in many ways, including the ability to achieve sets of goals (Parsons 1967) or various forms of restrictions on human action, while making action possible, in a specified scope. Others have defined power as how sections of a society control resources (material, human, intellectual, and financial). The latter definition of power fits well with the dynamics of the climate change negotiations. The reason is that those countries and institutions that are better positioned to control resources (which either determine the process of negotiations or the outcomes), tend to swing the climate change discourse in their favour.

Guijt (2005) describes the 'power cube' framework in terms of the spaces, place, and power as the main elements under which actor engagements and types of power are held. In the framework, 'place' refers to the levels at which action takes place, and in the case of this paper, it includes the national level which involves national networks of actors, including governments and NGOs, and the international level which includes Regional Economic Communities (RECs), the AU and the COP. 'Spaces' are understood to be areas of engagement filled with power of varying kinds – visible and invisible – including knowledge and discourse. Thus, a 'space' is the platform, process or mechanism within which countries communicate about climate change issues, share information, make decisions and take actions about climate change. It may also refer to mechanisms under which countries and interested parties seek to have influence on decisions about climate change.

■ The Conference of the Parties process

The Copenhagen COP created much expectation as it was to be the ultimate gathering where member states would have agreed on a legally binding instrument on climate change. Unfortunately, this was not the case.

■ What happened?

From the perspectives of International Relations (IR) and Political Science theories, several explanations can be applied to this situation.

In analysing the climate change negotiations so far (Copenhagen, Cancún and now Durban), what can be seen playing out is the reconciliation of the need for policy agreement at an international level, and the implications it might have at

national and regional levels. It is therefore important to understand the underlying power relationship in the policy-making process and how the decisions are made.

- Who are the key players influencing the process? What are their agendas and positions?
- What are the dynamics of the climate change negotiations on the critical questions of
 - concluding a legally binding agreement
 - the future of the Kyoto Protocol
 - financing.

It is clear that the negotiations have so far been strongly influenced by the positions of the United States (U.S.), China, and the European Union (EU), and now Brazil and India, and Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) as a bloc, based largely on their economic and political interests. These countries and groupings have come into the negotiations with clear objectives of what they want to achieve for themselves and what they can offer to others in return for supporting their positions. Most of these economies are high-carbon, with China and India leading the pack in their heavy reliance on coal to drive productivity and economic growth.

■ Africa's position in climate change negotiations

In order to prepare themselves, Africans should raise the following questions: What is Africa hoping to gain from the negotiations? What does Africa have? What can Africa offer, in other words, what is its bargaining chip?

As the Durban negotiations commenced, there was still no clue as to what the outcomes would be, given the highly political nature and the high stakes of the negotiations. While the science is clear on the impacts of climate change, the outcomes so far (based on the experiences from Copenhagen and Cancún) have been influenced mostly by the economic and political interests of some major countries. COP 17 in Durban represented a critical moment in the climate change negotiations and a defining opportunity for African leaders to chart a course towards outcomes that advance the interests and aspirations for social development and economic modernisation of Africa.

The position taken by Africa can be explained by how it perceives the causes of climate change and global warming, and the issue of power in influencing the outcomes of any international agreement on climate change. The 'African Common Position' document responds to the need to take into account not only Africa's acute

vulnerability but also its legitimate development needs, and the broader principles of equity and fairness as a recognition of the fact that the continent will be most negatively impacted upon, even though it is the least responsible for emitting greenhouse gases and causing climate change.

■ Coordinating an African common position

The political leadership of the continent realised that to constitute a strong voice in the negotiation process (power), and hence put Africa's interests on the table, it was imperative for the continent to go into the negotiations as a single voice with an African common position detailing Africa's stance on key issues in the negotiations. To this effect, the 15th, 16th and 17th Ordinary AU Summits took various decisions relating to the coordination of Africa's participation in the climate change process, and on substantive matters relating to the negotiations. Hence, the AU Summit, as a high-level policy organ of the AU, created 'space' for climate change; this sent a strong message to other parties that Africa is serious about extracting tangible benefits from the climate change negotiations.

These efforts yielded position results and prevented Africa from being marginalised. Ultimately, the process resulted in the following:

- Enhanced coordination among Africa's delegation at all levels in global climate change negotiations: Heads of state (Conference of African Heads of State and Government on Climate Change (CAHOSCC)), ministerial (Ministers of Environment) and expert (African Group of Negotiators) levels.
- The establishment of a bureau by the African Group of Negotiators.
- A stronger and supportive role played by key African institutions: AUC, NEPAD, African Ministerial Conference on the Environment (AMCEN).
- Speaking with one voice and a clearer articulation of Africa's demand and interest.
- A coordinated process to an updated African Common Position on climate change to COP 17/CMP 7 on the following issues: a second commitment period for the Kyoto Protocol, balanced financial allocation and commitments for adaptation and mitigation.

■ The way forward for Africa at COP 17 in Durban

Africa needed to adopt a number of strategies for a favourable outcome from COP 17. These included negotiations guided by a focus on ensuring equity

with ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ and respective capabilities. Africa needed to reaffirm its call for a two-track approach to the negotiations with separate outcomes: Life cycle assessment (LCA) for the implementation on the UNFCCC, and an amendment to Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol’s 2nd commitment period for Annex 1 countries. It was also critical that Africa ensured that Annex 1 countries show leadership by increasing mitigation pledges. Africa needed to affirm adaptation because this is an essential priority for the continent. In addition, Africa needed to affirm its commitment to achieving sustainable development and poverty reduction as its main priorities. Lastly, Africa should ensure that the environmental integrity of emission reduction commitments are met. In this regard, ambitious mitigation commitments by Annex 1 countries should not be conditional; in comparison to 1990 levels, Annex 1 countries must aim to reduce their GHG emissions by at least 40% and 95% by 2017 and 2050, respectively.

■ Outcomes of COP 17 from an African perspective

In supporting a positive outcome for Africa from COP 17 and future climate change negotiations, recommendations are made based on the power framework. Agrawal and Ribot (1999) identify four types of power, namely, power (i) to create rules (ii) to make decisions, (iii) to adjudicate disputes, and (iv) to ensure compliance. African delegates must focus their attention on these four elements in order for them to obtain optimal outcomes from the meeting in Durban in November/December 2011.

Since the COP has the mandate to create rules and make decisions, Africa needed to ensure that the COP 17 concludes the operationalisation of effective and accountable institutions under the COP, including adaptation, technology and finance (CAF), Technology Mechanism and the Green Climate Fund (GCF). It is important for Africa to insist on the establishment of the Adaptation Committee, with adequate representation from African states. There is also a need to ensure clarity on the institutional design of the Technology Mechanism, i.e. the Technology Executive Committee, the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN) and their capacity to address the needs of Africa. Furthermore, regarding the GCF, it was essential that COP 17 adopt a decision on the standing committee of the fund that addresses the roles, functions and composition of the committee.

As the climate negotiations reflect a range of perspectives, it is important for the African Group to keep its options open, and these may include partnering with most members of the Group of 77 and China (G-77+China) in seeking to implement the agreement, as outlined in the Bali Road Map. This calls for two parallel

negotiation processes, resulting in two distinct legal outcomes in relation to the implementation of the Convention and its Kyoto Protocol. Therefore, 'the overall objective is to strengthen the climate regime by building on the foundation of the existing architecture built over the past two decades'. This includes the Framework Convention and its Kyoto Protocol, with regard to mitigation.

Africa should build strategic power and space dimensions, in accordance with Cornwall's (2002) 'power cube'. The dynamics of the COP negotiations must be understood in terms of, firstly, which stakeholders are involved in the bargaining process and what their interests are, and secondly, the power conferred in these stakeholders and the power they wield by lobbying the major parties of the COP. Therefore, Africa's position has to be maintained, including negotiating for (i) developed countries to undertake a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol, (ii) developing countries to take on mitigation actions with financial, technological and capacity support from the developed countries, and (iii) the developing countries to receive support to undertake adaptation actions.

Conclusion

While Africa has made tremendous progress in negotiating the UNFCCC, there are many challenges still hampering the continent from achieving optimal outcomes from this process. AMCEN and the AU mechanism have enabled Africa to consolidate its position. However, the process is still riddled with issues of power and political economy, which Africa as a continent needs to take into account as it engages other stakeholders. The global political economy of climate change negotiation might be too complex for Africa; however, a focus on key areas would be adequate to achieve the minimum acceptable outcomes. These include building a coherent common African voice under the framework of the AU and strengthening the capacity of African stakeholders (including CSOs and NGOs) to provide support to government negotiators. Africa should strive to obtain concessions from developed countries on the commitment to the Kyoto Protocol, which will make funding available for African countries to finance mitigation and adaptation actions. There is a need for political commitment within Africa to address the impacts of climate change through policy and governance reforms, which will ensure climate-smart development at all levels of society.

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■ Civil Society and Climate Change Negotiations: Game Changers, Players or Spectators?

□ Nancy Kachingwe

■ Introduction

Countrymen, the task ahead is great indeed, and heavy is the responsibility; and yet it is a noble and glorious challenge - a challenge which calls for the courage to dream, the courage to believe, the courage to dare, the courage to do, the courage to envision, the courage to fight, the courage to work, the courage to achieve - to achieve the highest excellencies and the fullest greatness of man. Dare we ask for more in life?

– Kwame Nkrumah, first President of Ghana, address to the National Assembly, 12 June 1965

The Durban COP 17 has brought climate change negotiations to the doorstep of African civil society. This will be the first time that large numbers of African citizens and their movements will have interacted with the intergovernmental process; it will also be the largest mobilisation around the continent on climate change impacts and



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development challenges. The organisations coming to Durban will have spent a year familiarising themselves with the issues, raising awareness amongst constituencies and developing demands for the conference. But as new entrants to a process that has worn on for 17 years, it is worth reflecting on how far African civil society can be game changers in the climate change negotiations.

It should not be a matter for debate that African civil society *should* be making a difference to the climate change debate: the African continent will, by all scientific accounts, be the worst affected by climate change, while having the misfortune of being the region with the least technological and financial means to deal with its disastrous impacts. Climate change will alter the natural resource base that the continent's largely agrarian population depends on for its livelihood. Development efforts across the board have to factor in climate change as a major risk to achieving stability, justice and growth on the continent.

The future for Africa is made even more uncertain because of the current stalemate on the question of cutting emissions. When the UNFCCC came into being in 1992, the threat of global warming was thought to be several generations away, so time was a luxury the world could afford. This was a mistake – the earth is warming up faster than anticipated, and the world has to do something immediately. African governments have rightly insisted on the principle of historical responsibility to define who must cut emissions and by how much. With major historical emitters refusing to make any binding pledges to cut emissions drastically, Africa can hope for little from a global deal in the near future. Faced with a 'clear and present danger', governments and civil society in Africa need to come up with an emergency plan to force the hand of those whose GHG emissions have brought the world to this point.

The scientific arguments that global warming is nearing a tipping point, the hardships populations across the world will face, the sight of dried-up river beds and melting glaciers have all been insufficient in cutting emissions. The negotiations continue to be defined by countries' political and economic interests and the global balance of power, rather than by scientific realities. The hosting of two COPs in the south – Mexico and South Africa – following the 15th Conference of the Parties (COP 15) in Copenhagen, have not been able to move the larger political questions of cutting emissions and shifting global production and consumption patterns to a more sustainable path. Africa should not expect any nations to act on its behalf, and urgently needs a new game plan to turn the negotiations in its favour – to rapidly conclude a fair and balanced legally-binding deal.

■ African civil society participation in the climate change discussions

Beyond the environmental NGOs, African civil society groups have largely been absent from the climate change negotiations, and indeed they may have neglected to give enough attention to questions of sustainable development on the continent. This does not mean that the potential to make a difference is not there; since the rebirth of democracy in the 90s, social movements and unions, faith-based groups, the women's movement, development NGOs and human rights organisations, academics, individual activists and the media have all played a significant role in defining public policy and transforming governance on the continent. These groups have also contributed to defining African positions and issues in international agreements, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO). The Durban Conference represents the largest mobilisation of African civil society at any climate change event, but it is to be the beginning of broader civil society engagement from which organisations must start to build.

The game changers: African civil society groups will need to assess their respective power, influence and importance in the negotiations to figure out how far they need to exert any sway over the process. Those who are most powerful – the game changers – are able to dictate the agenda, constrain or expand options and force the pace of talks. Game changers do not need to be part of the negotiations process; they may be outside of the process, but still wield 'invisible power' to impose their preferred ideological framework as the set of universal laws. The dominance of the private sector, therefore, is indicated by the overwhelming attention given to market-based mechanisms, rather than rules and sanctions, to encourage business to reduce emissions. The conventional view is that what the U.S. does (or does not do) is the major game changer. This is particularly so, as emerging powers like India, China and Brazil seem unwilling to use their superpower muscle to force a deal in the negotiations. In their case, one has to ask whether this is because they cannot, or because they do not wish to, preferring the U.S. to be the target of opprobrium while they bide their time.

The players: Whether by choice or by circumstance, many of the parties to the negotiations are in the position of being players rather than game changers. Even small players are important: without them, there is no process. The main players are the government negotiators, who have to defend or promote their interests, but there are many other organisations that are significant players because they are able to provide specialised expertise, have access to media to shape opinion, or have resources to support particular lines of action (e.g. large foundations) or represent

powerful constituencies. Without the coercive power of the game changers, the players are forced to work within the established parameters. Even where they may try to put new issues forward or propose different directions, their ideas are easily swept aside, if the more powerful are not on their side. While they cannot change the rules of the game, what they do and whose side they play on will determine wins and losses.

The African Group has become an important negotiating bloc, but seems unable to extract very significant gains. What is unfortunate with the African Group is that no single country, or group of countries, has emerged at the forefront as a strong champion for faster and deeper action in the negotiations. Working as a bloc may give Africa more stature in the negotiations, but it may also have the effect of disabling individual country action in the negotiations. Without strong national civil society constituencies to hold individual governments accountable, membership with the African Group may enable many African states to not take responsibility. On the one hand, negotiations may not be progressing that fast, but on the other, many African countries may be aiding the slow progress by sitting on the benches rather than being proactive.

The spectators: As suggested in the introduction to this paper, most of the African CSOs coming to Durban can only be categorised as spectators. Reading participant lists at UNFCCC conferences and intersessionals demonstrates the low level of participation of African organisations, compared to southern and northern counterparts. There are more international CSOs defending Africa's interests than there are African organisations from any sector. Durban should be a wake-up call for CSOs on how much more work there is to be done in these negotiations.

As much as spectators will have little direct influence on the negotiations, they are still an important part of the process because they force the talks out of relative obscurity into the full view of the public. African civil society have moved from being outsiders, and can be categorised as 'the excluded' and 'the detached'. The excluded are the socially- and politically-isolated citizens who have no access to – and even less direct representation in – the negotiations. The excluded are different from 'the detached' who have the potential to be movers and shakers, because they at least have connections to, or are part of, the establishment, and have access to information and knowledge, but remain disengaged.

It is important to acknowledge that the civil society presence in Durban is a step forward for the climate change negotiations. As spectators, we are still learning how the negotiations affect the interests of our constituencies and find partners

with shared interests. Spectators can bolster the position of one party or another by bestowing them with legitimacy and credibility. Spectators are important for first-hand reports on how respective governments have conducted themselves, and raise awareness far and wide about the challenges of climate change. African civil society's participation in the Durban process should move from being tokenistic and once-off, to one that is consistent and meaningful.

This judgement is not to ignore the inputs of many African CSOs, particularly environmental groups to the UNFCCC. Similarly, we must count the participation of many Africans as staff of international organisations. These groups and individuals have, over the years, kept up to speed with the issues, followed technical meetings and conferences, and supported African negotiators in developing their positions. But the truth is that these groups and individuals have been working in isolation from the national civil society collective, as climate change remains an esoteric topic in African development debates.

■ Can African civil society transform the climate change game?

With Africa so disastrously exposed to the impacts of climate change, a radical shift in our positioning in the negotiations process is imperative. There are many theories about how change happens; what drivers of change might be brought into play to make this happen?



One model of change suggests that change comes from an interaction between contexts and events on the one hand, and institutions and agents on the other. Contextual factors that might drive change include globalisation, demographics, technology, environment or cultural changes. Events that might force change could

be war, economic crises, elections or natural disasters (cf diagram). But institutions and agents are needed to act on these events for change to happen. With so much global turbulence, are Africans letting a good crisis go to waste?

Rights, development and justice champions have forced change in issues of human rights and constitutional reforms, HIV / AIDS, extractive industry standards, environmental conservation, conflict and peace-building or women's rights, and international trade and cooperation, to name but a few. If we look at how civil society has been able to make a difference, it is where they have succeeded in providing intellectual and political leadership, coming forward with clarity and consistency in their goals, mobilising strategic mass constituencies, building partnerships, or raising media awareness. We can accept that contemporary African civil society has considerable experience in campaigning and influencing work. It is now a question of channelling that experience to the climate change debate. So what needs to happen?

■ Understanding climate change as a development and rights issue

The low participation of many civil society groups is due to climate change being seen as a specialised environmental issue, best left to the experts. It has become slowly apparent that climate change cuts across all of public policy, whether this is trade, investment and finance, health, food and livelihoods, access to basic services or housing or land rights. Global climate change agreements will reshape the global political economy, generating new sets of winners and losers. Thus, climate change is to be understood as more than simply the greenhouse effect: it is about fundamental rights and the politics of resource allocation.

Linked to the point above is the need to crystallise a common understanding across Combined Sewer Overflow (CSOs) to generate a collective set of policy demands. A large number of declarations and public statements have come out of African civil society on the eve of the Durban conference, but we have been fairly dependent on the existing analysis and positioning from our external partners, rather than from our own research. Furthermore, climate change has the convenience of being a catch-all platform for championing the particular interest of each group (land, agriculture, pollution, economic justice, mining, human rights etc.), rather than bringing these multiple and relevant issues together within a single climate change agenda. Civil society can carve an important niche by consolidating their positions around the green economy and leading the debate on how such an economy should look for Africa.

■ Building knowledge-based partnerships for involvement in the negotiations

These are technical processes that require partnerships with academic institutions and scientists to have a better understanding of how climate change is affecting people on the ground, including partnerships with IR groups about how Africa can best take its struggle forward within the negotiations. Such partnerships are limited, while the media's grasp of climate change questions remains rudimentary, with few papers having environmental or science reports, making the cross-sector collaboration even less likely.

Resources are needed by civil society groups to follow the negotiations on a more consistent basis, to monitor whether African governments' responses are commensurate with the challenges presented by climate change. There is a danger that resources to civil society will predominantly be for on-the-ground adaptation work, and not the political work of mobilising around a more radical African response to the climate change challenge. African civil society groups have to strive for much greater visibility on the global stage to push for a new way of dealing with climate change.

■ Building alliances between civil society and governments

African governments must be persuaded to overcome their knee-jerk aversion to civil society and to support key stakeholders by working alongside them in the climate change negotiations. By doing so, they would be able to draw from a wealth of resources from civil society, including legal, scientific or political skills for negotiations, campaigning for additional support (to the continent) to deal with climate change, and programming to design national climate change responses. Indeed, African governments have all the expertise they need at their disposal, in every discipline, both within the continent and in the diaspora. The rationale for negotiating as an African Group should now be based on the strengths and talents that each country can bring to the table, rather than because countries are too weak to negotiate on their own behalf. Continental climate change initiatives, such as those being initiated by the AU/United Nations (UN) Economic Commission for Africa (ECA)/African Development Bank (AfDB) partnerships, should receive more resources and individual government support.

It is particularly important for Africa (both civil society and states) to develop more autonomy in the climate change negotiations. South-South solidarity may provide some level of support for African positions, but Africa's primary concerns

are very different from those of many of its southern partners whose priorities in the global negotiations is the race for dominance over green technology. With its rich and untapped resource base, Africa's partners are also influenced by the global scramble for natural resources, which should be used to leverage more concessions in the negotiations. Africa will therefore be more of a pawn than a player in the negotiations, if it continues to rely so heavily on external expertise driven by particular national agendas.

■ Push for African governments to take leadership

Civil society should put pressure on the major powers in Africa to take a stronger stand in the negotiations. Countries such as South Africa and Nigeria claim that they are working as part of the African Group, but they are not seen as playing a leadership role on the continent's behalf, particularly when they have access to clubs such as the Group of 20 (G20) and BRICS. Equally, the African civil society effort would be greatly assisted by one or two vocal leaders, prepared to stick their heads



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out and carry the rhetoric forward; in this sense, the passing of the late Wangari Maathai leaves a gap in African environmental advocacy. And while we may not have supported the grandstanding of Africa's big men, their disappearance from the scene leaves no one to galvanise around particular issues. Civil society would do well to go in search of its own African Al Gore – a person with the stature (and deep pockets) to shame or coax global and African leaders into action.

Conclusion

This paper makes the case for African civil society to intervene more forcefully in the UNFCCC negotiations, with a view to jolting the current stalemate and pushing African countries to take a firmer stand against the lack of progress in reducing GHG emissions. African civil society has untapped potential to make that difference: the Durban climate change conference has provided a starting point for new civil society leadership to ensure that Africa is not short-changed in the negotiations. The turbulent global environment suggests that institutions and non-state actors in the continent can become drivers of change. We must believe that, as Africans, we can be more than spectators or hapless players in the re-ordering of the global economy that is taking place. Leadership, collective will and bold action is all that is needed to prevail.

Further reading

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□ Points of Discussion

In looking towards how Africa and the Global South could effectively negotiate their interest on climate change, the discussion that followed the presentations highlighted the need for negotiations to be more robust and inclusive of civil society.

Questions were raised about the potential role of fossil fuel producers – including South Africa – in the negotiations, and how they were positioning themselves amongst factions in the broader debates about a lack of accountability versus ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’. Considering that a significant portion of these economies’ revenues were driven by the production and export of fossil fuels, it was foreseen that a ‘sea change’ in these economic policies would be difficult to achieve. It was noted that most states should, at least for the short- to medium-term, attempt an ‘energy mix’ of both fossil fuels and clean energy through alternative technology. Transitioning to cleaner technologies is still very expensive, and further research is needed on ensuring the financing capacities for adopting cleaner practices with renewable energy. The current paradigm also inherently penalises much of the African continent and other fossil fuel-dependent states because of the nature of these economies.

From a political standpoint, representatives from the government of South Africa noted that the South African position at COP 17 would be exactly aligned with that of the African Group. As host country, South Africa would face a very delicate balancing act between the demands of the developed and developing worlds, respectively. South Africa’s COP 17 position would also be more broadly reflective of the expectation that South Africa represents Africa on a regional level in global multilateral fora, such as the G20, BRICS and India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA). South Africa aims to represent the interests of the region in international discussions, and is one of the only countries in the world that faces this expectation. Subsequently, South Africa not only seeks to ensure that its own interests are pursued globally, but also attempts to secure discussions of issues that affect Africa more broadly.

The impact of the global financial crisis was not overlooked in the discussion, as it was argued that one particular ramification of the crisis might be Africa looking inwards for capacity and resources to tackle the effects of climate change. Due to financial difficulties, the West will no longer necessarily be a source of financial assistance for climate change programmes, and Africa and the developing world will need to explore other avenues to mobilise domestic resources for technical innovation. South-South cooperation could be integral in pushing this agenda forward. It was recognised that civil society had a significant role to play in facilitating this process, and providing a space in which solutions could be introduced and discussed.

Moreover, it was agreed that civil society's role in combating the effects of climate change goes beyond merely raising awareness and flagging issues; it also has a responsibility to provide constructive criticism to governments, and to offer the space for dialogue on policy processes. However, further promotion of the culture of involving civil society in international negotiations needs to be encouraged. A state with political clout, such as South Africa, would set an example for the rest of the continent to engage actively with civil society in all stages of negotiations. It was also noted that civil society requires more formalised structures of engagement with government. Civil society needs to be guarded from forces that might seek to exploit it through imbalanced financial and power dynamics. Lastly, there also exists the perception from government's standpoint that civil society represents donor interests and not African agendas – which explains why governments are sometimes hesitant about including civil society in negotiations.

Concerns were raised about the various roles South Africa might have to fulfil during COP 17, and the tensions that might exist between them. Whilst South Africa has stated its intention to comply with and support the African Common Position, the country still retains its informal membership with the Brazil, South Africa, India, China group (BASIC). Indeed, South Africa is still a heavy emitter of carbon, with a carbon footprint significantly larger than any other African state. In this respect, it was proposed that BASIC's rationale lies in a shared economic policy: South Africa probably aligned with BASIC at COP 15 in Copenhagen due to economic interests. The extent to which economic interests have a role to play in these negotiations tends to be undermined.

Irrespective of South Africa's membership with BASIC, it intends to maintain the African position as its own, and to push for the same targets proposed by the African Group. The Group is pushing for broader sustainable development practices on the continent, with political leadership at the level of heads of state driving the process; expert and ministerial leadership is also steering the African Common Position, but to a lesser degree. The African Group seeks international commitment to sustainable development practices, but has thus far been disappointed by a lack of appropriate global response. Concerns were raised over the issue of climate change not being treated seriously enough, as evinced by the \$100 billion committed to the GCF and other climate mechanisms, which equalled the amount used to bail Greece out of its economic crisis. South Africa would thus face the very difficult task of meeting diverse expectations, and stakeholders have been warned to be realistic when examining South Africa in its capacity as host of COP 17. Ultimately, the African Common Position on climate change is simply one aspect of a political programme on South Africa's part to support a broader African agenda. The difficulty of uniting many diverse opinions and perspectives must, however, be recognised.

Lastly, whilst most participants recognised the need for the African Group to have its proposals considered more seriously, it was noted that the negotiations themselves would not necessarily be driven by the demands of regional groups, but political groups. Thus, in spite of states seemingly organised in regional blocs, the negotiations would be influenced, and ultimately decided, by political groupings such as the G-77+China, Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and the EU. Whilst African states have successfully negotiated and unified for the purpose of ratifying international agreements in the past (such as the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety), unifying under the African Common Position would be a far more difficult task. Africa will have to ensure that its voice is heard during this international platform, in order to avoid environmental and economic catastrophe for the continent.

■ Annex 1

□ Programme



international relations
& cooperation
Department:
International Relations and Cooperation
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA



Negotiating Africa and the Global South's Interests on Climate Change

Southern Sun North Beach, Durban

25 November 2011

09:00 – 09:30 REGISTRATION

09:30 – 09:50 **Introductory Remarks**

Dr Siphamandla Zondi, Director, Institute for Global Dialogue

Mr Nhlanhla Mtaka, Executive Director, Ingabadi Group

Mr Fadl Nacerodien, Chief Director, Policy, Research & Analysis
Unit (PRAU), DIRCO

09:50 – 10:10 **Welcome**

Representative of the Office of the Premier (KwaZulu-Natal)

SESSION 1: GLOBAL SOUTH AND CLIMATE CHANGE

This session will discuss the interests of emerging powers and the Global South broadly in the ongoing UNFCCC negotiations, and the extent to which these offer reprieve to Africa's aspirations out of the negotiations. It will provide space for perspectives, from leading nations in the Global South (which are also members of BRICS), to be debated openly.

Chair: Dr Siphamandla Zondi

Director, Institute for Global Dialogue

10:10 – 10:30 **From G-77 to BASIC: China in Global Climate Change
Negotiations**

Mr Xinran Qi, Georgetown University, USA

- 10:30 – 10:50 **Brazilian Environmental Politics and Global Climate Governance**
Dr Marco Vieira, Lecturer in International Relations, University of Birmingham, UK
- 10:50 – 11:10 Tea
- 11:10 – 11:30 **Indian Climate Change/Energy Security Nexus in Multilateral Negotiations**
Ms Swati Ganeshan, Associate Fellow at the Centre for Global Agreements, Legislation and Trade in Resources, Regulation and Global Security Division of The Energy and Resources Institute (TERI), India
- 11:30 – 11:50 **Introduction: Emerging Powers and Climate Change: BASIC & COP 17 at Durban and Beyond**
Mr Francis Kornegay, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD)
- 11:50 – 12:50 Discussion
- 13:00 – 14:00 Lunch

SESSION 2: AFRICA AND CLIMATE CHANGE

It is assumed by some that the existence of a common position by African countries, that are parties to the COP in the UNFCCC, translates to a stronger capacity to negotiate a generally favourable outcome. Although Africa contributes the least of all major global regions to GHG emissions, it is one of the most affected by the negative ramifications of climate change. It, therefore, has a vested interest in a strong and practical agreement amongst negotiating parties regarding climate change mitigation and adaptation imperatives. But whether the common position provides the basis for such an outcome and whether conditions exist for common diplomacy, what would be the role of key African states, and what elements of the common position would be most suitable for bargaining exercises, are some of the questions to be debated by the panel in this session.

Chair: **Prof. Hamilton Sipho Simelane**
UKZN and Research Associate, Ingabadi Group

- | | |
|---------------|--|
| 14:00 – 14:20 | Africa at COP 17: Building a Common Position against a Backdrop of Inequality
Ms Masego Madzwamuse, Economic Justice Programme Manager at Open Society Initiative of Southern Africa (OSISA) |
| 14:20 – 14:40 | Climate Change Negotiations: What Outcome for Africa?
Ms Estherine Lisinge-Fotabong, New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) |
| 14:40 – 15:00 | Civil Society and Climate Change Negotiations: Game Changers, Players or Spectators?
Ms Nancy Kachingwe, Land Access Movement of South Africa (LAMOSA) |
| 15:00 – 15:20 | Opportunities and challenges for development: Africa's interest in the adaptation arena and the implications for mechanisms (financing) that may be further developed during COP 17
Professor Mike Muller, visiting Adjunct Professor, University of the Witwatersrand Graduate School of Public and Development Management and Commissioner, National Planning Commission |
| 15:20 – 16:30 | Discussion |
| 16:30 | Closure and vote of thanks |

Please join us for a Cocktail Reception (18:00)

This event is generously supported by the Government of Norway.

Annex 2

Participants List

Surname	Name	Organisation
Alsharif	Ali Yousif Ahmed	Embassy of Sudan
Baleka	Patrick	Western Sahara Solidarity Forum (SA)
Bengis	Terry	Webtune (Pty) Ltd
Bhengu	Lamula Sabelo	Zulehlangene Management
Bradlow	Daniel	DIRCO
Bridgemohan	Nitesh	Msunduzi Municipality
Brijraj	Reshwant	
Busuku	Gugu	AFASA
Buthlezi	Thulasizwe	Khuthala Group (Pty) Ltd
Calitz	Willemien	
Cele	Njabulo	Mangosuthu University of Technology
Chindia	Morina	High Commission of Kenya
Clark	Nagida	
Coan	Stephen	The Witness
Dawnarain	Reena	KZN DAEA
Delkasso	Desta	Embassy of Ethiopia
Diakolo	Muzungu	Embassy of the DRC
Dlamini	Siphokuhle	Isihawu Initiative
Do	Lihn	
Dove	Patricia	
Dube	Simphiwe	KZN-DAEA
Duff	Lyndsey	IGD
Dukada	Toleka	DBN-LC
Ganeshan	Swati	TERI
Govender	Dana	The Heart and Stroke Foundation
Gumede	Sandile	Ndwedwe Municipal Housing Sector Plan
Gumede	Sibusiso	COSATU
Hermitte	Tony	PolluSollu
Hlatshwayo	Siyanda	Horizon Group
Kachingwe	Nancy	LAMOSA
Kaye	Sylvia	UKZN
Khanyile	Nomsa	KZN DAEA
Khuluse	Nkosingiphile	KZN DAEA

Khumalo	Bheki	Maverick Consulting
Kingsley	Angela	DIRCO
Kornegay	Francis	IGD
Kuryszczyk	Sean	Refugee & Migrant Ministry
Lesuthu	Zodwa	Department of Labour
Lewis	Meggan	
Linda	Zanele	DAFF
Lisinge-Fotabong	Estherine	NEPAD
Lukamba	Jean-Pierre Alumba	Amnesty International
Luthuli	Gcinekile Gcina	INK ABM/URP
Luthuli	Mbali	KZN DAEA
Mabaso	Nkanyiso	Mangosuthu University of Technology
Madlala	Sbongiseni	Msunduzi Municipality
Madzwamuse	Masego	OSISA
Maharaj	Nurdesch	KZN DEDT
Maharajh	Yashna	
Mahlaba	Nkosinathi	KZN DAEA
Maile	Thabo	Freedom of Expression Institute
Makina	Anesu	Africa Policy Institute
Mashaba	Xolile	Mangosuthu University of Technology
Masters	Lesley	IGD
Masuku	Bongani	COSATU
Mathebula	Zanele	COSATU
Mavuso	Sihle	The New Age e-Paper
Mbatha	Thulani	Sunday Times
Mbatha	Njabulo	Mangosuthu University of Technology
Mchunu	Benton	KZN DAEA
Mdakane	Thobeka	Gumbi Consulting
Mdletshe	Thobani	UMIX News
Mdloti	Ntuthu	IGD
Mkhwanazi	Don	
Mkhwanazi	Nosipho	KZN DAEA
Mkhwanazi	Thula	AFASA
Mlambo	Ntuthuko	KZN DAEA
Mlangeni	Khulekani	Maverick Consulting
Mnyungula	Ayanda	Forestry Development
Mokoena	Silungile	Sluvin News & Tourism
Moodley	Kuben	Strategic Support Services
Moodley	Keshan	Bosch Munitech

Moonsamy	Sathia	RECO
Mpanza	Bonga	Mangosuthu University of Technology
Mpanza	Andile	Mangosuthu University of Technology
Msimango	Makhosi	Ingabadi Group
Msimango	Peggy	KZN DOE
Msimango	George	KZN DOE
Mtaka	Nhlanhla	Ingabadi Group
Muller	Mike	University of the Witwatersrand
Mvuyane	Sifiso	Mangosuthu University of Technology
Nacerodien	Fadl	DIRCO
Naidoo	Jayaseelan	The Saviour
Naidoo	Shirley	The Saviour
Ndlovu	Nhlawenhle	
Ndlovu	Nkosingiphile	AFASA
Ndlovu	Nkosi	AFASA
Ngcobo	Caesar	Caesar & Associates
Ngcobo	Thembinkosi	Ethekwini Municipality
Ngcobo	Sibusiso	Mangosuthu University of Technology
Ngidi	Siphindile	DSW
Ngubane	Xolani	Department of Defence
Ngubane	Sibonelo	
Ngubo	Ntokozo	KZN DAEA
Nisa Sayed	Saydoo	WCRP
Nsibande	Angel	AFASA
Ntshangase	Mbali	KZN DAEA
Ntuli	Mthoko	Mangosuthu University of Technology
Ntuli	Siyabonga	Mangosuthu University of Technology
Nzama	Nonkululeko	UKZN
Nzama	Nonjabulo	Mangosuthu University of Technology
Parkes	Lisa	Icologie
Perumal	Jane	Msunduzi Municipality
Reddy	Vivian	Edison Corporation
Sairosi	Emmanuel	UKZN
Salifu	Uyo	IGD
Sarabji	Kate	Msunduzi Municipality
Shandu	Mzwandile	Mangosuthu University of Technology
Sibisi	S Zama	Office of the Premier, KZN
Sibiya	Ntombifuthi	KZN DAEA
Simelane	Hamilton Sipho	Ingabadi Group

Smith	Jane	
Tembe	Zandile	Ukhozi FM
Tesha	John	Africa Forum
Tshibangu	Mbuyi Christophe	UNISA
Vieira	Marco	University of Birmingham
Xinran	Qi	Georgetown University
Xulu	Celumusa	AFASA
Zondi	Siphamandla	IGD
Zondi	Bongiwe	DAFF
Zungu	Hlengiwe	Sluvin News & Tourism

Endnotes

1. This dilemma is eloquently described in the memoirs of a pioneer African diplomat at the United Nations, Mr Frederick S. Arkhurst of Ghana, in a recently published book entitled *African Diplomacy: the UN Experience*.
2. See excerpts from the speech entitled 'COP 17: a coup for Africa – Zuma,' at <http://www.southafrica.info/cop17/zuma-121211.htm#ixzz1wA0uQKhy> (accessed on 13 December 2011).
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