

The Global South and the International Politics of Climate Change

Proceedings Report of the International Workshop:
Negotiating Africa and the Global South's Interests on Climate Change

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■ Table of Contents

■ Executive Summary	5
■ Acknowledgements	8
■ Acronyms and Abbreviations	9
■ Notes on the Contributors	11
■ Introduction: Emerging Powers and Climate Change: BASIC and COP 17 at Durban and Beyond	13
□ Francis Kornegay	13
■ From G-77 to BASIC: China in Global Climate Change Negotiations	16
□ Xinran Qi	16
■ Introduction	16
■ China's Climate Profile	17
■ China's Climate Policy-Making	17
■ Defining China's Interests in Climate Change Negotiations	19
■ From G-77 to BASIC: An Option to Advance Negotiating Positions	21
■ COP 17 and the Road Ahead	23
■ Brazilian Environmental Politics and Global Climate Governance	25
□ Marco Vieira	25
■ Introduction	25
■ Brazil's Climate Profile	27
■ Understanding Brazilian Climate Politics	28
■ The Current Brazilian Negotiating Position in Global Climate Talks	34
■ Indian Climate Change/Energy Security Nexus in Multilateral Negotiations	36
□ Swati Ganeshan	36
■ Introduction	36
■ India: Grappling with Challenges in a Globalised World	37
■ Energy – Steering Development	38
■ The 4 As and Energy Security	39
■ Energy for Growth – A Tough Road Ahead	40
■ Emissions Scenario – Where is India?	41
■ India in Climate Change Negotiations	41
■ Climate Change Efforts – International Outlook	43
■ Domestic Actions	44
■ Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency – Focusing on Co-benefits	45

■ India, BASIC and Multilateral Negotiations	47
■ Multilateral Negotiations in Climate Change – Is there too much Focus on BASIC?	48
■ India and BASIC at COP 17 and Beyond	48
■ Emerging Powers and COP 17: South Africa's BASIC Dilemmas	50
□ Francis Kornegay	50
■ Introduction	50
■ South Africa and the Africa Group	51
■ Euro-African Synergy: Beyond Cancún	52
■ BASIC Synergies and Contradictions	53
■ South Africa in Search of a 'Green' Path	55
■ 'Responsibility' and the Ethical Dimension	56
■ Durban Requiem?	58
■ Europe's Comeback: Copenhagen begets Durban	61
■ The 'Durban Deal' Regionalised: Variation along a 'Building Blocks' Theme	62
■ Needed: Regional Environmental Security Cooperation	64
■ Conclusion	65
■ Points of Discussion: From the Floor	67
■ Endnotes	69
■ Annex 1	73
■ Annex 2	76

■ Executive Summary

On 25 November, 2011, the Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD), the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) and the Ingabadi Group hosted the second in a series of dialogues on climate change in Durban, prior to the formal opening of the 17th Conference of the Parties (COP 17). This all-day workshop gave consideration to *Negotiating Africa and the Global South's Interest on Climate Change*. The proceedings report captures the first half of the discussion on the role of emerging powers and their role within the international climate change negotiations. Panelists were drawn from of Brazil, India, China and South Africa (BASIC) to share their expertise on these multidimensional country positions. The session brought together members from the diplomatic corps, academia, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), media and national, provincial and local governments, to build a better understanding of the critical roles of Global South multilateralism and club diplomacy (through the Group of 77 (G-77) and other platforms) in forging a common position. The G-77 provides a means for developing countries to articulate collective interests and enhance their negotiating capacity on all major issues within the United Nations (UN) system, including the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations.



Mr Xinran Qi (Georgetown University); Dr Marco Vieira (University of Birmingham); Ambassador John Tesha (Africa Forum); Ms Swati Ganeshan (TERI); Mr Francis Kornegay (IGD)

In his contribution, Xinran Qi notes that China's position in the climate change negotiations has moved to one of prominence on the global agenda, due to significant economic transformation and current interaction with emerging powers through groups such as Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) and BASIC. China's climate change policy is driven by industrialisation, modernisation and social stability – all of vital importance to China in achieving its developmental goals. Mr Qi notes that for Beijing, ensuring energy security is also crucial for political survival, yet China remains dependent on coal for energy. Nevertheless, China has taken steps to address climate change by ratifying the Kyoto Protocol in May 1998 and releasing the *Green Book of the Environment* (2010).

In terms of the climate change negotiations, China has been consistent in emphasising the principle of historical responsibility for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. However, with rapid industrialisation, China's own GHG emissions have rapidly risen to place it as a major emitter. This position weakens Beijing's bargaining power, with China increasingly under pressure from both developing and developed states to reduce its GHG emissions. In view of this, BASIC and the Group of 77 and China (G-77+China) provide not only a platform for China to develop its interests with other economies, but also offers the economic clout and leverage to negotiate. Qi indicates that pragmatism has increasingly become a feature in China's approach to climate change.

In his presentation on 'perspectives from Brazil', Marco Vieira highlights key differences between the BASIC countries, such as deforestation, which has presented a more significant challenge to Brazil and has occupied importance in its negotiating position. This is because the Brazilian Amazon has been viewed by various presidents as a symbol of sovereignty. Brazil also faces a growing demand for its agricultural goods, and the need to balance food security and other developmental issues with environmental protection (important in Brazil's negotiating position). Brazil also presents an interesting case of how emerging countries are attempting to develop sustainably. Alternative energy sources have become so prominent in Brazil's environmental policy that presidents have made use of alternative energy as a foreign policy tool. Ethanol from sugarcane has become a major source of energy in Brazil; a large number of cars in the country run on alternative sources of energy.

Dr Vieira traces the development of Brazil's negotiating position from the 1970s, when its nationalist party began with a more defensive, nationalist approach to the inception of democracy, where considerations of the country's international position have become more important. Indications are that Brazil will likely adopt the demands for a legally-binding climate agreement, with Brasilia prepared to negotiate and make the necessary concessions, provided its national interests and core values are considered.

In providing a perspective on India, Swati Ganeshan notes that Delhi's negotiating position is largely informed by the country's energy and broader developmental needs. Despite India's relatively high GHG emissions rank, the country's per capita emissions remains low. India is, however, committed to reducing its emissions. Some of the mechanisms it has set in place to achieve this are its National Action Plan and the Five Year Plan. Within the international negotiations, Delhi pursues multilateral, regional and bilateral approaches to addressing climate change with the ratification of international environmental agreements reflecting support for the multilateral frameworks. India continues to underline the importance of the principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities, as well as capacity building, access to technology transfer, intellectual property rights (IPR) and unilateral trade measures, with the country taking up a leadership role when required.

On South-South cooperation, Ms Ganeshan highlighted that there are a number of other groupings, including G-77+China, Middle East groups and the Small Island Developing States (SIDS), and that perhaps there had been too much focus on BASIC. Nevertheless, BASIC has proven influential at the negotiations, and each country has done well in terms of their climate change initiatives. Even though this is not a formal group, it maintains a strong voice within the talks, showing cooperation and engagement on a number of different platforms.

For South Africa, Francis Kornegay notes that Pretoria's position is influenced by its membership of the Africa Group, BASIC and its own national priorities. A commitment to the Africa Group has remained prominent in South Africa's negotiation stance with a clear focus on adaptation and, specifically, the adaptive implementation of the commitments made in Cancún during the 16th Conference of the Parties (COP 16), including a second commitment period for the Kyoto Protocol. In his discussion, Mr Kornegay also goes on to highlight the tension that exists between South Africa's position and the other BASIC countries (ahead of Durban), and the challenges that face these countries, particularly as they have identified themselves as 'different' (via BASIC) to other developing countries. This allowed the European Union (EU) to adopt a more prominent role in the COP 17 negotiations and, ultimately, in shaping its outcome.

South Africa's role in the Durban climate talks is also complicated by the fact that it needs to address its own high GHG emissions rank and its role as host of COP 17. Its challenge is further exacerbated by the fact that, within the context of the Kyoto Protocol, there is no 'political middle ground' for reconciling high-emitting developed countries with high-emitting emerging powers for tackling climate change. As a result, emerging powers are able to remain under the category of 'developing states' and benefit from the associated advantages, despite the impact of emissions from these countries.

Kornegay also addresses the question of broader environmental security, where depletion of Africa's natural resources by western and Asian powers has contributed to more extensive environmental security concerns. Here, suggestions are made for further attention to be given to a 'green' regional environmental security force that goes beyond the narrow focus on climate change.

Acknowledgements

The IGD would like to acknowledge the Government of Norway for their support of the Environmental Diplomacy Programme through which the dialogue series on climate change has been made possible.

■ Acronyms and Abbreviations

AAI	African-American Institute
ABIOVE	Brazilian Association of Vegetable Oil Industries
ADP	Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action
ALBA	Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America
ANEC	National Association of Grain Exporters
AOSIS	Alliance of Small Island States
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BASIC	Brazil, South Africa, India and China
BLY	Bachat Lamp Yojana
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CARICOM	Caribbean Community
CDM	Clean Development Mechanism
CEM4	4th Clean Energy Ministerial
CFL	compact fluorescent lamp
CO₂	Carbon Dioxide
COP	Conference of the Parties
COP 16	16 th Conference of the Parties
COP 17	17 th Conference of the Parties
CP2	second commitment period
CTCN	Climate Technology Centre Network
ECBC	Energy Conservation Building Code
EU	European Union
G-77	Group of 77
G-77+China	Group of 77 and China
GCF	Green Climate Fund
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GHG	greenhouse gas
GNI	Gross National Income
HDI	Human Development Index
IAR	international assessment and review
ICA	international consultation and analysis
IBAMA	Brazilian Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural Resources (<i>Instituto Brasileiro do Meio Ambiente e dos Recursos</i>)
IBSA	India, Brazil, and South Africa
IEA	International Energy Agency

IGD	Institute for Global Dialogue
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IPEEC	Internal Partnership for Energy Efficiency Cooperation
IPR	Intellectual Property Rights
IREDA	Indian Renewable Energy Development Agency Limited
LDCs	least developed countries
LULUCF	Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MEA	multilateral environmental agreement
MEF	Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate
MOU	memorandum of understanding
NAASP	New Asian-African Strategic Partnership
NAPCC	National Action Plan on Climate Change
NARCC	National Assessment Report on Climate Change
NBI	Nile Basin Initiative
NCCC	National Coordination Committee on Climate Change
NDRC	National Development and Reform Commission
NGO	non-governmental organisation
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
PAT	Perform, Achieve and Trade
PPP	purchasing power parity
PROALCOOL	National Alcohol Programme
REDD	Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SAPCC	State Action Plan on Climate Change
SEI	Stockholm Environment Institute
SEPA	State Environmental Protection Administration
SIDS	Small Island Developing States
UMEAC	Universal Modern Energy Access Case
UN	United Nations
UNCED	United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
U.S.	United States
WWF	World Wild Fund for Nature

■ Notes on the Contributors

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Ms Ganeshan is an Associate Fellow at the Centre for Global Agreements, Legislation and Trade in Resources, Regulation and Global Security Division of The Energy and Resources Institute (TERI), India. Swati has a master's degree in International Studies (Security Studies) from the University of Birmingham, UK, and in Mass Communication from Jamia Millia Islamia University, Delhi. She also has an honour's degree in Journalism from Kamala Nehru College, Delhi University. She is currently coordinating the Asian Energy Institute secretariat (hosted by TERI) which focuses on research on energy, climate and sustainable development issues. She is also the overall coordinator for the ITEC programme, conducted by TERI, with the support of the Indian government's Ministry of External Affairs on issues ranging from renewable energy and trade to climate change.

□ **KORNEGAY, Francis**

Mr Kornegay is a Senior Research Fellow in the Emerging Powers programme at the Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD). He has a master's degree in African Studies from Howard University, Washington, DC, and in International Public Policy from the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore. Kornegay served two terms in the U.S. (United States) Congress as a professional staffer developing financial sanctions legislation on South Africa. He established the Research and Evaluation Unit for the African Development Foundation, an independent U.S. agency. In South Africa, he served as the country director of the African-American Institute (AAI) and was involved in electoral support activities. Since then, he has focused on South-South co-operation issues, on which he has written and published extensively.

□ **QI, Xinran**

Mr Qi was a Michael Huffington Junior Fellow in the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University. His research interests include the international climate change negotiations with a focus on major emerging economies, and energy

security, environmental politics and economics. Xinran was a non-governmental organisation (NGO) observer with the United Nations Foundations to the 16th Conference of the Parties (COP 16) at Cancún in 2010. Prior to that, he was a Research Associate at the Atlantic Council of the United States and the World Resources Institute. He holds a master's degree in Foreign Service from Georgetown University and a bachelor's degree in International Politics from Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou. He is currently a case manager at Kroll Risk & Compliance Solutions.

□ **VIEIRA, Marco**

Dr Vieira is a lecturer in International Relations at the Department of Political Science and International Studies, University of Birmingham. He joined the Department of Political Science in January 2010, having previously taught international relations at The London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), King's College and the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London. His research is currently focused on the rising influence of 'southern powers', especially South Africa, India and Brazil, and their growing importance in reshaping global governance structures. This includes areas such as institutional frameworks to tackle climate change, international trade and finance, and the reform of the United Nations (UN) Security Council. Dr Vieira is also interested in Brazilian foreign policy and the role of Brazil in South American politics. Dr Vieira is the author of various articles and conference papers, and he is the co-author of the book *The South in World Politics* (with Chris Alden and Sally Morphet). He is currently working on a new research project about the North–South divide and the global governance of climate change.

■ Introduction: Emerging Powers and Climate Change: BASIC and COP 17 at Durban and Beyond

□ Francis Kornegay

From 28 November to 9 December, 2011, South Africa hosted the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations in Durban. Many key political, unresolved questions remained on the international climate agenda, following the Cancún negotiations. Unlike that at Cancún and Copenhagen before that, the emerging powers assumed centre stage as a pivotal group in gauging the likelihood of an outcome that would salvage the Kyoto Protocol; this would imply an outcome embracing high- and low-carbon emitters from developed and developing countries alike – a settlement transcending North-South contradictions.

Copenhagen had set the stage for the pivotal role the emerging powers would assume (at the 17th Conference of the Parties (COP 17) in Durban) by forming Brazil, South Africa, India and China (BASIC). Looked at another way, the group constitutes India, Brazil South Africa (IBSA) along with China, who are all also members of the BRICS group, which forms the counterpoint to the G7/8 within the G20. With a dual identity overlapping both developed and developing countries,



Mr Nhlanhla Mtaka (Ingabadi Group); Dr Siphamandla Zondi (IGD); Ambassador John Tesha (Africa Forum); Mr Fadl Nacerodien (DIRCO)

BASIC found itself in the middle of the climate political spectrum in Durban, while championing the 'common but differentiated responsibility' position of the latter. Moreover, as the host of the talks, South Africa epitomised the extent of this awkward middle ground by supporting an African agenda, unaligned with that of BASIC.

As a member of BASIC, South Africa was faced with a challenge of uniting disparate positions to reach an internationally-accepted climate change agreement. The Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD) panel deliberated on these dynamics and sought to explore the BASIC challenge not only from South Africa's position, but from the vantage points of its sister member states (Brazil, India and China) too.

In the run-up to COP 17, China and India, which had very closely coordinated their strategies in Copenhagen, retained their steadfastness against binding outcomes with India, proving resolute in their position. South Africa gravitated towards an Africa Group position which, in turn, had gravitated towards a European consensus that represented a European Union (EU) comeback from its marginalisation at Copenhagen. Brazil, on the other hand, reportedly proved pivotal in salvaging an outcome resulting in a Durban Accord that almost failed to materialise. This cliffhanger reflected contradictions amongst emerging powers that challenged the cohesion of BASIC in Durban.



Ambassador John Tesha (Africa Forum); Ms Swati Ganeshan (TERI); Mr Francis Kornegay (IGD)

While the South African presentation explored the political minefield that awaited its hosting of COP 17, the Brazilian presentation analysed Brazil's environmental politics in terms of its bearing on global 'climate governance'. The Indian presentation explored India's climate change/energy security nexus in multilateral negotiations, while the Chinese perspective reflected on how China's approach to climate and environmental diplomacy has evolved, from the time of its inclusion in what is now the Group of 77 and China (G-77+China), to BASIC. These presentations presaged the drama that would unfold once the COP 17 talks got underway. Individually and collectively, they may be harbingers of what the future holds in climate diplomacy, and how cohesive or fragile the influence of the emerging powers will prove to be as the climate saga unfolds.

■ From G-77 to BASIC: China in Global Climate Change Negotiations

□ Xinran Qi

■ Introduction

As the world's largest emitter of greenhouse gases (GHG), China has become the focus of much scrutiny in the past decade. Increased international attention on the issue is reflected in China's domestic policy-making process, primarily through institutional restructuring aimed at better government coordination on climate-related policies and activities. As China is making significant efforts to transform itself from the world's leading carbon polluter to a greener economy and a more constructive player in global climate talks, Beijing's interests and negotiation strategies need to be redefined as well. The past few years have witnessed China's hedge between the traditional Group of 77 (G-77) bloc and the newly-founded BASIC group. This move has triggered questions on China's negotiating position and its relations with other players, in particular the global South. This paper attempts to provide a snapshot in exploring China's perception on climate change and its interests in climate negotiations.



Mr Xinran Qi (Georgetown University)

■ China's Climate Profile

China overtook the United States (U.S.) in 2007 as the world's largest Carbon Dioxide (CO₂) emitter. According to the data published by the International Energy Agency (IEA) in 2011, Chinese CO₂ emissions tripled between 1990 and 2009.¹ These increases have been particularly significant in recent years, with a 16% growth in 2003, a 19% growth in 2004, an 11% growth in both 2005 and 2006, and an 8% growth in 2007 and 2008. However, due to the world's economic crisis, the growth rate slowed down to 5% in 2009.²

Demand for electricity has been the largest driver of the rise in GHG emissions in China. In 2009, the electricity and heat generation sector contributed 48% of China's total CO₂ emissions, with coal playing a major role in supporting the growing demand for electricity generation. According to the IEA, nearly all of the CO₂ emission growth from power generation between 1990 and 2009 was derived from coal, and coal/peat accounted for 67.3% of China's primary energy supply in 2009.³

Since 2003, the rapid expansion of the heavy industrial sectors to serve infrastructure investments and burgeoning domestic and overseas demands for Chinese products has provided the largest boost in China's demand for fossil fuels. As a result, CO₂ emissions per unit of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) rose from 2002 to 2004, yet China was ranked only 78th globally in 2008 and remains below the world's average.⁴ The increasing share of coal in power generation, despite some of the world's largest investments in renewable energy, implies that a small decline in energy intensity may still be paired with an increase in emissions intensity.

■ China's Climate Policy-Making

As China has been seeking ways to limit its emissions growth, substantial efforts are required by all local governments to participate in the implementation of the 12th Five-Year Plan target of lowering CO₂ emissions per unit of GDP by 17% in 2015, compared to 2010,⁵ and in meeting the national pledge announced in 2009 (under the Copenhagen Accord) to reduce CO₂ emissions per unit of GDP by 40% to 45% in 2020, compared to 2005. However, many challenges remain ahead on its way to a low-carbon economy, thus shaping the country's perception on climate change and its position in the international climate change negotiations.

Consideration of the development of the institutions responsible for China's climate change policy-making is one way of understanding how the government has perceived this issue over time. Starting in the 1980s, China viewed climate change largely as a

scientific issue and gave the China Meteorological Administration the authority to advise the government on policy options in international negotiations surrounding the establishment of the UNFCCC. As political awareness on climate change increased in the late 1990s, this role shifted to the more powerful National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the successor of the State Development and Planning Commission (SDPC).⁶ This move indicated a rise in the importance of the climate change issue on China's political agenda. It was also an indication that climate change was becoming a development issue, as opposed to merely a scientific issue.

Given that NDRC is also China's primary energy policy-making authority, this move reflected the need for climate policy-making to be better coordinated with energy policies and other economic and social development issues. As a result, a number of central government agencies have been jointly involved in climate decision-making in recent years. These include the National Coordination Committee on Climate Change (NCCCC) in the State Council, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Science and Technology and the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA). Today, NDRC and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are primarily accountable for mapping out China's positions in international climate negotiations.

Further institutional changes can be found in the release of China's first *National Climate Change Programme* on 4 June, 2007, which announced the establishment of the high-level 'National Climate Change Coordinating Leading Small Group, chaired by Premier Wen Jiabao. Subsequently, in September 2007, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced the appointment of Ambassador Yu Qingtai as China's first Special Representative for Climate Change Negotiations.⁷ These changes were a positive sign that the Chinese leadership had begun to pay more attention to the issue and realise the need to advance national interests by proactively participating in global climate talks. Around this time, leading governmental research institutes and government think tanks began scaling up their work on climate change to help Beijing formulate its national climate strategy. In late 2006, the State Council released its first National Assessment Report on Climate Change (NARCC), which was conducted as a collaborative effort among more than 20 government agencies and taking four years to complete. The 2006 NARCC was structured similarly to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's (IPCC's) assessment report, which consists of an analysis on three main aspects, including China's climate change history and trends, climate impacts and adaptation, and China's mitigation efforts and socio-economic evaluation.⁸

In June 2007, the State Council published the first *National Climate Change Programme* report, which provided a comprehensive analysis of China's existing policies serving to limit its CO₂ emissions growth. The majority of the policies discussed are not climate policies per se, but broader economy-wide policies, which were enacted

to help the country meet its economic development goals and, if implemented effectively, will also serve as policies to mitigate CO₂ emissions. Some of the key policy areas include energy efficiency, renewable energy and industrial policy.⁹ These key areas of policy focus were mostly re-emphasised in a series of later-published white papers, entitled *China's Policies and Actions for Addressing Climate Change*, which have been published annually prior to the commencement of the UNFCCC's Conference of the Parties (COP) since 2008.

■ Defining China's Interests in Climate Change Negotiations

To understand China's behaviour in the global climate change negotiations, it is important to understand that climate change policy is primarily driven by domestic politics and development agenda. China is at a developmental stage of rapid industrialisation at a time when the impacts of climate change have emerged as a result of, and a threat to, its modernisation process. Like other developing countries, China's key domestic priorities are economic development, poverty alleviation and social stability.¹⁰

As the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party depends on its capability to deliver continued economic growth, the government's focus on development and poverty alleviation is not merely an economic necessity, but also a matter of political survival. With almost half of the population living under two dollars per day, developmental needs are immense and necessary to maintain social stability.

To decouple its carbon emissions from economic growth, China faces a challenge that no other country has ever handled at a similar stage of development. Although the leadership is aware of the potential economic benefits from a low-carbon economy, it is also an uncertainty that cutting emissions without thorough economic restructuring would yield substantial economic rewards in the near future. China's current economic growth with high-energy intensity makes it difficult to break out of coal dependence, which in turn makes it extremely hard for China to level-off its emissions growth in the near future, let alone make a deep cut to its carbon emissions. China's mitigation efforts, therefore, will depend on how it attempts to balance short-term poverty alleviation and long-term sustainable development.

With the common focus on the imperatives of development, China has historically associated itself with the rest of the developing world, usually acting in concert with the G-77 (a group of 131 developing countries). The G-77 provides a means for developing countries to articulate collective interests and enhance their negotiating capacity on all major issues within the UN system, including the UNFCCC negotiations. As the largest developing-country emitter, China can use the G-77 bloc

as protection against being singled out, while its size allows it to take a leadership role in formulating the common positions of the group. An active advocate for the principle of 'common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities', China has been consistent with the G-77 in emphasising the historical responsibility of developed countries and the disparity in per capita emissions between the developed and developing worlds. Nevertheless, both arguments are weakening, as China is shifting from being a victim of other countries' historical emissions to a major contributor to global emissions. If China does not deviate significantly from its current trajectory of emissions growth, its cumulative per capita emission levels could also reach the world average as early as 2020.¹¹

The rapid increase in China's CO₂ emissions has weakened not only China's bargaining power, but also undermined the legitimacy base of the principle 'common but differentiated responsibilities,' on which the G-77 has established overarching unity for decades. As developed countries increasingly link their financial commitments to major developing countries' mitigation commitments, pressure mounts on China not only from the developed world, but also from within the bloc of developing countries, particularly the Small Island Developing States (SIDS), which are adversely impacted by climate change. For example, in August 2007 at the Vienna UN Climate Change Talks (AWG 4 and Dialogue 4), Belize, on behalf of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), openly called for 'large (emission) reductions within the next 10 – 15 years ... by major emitting developing countries,'¹² explicitly including China. Two years later in Copenhagen, China came under criticism within the G-77 for allegedly blocking the possibility of a stronger agreement.¹³ It was not until then that China considered reviewing its negotiating positions and relations with the G-77 bloc.

In November, 2010, China published its second green book on climate change, the *Annual Report on Actions to Address Climate Change (2010): Challenges in Cancún and China's Actions*, right before the commencement of the Cancún conference. For the first time, China openly discussed its divergence with other subgroups within the G-77 bloc, including the Africa Group, AOSIS, the least developed countries (LDCs), Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA). The green book categorises those countries in general as 'medium- and small-sized developing countries', and states that China shares common interests with them on three main aspects, including the insistence on the two-track negotiation approach, prioritising adaptation as an urgent issue for developing countries and demanding developed countries to fulfil their financial commitments.

According to the green book, divergences are mainly concentrated on three aspects. The first of these is long-term goals versus mid-term goals. As noted,

most LDCs and SIDS have argued for a stricter goal of limiting global temperature rise to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels, an emissions peak year, and an absolute mitigation target by 2050. China accepts the goal of a global temperature rise by 2 °C, but views a mid-term mitigation target by 2020 as more down-to-earth. That is because (a) if a mid-term target cannot be set and met, there is no basis to discuss a long-term goal, and (b) there is scientific uncertainty between the 2 °C goal and the proposed 450 ppm CO₂ concentration required for a temperature rise of 2 °C, and also uncertainty between the proposed CO₂ concentration and the actual amount of CO₂ emissions from human activities. Finally, an emissions peak year and an absolute mitigation target by 2050 may contradict the principle of equity, because a cap would be set to undermine developing countries' equal access to the carbon space.¹⁴

The second divergence is on the priority of developed countries' climate commitments. China believes that the main cause of climate change is GHG emissions, and the fundamental solution to the climate question lies in mitigation, especially the fulfilment by developed countries of their mitigation commitments.¹⁵ Financial support and technology transfer are essential to support adaptation in developing countries, but they only serve as remedies and are often hindered by developed countries' lack of political will to take sufficient actions in those areas. China's financial and technology support needs are minor and less urgent than those of small developing countries. The green book pointed out the possibility that some developing countries might be induced to pressure China and other major developing countries on mitigation, in exchange for developed countries' financial aids. Thirdly, in terms of the means of financing, many small developing countries support carbon tax or other market mechanisms that China has not fully developed or completely agreed with.¹⁶

■ From G-77 to BASIC: An Option to Advance Negotiating Positions

As the diversity of interests within the G-77 bloc gradually came to light, China began to explore other alignment options to advance its negotiating positions. One of the moves China made was reaching out to other emerging economies to form the BASIC group of countries. The group, which contributed over 15% of the world's GDP and over 25% of global GHG emissions by 2009, has veto power over future climate agreements.¹⁷

The term 'BASIC' was first used publically in 2005 to refer to the four countries as a unit, when a group of non-governmental climate experts from each country were convened by the European Commission to jointly complete a research project

called the BASIC Project. This was aimed at enhancing the institutional capacity of individual countries to participate in future climate negotiations.¹⁸ At the 2007 Bali conference, BASIC worked together to reach a compromise with the U.S. on a series of issues and shaped the Bali Road Map. As the process accelerated toward Copenhagen in 2009, BASIC developed a wide range of common interests and positions that made them convinced that their alliance in international negotiations would serve both national and broader interests. China and India took early steps to encourage and deepen the group's coordination; on October 22, 2009, China and India signed a Memorandum of Understanding in Beijing 'to coordinate their approach to climate negotiations'.¹⁹ It is believed that the two then invited Brazil and South Africa to join the group at their first ministerial meeting in Beijing in November 2009, a week before the Copenhagen negotiations. The meeting officially marked the foundation of the BASIC alliance, although they had been working together in some areas since the start of the BASIC Project.

China believes it has much to gain by forming such a group of emerging economies, which, in a credible manner, could claim to defend developing countries' interests, while also having the political leverage and economic clout to confront developed countries. Participation in such a group could deflect criticism that China is negotiating merely out of its self-interest. It also creates a platform for China to influence and develop its relationship with other major developing countries and regional powers. The birth of BASIC, however, does not imply that China is leaving the G-77 in the near future. In fact, China continues to benefit by keeping one foot firmly placed in the G-77; maintaining its identity within the G-77 enables Beijing to wear the mantle of 'developing country'. This motive applies to the other three BASIC members, who all repeatedly pronounce their commitment to the G-77+China. Representatives of the G-77 have been invited to all the BASIC ministerial meetings through the 'BASIC-plus' approach, and their meeting statements all close with a reiteration that BASIC remains part of the G-77+China and will work with the group towards a unified position in climate change negotiations. The BASIC countries continue to uphold the stance that the G-77 has historically shared in climate negotiations and called for further international commitments on behalf of the developing world, including a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, prioritising adaptation in COP 17, and increased funding and technology transfer to developing countries.²⁰

Despite the four's efforts to coordinate their positions, recent negotiations and informal consultations have witnessed divergence within BASIC on certain issues. With almost 7 billion tons of CO₂ in 2009 (24% of global emissions), Chinese emissions far surpass those of the other BASIC countries. The emission disparity makes China more prominent in the group, and the unbalance of power may create

a sense of inequality among other members when it comes to decision making. On the issue of transparency, India did not oppose western verification for projects that use western funding, while China originally opposed such actions. In terms of technology transfer, Brazil stresses the developing countries' contribution to technology transfer and sees it as a chance to spread its biofuel technology around the world, but such an idea has not been unanimously shared by other BASIC members.²¹ Regarding the legal format of a future agreement, South Africa and Brazil have made it clear that they welcome legally-binding mitigation commitments for developing countries, while China and India had not yet agreed to this position prior to Durban, and continue to face increased pressure from the developing world on questions of mitigation.

■ COP 17 and the Road Ahead

On November 28, 2011, COP 17 opened in Durban, South Africa. The adoption of the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol marked a breakthrough in the two-year negotiating process after Copenhagen. The negotiations also made the new Green Climate Fund (GCF) operational for developing countries, and approved a series of measures which build on the progress made in Cancún.



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Negotiators did not go home empty handed, yet gains varied among parties. The *Durban Platform for Enhanced Action* saw agreement on mitigation actions by all major CO₂ emitters; nevertheless, the U.S. and Umbrella Group members, including Japan, Canada and Russia, were able to remain outside of the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. As expected, the EU pushed for the establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP), and a roadmap it proposed for drawing up a legal framework by 2015 for climate action by all countries. The Africa Group and other LDCs pressed for the operationalisation of the GCF, although funding sources and timetables remain to be specified. The gains by BASIC were relatively moderate. Although the Kyoto Protocol was extended, the second commitment period will only cover approximately 15% of the world's emissions. China and other major developing economies will have to start making quantified mitigation commitments after 2015 (under the framework of the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action) and financial commitments to the GCF.

As China is playing a more active role in global climate change negotiations, it is important for Beijing to better define its interests and positions. Given the current emissions and low per capita income, China is, and will remain, a developing country over a long period of time. Negotiating as part of the G-77 bloc enables China to craft its position, while ensuring that a large contingent of countries will stand at its side when it is presented before the world. In addition, aligning with other like-minded BASIC countries could augment China's voice on a series of climate issues that are exclusive to the interests of the major developing countries. One example is the recent joint opposition of the four countries to the EU's carbon tax on airlines flying into Europe, which was reiterated at their 10th ministerial meeting in New Delhi in February, 2012.²²

The past decade has witnessed China's emerging shift from a global rule follower to a rule maker. This trend can also be found among the other three BASIC countries, particularly in the area of climate change. It is likely that the four will try to come up with a comprehensive proposal, backed by the developing world, to help shape the architecture of a post-Kyoto Protocol climate regime. As a first attempt, BASIC has been developing the concept of 'carbon budget', based on historical per capita emissions and the principle of equity. A research project entitled *Equitable Access to Sustainable Development*,²³ which was jointly conducted by experts from BASIC, was presented at COP 17 as a foundation of BASIC's proposed guiding principal of the international climate efforts beyond 2015. It remains to be seen if, and how, the four countries will seek consensus on this proposal within the G-77, and bring it to the agenda of the future UN climate negotiations.

■ Brazilian Environmental Politics and Global Climate Governance

□ Marco Vieira

■ Introduction

The most fundamental challenge states face in contemporary global politics is the political harmonisation of their territorially-defined political communities with a system of intensely globalised existential threats, such as climate change. In this regard, whether a compromise between diverging or competing national interests will be possible in multilateral climate negotiations, is a question of whether a system of independent sovereign nation states will be sufficient to cope with the highly interdependent global governance problems of the 21st century. The global governance of climate change highlights relevant issues concerning multilateral policy-making in the 21st century. The definition of the appropriate space of domestically-devised actions and the arena whereby sovereignty should be conditional to the achievement of the common good, is a central dilemma the global community faces today.

With regards to collective action on climate change, the political dynamic of international negotiation is clear: There is an unequivocal North-South split over



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commitments to reduce GHG emissions, and the related issue of developed nations' responsibility over financing and technology transfer to developing countries. This division has been embedded in a moral, ideological and economic rationale. Put simply, the central economic issue concerns how emerging and established economies would agree on sharing short-term costs and (uncertain) long-term benefits involved in moving towards a low-carbon global economy. The moral/ideological argument is shared by southern states and compellingly articulated within the G-77, and promoted individually and collectively in multilateral climate gatherings by the diplomacies of BASIC. They claim that industrialised nations have a moral obligation to act upon climate change, given their 'historical responsibility' in causing atmospheric pollution. Northern states, on the other hand, maintain that countries such as China, India and Brazil, due to their particular position as emerging economic powers and large polluters, should also agree to legally-binding commitments to reduce emissions.

As it is well known, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol sets clear reduction targets and time frames only for developed nations (Annex 1 countries). For over a decade now, the U.S. has refused to sign onto the Kyoto Protocol, which it sees as allowing emerging economies (Non-Annex 1 countries) a 'free ride' in the climate regime. Although BASIC have agreed to establish voluntary pledges to lower their emissions, they have consistently resisted attempts by northern powers to lure them into a legally-binding international agreement. Present negotiations over a post-Kyoto Protocol, comprehensive, multilateral treaty have stalled. This is due not only to the U.S.' intransigence, but also to the somewhat awkward position BASIC occupy: as members of the larger G-77 group of developing countries, which commonly face important socio-economic challenges, and as constitutive members of the much smaller BASIC coalition of large emitters and emerging economic powers. The negotiation dynamics in the latest round of talks in Durban seem to indicate that the long-standing deadlock around the creation of a new, legally-binding treaty has been finally overcome. More importantly, the acceptance by BASIC of reduction targets with international legal force, signals their gradual withdrawing from the principle-based logic that has legitimised, until now, their negotiating coalition.

As the following analysis of the Brazilian case highlights, there are important differences between the BASIC countries, which are commonly masked by their shared position in climate negotiations. Given its particular climate/energy profile, Brazil is in a much stronger position than its BASIC partners to accept bold and legally-binding commitments to reduce emissions. In Brazil, the particularities of domestic climate politics strongly determined the direction of Brazil's foreign climate policy. Since the early 1990s, but more clearly from 2006, the predominant principled view of the Ministry of Foreign Relations and its domestic allies, generally in line with the

negotiating position of other emerging powers in the BASIC coalition, started to lose traction in the Brazilian decision-making process. This has been reflected in Brazil's recent stronger climate legislation and renewed commitment to multilateral climate frameworks.

■ Brazil's Climate Profile

Brazil is an interesting and atypical case among other leading economies from the developing world. It has one of the cleanest energy matrixes in the world with over 80% of its domestic electricity generation and over 50% of its overall domestic energy consumption deriving from renewable energy sources. Hydroelectric power and biofuels, particularly ethanol from sugar cane, are the main sources of electricity generation and transport fuel in the country. They share around 15% each of the country's overall energy production.²⁴ Ever since the military regime first established Brazil's National Alcohol Programme (PROALCOOL) in the mid-1970s, Brazil has used sugar cane ethanol as a central source of transport fuel. Since Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva came to power in 2003, the Brazilian government has skilfully used Brazil's profile as a relatively low-carbon economy to reverse the country's traditionally negative, international image (as a result of its lack of control of deforestation and its long-term, defensive position on multilateral environmental negotiations) on environmental issues. In 2007, for example, during his speech at the 62nd UN General Assembly, Lula articulated Brazil's biofuel contribution to tackling climate change, to a global audience. He stated that

*the world urgently needs a new energy matrix. Biofuels are essential to building it. They reduce GHGs considerably. By using ethanol in Brazil, emissions were reduce[d] by 644 million tons of CO₂ in the last 30 years.*²⁵

Unlike China, India and South Africa, for example, Brazil's contribution to global warming is not significantly related to energy production and use. The burning of the Amazon for land-use is the main source of Brazil's emissions.²⁶ Any attempt to reduce Brazil's share of global GHG emissions will largely depend on its ability to dramatically reduce the Amazon's deforestation. It has historically been a very sensitive issue. The Amazon was instrumentally used by the generals that ruled Brazil from 1964 to 1985 as a symbol of national pride and sovereignty. During the 1970s, the official slogan 'A Amazônia é Nossa' (the Amazon is ours) was widely used as a tool of nationalist propaganda by the military regime. Even after democratisation, this vast and resource-rich rainforest was used politically by consecutive governments to reaffirm Brazil's great power status and autonomy in managing its natural

endowments. Over the years, however, the increasingly negative impact of economic activity on the Amazon has become a source of fierce political conflict among a range of different Brazilian stakeholders. Powerful economic lobbies and entrenched ideas of national development and sovereignty, upheld by sectors of the Brazilian government (especially since the 2002 presidential election of Lula da Silva), have been seen as important hurdles to a more proactive and firm action on deforestation.

Although deforestation is still rife in the Brazilian Amazon, it is consistently decreasing since its peak in 2004.²⁷ From 2000, legislation was put in place to demarcate significant protected areas, which now cover around 15% of the Brazilian territory. In a detailed discussion that follows, environmental politics in Brazil, including in the central area of deforestation, is embedded in fierce political struggles among different government agencies and other players in the private and non-profit sectors. In this sense, advances in policy implementation to deal with deforestation should be credited, in large measure, to the political agency and active engagement of the Ministry of the Environment and its domestic supporters. The recent contentious debate in Brazil over the establishment of a new National Forest Code clearly epitomises the political divide over what should be the policy priorities and accepted legal frameworks to manage the Brazilian rainforest.

■ Understanding Brazilian Climate Politics²⁸

Three important, interrelated dimensions should be taken into account when analysing Brazil's behaviour and particular positions in international climate negotiations:

- The political ideologies, which are deeply entrenched in government, relate to economic development, poverty reduction and protection of sovereignty.
- The relationship between states' political institutions, decision-making structures and domestic-private interests, which can either compete, clash or cooperate. These internal political dynamics have an important impact on Brazil's behavioural consistency in international negotiations.
- The global climate framework of norms, which has been a source of both constraint and opportunity to advance Brazil's development and environmental agendas. This is particularly important in understanding the dynamic relationship between the Brazilian government and international environmental institutions. This relationship gradually evolved from defensive/hostile during the 1970s, to cooperative and purposeful from the 1990s. Brazil's increasing engagement was reflected, for example, in its hosting of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992 and in its contribution to

the creation of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), which became a fundamental source of climate financing in developing countries. Brazil has, however, fiercely opposed the inclusion of Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) in the CDM, given its concerns with domestic interference.²⁹

During the military regime (1964 – 1985), the position of Brazil in environmental debates was informed by the belief that rapid economic development must not be hindered by environmental protection policies. The nationalist values of the military establishment and its emphasis on material power and diplomatic pragmatism contributed to this defensive position in environmental debates. In addition, the foreign-policy thinking of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (known as *Itamaraty*) owed much to the intellectual contribution of dependency theory, which exposed the uneven relations between the North and South, and elicited a reaction amongst policy makers to expose and address such imbalances.

A significant change in this historically-defensive position occurred with the end of the military dictatorship and the end of the Cold War, which brought about the resurgence of environmental concerns at a global level. Domestic perceptions and positions vis-à-vis international partners during global negotiations have been influenced by a more inclusive and democratising political system, which allowed sub-state and international actors to participate in the domestic political debate on environmental policies.³⁰ A gradual power shift has come about within the Brazilian foreign policy establishment, with previously-excluded political actors who have favoured international engagement on environmental issues gaining more influence. Civil society organisations have become more active, better organised and able to articulate their programmatic agenda on environmental issues. Domestic activist groups, connected to the global environment movement, have played a critical role in exposing the environmental challenges facing Brazil and in influencing the debate on environmental policies. Organisations such as the Brazilian office of the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), Greenpeace and the Brazilian Amazonia Brasileira have become more effective since the 1990s in targeting, lobbying, publicising and promoting environmental issues in the Brazilian domestic system. As a result of such national, transnational and international pressures, Lula's administration made important compromises, for example, green non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have played a key role in representing and advancing the political agendas of indigenous communities (who live in remote forest areas and have been affected by large-scale infrastructure projects, such as the construction of dams for hydroelectric power plants) in Brasilia and abroad.

The democratisation of the Brazilian domestic system and the improved multilateral cooperation on environmental issues, were not, however, sufficient conditions to bring about a radical change in the traditional foreign policy stance that objected to foreign involvement in the Amazon region. The paradigmatic resilience of deep-rooted diplomatic ideas played an important role in the construction and institutionalisation of Brazil's foreign policy objectives. Brazil's strategy during the Kyoto Protocol negotiations combined the traditional foreign policy position (which emphasised the right to develop and a defence of sovereignty, particularly in relation to the Amazon region) with a liberal position (that favoured collective governance mechanisms to effectively enhance environmental sustainability). The receptiveness of the domestic environment to international, liberal norms did not alter Brazil's opposition to setting emission reduction targets for developing countries.

Inter-bureaucratic tensions were a feature of the decision-making process on climate change. The nationalistic/ideological views of the diplomatic establishment clashed with the political agendas of domestic environmental organisations and their international supporters, such as Greenpeace, whose ideas were increasingly reflected in parts of the bureaucracy. Two opposing groups, with different ideological, material and political concerns, shape the domestic debate on climate change. The first group, which can be termed the 'traditional' group, resisted international regulation of the Amazon conservation projects by invoking nationalistic, economic and sovereignty motives, as mentioned above. This group has been led by the *Itamaraty* and includes the ministries of Science and Technology, Mines and Energy, Agriculture, Livestock and Food Supply, and the Brazilian state-run oil company Petrobras, sectors in the Military and the so-called *ruralista* lobby in the Congress led by soya, logging and cattle farmers. The second group is in favour of including the conservation of the Amazon in global climate negotiations, providing that international funds are created for the protection of the forest. This group is led by the Ministry of the Environment and includes most of the scientific community, governors of some states in the federation, the ethanol lobby in the Brazilian Congress, renewable energy producers, a growing number of local multinational corporations based in Brazil, local business associations, and international/domestic environmental NGOs. It is a group allied with international advocates for forest protection, and represents the main entry point for international environmental norms.

Ahead of the 2009 Copenhagen climate change conference, the environmentalist group forcefully challenged the government to re-think traditional foreign policy ideas. Increasingly influential domestic players argued that international recognition of Brazil, as a great power, can be achieved by means of Brazil's commitment to new international governance mechanisms on climate change, with a view to creating a

global low-carbon economy. Such a position represented a clear departure from the prevalent stance in the Itamaraty, which regarded fast-paced economic development without external interference as the linchpin of Brazil's environmental strategy. This coordinated challenge to Brazil's traditional view on environmental issues has produced some palpable results domestically and internationally. In this sense, Brazil's departure (in Durban) from its historic resistance to international legal commitments to reduce carbon emissions, is the latest and hitherto most important development in Brazil's shifting position in global climate talks.

In recent years, a more cooperative strategy on environmental issues has been emerging. This strategy reflected the normative and political agendas of international and domestic environmental NGOs, and reverberated the similar 'principled-beliefs'³¹ of the two Environment Ministers during Lula's administration. In 2006, as a result of the Greenpeace spearheaded campaign, *Articulação Soja* (Soy Articulation), an international moratorium on soybeans from land that had been illegally cleared to grow soy in the Amazon forest, was agreed to by the Brazilian Association of Vegetable Oil Producers (ABIOVE), the National Association of Grain Exporters (ANEC), and the big supermarkets and fast-food chains, such as MacDonald's.³² A more proactive engagement in international norms negotiations followed Brazil's relative success in tackling deforestation since 2005, when the historic pattern of escalating deforestation was undoubtedly broken in the Amazon. A more purposive stance replaced the traditional defensive and non-committal position of Brazilian diplomacy. An important change in Brazil's long-standing resistance (to link national deforestation policies with global financial mechanisms) occurred in 2006 during COP 12 in Nairobi, when Brazil proposed to create a global fund which will assist countries in reducing deforestation.

At the initiative of the Ministry of the Environment, under the leadership of Marina Silva (2003 – 2008) and Carlos Minc (2008 – 2010), the Brazilian government built further capacity, created a more stringent system of law enforcement on environmental issues, and effectively implemented conservation strategies in endangered areas. In May and December 2008, President Lula launched two initiatives: the Sustainable Amazon Plan (*Plano Amazônia Sustentável*) and the National Plan on Climate Change (*Programa Nacional para as Alterações Climáticas*). The National Plan on Climate Change, for example, established mandatory and ambitious goals, aimed at dramatically reducing illegal deforestation in the Amazon by 2020.³³ The National Policy on Climate Change (the Climate Bill), passed by the Senate and subsequently signed into law by Lula in December 2009, represents Brazil's first legally-binding commitment to the decarbonisation of the Brazilian economy and a strong signal of the government's commitment to drastically reduce emissions. Finally, at COP 15 in Copenhagen, the Brazilian government voluntarily

offered an 80% reduction in deforestation by 2020. This pledge places Brazil in the leading position in reducing GHG emissions, since deforestation amounts to roughly 60% of Brazil's overall carbon emissions.³⁴ These measures signalled an important policy shift, given the Brazilian government's traditional reluctance to set up clear targets to halt deforestation and to legally commit to tackling climate change. They are indicative of the fact that the Ministry of the Environment and its domestic and international allies have gained sway over the traditionally, more influential *Itamaraty* and the ministries of Agriculture, Science and Technology, and Mines and Energy. Most importantly, they are indicative of a more inclusive decision-making process on environmental issues. Ultimately, the Brazilian official position attempted to conform to both stances by fiercely defending national sovereignty, autonomy and the 'right to develop' and actively engaging with international environmental norms and their supporters.

However, tensions between the two camps persist and both sides are actively involved in campaigns to influence the decision-making process on environmental issues. The resignation of Marina Silva, the Minister of Environment, in 2008, after repeated confrontations with ministers from the 'development' side of the debate (including Lula's Chief of Staff and his chosen successor, Dilma Rousseff), is symptomatic of the clashes between these different views. Silva withdrew from Lula's Workers' Party (PT) and joined the Brazilian Green Party (PV). This allowed her to run in the 2010 presidential elections on a strong environmental platform. According to Silva, the decision to leave the PT was taken based on the dream to achieve sustainable development in Brazil, which should no longer be a marginal issue in the government's agenda.³⁵ Despite gaining 19% of the total valid votes, a record high for a candidate running on a primarily environmental platform, Silva did not advance to the second round of voting. Yet, her participation in the first round of the electoral campaign brought the environmental agenda to the centre of national public debates, even if temporarily, and increased public opinion's support for environmental issues in Brazil. The absence of these issues in the run-off, which was eventually won by Lula's protégé, Dilma Rousseff, is regarded by environmental groups as an indication that 'the idea of development at any cost is what will win out'.³⁶

The disputes around the construction of the Monte Belo hydroelectric dam complex in the Xingu River, in the Amazon state of Pará, are also revealing of the political struggle between 'developmental' and 'environmental' claims in Brazilian domestic politics. According to the Brazilian government, the dam is intended to provide clean and relatively cheap energy and contribute to the country's economic growth. However, the project's impact upon the local ecosystems and the traditional (and sustainable) everyday life of local indigenous communities,

has led international and domestic environmental NGOs, indigenous people and the Ministry of the Environment to challenge the environmental credentials and sustainability of the project. Nevertheless, the Brazilian Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural Resources (IBAMA) (*Instituto Brasileiro do Meio Ambiente e dos Recursos*), under alleged political pressure from the federal government, issued an environmental license which gives the green light to preliminary construction works.³⁷

Dilma Rousseff's trajectory, as Minister of Mines and Energy and Lula's Chief of Staff, was marked by direct confrontation with the Environment and Strategic Affairs Ministers, over the construction of the Monte Belo dam and other massive infrastructure projects with environmental impact. As President, however, Rousseff has been pursuing a softer line, perhaps as a result of growing awareness and support in the Brazilian society for environmental action. Rousseff's new attention to climate policy had an immediate impact on Brazil's international behaviour. As presidential candidate and Lula's Chief of Staff, she headed the Brazilian delegation during part of the 2009 Copenhagen conference, which was also attended by the other two frontrunners in the Brazilian presidential elections, Jose Serra and Marina Silva. In November 2009, Carlos Minc (the then Environment Minister) together with Dilma Rousseff, officially presented Brazil's voluntary emission reduction targets of 36.1% to 38.9% below business as usual, by 2020. This act of 'domestic political reconciliation' had an important symbolic value, given the long-standing differences between these two government officials who represent opposing institutionalised views in the environmental policy debate.

The new version of the national Forest Code, which already passed in June 2011 in the Lower House of the Brazilian Congress with an overwhelming majority and is being debated in the Senate, casts doubt on Brazil's continuing ability to achieve its deforestation commitments. It also speaks of the influence and the ability of the rural bloc lobby to impact upon the government's environmental policies. If voted in the current form, the Code will allow an increase in legal deforestation activities and will grant amnesty to the previously illegal clearing of protected forest. A number of loopholes in the proposed draft will allow farmers, who illegally cleared forest, to avoid fines and obligations to re-forest. It will also allow states to indefinitely postpone action on deforestation.³⁸ The public debate over the Forest Code has revealed a strong divide between the Brazilian Congress (still dominated by the agriculture lobby from the north and northeast regions of Brazil) and a more politically-activist civil society, which is pressing the government to protect the Amazon against agricultural expansion. Dilma Rousseff has the final veto power over the proposed Code; her decision will decisively impact on the future configuration of political

forces in Brazil's domestic environmental politics and, as a result, help define the shape and size of the Amazon forest for future generations.

■ The Current Brazilian Negotiating Position in Global Climate Talks

The Brazilian strategy applied in the latest round of climate negotiations, during COP 17 in Durban, involved three main elements:

- Strengthen the coalition of developing nations and more-recently-emerging economies by supporting the norm of 'common but differentiated responsibilities', and at the same time coordinate pressure on developed nations to take firm obligations to reduce emissions and finance mitigation/adaptation activities in developing countries.
- Use Brazil's particular synergy between climate and energy security to consolidate the country's credentials as an environmentally-friendly emerging economy.
- Apply a more nuanced approach to the negotiation, which would preserve core values but grant concessions in areas of perceived benefit, such as the creation of international funds to tackle deforestation, the recently created GCF being an example.

In Durban, the real shift in the Brazilian position relates to the last point that has only been included as a clear element of Brazil's negotiation strategy in 2006, when Brazil finally accepted some form of linkage between national initiatives on tackling deforestation and multilateral mechanisms to finance deforestation activities in developing countries. However, the Brazilian government has expressed reservations and actively resisted proposals that constituted a perceived infringement of sovereignty through the establishment of intrusive verification and monitoring processes. Brazil's official position has been guided by the principle of historical responsibility, and the Brazilian government firmly believes that Annex 1 countries have not done enough yet to reduce their emissions to be in a position to pressure emerging economies to accept binding targets.

The initial negotiating position of the Brazilian government during COP 17 was to extend the Kyoto Protocol until 2020, including maintaining binding reduction targets for Annex 1 countries and a possible inclusion of emerging economies after that period. In the build-up to and during the Durban conference, Brazil received substantial pressure from developing states (highly threatened by climate change, especially the Africa Group and the AOSIS), developed nations and domestic and international NGOs to formally accept legally-binding reductions on its GHG emissions. In line with other BASIC countries, Brazil was reluctant to accept further

commitments without a firmer agreement on what and how new funds will be made available for developing countries, that will go beyond re-branding development assistance to fit in environmental action.

As shown earlier, since 2008, Brazil has made important unilateral commitments to reduce climate emissions domestically. Nevertheless, it has not been willing to internationalise these commitments into binding legal agreements. Until COP 17, the current shift in Brazilian domestic climate thinking had not yet reflected a significant departure from the long-standing principle of 'common but differentiated responsibilities', shared by the G-77 and BASIC. Brazil has, however, been gradually distancing itself from China and India, which have deeper entrenched positions in climate negotiations. The Durban Platform, even if far from sufficient, represents a breakthrough moment in this regard. Coordinated, multi-level political pressures seem to be eroding the apparent principle-based cohesion of BASIC, which have managed to influence the Brazilian government, who in turn played a decisive role as a broker, while convincing its BASIC partners to accept important concessions to their original negotiating positions.

■ Indian Climate Change/Energy Security Nexus in Multilateral Negotiations

□ Swati Ganeshan

India will be a constructive participant in the global climate change negotiations based on the principles of common but differentiated responsibility.

– Dr Manmohan Singh, Prime Minister of India
on his visit to the Republic of Maldives, 12 November, 2011

■ Introduction

Post-Copenhagen, multilateral climate negotiations witnessed the emergence of BASIC as key negotiators steering global political will during a deadlock in the COP 15. The rise of the four was considered a 'break away' from the 'developing country' grouping. However, their fundamental principles and 'developing country' stance have remained the same over the past two years – evident in the regular BASIC meetings, held since the Copenhagen conference. Although globally the BASIC countries are viewed as emerging economic powerhouses in



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a climate change context, their domestic challenges echo a different story. India, a key player in the BASIC group, has continuously been highlighted as a powerful entity within the group, and its position in COP 17 is considered significant enough to 'shift the winds' during negotiations. However, India faces profound concerns, such as poverty and lack of energy access on the road to becoming an economic powerhouse. These challenges form the contours of its energy security framework and climate-related measures.

The paper discusses the key issues that shape India's climate change position, which are also reflective in its dialogues with BASIC. It further focuses on India and BASIC's standpoint within the South-South climate change position, discussing the contours of the negotiations and the understanding within the developing country grouping. Firstly, the paper discusses the contours of India's negotiating position that is rooted in (a) its development imperatives, and (b) its energy needs. It argues that, while India is concerned about the impact of climate change and has to tackle this global challenge, it requires efforts such as enhancement of its adaptation capacity, establishment of significant physical infrastructure and coastal protection – necessities that only development can generate – and development that requires considerable financial impetus, as well as energy to fuel the growth engine. Secondly, it considers the actions related to climate change and initiatives undertaken by India, both domestically and globally, in the purview of its developmental goals and constraints. The third aspect it reflects upon is India's developments in renewable energy and energy efficiency, which provide co-benefits for its energy security and climate change woes. Within the above context and India's climate change position, the paper reviews India within the BASIC group and the larger South-South coalition. It argues that, while India and BASIC as a group are an influential voice, there are other strong players with varied stakes who also have a significant 'say' in the negotiations. The paper concludes by deliberating on some key issues that India and BASIC, as a collective, have focused upon for COP 17, and the future of the group itself in climate talks.

■ India: Grappling with Challenges in a Globalised World

India, touted as the 'Asian Tiger' in the global economy, has shown impressive strides in achieving rapid economic growth in the past two decades, since its economic liberalisation in the 1990s. India experienced a 9.1% growth in its GDP in 2008 – 2009, and GDP per capita growth of 7.7% in the same year, however, it ranked 154th in its purchasing power parity (PPP) and Gross National Income (GNI).³⁹

As a developing economy amidst an economic boom, India still faces myriad socio-economic challenges with poverty reduction being the priority. India is home to a population of approximately 1,2 billion, out of which around 75.6% live on less than \$2/day, and 41.6% on less than \$1.25/day.⁴⁰ As an agrarian economy, a considerable part of its population (70%) subsists in rural areas, therefore lacking basic facilities including access to modern energy services. Although it is a rapidly growing economy, its primary thrust has been to address the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015. India's progress report on the MDGs is a mix of highs and lows, and still has considerable objectives to achieve.

In terms of target achievements in MDGs (ranked A – F), India has been struggling to halve the number of people suffering from hunger in the period of 1990–2015 and has been rated an E, while it has shown better performance with a B in the target to halve the proportion of the population below the national poverty line within the same period. In the target to integrate sustainable development within policies and programmes, and reduce environmental resource losses, the country's progress signs are rated A – a clear indication of its stress to integrate sustainable development activities within the larger development agenda.⁴¹ Nevertheless, its socio-economic problems take precedence as the MDG deadline approaches with energy remaining one of the key factors critical for India's overall development.

■ Energy – Steering Development

A major catalyst for India's development is energy, and in recent years, its efforts to enhance its energy security have risen dramatically, with the issue emerging as key on the foreign policy agenda, discussed at bilateral, regional and multilateral spheres. Energy choices have a significant bearing on a country, especially in the climate change context. However, undertaking stringent measures, such as reducing fossil fuel consumption or switching to alternatives, like renewable energy, requires finances and technical impetus. Therefore, developing countries moving up the economic ladder cannot be asked by developed countries (historically high emitters) to make harsh choices, especially in light of the existing socio-economic conditions in these countries. In the next section, the focus is on India's energy choices, its rampant energy poverty and the future of energy in the country that would be critical for its developmental agenda and climate positioning.


■ The 4 As and Energy Security

India's energy choices could be viewed from the 4As perspective – accessibility, affordability, availability and acceptability. Reaching the un-served in the country is the priority of India's energy security, by increasing access to modern energy services and enhancing the existing energy deficits. The country's reliance on coal is significant and will continue to remain so until 2031 – 2032 (IEP, 2006).⁴²

As a low-to-middle income country, it is dependent on fossil fuels such as coal, due to its affordability, sufficient availability, accessibility within its borders and its acceptability (due to the low costs involved). Coal is the primary source in the country's installed power generation capacity (see figure 1).

Oil and gas are the next two fuels that have a significant share in the energy profile. Transportation is the major sector where demand for oil emanates, and is set to rise with increasing economic growth. The inclusion of gas in transport and cooking has had a considerable impact in reducing emissions in urban areas, and its share is projected to increase in the near future. Although fossil fuels have a major share in India's energy profile, diversification of energy resources is one of the primary objectives of India's energy security framework, with the inclusion of alternatives including bridge fuels, such as natural gas and shale gas, along with renewable energy as a major strategy. While fossil fuels are an essential part of the energy mix, traditional biomass is still the primary source of energy for cooking for around 72% of the population, thus indicating the proportion of the largely unserved section of the population.⁴³

Figure 1: Installed power generation capacity 2010



Source: TEDDY, TERI 2010

Due to the high demand for energy, India is also a major energy importer, with oil accounting for most of the energy imports. In 2008, 25% of the energy use was

accounted as net energy imports (World Bank, 2011),⁴⁴ a proportion that is projected to rise in the future. While India's energy consumption has been increasing rapidly, the proportion of energy poor is still significant and the current energy consumption remains low. In 2008, 404 million people in India lacked access to electricity⁴⁵ – an astounding figure for a rapidly developing country. India is also positioned quite low in the Human Development Index (HDI), ranking 134th among 187 countries in 2011, a troubling position as research evidence has shown that HDI and energy have a positive correlation.

India's total energy production stands at 468.3 Mtoe (World Bank, 2011),⁴⁶ and its total energy use in 2008 was 621.0 Mtoe, compared to other low-income countries whose energy use was 279.9 Mtoe in the same year. Nevertheless, its 2008 figure is nowhere near the energy consumption of high-income countries, which stood at 5 672.5 Mtoe in the same year. India's per capita energy consumption in 2006 was a mere 510 kgoe, while for high-income countries the same stood at 5 416 kgoe.⁴⁷

Such statistics present a challenging position for an emerging country, such as India, that needs to factor in rising energy needs into its climate and larger foreign policy objectives.

In recent years, India's efforts in building energy relations with other countries has increased with various regions such as Africa, South America and Southeast Asia, among others. Conscious efforts are being undertaken to increase sustained access to energy resources beyond its borders. Visits by state dignitaries to various countries, with energy security as one of the key agendas, reflects the rising significance of energy in India's growth plan. Although the share of renewable energy in electricity generation has significantly increased in the past decade, the acceptability of the energy resource at household-level, especially in off-grid solutions, is still at the nascent stage. The costs for acquiring the technology, and the preliminary investments required for awareness and capacity-building (about the renewable application), require both a transfer of technologies that are cost effective and scalable, along with considerable finances for start-up and preliminary maintenance. The role of renewable energy has been envisaged to be prominent, and hence recent policies, such as the Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission, are indicators of India's resolve to diversify its energy sources.

■ Energy for Growth – A Tough Road Ahead

As an emerging economy, India's actions, initiatives and strategies are keenly observed by the rest of the world. The emergence of BASIC during the 2009 climate talks, amidst the concerns of failing negotiations, raised expectations among other

nations of a 'new power bloc' in climate change – a bloc that comprises of emerging economies with rising GDPs and increasing future emissions. Although the bloc comprises of significantly large economies, their developmental needs are the key drivers behind their coalition.

India, with its significantly unserved population, needs finance, technology transfers and energy to achieve its developmental needs. While India has been consistently engaging in climate change negotiations, binding emissions would curb its growth trajectory. Investments required under the 'energy for all' case estimates that between 2010 – 2030, total investments of \$640 billion are required for electrification globally. To achieve universal access to electricity, it is estimated that India would require \$62 billion in 2010 – 2020 (MDG period) and \$73 billion in 2021 – 2030 as additional investments.⁴⁸

Under the Universal Modern Energy Access Case (UMEAC) (WEO/IEA 2011), the generation requirements estimated for 2030 for India are on-grid electrification of 85 TWh, mini grid-based generation projected at 112 TWh, and there is a need for 48 TWh isolated off-grid. Such high-energy needs and significant financial requirements are a major challenge for New Delhi, which is striding a thin line to balance energy security and sustainable development.⁴⁹

■ Emissions Scenario – Where is India?

While India appears in the top 10 GHG emitters, the difference between India and the top two emitters is significant. Both the U.S. and China account for 41% of the total CO₂ emissions. With 17% of the world's population, India accounts for only 5% of the total CO₂ emissions, with per capita emissions at 1 tonne of CO₂. This is in contrast to China's 5 tonnes and the U.S.' 17 tonnes of CO₂, with 20% and less than 5% of the world's population respectively, in 2009.⁵⁰ In addition, in terms of CO₂ emissions per unit of GDP, India is also the lowest among the top five emitters.⁵¹

With the lowest emissions and a large population that still faces the grave challenge of poverty, India's climate change negotiating position focuses on climate change-related measures that can be aligned with its developmental priorities. As such, it has intensively emphasised sustainable development with climate change measures, as an integral part of this larger goal.

■ India in Climate Change Negotiations

The fundamental negotiating position of India has remained the same, with the principle of 'common but differentiated responsibilities' as the benchmark for

any talks, along with the issue of the equity principle that has been consistently discussed in all platforms (see figure 2). Due to its constant stand on these principles, at times India has been singled out as the 'villain' in obstructing the progress of negotiations. However, its voluntary commitments and pledges reflect a different story of a responsible partaker in the climate change measures, even with its developmental challenges. India has made a strong statement of keeping its per capita GHG emissions below the average for the industrialised countries – a major voluntary curb, especially when taking the current low per capita emissions of the country into account. This is a major statement considering the large, unserved population that would move up in the energy ladder, adding to the energy demand and emissions. This voluntary pledge actually reiterates that India would make efforts to curtail its emissions from surpassing the average emissions of industrialised countries in the long term. In addition, as a part of the political agreement at Copenhagen, it also pledged to reduce the emissions intensity of GDP by 20% between 2005 and 2020.




Figure 2: Cornerstones of India's negotiating positions

Even though the country has undertaken various commitments and has shown willingness to discuss the climate change issue in a multilateral platform, its stand has been considered as 'hurdle maker', due to its continued pressure on industrialised countries to take up legal commitments. Nevertheless, India has not sat on the sidelines of multilateral negotiations, waiting for industrialised countries to fulfil pledges, but has been an active participant – not just in COP dialogues – but also in other major international forums, voicing its concerns and working towards its voluntary pledges, as well as its energy security concerns.

■ Climate Change Efforts – International Outlook

India's international cooperation efforts on the environment have been consistently linked to socio-economic development. While development is a key priority, India has been supporter and participator in many environmental agreements that form an important aspect of the larger climate change measures. The issue of climate change and energy has been continuously discussed by India at a regional and bilateral level. As a key driver of South-South cooperation initiatives, its role in the G-77 has remained significant. As an emerging country, India has also engaged in climate-, environment- and energy-related discussions at the G20, among other important collectives. India is an active signatory to approximately 500 multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs)/ memorandums of understanding (MOUs). It is part of 20 major MEAs and has laid specific emphasis on working towards sustainable development endeavours.

In addition to its environmental-related commitments with regard to energy, India has made strides towards renewable energy through various organisations and forums (see figure 3). For instance, India is scheduled to host the 4th Clean Energy Ministerial (CEM4) meeting in 2013. Since 2009, India has also been a member of the Internal Partnership for Energy Efficiency Cooperation (IPEEC), along with its active involvement in the newly-formed Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate (MEF) – one of the many multilateral platforms where India has engaged in both energy and climate change aspects.

India's multilateral engagements in these areas have translated into considerable goals and voluntary commitments at the domestic level. The penetration of international engagement is visible in its renewable energy and energy efficiency measures, as well as in its increasing utilisation of the CDM.




Figure 3: International Cooperation on energy and climate

■ Domestic Actions

India's position is focused on adaptation, but it has also been working towards mitigation measures that would support pro-poor growth strategies at the domestic level. As a part of its efforts, it is planning for a low carbon strategy under the Planning Commission as an input for the 12th Five Year Plan (2012 – 2017). As part of the Five Year Plan, the strategy would feed into the growth plans, ensuring sustainable development at a macro level.

The major milestone of India's climate change measures is the 2008 National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC) that has eight missions (solar, enhanced energy efficiency, sustainable habitat, water, sustaining Himalayan eco-systems, sustainable agriculture, Green India, strategic knowledge for climate change). In terms of renewable energy initiatives, India is one of the first countries to form a Ministry of New and Renewable Energy, and has established an agency for promoting and ascertaining energy efficiency, along with research and development institutions for solar and wind energy applications.

To further strengthen the NAPCC goals, and for the efficient penetration of the national level plans, the State Action Plan on Climate Change (SAPCC) is also being envisaged in many states, such as the Himalayan States, Gujarat and Kerala; Delhi has a plan in place for 2009 – 2012. India also has a financial institution, the Indian


Renewable Energy Development Agency Limited (IREDA), to promote renewable energy by providing loans for renewable energy and energy efficiency projects. The recently imposed coal cess on every tonne was envisaged as a mechanism that would provide funds for clean energy initiatives domestically.

India is highly vulnerable to climate change and poverty, which adds to the exacerbation of the vulnerability and stress. While undertaking emission cuts in the short-term is not an option for the country, an emphasis on the co-benefits of renewable energy and energy efficiency would be a significant contribution to climate change measures.


■ Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency – Focusing on Co-benefits

The voluntary actions of the Perform, Achieve and Trade (PAT) scheme of Energy Savings Certification, the Bachat Lamp Yojana (BLY) that focuses on distribution of compact fluorescent lamps (CFLs), the energy efficiency labelling programme for appliances (Star Labelling Program), and Energy Conservation Building Codes (ECBCs), are a few of the mechanisms that are already in place in India. In addition, the Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission has also been launched to enhance and achieve solar energy targets of 20 000 MW by 2022. The Mission envisages creating favourable conditions for the solar manufacturing industry. India has been making progress in other renewable energy sectors as well. India's total installed wind power capacity is 14 989 MW in August 2011, and it features among the top countries employing the energy source. The movement to expand small hydropower plants, biogas generation, and bagasse-based co-generation are also being pursued by the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy. While coal is the major component of India's electricity generation, the country has legally mandated a certain percentage of energy (purchased by distribution companies) to be from renewable sources ranging from 1 – 10%.

India is one of the largest implementers of CDM projects, and most of these are in renewable energy and energy efficiency sectors (see figure 4 & 5). In terms of carbon emission reduction, and with energy efficiency and renewable energy as two different areas, energy efficiency has 34% registered projects, while in terms of the number of CDM projects, renewable energy has the highest percentage of registered projects. Such volumes highlight the integration of energy measures with climate change initiatives, and the increasing focus on deriving co-benefits from renewable energy and energy efficiency measures.

Figure 4: Sectoral break-up (carbon emission reduction)

Source: MOEF, 2011

Figure 5: Sectoral break-up (CDM projects)

Source: MoEF, 2011

Within the context of its developmental needs, climate change and energy measures, the premise of India's negotiations in multilateral platforms has not been singular, as most developing countries and other emerging countries of the BASIC group have voiced similar concerns and formulated agendas based on domestic development priorities. The focus on convergence and balance between economic growth, energy security, poverty reduction and climate change has been a nexus that BASIC (as a group) and India (as a single entity) have focused on during their deliberations.

■ India, BASIC and Multilateral Negotiations

BASIC is an informal collective of emerging powers. The group also engages with each other through other collectives, such as BRICS and IBSA, among others. These informal collectives transpired as strong focal points for emerging economies to voice their concerns at international forums and serve as a useful grouping to engage with developed country forums that had a shared strength and influence in global politics. Although the countries are at different levels of growth and have different development priorities, they have engaged in issues of similar concern with climate change being one of them. BASIC assumed the limelight during the Copenhagen negotiations, and was touted as the new emerging collective from the developing country bloc. Nevertheless, while at the level of international politics BRICS has made considerable impact, the countries' economic growth and tackling of development concerns are still a 'work in progress' with much to be achieved.

The negotiating stand of BASIC focuses on equity and the principle of 'common but differentiated responsibility'. Since 2009 after Copenhagen's COP 15, the four countries have continuously and intensively discussed the action plan for climate talks and have stood together. The extension of the Kyoto Protocol and the operationalisation of the GCF were essential components of BASIC's negotiating position, and were achieved at the end of the Durban conference (BASIC 2011). Their coalition was the focus of the Durban conference with stories of rift among the countries. BASIC, however, refuted these claims and remained firm on their position.⁵² The issue of equity was included into the work plan for next year's conference – an issue that has been considered critical by India and other developing countries that expect more from industrialised countries.⁵³

According to a Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI, 2011) report, BASIC country pledges have been considered more ambitious than developed country pledges, a promising and revealing factor that underlines the increasing focus on climate-related measures in these economies. In addition, these countries are fast emerging as hubs for renewable energy and clean energy initiatives and markets. China's rising role in wind and Brazil's competence in biofuels are a few indicators of how these countries are moving ahead in clean energy mechanisms.

In recent years, the group has regularly met to discuss and share information on climate change issues and undertaken talks at a bilateral level within the group. The increasing global role of the countries in the multilateral climate negotiations appears to be stimulating domestic discussions on the issue as well. While BASIC, as a collective, has been influential in climate negotiations, the intensive spotlight on the countries is, however, shifting the focus from other significant groups and players with considerable clout.

■ Multilateral Negotiations in Climate Change – Is there too much Focus on BASIC?

While the focus on BASIC has assumed prominence, there are various other key players within the negotiations. The Middle East, a major fossil fuel producer, has been consistently demanding finances for adaptation and mitigation, due to their high dependence on resource rents.⁵⁴ This region's voice and position has been influential in many conferences. On the other hand, the highly vulnerable groups of SIDS and Africa have also emerged as strong voices within the G-77+China collective. The African Common Position, released prior to the beginning of the Durban conference, is evidence of the growing strength and increasing unification of the continent on the climate change issue. Within the developed country grouping, the EU as a group has steered the developed country agenda, while the U.S. has remained an entity on its own throughout the climate negotiations.

With so many players with varied stakes, the layer of negotiations and convergence of parties in climate talks would depend on the issue at hand in conjunction with national priorities, hence, the focus on BASIC as the only major group concentrating on national priorities, needs to be re-visited.

■ India and BASIC at COP 17 and Beyond

India introduced equity as a key issue for the Durban Platform at the end of the conference; equity was focused on in an impassioned speech by the Indian Environment and Forests Minister, Jayanthi Natarajan. However, the question of how the issue of equity would be dealt with and pushed forward in 2015, needs further examination. At the start of the COP, Delhi submitted a proposal on the inclusion of technology transfers and unilateral trade measures in the provisional agenda – two aspects that have received support from the developing country grouping as well. In the coming months, the key outcomes of the Durban conference and the road to 2015 will be deliberated upon by the parties in carving out the future beyond 2020. The question of how countries will respond will invariably depend on how well the issues are discussed in other multilateral, regional and bilateral platforms beyond COP in the next three years.

As a multilateral grouping, BASIC has been able to achieve a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol and the operationalisation of the GCF, while the increase in emission cuts in the future would be based upon the science in the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report and global review over the period from 2013 – 2015. India needs to assess its post-2020 scenario within the next three years, before the world gathers

to formulate a universal legal agreement by no later than 2015, which should be in effect by 2020.

As expected, there was significant pressure on BASIC during COP 17, in addition to rumours of discord among the countries circulating continuously. The rumours were constantly refuted in various statements by BASIC, that stood firmly on their negotiating position till the end of the conference. Nevertheless, in the near future, BASIC is projected to remain together on the issue – a positive sign of the growing cooperation among the four countries.⁵⁵

While the individual pledges of emission cuts by the BASIC members are noteworthy, there is a need for them to upscale their initiatives, which would enable them to undertake commitments that are realistic and relate to their development priorities. The significance of the group in multilateral talks would increase in the near future, with further pressure on them to take up significant GHG emission cuts, and India would be at the forefront of this. As the largest democracy with one-sixth of the world's population and rising economic growth trajectory, India would have to undertake binding emissions at some point in the future. However, with the MDG target and the legal agreement on climate change to be envisaged in the same year (2015), India needs to proactively converge its energy needs and climate measures, along with development priorities. Prioritisation of concerns, targets and goals in renewable energy, energy efficiency and adaptation need to be undertaken in the coming years to formulate a clear national mandate for the legal agreement in 2015.

As a developing economy, India's position is still rooted in the developing country bloc with its 'emerging country' character providing it an influential position in multilateral negotiations. India needs to continue exercising its influence at multilateral levels and utilise its role as an emerging country for the larger benefit of the developing country bloc, and ensure that the developing country grouping remains firmly together on the global concern of climate change. India's role in climate change negotiations has been rising with each COP, highlighting the growing role of emerging economies; there is a greater, global need to understand that its developmental needs are an urgent consideration. As stated by the Indian Environment and Forests Minister, Jayanthi Natarajan in her closing statement at Durban in 2011, 'the issue is about the livelihoods and sustainability – the fate of millions of people living in vulnerable parts of the country', a fate that needs to be addressed effectively to enable them to deal with climate change and its stresses for a sustainable future.⁵⁶

■ Emerging Powers and COP 17: South Africa's BASIC Dilemmas

□ Francis Kornegay

■ Introduction

This analysis is a 'before and after' as this paper was prepared for presentation on the eve of the opening of COP 17 in Durban. Hence, the first part of the paper assesses South Africa's positioning as an 'emerging power' member of BASIC in the run-up to COP 17, while exploring the coalitional contradictions within BASIC. The second part of the paper explores the post-COP 17 outcome, and the dynamics leading up to it as a reflection of where South Africa and BASIC stand in the unfolding drama of multilateral climate diplomacy. This also entails exploring multilateral regionalism as an alternative to the prevailing global approach to climate negotiations under the UNFCCC umbrella.

As South Africa prepared to host COP 17, its position within the context of the negotiations was amongst the most complicated. As such, there are three levels at which one could try to understand how South Africa stacked up within the BASIC context alongside Brazil, India and China:

- South Africa as a member of the Africa Group among developing countries, factoring in the diversity of this bloc, including oil producers, SIDS and LDCs.
- South Africa as a member of the BASIC coalition of emerging powers, which presumptively set itself as a representative of developing countries at Copenhagen, irrespective of the diversity that exists among them.
- South Africa within the context of its own national commitment and national interest in coming to grips with climate change, as a member of what are classed as globally high emitters.

From each of these vantage points, South Africa found itself in a contradictory position; one exacerbated by its role as the host of COP 17, wherein it must satisfy the diplomatic imperatives of North-South – and perhaps even more to the point, developed-emerging power – 'bridge-building.'

The problem with these bridge-building expectations was that, within the context of the Kyoto Protocol principle of 'common but differentiated responsibilities', no political 'middle ground' exists for reconciling developed-country high emitters with emerging-power high emitters within the overall North-South macro-bipolarity on tackling climate change. Implicit in the challenge of COP 17 is whether or not an accommodating middle ground can be found to move climate negotiations

forward into a second Kyoto Protocol period, after expiry of the first commitment period at the end of 2012. The problem here is the tug-of-war between developed and developing countries over the universality of legally-binding, as opposed to voluntary, commitments to reducing emissions on the basis of the contentious principle of 'common but differentiated responsibilities.'

Going into Durban, the U.S. and other developed-country high emitters saw no incentive in accommodating legally-binding outcomes to the climate negotiations, unless emerging-country high emitters also buy into such legally-binding outcomes. Countries that still see themselves as 'developing,' emerging powers generally hold fast to the non-binding pass that has been afforded to developing countries in general, whether 'emerging' high emitters or low-emitting LDCs. South Africa's chief negotiator, Alf Wills is quoted as putting it: 'The lack of differentiation between the poorer developing countries, and the advanced emerging economies serves as a convenient shield for these larger nations from binding commitments.'⁵⁷ Implicit within this candid observation is the missing 'middle-ground' for North-South bridge-building that would confront Tshwane-Pretoria.

■ South Africa and the Africa Group

Within these broad parameters of stalemating contradictions, South Africa, apart from its membership in BASIC, committed itself first and foremost to championing the Africa Group position within the broad alignment of 'developing countries'. There appears to be a partial North-South convergence on binding commitments with the EU, and this may be at the heart of reports of South Africa deviating from and rupturing the solidarity of BASIC.

In the lead-up to Durban, the latest interpretation of the African position came from an 11 November report stating that:

*Vulnerable countries led by Africa now demand that a new climate regime must be a legal obligation on all countries, to ensure, they say, mitigation of emissions and formation of a comprehensive international adaptation to support poor nations. This bloc also wants assurances on financial, technological and capacity-building support from developed countries.*⁵⁸

This stance reflects the seriousness of the climate change threat to much of Africa, and the differential but threatening impacts that will be registered in different parts of the continent. And this is in spite of the fact that Africa, and much of the developing world, are on the low- to non-existent end of the emissions-generating spectrum. As

such, legally-binding emission targets in developed and semi-developed countries must be calibrated with developmental and adaptational initiatives in developing countries. The issue is not adaptation versus mitigation; rather, there is the need to allow the same level of emphasis on both in tackling the issue of climate change.

■ Euro-African Synergy: Beyond Cancún

To the extent that 'legal obligations on all countries' is the African position, which is also South Africa's position, this is a stance that converged with the EU's negotiating position, which (like that of Africa and the developing-country groupings, including BASIC) pays tribute to the need to extend the Kyoto Protocol to a second commitment period (or CP2). However, the EU also underlines the need for a legally-binding accord.

On 10 October, the EU Council of Ministers stipulated their support for CP2 as part of a transition to a legally-binding framework, that would preserve the Kyoto Protocol and operationalise Cancún, including such adaptational elements as:

- Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF), including REDD;
- surplus of Assigned Amount Units (AAUs);
- market-based mechanisms;
- the Climate Technology Centre & Network (CTCN);
- a work programme on agriculture;
- modalities for the international assessment and review (IAR), and the international consultation and analysis (ICA).⁵⁹

The Africa Group, including South Africa, places major emphasis on the adaptive implementation of commitments made at the 16th Conference of the Parties (COP 16) in Mexico.⁶⁰ The aim has been to elevate adaptation to the same level of emphasis as mitigation with the latter's focus on emission levels. At Cancún, an Adaptation Committee was set up;⁶¹ this was accompanied by signatures put to GCF. This fund would handle \$30 billion in fast-track start-up funding to facilitate adaptation initiatives in developing countries.⁶² GCF funding would reach a level of \$100 billion by 2020.⁶³ Given the need for such funding to underwrite adaptation in African and other developing countries, the re-occurring transatlantic economic crisis presents a real threat to elevating adaptation to the level of implementation that the climate change challenge demands.

Funding adaptation in Africa and in other developing regions in the south is critical for another reason, that being the urgency of promoting a more comprehensive environmental security strategy beyond the soporific focus on emissions. This is looking at the interplay between climate change and the integrity of fragile

ecosystems in terms of protecting biodiversity, protecting the rights of indigenous peoples and managing river basins, marine and maritime resources. These are areas of environmental security where a dialectical interplay exists between climate change and the integrity of natural ecosystems and changing weather patterns. This interplay is at work in such areas as (1) in the relationship between deforestation, the drying of the atmosphere and the onset of drought patterns, (2) the impact of deforestation on increasing human security vulnerability to catastrophic flooding and land-slides, and (3) the degradation of water systems and the depletion of marine resources accompanied by the spreading of diseases.

All these hyperconsumptive human versus natural ecosystem dynamics are implicated in the adaptation challenges of climate change. Moreover, they are economically consequential in human security terms as when commercial agriculture, prioritising biofuels, leads to rising food prices that threaten food security, and at the same time eroding biodiversity. As such, adaptation in the developing world must extend into what might be termed 'deep environmental security', wherein many of these threats and the manner in which they relate to climate change, implicate rampant corruption and the lack of political will to enforce what is already legally binding. Hence, from an African and developing world perspective, the need for legal obligations on all countries must be accompanied by an equal focus on enforcement, including an expanding emphasis on underwriting environmental security initiatives. As far as Africa is concerned, where external powers in the west and in Asia covet the continent's land for food and agricultural production, such initiatives as the New Asian-African Strategic Partnership (NAASP) need to be made operational as a means of regulating economic transactions (which may have potentially serious human and environmental security implications). But this also demands greater inter-African discipline in resisting elite, rent-seeking tendencies toward selling off the continent's resources to the highest bidder.

These are proclivities based on rationales of 'national sovereignty' which exploit the continent's 'divide and rule' political fragmentation, in what amounts to a crisis of 'elite sovereignty' threatening African human and environmental security. Africa, therefore, stands to benefit from 'legal obligations on all countries' in climate change negotiations and in related areas of environmental and ecological concern.

■ BASIC Synergies and Contradictions

These are all areas of concern impinging on the capacity of African and other developing countries to adapt to climate change and related challenges. Such are

the considerations that link South Africa to the rest of the continent, thereby giving it a unique stake in an African position that may depart from aspects of the agenda of more economically advanced, semi-developed countries within BASIC and the emerging powers stratum.

South Africa, therefore, finds itself in the proverbial middle in how it navigates its African and emerging power agenda. In terms of its membership with BASIC, the dilemma this creates does not come more into play than in the geopolitics of climate change negotiations. And perhaps nowhere have the contradictions within BASIC been captured as clearly, in terms of understanding South Africa's dilemmas, than in the SEI's policy brief *Together Alone: Brazil, South Africa, India, China (BASIC) and the Climate Change Conundrum*.⁶⁴ This policy brief captures the fact that in spite of a

common set of non-negotiable terms, including a second commitment period for developed countries under the Kyoto Protocol and a demand for increased funding for mitigation and adaptation in developing countries,

there are major differences in the material circumstances and normative drivers behind each BASIC country's approach to climate diplomacy that might create future difficulties for cohesion – that is, unless 'the spirit of a shared approach is strong enough to foster political compromise within the group'.⁶⁵ And here, it might be added, a mutual understanding to 'agree to disagree' (where national interests intrude) is vital, especially where regional and continental imperatives must assume political priority over BASIC cohesion. This is where South African negotiator, Alf Wills' refrain about the lack of differentiation between poorer developing countries and advanced emerging economies becomes a factor in the politics of BASIC and each country's climate diplomacy.

The origins of the foursome – IBSA+China – is traced back to the emergence of the G8+5 which includes Mexico, Brazil, South Africa, India and China which, in turn, became a precursor to BRICS.⁶⁶ In 2005, the G8+5 Climate Change Dialogue arose which, in turn, led to the convening of the MEF in 2009, comprising major carbon emitters amongst emerging and established developed economies.⁶⁷ Thus, the precursors to BASIC emerged out of a fledgling diplomatic climate dialogue between developed and emerging economies, instead of as an outgrowth of climate diplomacy amongst the diverse G-77 grouping of developing economies; it was thought that BASIC would emerge as the supposed vanguard of the developing countries at Copenhagen.

Because each of the BASIC countries face different domestic realities, and therefore are seen as approaching climate diplomacy differently, each country, in its own way, can be termed 'the odd one out'.⁶⁸ Apart from the observation that South Africa looms larger in per capita emissions due to its energy dependence on coal, the country has 'long stressed the importance of its relationships within Africa and

on promoting the interests of the Africa Group,' and in fact came under pressure at Copenhagen for joining BASIC for fear that BASIC's agenda might shift away from that of the G-77, where much of Africa is aligned.⁶⁹ As a result, Durban was seen as a litmus test for BASIC's cohesion – something which may already be challenged on the issue of a legally-binding agreement emerging from the talks.

A BASIC consensus has been elusive on some issues, such as on concerns about 'equity'. South Africa's role as host of COP 17, and the requirement this imposes in terms of North-South 'bridge-building', was seen as making Durban a testing ground for the dynamics and cohesion of BASIC, wherein South Africa's position has become 'delicately poised between BASIC and African interests.'⁷⁰

Here, the apparent convergence between the Africa Group and the EU on legally-binding obligations, which other BASIC members object to, with India being perhaps the most adamantly opposed, may have already exposed the fragility of BASIC.

■ South Africa in Search of a 'Green' Path

The irony of such contradictions, especially as they relate to a legally-binding climate regime, is that each BASIC country, in its own national interest, has already embarked on ambitious mitigation and adaptation initiatives, given the economic and security consequences that loom in the future if they do not begin charting a 'green' path now. South Africa, as COP 17 host, is a case in point. Under its national plan, it is committed to a transition from a coal-based generation of electrical power to a low-carbon renewal energy mix. The country has enormous potential in terms of renewable energy involving a mix of solar, hydro, geothermal, wind or tidal power. The problem is limited capacity in adaptation-enabling areas of technology, finance and capacity. The national plan would call for investing in these alternatives, which is in line with similar challenges facing other African countries. Like other countries on the continent, South Africa has a major stake in the GCF.

The national plan calls for sacrifice from the business sector to get South Africa onto its envisioned low-carbon trajectory, including plotting a carbon budget that will prescribe (for the country's different business sectors) just how much carbon they have to 'spend'.⁷¹ Over two years ago, at the much-hyped climate talks in Copenhagen, President Jacob Zuma said that South Africa would reduce its emissions by 34% by 2020 and 42% by 2025, if backed by international funding.⁷² The plan put forth in the White Paper of the Department of Water and Environmental Affairs seeks to strike a balance between the country's socio-economic needs and preparations for coping with anticipated impacts of climate change. However, some

of the elements put forth in the paper are inevitably controversial in how they impact on vested economic interests. Thus,

one of the most contentious issues in the [White] paper will be the carbon budget, which will be published in two years after consultations with different sectors. Businesses will have to present plans to the government on how they envisage they will reduce their emissions, and the budget will then seek to impose the necessary caps.⁷³

Because of the difficult trade-offs implicit in such budgeting, South Africa's aspirational carbon budgeting for a low-carbon 'green' future is emblematic of the challenges facing other members of BASIC in making the transition from high to low emitters of CO₂.

■ 'Responsibility' and the Ethical Dimension

These challenges translate into the North-South contentiousness over 'common but differentiated responsibilities', which finds South Africa and other BASIC countries at the cutting edge of contradictions that, as 'developing countries', lets them off the hook even as they have graduated into the developed world of high emitters. Going into Durban, there was a sense that, based on the polarising politics of climate diplomacy at Copenhagen, this 'have it both ways' nature of BASIC would prove untenable, as argued in the SEI's *Together Alone: Brazil, South Africa, India, China (BASIC) and the Climate Change Conundrum*.

This was foreseen as especially the case for South Africa which, as host, had to show sufficient flexibility in mediating a satisfactory outcome to deliberations. As such, Pretoria's departure from a BASIC consensus had already become apparent, with an evolving Africa Group 'common position' that was aligning itself with the legally-binding aspirations of the EU's position on a second commitment period to the Kyoto Protocol. The Africa Group, LDCs and SIDS were moving toward the European position on the basis of their own national interest readings of their existential vulnerability. They see themselves as being the most vulnerable to anthropogenic climate change, and therefore, implicitly, the ones to benefit the most from a more universalist approach to responsibility, albeit insistent on the historical moral responsibility of the developed world. As such, they remain motivated by the imperatives of 'redress', but redress informed by a growing, threatening perception of vulnerability. This contributed increasingly to a sense of all countries having to take responsibility, developed and developing alike, but emerging developing countries in particular.

The ethical implications underpinning such a realisation means moving toward a more universalist posture of shared responsibilities, as opposed to the more pronounced 'redress' emphasis on 'differentiation' in 'common but differentiated responsibilities'. To be sure, differentiation would have to remain implicit within a context of 'universal responsibility'. Except for BASIC and other emerging powers, the differentiation between developed high emitters and developing to least-developed low emitters is too stark for developed countries to evade major responsibility in effecting a low-carbon transition in the global economy. Moreover, this is a differentiation historically rooted in the depredations of a latter day imperialism embedded in western colonial expansion and post-independence neo-colonial political economies of exploitative dependency.

Based on this history, 'differentiation', as it applies to climate diplomacy, is embedded in an enduring international politics of redress between developed and developing countries. It reflects a legacy of the unfinished business of overcoming the still largely un-redressed impacts of imperialism, in what has been the under-developing of the South. As such, developed countries cannot outrun the 'moral history' that keeps surfacing in global negotiations, as the 'rest' of the developing world has become more assertive in the diplomacy of multilateralism confronting the West.

At the same time, however, it is becoming increasingly untenable for the more advanced 'emerging' developing economies to continue hiding behind the developing and least-developed 'rest' to avoid responsibility as high emitters. Thus, an emerging ethic of 'universal responsibility' seems to represent the underlying dynamic of the politics of redress in meeting the challenges of climate change – challenges that exempt no nation in terms of 'common responsibility', linked to the emphasis on 'differentiation.' In this vein, differentiation has tended to place emphasis on voluntary, as opposed to, binding commitments. Voluntarism, in effect, defines a status quo of stalemated tension between developed and emerging powers in tacit alliance with one another, in opposing imposition of a legally-binding regime of environmental governance. Suspicions in this regard on the part of many, if not most, developing countries in the G-77+China first surfaced in Copenhagen, where it became apparent that China and India, in particular, would have been satisfied if an accord did not emerge from those talks.

A tacit alliance between China, the militant spokesman of the G-77+China and the ALBA group of Latin American states, led by Venezuela, came close to torpedoing any outcome in Copenhagen, were it not for the emergence of BASIC as a last-minute response to pressures from the U.S. and Europe. The emergence of BASIC reflected the more broadly evident economic power shift from west to east, as the EU came out of Copenhagen, effectively marginalised by the U.S.-BASIC understanding that

resulted in the accord which emerged from those talks. At the same time, China, in particular, came in for a measure of blame and criticism from many G-77 countries for having played a 'double game' that almost resulted in no outcome emerging from Copenhagen.

The BASIC quartet, by clubbing together have, in effect, wittingly or unwittingly defined themselves in their 'multilateral utility' as being in the 'middle' between developed and developing countries that have yet to ascend to emerging power / high-emitter status. In effect, they have differentiated themselves from the rest of the developing world *vis-à-vis* the developed world in a manner belying what South African negotiator, Alf Wills saw as their 'developing country' shield against accepting any binding commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. The untenable nature of this 'shield' had already become apparent in the run-up meetings preceding Durban, as South Africa was seen as having broken ranks with its BASIC cohorts in moving toward the EU 'road map' initiative that linked legally-binding commitments on the part of all countries, developed and developing alike, to a second commitment period for the Kyoto Protocol. This can be referred to as an evolving diplomatic climate politics of an emerging ethic of 'universal responsibility.' As such, this trend surfacing in the tough negotiating preludes to Durban, serves as a basis for reviewing the outcome of the South African COP 17 presidency, which does not end until the next round of talks next December in Qatar (2012).

■ Durban Requiem?

Going into Durban, there was increasing scepticism of a credible deal ensuring, at a minimum, that the Kyoto Protocol would be preserved. There was a very high probability that the entire UNFCCC process would come unstuck, given the politically-daunting task of producing an outcome guaranteeing a second Kyoto Protocol commitment and/or a way of building upon it beyond the first commitment (which expires in December, 2012). These made for high stakes for South Africa doubling as a member of the BASIC caucus of emerging power heavy emitters, in deadlock with the U.S. and other developed industrial powers, and as the host occupying the presidency of the UNFCCC; hence, the notion of a 'requiem' for the Kyoto Protocol and the prevailing process of climate change talks. As a consequence, expectations for the achievement of anything of substance were low, which, in itself, raised fundamental questions about the entire globalised framework of the talks and its essentially 'top-down' approach.

Unlike in Copenhagen, the U.S. came to Durban without any pretence of being able to clinch a deal, given domestic political constraints. There was not going to be a

repeat of the high-wire heads-of-state political act that saved the day in Copenhagen. If China was at the forefront of hard line opposition to a binding deal at Copenhagen (in tandem with the Venezuelan-led Bolivarian coalition within the G-77), it was India's turn in Durban to dig in its heels over a binding deal contingent on a U.S. commitment in the stand-off between developed and emerging powers. India's stance was foreshadowed (in the run-up to COP 17) in news reports in India that South Africa was breaking ranks with its BASIC partners by siding with the EU proposal, calling for universally-binding commitments as a basis for a second Kyoto Protocol commitment period. What Indian press reports did not reflect was how the EU had regrouped, since Copenhagen, in forging a 'partnership' convergence with much of the G-77, including the Africa Group. This provided South Africa with a narrow window for diplomatic bridge-building, as the cornerstone of Pretoria's Durban strategy would rest on a more disciplined African 'common position' going into the talks.

Once the talks got underway, *Hindustan Times* covered India's stance within the unfolding dynamics of the talks in some detail, as they were unfolding in Durban.

India has stuck to its position that climate treaty should be based on the common but differentiated responsibility – a principle of the United Nations climate convention – which did not envisage emission cuts for the developing world.⁷⁴

It has resulted in some isolation for India as China and South Africa – India's partners in the Basic group – are agreeable to binding climate treaty. India's opposition is also seen as going back on its promise made by former environment minister Jairam Ramesh in 2010 when he agreed for binding treaty under an appropriate legal forum.⁷⁵

As such, India, seen as a 'vocal detractor of a legally binding treaty,' had expressed concern over the direction in which discussions on a legal forum were going.⁷⁶ It appears that India's opposition would, up to the very end, place a Durban deal in doubt.

In fact, it is ironic, given the manner in which BASIC had come together as 'developing countries' in Copenhagen around 'common but differentiated responsibilities', that the Durban outcome would ultimately be sealed within BASIC itself. Perhaps this is why another take on BASIC's role in Durban was bylined under the heading: 'Brics ties "helped SA to deliver deal at COP17"', in what was a reference to BASIC.⁷⁷ In as much as the focus was on a European observation, it was Pretoria's relationships with Brazil, India and China that allowed it, diplomatically, to successfully conclude the UNFCCC talks.⁷⁸ (Although Russia is mentioned, it has never featured as much at the centre of the ongoing climate saga as its other BRICS partners which, without it, comprise BASIC.)

In the end, it was reported that it was South Africa, Brazil and China that overcame a last-minute intervention by India on watering down language regarding a legally-binding commitment, almost causing the EU to walk. This would have doomed any deal coming out of Durban. Khadija Patel reports in the Daily Maverick's iMaverick that, with the talks going well overtime (for which South Africa came under heavy criticism in how it managed its 'indaba' process as an African methodology), the EU-led plan to have all countries bound by a commitment to cut emissions, came close to collapse when India inserted language referring to a 'legal outcome' at the last minute in the negotiating text.⁷⁹ It was Brazil's chief negotiator, Luis Figueres who came to the rescue by forcing agreement on 'an agreed outcome with legal force'.⁸⁰

A last-minute huddle comprising China, India, Brazil, and Gambia (an LDC), along with developed country members, namely the U.S., Britain, France, Sweden and Poland, produced this outcome.⁸¹ As such, BASIC, in spite of contradictions that had blossomed into open differences, managed nevertheless to exert decisive, if ambivalent, influence in arriving at South Africa's 'Durban Declaration'. Editorial post-mortems on what had been accomplished in Durban were a curious mix of dismissiveness with grudging acknowledgement that, perhaps, an unprecedented breakthrough had actually been achieved. South Africa's sole business daily, *Business Day* was emblematic of this ambivalence.

Seeing the outcome as, depending on one's perspective, 'either successful or a complete failure,' the editorial saw it both ways: a definite diplomatic success for South Africa while, from the perspective of saving the planet from 'what science tells us will be irreversible and damaging climate change, it was a dismal failure'.⁸² Yet, it extended the Kyoto Protocol, agreed on the format of the GCF and got 'the world to agree to negotiate a legally binding deal on emissions reductions by 2020 at the latest'.⁸³ The editorial touted the biggest 'win' as getting 'both developed and developing nations to agree in principle that the 200-or-so negotiating countries should all be legally bound to reduce their emissions', which 'fundamentally changes the picture' resulting in the talks achieving 'slightly more than was promised by SA as host'.⁸⁴

What was agreed to in Durban amounted to 'a sea change', though much depended on how South Africa managed the remainder of its COP 17 presidency into 2012.⁸⁵ This caution is advisedly in order, in as much as the global economic doldrums of the developed world raises serious questions about what type of resources will be forthcoming in assisting developing countries to undertake urgent adaptive measures. This could very well come down to the developing world, including emerging powers generating their own resources – a tall order indeed. Nevertheless, the Durban outcome represents a major reversal of the coalitional balance of forces that produced the Copenhagen result.

■ Europe's Comeback: Copenhagen begets Durban

If Copenhagen unveiled a 'new strategic geography' in ushering in BASIC at the expense of a comparatively marginalised EU on European soil, Durban represented something of a European comeback on African soil.⁸⁶ Deciphering the politics of what some dubbed 'hopelesshagen' revealed the essential geo-economic power shift underway from west to east and north to south – the outcome of Copenhagen reflecting the emerging powers' ascendancy of BASIC. It is possible that the European climate change political comeback (in Durban) was a dialectical outcome of the contradictions between BASIC's ascendancy, and the expectations of the SIDS and LDCs within the G-77+China at Copenhagen.

BASIC, after all, did not salvage a deal in Copenhagen in as much as it was more or less forced into a compromise accord, due to Washington's proactive initiative of engagement. Otherwise, there was a very real prospect that China, in playing 'both ends against the middle' with the rejectionist forces within the G-77 (+China), would have been even more satisfied if no accord had emerged from Copenhagen. India shared the same sentiment, although Delhi avoided the backlash that came China's way from other developing countries. China, by several accounts, was seen as trying to 'double-game' Copenhagen and was criticised by other members of the G-77. This was especially after it was roped into a deal with the U.S., along with the other BASIC countries, while at the same time trying to accommodate the Venezuelan-led rejectionist Bolivarian caucus, which tried to torpedo an accord.

Thus, the G-77+China came out of Copenhagen divided, even as the accord that came out of the talks was hammered out by the U.S. and BASIC, with the EU essentially on the sidelines. Whereas, a sidelined Europe may have appeared marginalised amid the rise of the Global South, the divisions within the latter sowed the seeds for a re-grouping by the EU, in what emerged as its coalition in favour of a universally-binding legal follow-up to the Kyoto Protocol in Durban; a new balance of forces cutting across the North-South divide included the AOSIS, LDCs and the Africa Group. The Europeans were therefore successful in out-manoeuvring BASIC by playing on the Global South divisions, inherent in the latter's ascendancy in Copenhagen.

As a result, BASIC was not able to play their 'developing countries' identity card to stave off a reconfiguration of divisions coming out of Copenhagen into the EU-led developed-developing countries coalition, which was at the heart of the declaration coming out of Durban. Indeed, this outcome was inherent in South Africa's hosting of the climate talks in which it had to give priority to an African agenda – one that was very much aligned with the EU. In this way, the 'new strategic landscape' that emerged in Copenhagen is still very much a 'work in progress' in terms of what shape this new terrain will eventually assume. Given Europe's moral, 'high

ground' victory in Durban, will the EU's economic debility allow it to consolidate the amended strategic landscape by implementing the new universally-salvaging Kyoto Protocol?

Signs of economic weakness within BASIC, as 2011 came to a close, adds to these uncertainties. Indeed, Durban could well signal the limits of the UNFCCC format of climate diplomacy, since there are so many other dimensions to mitigation and adaptation than the soporific focus on emissions. As such, the Durban Declaration could represent something of a pyrrhic victory alongside the demise of the Doha 'developmental' trade round. Given all these factors, Durban may signify a crossroads in global multilateral negotiations that require a rethinking of the centralised, 'top-down' format of the UNFCCC. Just as trade globalisation seems to be giving way to a new ('open') regionalism in the aftermath of a terminally stalemated Doha, global climate negotiations may need to follow suit.

■ The 'Durban Deal' Regionalised: Variation along a 'Building Blocks' Theme

The problem with the prevailing UNFCCC climate diplomacy emissions-focused format is that it obscures the depth of the ecosystemic challenges threatening the matrix of human and environmental security threats in the south. This remains even as the UNFCCC process has produced major adaptation initiatives, such as REDD, which is vital to protecting fragile forested ecosystems throughout Africa, Asia and Latin America. In spite of such initiatives, natural ecosystems remain under threat, irrespective of what progress countries are making on emissions under the UNFCCC umbrella. And perhaps it is just that the 'umbrella' of the UNFCCC may have reached a point where a more regionalist 'building blocks' approach to countering the effects of anthropogenic climate change may need to be considered – one wherein more pressure is exerted at regional-continental levels to enact and, more importantly, enforce more effective environmental security regimes.

Hence, a need to reiterate an earlier proposal made in IGD's preparatory run-up to COP 17. The point made was that ultimately, the mitigation-adaptation dynamic of coping with climate change is about 'environmental governance.' Here, the focus was on the Afro-Asian nexus which could, and should, include the Americas as well. To recap, what was suggested was the need for a global environmental security regime with regionally-adapted frameworks and responsibilities in ecosystems management. It is argued that the highly technical and narrowly-focused emphasis on emission targets may not do justice to the multi-dimensionality of the climate change challenge. Geopolitically, ecosystemic

sustainability, linked to climate, could and indeed should form one of the pillars for fleshing out the fledgling but moribund NAASP. The emerging Afro-Asian nexus, around which a matrix of contentious sustainability issues are taking shape (such as Asian land acquisitions in Africa), should lend a sense of urgency to fashioning a Global South environmental governance architecture. This should happen, irrespective of global negotiations and as a necessary complementary corollary to them.

In global terms, given the regionalised character of 21st century multipolarity, a more practical approach to climate change and environmental security might be a system reconfigured around continentalised regional negotiations. This can be referred to as the 'regionalization of multilateralism and multilateral negotiations, as sort of a bottom-up evolution toward global multilateral convergence within an increasingly multipolar international system'. What might emerge out of such a framework would be continental or regional environmental security regimes and subsystems. Continental bodies, like the African Union, interacting with regional economic communities and similar structures in Asia, like the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), could serve as the nodal points in a multipolarised system of climate-focused environmental security regimes. Broader ecosystem sustainability concerns and emission targeting would be addressed.

The UNFCCC could serve as the global umbrella coordinating body that interfaces with such regionalised continental and/or subregional regimes (as these would have to also factor in a Euro-North Atlantic system, a Caribbean Community-based (CARICOM) subsystem and a South American system linked to the Union of South American Nations). Such a UNFCCC liaising and interfacing role could factor in northern hemispheric, North American and Euro-Atlantic concerns, as well as the means of ultimately arriving at North-South policy and political convergence. Under such circumstances, it might be useful to further institutionalise the UNFCCC as a 'UN environmental security coordination council' on its own or as an adjunct to the UN Security Council.

Such a system would require concerted efforts at combatting and rectifying governance challenges to environmental security that impinges on climate change. This would have to involve combatting corruption, the rigorous enforcement of laws (affecting the environment and ecologically threatened biomes), the controlling of scrambles for resources by elites and the bringing of murderers of environmental activists (who give their lives to protect forests and the rights of indigenous peoples) to justice. These are considerations that exacerbate climate change, which is an evolutionary inevitability. But the consumption pressures on the carrying capacity of ecosystems is what threatens to erode the resilience of these systems in dialectically

accelerating adverse climate change impacts.⁸⁷ The approach proposed here is a variation of what is advocated by Robert Falkner, Hannes Stephan and John Vogler in the October 2010 issue of *Global Policy*. Termed a 'building blocks' approach as an alternative to the 'global deal' methodology of the UNFCCC, what is proposed is a path that 'develops different elements of climate governance in an incremental fashion and embeds them in an international political framework', an alternative they perceive as already emergent in international politics.⁸⁸ It is suggested that such an alternative to global deals 'offers the hope of breaking the current diplomatic stalemate', although they see this as a 'second best scenario'.⁸⁹

One might differ on this point. A regionalisation of the post-Durban scenario within the UNFCCC framework, rather than outside it, might not be as incremental as suggested in the issues-based functionalism of Falkner, Stephan and Vogler. Rather, it might present a more expedited means of implementing the outcome of COP 17; eventually arriving at a legally-binding treaty but, in the process, effectively managing continental and regional ecosystems. The negotiating of a new, continentalised governance architecture, while enforcing the full panoply of environmental security regimens, would be involved, including the vigorous combatting of corruption and the non-enforcement of already existing laws and regulations. Funding via the GCF and capacity-building would gather apace alongside and interacting with continental-regionalised negotiations in a periphery toward the UNFCCC centre process.

■ Needed: Regional Environmental Security Cooperation

Most countries have simply lacked the political will and public pressure to save their wildlife. Even protection of reserves tends to be feeble, with poaching of animals and timber rampant and mining and other illegal activities common. Needed by each country are an elite guard force supported by police and even the army, rigorous regional cooperation to stop the illegal trade of skins and bones, swift court action against offenders, and other deterrents. In the final analysis, conservation is politics....

– George B. Schaller⁹⁰

The problem is that, even as BASIC voluntarily, in their own national interest, pursue green alternatives to the carbon-based energy status quo, environmental degradation shows no sign of slowing. A post-Kyoto Protocol legally-binding emissions regime would not be guaranteed to address such an environmental threat perception; this is because of the voracious resource hyper-consumption of emerging power-

generated economic growth. In this regard, China is very much at the forefront, representing a veritable global ecological security threat in its gluttony for timber, minerals and energy resources, haphazard dam construction and biodiversity-threatening search for aphrodisiacs in other countries, since it has decimated its own ecological patrimony. Moreover, environmental degradation linked to resource hyper-consumption increases the threat perception with regard to water, thereby raising the urgent need for regional cooperation in river basin management.

In Africa, the upstream-downstream tug of war over the Nile and the interminable inconclusiveness of the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) is legendary.⁹¹ In Asia, water features in Sino-Indian rivalry and regional tensions, as well as in India's relations with its neighbours. This hydro-driven threat perception has received increasing attention, as reflected in Centre for Policy Research (New Delhi), Professor Brahma Chellaney's *Financial Times* critique of China's dam construction⁹² Chellaney has authored *Water: Asia's New Battleground*. In the November 19, 2011 edition of *The Economist*, a 'briefing' was carried out on 'South Asia's war', also implicating the East Asian dimension introduced by China.⁹³

These issues, in their Asian and African contexts, expose the inadequacy of the emissions focus of the UNFCCC's 'global deal' process when regional environmental security cooperation is urgently needed in the Global South. The Durban 'grace period' for following-up on the Kyoto Protocol offers an opportunity to make climate diplomacy more comprehensive and multidimensional, in addressing continental and regional imperatives.

■ Conclusion

In spite of the gloomy forecast preceding Durban, South Africa managed to navigate an 'endgame' that would appear to have taken the UNFCCC 'global deal' approach to climate policy as far as it can go. Fundamentally, South Africa as the host (and the incumbent president until Qatar) was the perfect choice for mounting a global effort to move forward from Copenhagen and Cancún. As an African country and a member of BASIC (as well as BRICS and IBSA), South Africa perfectly symbolised the ambivalence of contradictions that have arisen in the developing world-cum-Global South between emerging powers and lesser- to least-developed countries, many of which are in Africa. It was perhaps best placed to confront the challenge that this contradiction, interacting with that between emerging powers and developed economies, presented – the challenge being arriving at a binding global deal addressing climate change in its manifold aspects. In the process, BASIC was found wanting as the leader of a coherent developing world bloc on climate diplomacy.

The Durban conference, and the run-up to it, exposed the emerging power/ Global South divisions that surfaced at Copenhagen; these tended to be obscured by the 2009 sidelining of the EU. In a sense, this facilitated the bridge-building that South Africa had to undertake by using the African 'common position' (as it was unfolding, as it had not been publicly unveiled until 25 November) as its point of departure, rather than its emerging powers – BASIC as a point of reference.

If, however, Durban did not signal the Kyoto Protocol's requiem, did it signal a requiem for BASIC? Not necessarily. What emerged was a more honest reflection of the dynamics at play in climate diplomacy. Given Copenhagen's divisiveness and what needed to be followed up coming out of Cancún, Durban did not allow much room for a politics of pretext based on 'common but differentiated responsibilities'. Thus, North and South sufficiently found one another in a legally-binding universal responsibility transcending the BASIC agenda.

Politically, BASIC could not go against the SIDS and LDCs. The imperatives of Durban, at least for Pretoria's purposes, stripped away the shield of a lack of differentiation between poorer developing countries (many of which are African) and the more advanced emerging economies (cited by chief negotiator, Alf Wills as a major obstacle in moving forward in climate talks). As such, lesser- and least-developing countries within the G-77 deserve as much credit as the EU in delivering the Durban Declaration. In the end, it was birthed within BASIC, which has its uses.

Without there being any more shielding of conflicts of interest between emerging powers and lesser- to least-developed countries, BASIC may be better positioned to more forthrightly navigate the North-South politics of redress in future climate negotiations, if the stripping away of the 'developing country' shield has been driven home as a political reality to each BASIC member. If that is the case, then the coordinating mechanism that BASIC provides for its members should offer a useful vehicle for hammering out compromises liberated from a developing world 'united front.' More creatively, BASIC could become an 'umbrella' within the UNFCCC umbrella as the vehicle driving regional environmental security cooperation in the south. For South Africa, this means it could more effectively embrace and participate in the shaping of an African climate change agenda that advances the continent's interests.

Africa has to be South Africa's main point of reference, not BASIC-IBSA-BRICS; the emerging powers and the global South are secondary. After all, 'Africa first' has always been at the centre of Pretoria's post-apartheid foreign policy paradigm. Hence, the need exists for a more continentally-regionalised approach to climate negotiations within the UNFCCC umbrella for addressing Africa's needs.

■ Points of Discussion: From the Floor

Following the key presentations by the speakers on the question of the role of emerging powers in shaping the future of the international climate change regime, the floor was opened for a discussion session where a number of comments and questions were raised. In the first instance, doubt was expressed on the seriousness of the commitment by BASIC towards the extension of the Kyoto Protocol. Although there were questions as to the commitment of BASIC towards reducing GHG emissions, they expressed their commitment to this endeavour. India, for instance, has made a commitment that their emissions do not surpass those of the industrialised countries. Energy diversification is also an expression of this commitment. Nevertheless, there is a split between BASIC on the issue of the second commitment period to the Kyoto Protocol.

In a question relating to the focus on finance and the GCF, concern was expressed that in the current economic climate, developed countries, in particular, may not be able to meet expectations in meeting pledged targets. In response, the role of regional environmental settlement regimes was highlighted to be set up for the purpose of funding; regionalism, in coming to terms with climate change, should be ardently pursued. Key countries, like BASIC, would be fundamental in this regard, as they could help with funding these initiatives. Regional environmental regimes should focus on addressing the hyper-consumption brought about by capitalism *en route* to addressing climate change. In addition, there needs to be a re-thinking of the conceptual framework, with a focus on the background of the current economic climate. The re-focus should be on environmental security with food security, water security and biodiversity featuring more prominently.

The discussion highlighted that there is a general agreement that addressing climate change is inherently linked to sustainable development. However, the question was posed on the potential for Rio+20 as a blue print for going forward in the climate change milieu. Panelists noted that countries were already taking action in their preparations for Rio.

Participants representing the youth raised the question concerning the role of young people in eradicating climate change. It was suggested that one of the roles for the youth, especially in Africa, is to find a different 'name' for climate change; 'climate change' is a misnomer as it gives a false indication that the change to the climate is occurring slowly. Young people can be game changers and put an end to the diplomatic dance that has been going on for decades.

In pursuing progress in the development of the climate change regime, the session noted the potential role of Africa and developing countries in pressing through an international agreement. For instance, according to Article 20 of the Kyoto Protocol,

The Parties shall make every effort to reach agreement on any proposed amendment to this Protocol by consensus. If all efforts at consensus have been exhausted, and no agreement reached, the amendment shall as a last resort be adopted by a three-fourths majority vote of the Parties present and voting at the meeting.

One hundred and ninety three (193) countries signed the Kyoto Protocol; the G-77 and the African Union (AU) alone total 153, and these parties have expressed support for the Kyoto Protocol. Using the rule of the three-fourths majority, a second commitment period for the Kyoto Protocol could be made possible. Nevertheless, tension remains in reaching an international agreement because of economic concerns of states.

Participants from the floor noted that there is a lot that could be learnt from Brazil in developing a clean economy and that the country could take the lead in terms of 'best practice'. It was, however, indicated that there are a number of domestic challenges that Brasilia needs to address before it can lead such an initiative globally. Brazil needs a firm commitment from its administration to addressing climate change; agriculture and environmental lobbyists affect this commitment. On the other hand, Brazil has already begun exporting its energy diversification to other countries, such as Mozambique, where it is promoting ethanol technology. Its investments in Mozambique are leading not only to addressing the impact of climate change but also to economic returns for Brazil.

The discussion session also raised the role and impact played by economic concerns in impacting on climate change negotiations. It was noted that economic aspects still need to be addressed, but that environmental security should remain a focal point in addressing climate change, rather than the more narrow focus on the reduction of emissions.

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■ Annex 1

□ Programme



international relations
& cooperation
Department:
International Relations and Cooperation
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA



Negotiating Africa and the Global South's Interests on Climate Change

Southern Sun, North Beach, Durban

25 November 2011

09:00 – 09:30 REGISTRATION

09:30 – 09:50 **Introductory Remarks**

Dr Siphamandla Zondi, Director, Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD)

Mr Nhlanhla Mtaka, Executive Director, Ingabadi Group

Mr Fadl Nacerodien, Chief Director, Policy, Research & Analysis
Unit (PRAU), DIRCO

09:50 – 10:10 **Welcome**

Representative of the Office of the Premier (KwaZulu-Natal)

SESSION 1: GLOBAL SOUTH AND CLIMATE CHANGE

This session will discuss the interests of emerging powers and the Global South broadly in the ongoing UNFCCC negotiations and the extent to which these offer reprieve to Africa's aspirations out of the negotiations. It will provide space for perspectives, from leading nations in the Global South (which are also members of BRICS), to be debated openly.

Chair: Dr Siphamandla Zondi

Director, Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD)

10:10 – 10:30 **From G-77 to BASIC: China in Global Climate Change Negotiations**

Mr Xinran Qi, Georgetown University, USA

- 10:30 – 10:50 **Brazilian Politics and Global Climate Governance**
Dr Marco Vieira, Lecturer in International Relations, University of Birmingham, UK
- 10:50 – 11:10 TEA
- 11:10 – 11:30 **Indian Climate Change / Energy Security Nexus in Multilateral Negotiations**
Ms Swati Ganeshan, Associate Fellow at the Centre for Global Agreements, Legislation and Trade in Resources, Regulation and Global Security Division of The Energy and Resources Institute (TERI), India
- 11:30 – 11:50 **Emerging Powers and COP 17: South Africa's BASIC Dilemmas**
Mr Francis Kornegay, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD)
- 11:50 – 12:50 Discussion
- 13:00 – 14:00 LUNCH

SESSION 2: AFRICA AND CLIMATE CHANGE

It is assumed by some that the existence of a common position by African countries that are parties to the COP in the UNFCCC, translates to stronger capacity to negotiate a generally favourable outcome. Although Africa contributes the least of all major global regions to GHG emissions, it is one of the most affected by the negative ramifications of climate change. It, therefore, has a vested interest in a strong and practical agreement amongst negotiating parties regarding climate change mitigation and adaptation imperatives. But whether the common position provides the basis for such an outcome and whether conditions exist for common diplomacy, what would be the role of key African states, and what elements of the common position would be most suitable for bargaining exercises, are some of the questions to be debated by the panel in this session.

Chair: **Prof. Hamilton Sipho Simelane**
UKZN and Research Associate, Ingabadi Group

- 14:00 – 14:20 **Africa at COP 17: Building a Common Position against a Backdrop of Inequality**
Ms Masego Madzwamuse, Economic Justice Programme Manager at Open Society Initiative of Southern Africa (OSISA)

- 14:20 – 14:40 **Climate Change Negotiations: What Outcome for Africa?**
Ms Estherine Fotabong, New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD)
- 14:40 – 15:00 **Civil Society and Climate Change Negotiations: Game Changers, Players or Spectators?**
Ms Nancy Kachingwe, Land Access Movement of South Africa (LAMOSA)
- 15:00 – 15:20 **Opportunities and Challenges for Development: Africa’s Interest in the Adaptation Arena and the Implications for Mechanisms (Financing) that may be further Developed during COP 17**
Professor Mike Muller, visiting Adjunct Professor, University of the Witwatersrand Graduate School of Public and Development Management and Commissioner, National Planning Commission
- 15:20 – 16:30 Discussion
- 16:30 Closure and thanks

Please join us for a Cocktail Reception (18:00)

Annex 2

Participants list

Date: 25-Nov-11
Title Dialogue Series On Cop17/Cmp7
Venue: Southern Sun, North Beach, Durban

Surname	Name	Organisation
Alsharif	H.E. Dr Ali Yousif Ahmed	Sudan Embassy
Baleka	Patrick	Western Sahara Solidarity Forum (SA)
Bengis	Terry	Webtune (PTY) Ltd, Environmental services DBN
Bhengu	Lamula Sabelo	Zulehlangene Management
Bradlow	Prof. Daniel	DIRCO
Bridgemohan	Nitesh	Msunduzi Municipality
Brijraj	Adv. Reshwant	DBN
Busuku	Gugu	NGO-AFASA
Buthelezi	Mr. Thulasizwe	Managing Director, Khuthala Group (Pty) Ltd
Calitz	Willemien	KZN
Cele	Njabulo	Mangosuthu University of Technology
Chindia	Ms Morina	Ethiopian Embassy
Clark	Nagida	KZN
Coan	Stephen	The Witness
Dawnarain	Reena	KZN-DAE
Delkasso	H.E. Dr Desta	Embassy of Kenya
Diakalo Docta	Mr Muzungu	DRC Embassy
Dlamini	Ms Siphokuhle	Isihawu Initiative
Do	Lihn	KZN
Dove	Patricia	
Dube	Simphiwe	KZN-DAE
Duff	Ms Lyndsey	IGD
Dukada	Toleka	DBN-LC
Fotabong	Ms Estherine	Ambassador
Govender	Dana	The Heart and Stroke Foundation
Gumede	Sandile	Ndwedwe Housing Coord.

Gumede	Sibusiso	COSATU
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Hlatshwayo	Siyanda	Horizon Group
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Kornegay	Mr Francis	IGD
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Lewis	Meggan	DBN-
Linda	Zanele	DAFF, Pietermarzburg
Lukamba	Jean-Pierre Alumba	AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL
Luthuli	Gcinekile Gcina	eThekwini INK ABM/URP
Luthuli	Mbali	KZN-DAE
Mabaso	Nkanyiso	Mangosuthu University of Technology
Madlala	Sbongiseni	Msunduzi Municipality
Maharaj	Nurdesb	KZN-DED
Maharajh	Yashna	DBN
Mahlaba	Nkosinathi	KZN-DAE
Maile	Mr Thabo	Freedom of Expression Inst..., KZN
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Mashaba	Xolile	Mangosuthu University of Technology
Masters	Dr Lesley	IGD
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Mathebula	Zanele	COSATU
Mavuso	Sihle	The New Age News Paper
Mbatha	Thulani	Sunday Times
Mbatha	Njabulo	Mangosuthu University of Technology
Mchunu	Benton	KZN-DAE
Mdakane	Ms Thobeka	Senior BEE Analyst, Gumbi Consulting
Mdletshe	Thobani	UMIX News
Mdloti	Ms Ntuthu	IGD

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Mkhwanazi	Nosipho	KZN-DAE
Mkhwanazi	Thula	NGO-AFASA
Mlambo	Ntuthuko	KZN-DAE
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Msimango	Dr Peggy	KZN-DOE
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Naidoo	Mrs Shirley	The Saviour
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Ndlovu	Nkosingiphile	NGO-AFASA
Ndlovu	Mr Nkosi	AFASA-Chairpeson
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Ngcobo	Mr Thembinkosi	Ethekwini Municipality
Ngcobo	Sibusiso	Mangosuthu University of Technology
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Ngubane	Xolani	Department of Defence
Ngubane	Sibonelo	KZN
Ngubo	Ntokozo	KZN-DAE
Nisa Sayed	Saydoo	WCRP
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Swati	Ms Ganeshan	Delhi India
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Tesha	Amb. Dr John	Africa Forum
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Vieira	Mr Muxagata	Birmingham
Xinran	Mr Qi	Washington
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