




ARE AU ROADMAPS AFRICA'S SOLUTION TO POLITICAL CRISES?

Proceedings report of a roundtable organised by the
Institute for Global Dialogue

Kwame Nkrumah Hall, Pretoria, 19 October 2012



Compiled by Fritz Nganje



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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AHCL	AU High Level Ad-hoc Committee on Libya
AMRI	Archie Mafeje Research Institute
AU	African Union
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions
DIRCO	Department of International Relations and Cooperation
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
GCS	Global Crisis Solutions
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IGD	Institute for Global Dialogue
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NTC	National Transitional Council
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
SADC	Southern African Development Community
UP	University of Pretoria
UN	United Nations
UNISA	University of South Africa
UNIVEN	University of Venda

INTRODUCTION

In response to the political crisis in Libya in 2011, the African Union (AU) adopted a roadmap, which underscored the organisation's position that only a political solution would guarantee peace and meet the legitimate aspirations of the Libyan people, while also upholding the unity and territorial integrity of the country. The same principle and logic influenced the AU's position on the post-election crisis in Côte d'Ivoire earlier in 2011, and has been the foundation on which the AU, through the Southern African Development Community (SADC), has engaged with the disputing parties in Zimbabwe since 2008. In all these crisis situations, the position of the AU has been at odds with that of major Western powers, which have invoked the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine to advocate military intervention and other strong-arm tactics. Clearly, then, the crises in Côte d'Ivoire, Libya and Zimbabwe highlight a fundamental divergence of views between African leaders and their Western counterparts on how political conflicts on the continent should be handled. At the heart of this disagreement is the preference by African leaders for political solutions to conflicts, which often find expression in the adoption and implementation of roadmaps. It is worthy to note that there is no consensus on the motivations for this commitment to political solutions.

Against this backdrop, the Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD), with financial support from the UK's Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), convened a roundtable on 19 October 2012 to reflect on the use of roadmaps, in the context of debates about the R2P and the idea of African solutions to African crises. The dialogue was part of a project aimed at understanding the divergent perspectives between African and Western leaders on how to respond to crisis situations on the continent. Ultimately, the project sought to identify the ingredients for a joint and concerted approach to crisis response in Africa. The discussion was led by a three-man panel composed of Prof Gilbert Khadiagala from Wits University, Ambassador Tom Amolo from the Kenyan High Commission in South Africa, and Ambassador Gaoussou Touré from the Embassy of Guinea in South Africa. This report synthesises keynote inputs and the interactive discussion that followed.

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES ON THE SPEAKERS

Ambassador Tom Amolo

Ambassador Tom Amolo is the High Commissioner of the Republic of Kenya to South Africa, Swaziland and Lesotho. His diplomatic career has its roots in a rich academic background. In 1983 he obtained a Bachelors degree in Political Science and International Relations from the University of Nairobi, before moving on to complete his graduate studies in Diplomacy and International Relations at the same university in 1986. Ambassador Amolo also holds postgraduate qualifications in international economics and diplomacy, as well as in preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution from the German Foreign Service Institute and Columbia University respectively.

Ambassador Amolo has served in the capacities of Deputy Chief of Mission, Counsellor, Second and First Secretary in Kenya's permanent missions and delegations to the United States and the United Nations. From December 2002 to October 2004, he was the Deputy Chief of Mission at the Kenyan Embassy in the US. He also served as Alternate Representative in the Kenyan delegation to the UN Security Council from January 1997 to December 1999.

Ambassador Amolo has also served in different capacities in the Kenyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including as Director of International Organizations and Conferences, as well as Deputy Director of the Special Unit dealing with cooperation between Kenya, Sudan and Somalia. Before assuming his current position as High Commissioner in December 2007, Ambassador Amolo served as Director of Political Affairs in the Kenyan Foreign Affairs Ministry from December 2006 to September 2007.

Ambassador Gaoussou Toure

His Excellency Mr Gaoussou Toure is the Ambassador of the Republic of Guinea in South Africa. Ambassador Toure holds a degree in Economics and Mathematics from the Gamal Abdel Nasser University of Conakry, Guinea. He is also a graduate of the International Institute of Public Administration in Paris and holds a Diploma in Specialized Higher Studies (3rd cycle) in International Organizations Law.

Before entering the diplomatic field in 1986 as Head of Guinea's Bilateral Cooperation with Europe, Ambassador Toure served as Professor of Economics and Statistics at the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Conakry. From 1993 to 1997, Ambassador Toure was the Economic Advisor to the Embassy of Guinea in Brussels for the Benelux and European Union from 1993 to 1997. He went on to serve as Counsellor for Political and Cultural Affairs at the Embassy of Guinea in Pretoria from 1997 to 2003. He held the same position at the Embassy of Guinea in Morocco.

In 2004, Toure was promoted to the rank of Ambassador, and Director of Political Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This position allowed him to coordinate the activities of the foreign policy of Guinea by taking part in several missions at the bilateral level and the statutory meetings of sub-regional and regional

organisations (ECOWAS, African Union), the Organisation of Islamic Conference and the UN. In 2008, Ambassador Toure returned to South Africa in the capacity of Ambassador of Guinea in Southern Africa with his residence in Pretoria.

Prof. Gilbert Khadiagala

Prof. Gilbert M. Khadiagala is the Jan Smuts Professor of International Relations and Head of the Department of International Relations at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. He has previously taught comparative politics and international relations in Kenya, Canada, and the United States. Prof. Khadiagala holds a doctorate in International Studies from the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), at the Johns Hopkins University, Washington, D.C. His research focuses on security and politics in Eastern Africa, Southern Africa, and the Great Lakes region.

Prof. Khadiagala is the author of the recent book, *Meddlers or Mediators? African Interveners in Civil Conflicts in Eastern Africa*, and also co-editor of the book, *Conflict Management and African Politics: Ripeness, Bargaining, and Mediation*. He is currently working on a book on state formation in South Sudan.



ROADMAPS AS MECHANISMS FOR RESOLVING AFRICAN CONFLICTS

Prof Gilbert Khadiagala



The dialogue was guided by a presentation on roadmaps as mechanisms for resolving African conflicts delivered by Prof Gilbert Khadiagala. Prof Khadiagala began by locating the ascendancy of roadmaps within the history of conflict resolution practices in Africa. He highlighted the fact that external intervention to resolve intra-state conflicts is not a novel phenomenon in Africa. There is a rich history of African mediators, in the form of governments, regional organizations and even elderly statesmen, helping to negotiate ceasefires and finding ways to restore political stability in a variety of conflict situations. This was often achieved with the support of a wide range of international actors. While underscoring a preference for negotiated settlements, African conflict resolution efforts in the 1990s also reveal a strong push in favour of greater African ownership of peace processes. This often created tension between African mediators and external [read: Western] actors, who were seen to be intruding in local peace processes. African leaders only accepted collaboration with their Western counterparts because of the financial leverage that the latter brought to peace processes. Besides the problems of inadequate resources and the perceived interference from Western countries, African peacemakers also faced the challenge of having to deal with multiple, and at times competing initiatives from different actors within the continent. From this historical perspective, the current practice of using roadmaps could be

seen as epitomising a process of institutional and organizational learning as African countries try to manage the problems of multiple initiatives, ownership and institutional leadership in the resolution of conflicts on the continent.

Today, roadmaps and the appointment of high-level panels have become the dominant modes of mediation in Africa, underscoring the importance of coordinating intermediary initiatives and collective pressures. Although these institutions are new and often scrambled in haste, their growing significance is indicative of more proactive efforts to realise the objectives of African ownership of peace processes. The roadmaps in Sudan, Libya, Cote d'Ivoire and Madagascar present lessons for probing their roles as process and content tools in mediation, how and when they make a difference in conflict resolution, and more pertinently, the broader contexts in which they operate. Lessons from the Libyan experience, for instance, point to the weaknesses of roadmaps in the inauspicious circumstances of external intervention while the Sudan reinforces the division of labour between regional and international actors to resolve African conflicts.

Prof Khadiagala's review of the AU's use of roadmaps further underscores a number of key issues relating to the normative underpinnings and application of this crisis response mechanism. These are summarised below.

- In the first instance, the use of roadmaps reveals the continued determination of African leaders to take ownership of peace processes on the continent. The 2011 Libyan crisis is illustrative in this regard. One week before the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1973 of March 2011 to authorise a no-fly zone over Libya, the AU adopted a four-point roadmap and appointed a High-Level Ad-hoc Committee on Libya. Despite the impediment posed by NATO's military actions in Libya, and notwithstanding the opposition of Western powers to the roadmap, the AU High-Level Committee on Libya (AHCL) did not give up in its attempts to convince the warring Libyan parties to enter into dialogue. Through this relentless action, the AU was in effect giving expression to the perception held by the African political leadership that African-led initiatives should take precedence on matters of conflict resolution on the continent.
- Furthermore, the examples of Libya and Cote d'Ivoire highlight the challenge of implementing roadmaps in the context of a divided international opinion. In both cases, disagreement between sections of the African leadership and their Western counterparts undermined prospects for the conflicting parties to accept the mediation framework of the AU. On the one hand, NATO's military campaign against Gaddafi's forces emboldened Libya's National Transitional Council (NTC), foreclosing a negotiated solution to the conflict. On the other hand, knowledge of the military backing of UN and French forces contributed to Alassane Ouattara's rejection of the peace plan proposed by the AU High Level Panel for Cote d'Ivoire.
- Also highlighted in the review of the AU's use of roadmaps is the weakening consensus within the African leadership on the application of this mechanism for conflict resolution, which tend to find expression in rifts between the AU and regional organizations. For example, in the case of Cote d'Ivoire, dissenting voices from Angola, South Africa and Uganda about the legitimacy of the election results encouraged the AU to adopt an approach that was far more conciliatory towards Laurent Gbagbo than that of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). To some extent, these differing perspectives on the conflict and how to resolve it contributed in undermining the African mediation effort and paved way for the joint UN-French military action that ousted Laurent Gbagbo.

AU ROADMAPS: PERSPECTIVE FROM AFRICAN DIPLOMATS



Ambassador Tom Amolo

Ambassador Tom Amolo presented a perspective on the subject, which was partly in response to Prof Khadiagala's input but drew extensively from the Kenyan experience. He argued that as both content and process instruments, roadmaps have gained currency in peace processes in Africa because of their inherent strengths, particularly in terms of the fact that they often come with clear milestones and measureable options, which could facilitate the full settlement of conflict. However, he noted that despite its success in restoring calm, the application of this instrument in the 2007–2008 post-election crisis in Kenya underscores some practical constraints that deserve attention. Among these is the suspicion that local actors tend to hold of external actors (African and Western alike) who come in to broker peace. Together with feelings of national pride, this tendency could undermine the contributions of external actors.

According to Ambassador Amolo, the view that peace should be pursued at all costs, which is sometimes brought to bear in the interpretation of roadmaps, is problematic and needs to be reconsidered, as it creates an

unnecessary dichotomy between peace and justice. The role of the international community in crisis situations in Africa also needs to be problematised. Notwithstanding the imperative for Africans to take charge of their own affairs, it must be borne in mind that the primary responsibility for global peace and security is vested in the UN. Having said that, it cannot be ignored that the interests and behaviour of the major powers that wield influence in the UN tend to interfere with the ability of the organisation to effectively execute this responsibility. What should be paramount in any international response to crises in Africa is the need to adopt a broad perspective of peace, so as to be able to address the interests of the communities in conflict.

In terms of making roadmaps work for Africa, the Kenyan diplomat underscored the need for greater coordination and institutionalisation of this instrument, recommending that consideration should be given



Ambassador Gaoussou Toure

to generating consensus around a 'template' that can be deployed with relative speed and efficacy once a crisis erupts.

In his input, Ambassador Gaoussou Toure cited the examples of Côte d'Ivoire, Libya and Madagascar to illustrate the dilemma that Africa faces with regard to the resolution of violent conflicts. On the one hand, he argued, military interventions spearheaded by external powers often fail to address the underlying causes of conflict, as demonstrated by the continued instability in Côte d'Ivoire and Libya following the military campaigns to oust Laurent Gbagbo and Muammar Gaddafi. It is also the case that this instrument tends to be used to serve other interests. On the other hand, there is hardly any concrete evidence to suggest that roadmaps, as crisis response instruments, have produced positive outcomes on the continent. This dilemma has been responsible for the sub-optimal responses to political crises that the continent has experienced in recent years.

In the view of Ambassador Toure, the inefficiency of roadmaps could be attributed to a number of factors, among which are the lack of political will and concerted leadership on the continent. As the example of

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ECOWAS's response to the Malian crisis suggests, this challenge is compounded by inadequate resources, which often leave Africa at the mercy of external actors. The growing tendency to regionalise conflicts also works to undermine the ability of the continent to respond to crises expediently, as it creates undue tensions between the AU and regional bodies. What Africa needs, therefore, is increased capacity and commitment to coordinate its internal processes. From this vantage point, the continent would then be able to define a constructive role for the international community in its internal affairs.

KEY POINTS FROM THE INTERACTIVE DISCUSSION



Participants at the roundtable

Supremacy of political solutions needs to be qualified

There was consensus at the forum that the most desirable response to political crises in Africa is one that prioritises the search for negotiated and inclusive outcomes. The military option, it was argued, could under certain circumstances become attractive, such as when local actors display a cruel intransigence that triggers or escalates a humanitarian crisis and threatens regional stability. However, the challenge here is that while military campaigns may succeed in containing overt violence, the solution they offer is not sustainable. More engagement is required even after one of the belligerents has been neutralised. Unfortunately, the international community that often champions military action has repeatedly demonstrated that it lacks the attention span to assist the conflict zone beyond the dropping of bombs. The examples of Libya and Côte d'Ivoire were cited in this regard.

It is in the context of the limitations associated with military action that roadmaps, as an expression of inclusive political solutions, become extremely desirable. Roadmaps offer an ideal crisis response mechanism that should guide the conflicting parties in understanding and addressing their differences in a manner that is conducive to an inclusive, sustainable and harmonious outcome. Even so, participants at the roundtable were united in the observation that, under current circumstances in Africa, roadmaps have become more of an obstacle than a reliable instrument in the search for sustainable peace. It was argued that insufficient political will on the part of Africa's political leadership, coupled with largely dysfunctional continental institutions, often undermine a genuine and concerted African response to crises when they do arise on the continent. In this context, political

solutions, as often articulated by the AU tend to be devoid of any real commitment to addressing the legitimate concerns of all conflict parties. Instead, they have been notorious for throwing a life-line to illegitimate and oppressive regimes, thereby creating conditions that favour the use of other crisis response instruments. Some participants even suggested that, just like military action, roadmaps do not have a record of addressing the root causes of conflict in Africa. They have often been designed and implemented with a bias towards a false notion of stability.



A cross section of the roundtable participants

Leadership crisis in Africa is at the centre of the continent's weak crisis response capacity

An equally important theme that animated the discussion was the perceived leadership crisis in Africa, which was blamed for the incapacity of the continent to respond expediently to political crises when they do erupt. The manifestation of this dearth in leadership was identified at two key levels. At the political level, the leadership crisis is manifested in the unwillingness of African leaders to take responsibility for the problems plaguing the continent, while also demonstrating a lack of political will to invest in, and take ownership of potential solutions to the challenges confronting the continent. There was near consensus on the observation that in defence of their strategic interests in Africa, external powers, especially those with a colonial history on the continent, have often acted in ways that undermine the emergence of a strong African agency. Here, reference was made to the continued influence of France in the affairs of its former colonies in Africa, which to some extent contributed to both the outbreak and the intractability of the 2011 post-election crisis in Côte d'Ivoire. Even so, it was argued that the continued reliance on the colonial matrix to analyse Africa's problems was misplaced. Although the structure of imperialism continues to impact negatively on the affairs of the continent, it is the lack of commitment and foresight on the part of the African leadership that sits at the centre of the continent's weak crisis response competency and poses the greatest threat to the well-being of Africa today. Africa's political leadership, it was suggested, has failed to rise above the appeal of parochial politics to commit to the collective development of the continent. In this context, the assertion that Africa lacks the resources to take full charge of its own peace operations borders on the ridiculous. Given the abundant wealth of the continent, it is only a lack of political will and a distorted sense of responsibility that could explain

the overreliance on outside assistance, even to the point of accommodating instability, as is the case with ECOWAS's stalled response to the Malian crisis.

In the view of some participants at the forum, the leadership crisis that seems to plague the efficiency of conflict resolution efforts in Africa is not confined to the continent's political class, but is also an attribute of the broader society. Departing from the premise that societal leadership is as important as political leadership in taking Africa forward, a case was made that the inefficiency in crisis management on the continent is to some extent a function of the weak state of consciousness displayed by the African citizenry. Proponents of this view contended that most African audiences lack the knowledge to decipher and appreciate the nature of the internal and external forces that have 'held Africa hostage'. Consequently the role of civil society in the emancipation of Africa has at best been passive and at worst been one of complicity with the very forces that undermine the progress of the continent.



Participants at the roundtable

Roadmaps and R2P can best be reconciled at the stage of conflict prevention

On the question of how African leaders' preference for political solutions could be reconciled with the intervention mandate bestowed on the international community in the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, the dominant perspective was a call for strengthening mechanisms for conflict prevention. It was noted that roadmaps do not only eschew the use of force in resolving conflicts in Africa, but also embody the notion of 'African solutions to African problems'. As such, they should be interpreted as exclusionary instruments, which leave little space for actors outside of the continent. This creates a major obstacle to the willingness of African leaders to cooperate with their counterparts in other parts of the world to address major conflicts on the continent, especially when these have escalated and threaten the lives of vulnerable populations. From this perspective, it was argued that the current deployment of roadmaps could be construed as being diametrically opposed to the normative underpinnings and objectives of R2P, notwithstanding the fact that the latter resonate with provisions of the AU's Constitutive Act. This is particularly true if due regard is given to Africa's weak institutional/operational capacity as well as the lack of political will on the part of its leadership, which often makes it difficult for the continent to respond expediently to crisis situations that fall

within the ambit of R2P. It was therefore suggested that reconciling the preference for political solutions with the objectives of R2P would require African leaders and the international community in general to become more proactive in preventing the outbreak and escalation of political crises on the continent. In particular, and in recognition of the truism that conflict prevention and good governance are two sides of the same coin, the African Union and its sub-regional organisations need to demonstrate greater determination in having their member states respect the provisions of the governance instruments they have signed up to.



CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

The ascendancy of roadmaps in Africa's conflict resolution practice, as well as the concerns and controversies around the concept, embody the contradictions of and lingering challenges to the African renewal project. Seen through the general frame that captures attempts to transform the continent's institutions of governance, the idea of roadmaps could best be described as being ahead of its time in engendering new thinking and behaviour on matters of peace and security in Africa. It is clear from the thought-provoking observations summarised in this report that the normative underpinnings of roadmaps – among which are the preference for inclusive and non-violent processes of dispute resolution and greater African ownership of African processes – are not only fundamental to the stability and development of the African continent, but also resonate with the emerging global consensus on governance, development and international cooperation. Put differently, the increased currency of roadmaps as crisis response mechanisms in Africa forms part of a larger process of institutional and normative transformation on the continent, from which some observers have inferred to credit Africa with a central contributory role in the emergence of new global norms and doctrines like R2P.¹ Be that as it may, the efficiency of Africa's preferred crisis response template, like the continent's new peace and security architecture, continue to be undermined by the vested interests and influence of anti-progressive forces, both within and outside the continent. From this perspective, the discourse on how to reconcile roadmaps and R2P needs to be more nuanced and move beyond the dominant frames of African versus Western perspectives or military versus political solutions. It should give greater analytical attention to the global political and economic interests and structures that connect Africa to the rest of the world, and which shape governance processes on the continent.

¹ See in this regard: Powell, Kristiana, "The African Union's emerging peace and security regime: Opportunities and challenges for delivering on the responsibility to protect" ISS Monograph Series, No. 119, May 2005.

APPENDIX 1: ROUNDTABLE PROGRAMME

09:30 – 10:00	Registration/Tea & Coffee
10:00 – 10:20	Opening remarks: Mr Francis Kornegay, Senior Research Fellow, IGD
10:20 – 10:50	<i>An appraisal of AU roadmaps</i> Prof. Gilbert Khadiagala, Wits University
10:50 – 11:50	Responses: H.E. T B Amolo, Kenyan High Commissioner to South Africa H.E. Gaoussou Touré, Ambassador of the Republic of Guinea to South Africa
11:50 – 12:55	Open Discussion
12:55 – 13:00	Closing Remarks

APPENDIX 2: LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

H.E. Tom Amolo, Kenyan High Commission

H.E. Gaoussou Toure, Embassy of Guinea

Gilbert Khadiagala, Wits University

Samba Mboup, UNISA

Francis Kornegay, IGD

Fritz Nganje, IGD

Sabelo Ndlovu, AMRI

Rashid Ahmed, AMRI

Ian Edelstein, ICRC

Zandile Bhengu, DIRCO

Faith Mabera, UP

Patrick Baleka, COSATU

Patrick Dzimiri, UNIVEN

David Penny, British High Commission

Josefina Pitra Diakite, Embassy of Angola

Sonia Adriano, Embassy of Angola

Simon Chisorochengwe, Embassy of Zimbabwe

Linos Mapfumo, Embassy of Zimbabwe

Amina Atem, Embassy of Egypt

Johannes Oljelund, Embassy of Sweden

Coulibaly Sira Cisse, Embassy of Mali

Martin Owuor, Kenyan High Commission

Hiroshi Jingu, Embassy of Japan

Dieudonne Tumba, UNISA

Rah Motaung, SHINGARA

David Mwamki, GCS

Charles Kipkorir, Kenyan High Commission

Juma Ali, Kenyan High Commission

Alexis Lingandu Mabele, Southern Africa Trust

William Mpofu, UNISA

Ahmed Sa'ad, Embassy of Yemen

Murray Sterley, DIRCO

Rany Kenawy, Embassy of Egypt

APPENDIX 3:

ABOUT THE INSTITUTE FOR GLOBAL DIALOGUE

The IGD is an independent foreign policy and international diplomacy think tank dedicated to the analysis of and dialogue on the evolving international political and economic environment, and the role of Africa and South Africa. It advances a balanced, relevant and policy-oriented analysis, debate and documentation of South Africa's role in international relations and diplomacy.

The IGD was initially established in 1995 as the Foundation for Global Dialogue after several years of effort led by the former South African president, Nelson Mandela, in his capacity as the president of the African National Congress. He and his team of leaders saw a need for a research organization that would facilitate the new South Africa's engagement with the changing global order after 1994. This was a period in which three vectors of change coincided: the tectonic shift in global power politics after the collapse of the Soviet Union; the wave of democratization that hit Africa and South America; and the near miraculous transition from apartheid to democracy in South Africa. The initial funding came from the German government and went towards establishing the Foundation's competitive edge, a combination of policy-oriented research, catalytic dialogue, tailor-made publications and grant-making for NGOs interested in international relations.

The IGD's research agenda has three broad programmatic focus areas: foreign policy analysis with special reference to the making and management of foreign policy and diplomatic tools like economic, developmental, and public diplomacy; African studies focusing on the role of regional and continental integration in African politics and development as well as the study of peace diplomacy; and international diplomacy, analysing dynamics in international diplomacy that have a bearing on African peace and prosperity.

Mission: The IGD strives for a prosperous and peaceful Africa in a progressive global order through cutting edge policy research and analysis, catalytic dialogue and stakeholder interface on global dynamics that have an impact on South Africa and Africa.

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