Once brothers in arms to topple the administration of Omar al-Bashir, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) find themselves entangled in a power struggle to rule Sudan. In their attempts to each gain absolute control of the country, this has severely damaged Sudan’s infrastructure, medical facilities and basic services. Undoubtedly, both warring factions have been at the forefront of this conflict. While the SAF has carried out arbitrary bombings on civilian populated areas, the RSF has consistently targeted civilians, infrastructure and medical facilities. The conflict has developed into a full-fledged humanitarian catastrophe, triggering a severe humanitarian crisis, not only within the country but across its neighboring countries. The instability has resulted in more than thirteen million Sudanese internally displaced, while at least 3.8 million citizens have fled to neighboring countries, giving rise to the worst displacement crisis in the world.

Due to the continuous violence, millions of people have been forced to evacuate their homes in search of safety, refuge, and basic services. One of the most significant humanitarian effects of the conflict has been the mass displacements of the Sudanese population.

Inside the country, the situation is deteriorating rapidly, the conflict has spread from the capital Khartoum to Millet, Darfur and other regions. Formerly serving as a safe haven for hundreds of thousands of civilians fleeing the violence in other regions between 2023-2024, El Fasher in Darfur is currently one of the most heavily affected regions. It is the epicenter of fighting where atrocious human rights abuses are recorded, deadly attacks on displacement camps leave many of the citizens severely wounded or resulting in loss of life, raising concerns of genocide.

Given the precarious situation internally, many Sudanese have resorted to seeking refuge in neighbouring countries which have their own domestic crises including poverty, disease, internal conflict, and governance challenges amongst others. In truth, Sudan’s neighbours, are already burdened by the past waves of displacement dating back to the 2003 Darfur genocide and are struggling to absorb the influx of refugees. The reality is that humanitarian programmes receive limited funding, and the arrival of refugees complicates aid distribution. Their arrival further places a burden on healthcare, education, and other basic services, therefore creating a fertile ground for violent clashes over resources.

At present it is recorded that, Egypt currently hosts the most Sudanese refugees (1.5 million), followed by Chad (773,662), South Sudan (349,935), Libya (256,000), Uganda (72,125), and Ethiopia (43,159). Moreover, adding the ‘burden’ on these countries poses a great concern on the Horn of Africa sub-region’s peace and security, with potential spillover effects throughout the region and beyond.

Beyond the humanitarian crisis, the advanced collapse of the Sudanese state has a significant impact on regional stability through economic decline and cross-border instability.

Neighbouring countries have been impacted by the conflict’s disruption of trade routes, regional supply chains, economic activity, and agricultural production. Consequently, this is the reality for South Sudan. Due to its heavy reliance on Sudan to export its oil, with the disruption of the activities Juba faces significant loss of revenue, domestic hyperinflation that could potentially rekindle its own internal conflict. The conflict has increased living expenses and economic instability in Chad, which may worsen local unrest. Due to border controls and instability along trade corridors, Ethiopia and Egypt have seen a considerable reduction in cross-border economic activity and greater transportation costs. This has limited the movement of products and services and undermined general economic stability.

Without a central authority, governance vacuums have emerged, which extremist groups and transregional jihadist networks can exploit. In this context, terrorist groups can thrive and prosper in Sudan’s unpredictable climate. Their presence endangers neighbouring countries as well as the entire region. This vacuum serves as a leeway for the illicit flow of small arms, drug smuggling, money laundering and human trafficking due to weakened border control. For instance, Chad, has seen an increase in arms trafficking and clashes involving armed groups since the inception of this conflict. The flow of small arms into countries sharing borders with Sudan is of great concern because it could intensify the security situation in surrounding countries by fuelling and spreading violence by armed groups with competing agendas, exacerbating the already fragile situation in Sudan.

What began as a power struggle to gain control over Sudan has evolved into a catastrophic war. The conflict in Sudan has exposed the country’s inability to maintain itself which is on the verge of state collapse. The situation in Sudan is dire, and it has led to the worst humanitarian crisis globally. Failure to resolve the conflict will trigger long-term instability potentially destabilizing the region, overwhelm already fragile neighboring countries and create power vacuums for warlords.

To prevent the Sudanese conflict from becoming a wider war, the Quintet coordination mechanism which includes the AU, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Arab League, the UNSC and EU was formally introduced at the 39^th AU Summit in Adis Ababa. The purpose of establishing this coordination mechanism is to foster reconciliation, restore peace, and stability in Sudan through coherent mediation processes in the quest for long-term political solutions.

Ms. Tlhompho Shikwambane is a Research Assistant at the Institute for Global Dialogue. She obtained a Masters degree in Political Science from Istanbul Sabahattin Zaim University (Turkey) and a bachelors degree in International Relations from the University of South Africa. Her key research interests include peacekeeping and foreign policy. The views expressed in this article are those of the writers and do not necessarily reflect the views of IGD