Often Africa is portrayed in terms of how outsiders perceive the continent’s external relations. This has led to a misalignment in the perceptions that tend to define Africa’s engagements, which echo the global mainstream narrative regarding who the legitimate state actors are in African external affairs. The inside perspective on how African state and non-state actors with agency would themselves pursue global affairs is often muted or relegated to the periphery.

Over time, interests relating to who constitute Africa’s credible international partners have become more about the kind of expectations that continental actors should be pursuing with external powers and whether such engagements represent a good fit in terms of bilateral relationships. Inevitably, the sense one gets from this outsider framing of Africa’s external relations is that most often, the assumption is that African nations cannot make informed decisions about their relationships regarding how to frame their engagements with external actors. What’s most disturbing is that Africa’s decisions regarding its external affairs becomes less about the equivalency of the engagement and more about how to determine who Africa can engage with.

Not only does this lead to a tension between the outsider and insider framing of Africa’s external engagements, it advances the notion that African actors need to consider how such relations will impact on national, regional and continental perceptions. This does not mean that African countries will stop cooperating with those they do not align with ideologically.

However, the idea that African governments have the potential to be pragmatic in their external relations is seen as disruptive, especially when such engagements are with countries like China and Russia as partners of choice, and even when the nature of the relationships is pragmatic.

South Africa is no exception to this dilemma, and in fact has found itself more recently with its back against the wall, having to constantly defend the notion that its foreign policy is independently designed and predicated upon it being an independent, sovereign state that has the right to pursue its national interests in the manner it intends. This dilemma also extends to South Africa’s domestic landscape. There are competing views about South Africa’s membership in BRICS, its positioning in the United Nations, and its relations with Russia. These are debated in terms of what value they have for the country’s identity in global affairs. Such attitudes are not homogenised, and more closely align with perceptions of how the world is viewed: both that the status quo is still relevant, and that impending systemic changes could unsettle the global status quo.

One such area where this can be discerned is in the way the image of Russia is characterised within South Africa, which is informed by global dynamics. There are varying degrees of understanding of this relationship, related to the context of elites and their proximity to influencing policy versus the general public and how these two are influenced by which information they choose to access and how it is interpreted. In shaping the image of how Russia is perceived in South Africa, we see the following set of issues as among the factors that define views of the country.

Historical support during liberation struggles

The historical relationship between the ANC and the USSR laid the groundwork for continued diplomatic and economic ties between Russia and South Africa in the post-apartheid era. There is a nostalgia that is associated with the appreciation for support during the liberation struggles of several African countries. The Soviet Union offered military, financial, and political support to countries fighting colonial rule and apartheid, which has informed lasting impressions. Although there was an awareness of Cold War dynamics, the fact that Russia was never a colonial power in the region was largely interpreted as a reflection of its shared commitment to fighting imperialism and to self-determination. The Soviet Union provided military training, financial assistance, and political backing to the ANC and its armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK). Many ANC leaders and members living in exile benefited from Soviet support, and went on to form part of a niche elite class in South Africa. They had greater proximity to decision making, including with respect to business and academia, and played a principal role in shaping more nuanced perceptions. However, putting the sentiment of this relationship aside, it is unclear how much the ANC of today knows about Russia.

In 2024, foreign policy featured more prominently than ever in South Africa’s national elections, with the conflict in Ukraine being a high point of reflection and contention for most political parties in how they represented themselves to their constituents through their positions towards Russia. The ANC was heavily criticised for having too much ideological influence over state policy, which impacted much of its relationships with the West.

The rhetoric strikes a particular chord in that 1) the politics of liberation icons may no longer hold the same gravitas in informing public opinion it once did, and 2) foreign policy issues are used to try influence voter behaviour on domestic issues. However, the ANC’s historical relationship with Russia is not reflected in public opinion, as both positive and negative perceptions of Russian influence are close to those of the ANC’s voter base.

Although Moscow has had to work hard to cultivate a positive image of itself through bilateral relations, the actions of the US and Europe have done more to actively shape perceptions of Russia among Africans. The USA and Europe have played important roles in Africans’ development, but many contend that their actions are perceived as exploitative, self-serving, or inconsiderate of the continent’s interests. Russia’s positioning as a counterbalance in great power politics in sensitive areas like military cooperation, trade, and diplomatic support, have shown Russia as a strategic player capable of stepping in to fill power vacuums or gaps left by other global actors. This also finds resonance in South Africa, but in a more conflicting way; discussions and policy debates become caught in the cross winds, where some contend Russia is an unsuitable actor and others see Russia pushing back against the West’s dominance of the international system as its self-proclaimed custodian.

The article was first published in Valdaiclub.com  

Arina Muresan is a senior researcher and Sanusha Naidu is a senior research associate at the Institute for Global Dialogue associated with UNISA. The views do not necessarily reflect those of the IGD.