This Q&A with South African expert Sanusha Naidu unpacks South Africa’s role in global governance through its membership in the BRICS and its presidency of the G-20. She currently serves as a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Global Dialogue. Through her insights, the piece explores how South Africa uses these international platforms to champion reform, elevate Africa’s voice, and advocate for a more inclusive global system. From the strategic priorities of BRICS expansion to leveraging the G-20 to advance development goals, Naidu sheds light on the challenges and opportunities shaping the future of multilateralism.

Introduction

South Africa’s global footprint has been elevated with its presidency of the BRICS group in 2023 and more recently by assuming the chairmanship of the G-20 until November 2025. Both events have intensified the spotlight on South Africa’s foreign policy orientation in terms of the country’s norm-setting agenda and its national interests. In this commentary, the author delves into some of the strategic considerations pertaining to South Africa’s BRICS presidency and leadership of the G-20, as well as the implications for the country’s international affairs going forward.

What are the main takeaways of the BRICS Summit in October 2024?

The 2024 Kazan Summit — which adopted a cautious yet strategic approach to expanding the BRICS — was pivotal in shaping the future of the group.¹ The summit prioritized practical adjustments to adapt the group to the global economy, aiming to advance its global governance agenda in reforming the international system, which has become characterized by growing geopolitical and inter-state tensions.

A key highlight of the summit was the introduction of “partner countries,” recognized for their regional influence and shared commitment to reforming the international system. These countries present significant potential for collaboration on diverse initiatives, including trade, investment, scientific innovation, and social development. Out of the initial 13 invitees, nine are now BRICS’ partner countries, signaling a strong interest in fostering cooperative ties.²

Although the Kazan Declaration provided limited information on the criteria for adding new partner countries, it outlined several substantial achievements that underscore the summit’s significance:

• The launching of a BRICS Grains Exchange commodity trading platform to enhance trade cooperation.
• A reinforced commitment to utilizing local currencies for financial transactions among BRICS nations and their partners, thereby promoting economic sovereignty.
• An exploration of a BRICS Clear Depository Facility that would establish an independent mechanism for cross-border settlements, strengthening global financial infrastructures.
• The proposal of a Reinsurance Agency to bolster risk management and collaboration among member countries.

Together, these outcomes marked a significant step forward and highlight the group’s dedication to mutual progress and innovation.

Is there an expansion strategy for the BRICS now? What would an expansion mean for founding members such as Brazil, India, and South Africa? What are these countries’ views on further expansion?

The BRICS does not currently have a clearly defined expansion strategy. Sentiment from the recent Kazan Summit indicates a cautious approach, especially from founding members like Brazil and India; both countries are uneasy about expansion because of the potential for China to gain greater leverage in securing political and economic support to bolster its global interests.

India sees the revival of the India-Brazil-South Africa subgroup within the BRICS as a means to counteract Beijing’s intentions to become the dominant actor within the group.

Likewise, Brazil views the group’s expansion as potentially diminishing the status of founding members, which could jeopardize Brasília’s position and identity as a regional leader.

In South Africa’s case, BRICS’s expansion has not sparked controversy. Within policy discussions, the focus has been on how expansion can enhance the group’s presence in the Global South and reflect broader structural shifts in the global system.

Overall, expansion of the BRICS is regarded as advantageous for India, Brazil, and South Africa in terms of fortifying political and economic bilateral relations with new members. Nevertheless, for both Brazil and India, any expansion must occur in a way that does not undermine the position of or compromise the interests of the group’s founding members.

What is the group’s strategy for advancing the reform of multilateral organizations? What are recent and prospective members’ expectations concerning that agenda?

The group’s reliance on a normative approach — making references to global frameworks that promote equity, inclusion, and fairness, such as is enshrined in the United Nation’s work — raises important questions about the effectiveness of this strategy and, consequently, its overall impact. Indeed, although the repeated affirmations in summit declarations underscore the significance of reforming multilateral organizations for the BRICS, the absence of a clear, actionable strategy diminishes the potential effect of reform measures. The insider approach, which seeks to influence change from within, may indeed be more productive in leveraging the group’s capacity to shift power dynamics. However, the tension between the group’s collective interests and the distinct national interests of member countries complicates the coherence of this strategy. This contradiction could impede the group’s ability to present a united front in advocating for necessary reforms. It could also explain why Brazil and India have been cautious about the expansion of the group.

The following example illustrates the impasse faced by the BRICS in presenting a cohesive bloc on the multilateral reform agenda.

Ethiopia and Egypt rejected Brazil and India’s condition that new members support their bid for permanent seats on a reformed UN Security Council. These two countries’ refusal to sign the BRICS Foreign Minister’s Communiqué on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly 2024 meeting stemmed from the lack of consensus on Africa’s representative. Indeed, for Egypt and Ethiopia, there is no consensus on which African state should become a UNSC permanent member; African countries have not agreed on South Africa’s candidacy. This stalemate highlights the political sensitivity of consensus decision-making because new members sometimes impose additional expectations on founding members.

Does the group have a strategy to leverage South Africa’s presidency over the G-20 to advance global governance reform?

Not really. The group will rely on what is contained in the summit declarations and use its broad stance of commitment to the global governance agenda and approach.

What can be discerned as a strategy is that there is consistency in how the G-20 identifies the Global South as the pivot to pursue its reform agenda. The group articulates its positioning in the G-20 as a strategy for advancing the interests of the Global South by advocating for the bloc’s greater inclusion and participation in shaping outcomes underpinning the global system based on the changing nature of power in world affairs.

Coordination of the BRICS strategy is imperative to leverage multilateral organizations like the G-20; coordination will further the BRICS’ objectives, including on issues like Agenda 2030 that seek to advance the global governance agenda.

One thing is certain: despite the lack of a coherent and defined strategy to advance global governance reform, there is a broad consensus among BRICS members about the fact that the international system needs profound changes to ensure equity, inclusivity, and policies that advance prosperity for all.

In 2024 Brazil chaired the G-20 Summit. What, in your opinion, were the key accomplishments on global governance reform during Brazil’s presidency?

The Brazilian G-20 presidency played a vital role in prioritizing global governance reform, especially in the context of sustainable development. This was achieved through the creation of a roadmap to reform Multilateral Development Banks for improved financing to bridge development gaps, as well as the establishment of two task forces aimed at advancing the global governance reform agenda, namely the Global Alliance against Hunger and Poverty and the Global Mobilization against Climate Change. During the Brazilian G-20 presidency, the focus on global governance reform shifted toward advancing the implementation of the global socio-economic frameworks associated with the Sustainable Development Goals and Agenda 2030.

The dynamics of reform during the Brazilian presidency highlighted that the effort was not merely about institutional changes; rather, it emphasized the need to understand how the global governance agenda directly impacts lives and livelihoods, often hindered by frustrations in the reform processes at the global level. This agenda seems to follow a two-step approach: first, identifying accessible opportunities for social development and reform, and second, understanding how these opportunities connect to broader institutional reforms.

In addition, the global mobilization against climate change raises an important question regarding how BRICS countries leverage forums like the G-20 to enhance their collective efforts on global governance reform. This approach is particularly effective when focused on climate change interventions, adaptation, and mitigation.

How does South Africa look at the BRICS, in light of South Africa’s role as holder of the current G-20 presidency? Does the country intend to advance the BRICS’ agenda, and, if so, what points in particular will it stress at the G-20?

South African President Cyril Ramaphosa views the G-20 presidency as a continuation of South Africa’s BRICS chairmanship in 2023. In many respects, South Africa’s leadership of the G-20 builds upon its BRICS theme, “BRICS and Africa: Partnership for Mutually Accelerated Growth, Sustainable Development, and Inclusive Multilateralism.” Likewise, its G-20 theme, “‘Fostering Solidarity, Equality, and Sustainable Development,” reinforces the notion that South Africa aims to consolidate its position as a bridge-builder for advancing the interests of Africa on critical issues such as the cost of capital, debt sustainability, illicit financial flows, financing for development, equitable access to markets and financial capital, and a stronger voice for the continent in global affairs.

By hosting the G-20 — a first for an African country, which also benefits from the inclusion of the African Union as a member of the group — South Africa is establishing its strategic value by linking its role in securing a more cohesive engagement between Africa and its partners to South Africa’s position as a Global South leader.

The agendas of the G-20 and BRICS are viewed as complementary for South Africa because they mutually reinforce each other. The aim is to promote a globalist approach that emphasizes a just, fair, and inclusive international framework. South Africa’s strategy in both forums focuses on consistently advocating for the integration of Africa and, more broadly, the Global South to ensure their influence is reflected in balanced decision-making outcomes.

What are you expecting from South Africa’s presidency of the G-20? Are you optimistic about reform, given the continuing lack of commitments by Western powers and deep disagreements about what reform looks like from the strategic to the more technical level?

The emphasis on the themes of Solidarity, Inclusivity, and Equality as the foundation for Pretoria’s G-20 chairmanship highlights the ongoing need to address the poly-crisis currently affecting the global system.³ This approach places the UN and Agenda 2030 at the forefront of South Africa’s presidency.

South Africa underscores the necessity of institutionalizing the global governance reform agenda at a technical level by tackling the socioeconomic challenges that currently plague the international system. By focusing on issues such as food security, the need for digital transformation, mobilization for a just energy transition, and proposing a cost-of-capital commission, South Africa can demonstrate that these issues transcend differences of opinion with Western actors regarding global governance reform.

South Africa will most likely use its G-20 presidency to shape the agenda going forward, especially given the uncertainty surrounding how Western powers might respond to shifts in the G-20 as domestic political changes occur within their governments. Thus, while the reform agenda under South Africa’s presidency could gain traction by linking to and building upon Brazil’s Global Alliance Against Hunger and Poverty and the global mobilization on climate change, it offers an opportunity to innovate on the proposed cost-of-capital commission becoming a permanent agenda item for future G-20 discussions.

What would you say to Western policymakers who may have an even more adversarial position toward the BRICS since its expansion, and the inclusion of countries like Iran, and argue that the BRICS lacks coherence?

The BRICS is not going to fade anytime soon. It will probably be more practical for the West to recognize that the expansion of the BRICS has been elevated with the membership of Indonesia. This suggests that trying to dismiss the BRICS as not having traction or being irrelevant may not be a useful strategy. Rather, Western decision-makers should consider how to work with members of the BRICS, as some do with India. Relying on the preponderance-of-power approach creates unnecessary friction.

Given the current state of the global system, trying to preserve the status quo is not viable. Therefore, even if the relevance of the BRICS can be challenged because of the inclusion of countries like Iran, this does not deter countries from wanting to become part of the bloc. The bottom line is that a non-member country does not have to agree with the BRICS and its members’ positions, but taking an adversarial position toward the group does not weaken the bloc.

Do you have specific policy recommendations for Western policymakers when it comes to supporting global governance reform?

Three steps would be useful in this regard:

• Utilize forums like the G-20 and bilateral meetings to initiate collaborative projects on global governance reform, including the Just Energy Transition.
• Create working groups in the G-20 and bilateral meetings to promote the global governance agenda.
• Set achievable targets for key milestones pertaining to the global governance agenda, such as the Sustainable Development Goals.

The article was first published in the STIMSON

Ms. Sanusha Naidu is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Global Dialogue associated with UNISA. Her views do not necessarily reflect those of the IGD