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Africa and globalisation: Transforming from taker to shaper?

africaIn recent years, a growing number of G20 nation states have used various forms of summit diplomacy to enhance engagement with the African continent through regular high-level meetings. These have been operationalised through initiatives such as the Forum on China-Africa CooperationIndia-Africa Forum SummitAfrica-EU Summit, the Korea-Africa Forum, the Turkey-Africa Partnership Summit, the United States-Africa Leaders Summit, and the Tokyo International Conference on African Development.

Except for the summit with the EU, all of these initiatives are essentially putting together a single country with an entire continent. The partnerships span the parameters of both South-South and North-South cooperation, presenting opportunities for the African continent to diversify its international relations and cooperation.

Africa’s growing web of global partnerships

The increased interest in Africa comes within the context of a continent that experienced an extended period of growth, with six to seven African countries repeatedly appearing in the list of the fastest growing economies in the world for an entire decade. With a young population projected to double to 2 billion by 2050, Africa was no longer only looking like the world’s problem, even though that narrative continues to be pervasive. It is increasingly obvious that Africa presents an opportunity for global powers; indeed the evidence suggests many opportunities to capitalize on the demographic dividend in Africa. This places a responsibility on African stakeholders to design strategies that will enhance the livelihoods of Africans and Africa’s place in the world.

The African continent needs to seize the initiative and shape those partnerships according to the individual, sub-regional, and collective interests of African stakeholders. Otherwise, it risks being mastered by its complex web of international partners instead. As the G20 seeks ways to engage the African continent, two important matters will have to be tackled in order to enhance African agency and institutionalise relation on equal terms. First, the issue of African representation in global summitry, and secondly, reducing the dependency on donors to finance Africa’s institutions such as the regional economic communities (RECs) and the African Union.

Who constitutes ‘Africa’ at global Summits?

The Kagame report on the imperative to reform the African Union, building on past initiatives such as the AU panel chaired by the late Professor Adebayo Adedeji, calls for the continent to rationalize its external partners, and to have a better distribution of labour between the various components of the AU system. The recommendations face the challenge of African nation states jealously guarding their sovereignty or looking to establish a sense of sovereignty in the first place. A key question will be who constitutes ‘Africa’ at the various summits with external powers.

The Kagame report recommends that ‘external parties should be invited to [AU] Summits on an exceptional basis and for a specific purpose, and that [p]artnership summits convened by external parties should be reviewed with a view to providing for an effective framework for African Union partnerships.’ It thus recommends that instead of all countries, Africa could be represented by:

  • Chairperson of the African Union
  • Previous Chairperson of the Union
  • Incoming Chairperson of the Union
  • Chairperson of the African Union Commission
  • Chairperson of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs)

This would no doubt have an effect on the myriad partnership summits by individual G20 members and the shape and form that an institutionalised engagement between Africa and the G20 could possibly take. South Africa, like all other members of the G20 would thus be responsible for pursuing its national interests in the G20, which have a continental and global dynamic, whereas the official African representation would express the consolidated views from the continent. This would however need to form part of a broader G20 engagement with certain regions of the world, and not just be an Africa specific outreach. Indeed, the G20 already has EU representation through the EU Commission, and this would have to be seen in a similar light. While G20 decisions have an effect on much of the world’s population, there is no strong representation of least developed countries (LDCs) or regional bodies, and such an Africa outreach would have to be seen in the broader light of involving the rest of the world in G20 processes. It would thus be important to incorporate regional perspectives on the effects of G20 policies, especially on the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and in terms of aligning it to Agenda 2063, the Africa-driven strategic framework for the socio-economic transformation of the continent over the next 50 years.

Financing Africa’s pan-African institutions

Also important to ensuring that African interests are taken on board is the ability of African stakeholders to finance their own regional cooperation, development agenda, and institutions such as the AU, which remains disproportionately financed by external donors, many of whom are members of the G20. The challenge is not to diversify its funders but to self-finance its institutions. Indeed the numbers tell a story that needs urgent addressing. According to the Kagame Report, ‘In 2014, the African Union’s budget was US$308 million, more than half of which was funded by donors. In 2015, it rose by 30 percent to US$393 million, 63 percent of which was funded by donors. In 2016, donors contributed 60 per cent of the US$417 million budget. In 2017, member states [were] expected to contribute 26 percent of the proposed US$439 million budget, while donors [were] expected to contribute the remaining 74 per cent.’

It further states that ‘The AU’s programmes are 97 per cent funded by donors. By December 2016, only 25 out of 54 member states had paid their assessment for the financial year 2016 in full. Fourteen member states paid more than half their contribution and 15 have not made any payment. This level of dependence on external partner funds raises a fundamental question: How can member states own the African Union if they do not set its agenda?’

An inability to fund its own institutions means that even if Africa’s engagement with external powers were to be institutionalised in a more coordinated manner, it would still not be on equal terms, as many of the G20 countries would in effect be dictating the agenda. The Kagame Report thus raises integral issues for Africa’s place in the world, namely domestic resource mobilization and representation. In the short to medium term, African countries will have to pay serious attention to the domestic mobilization of resources, which will also include addressing matters such as illicit financial flows.

Enhancing African agency in globalisation

The matter of self-financing the continent’s institutions is thus important to ensuring greater representation and the exercise of greater agency in Africa’s global partnerships in general, and with the G20 in particular.

Africa is clearly not a monolithic actor, consisting of over 1 billion people with approximately 2000 languages and cultures, and a geographic space large enough to fit the United States, Western Europe, India, China, and Japan. It will thus be important for the vast array of state and non-state actors interacting with their interlocutors in the G20 countries to construct individual and sometimes collective strategies that engage with their counterparts in the global community.

If Africa is to move from being shaped by globalisation to shaping its evolution, then it must seriously address the matter of funding so that it advances its agency and provides greater representation for its people on the global stage. However, previous reform efforts must also be studied closely to understand why they were never fully implemented. While groups such as the T20, comprising think tanks from the G20 countries and the BRICS Academic Forum, which comprises think tanks and academic institutions from the BRICS countries, play important roles in fostering mutual understanding, they are not yet central to the ideas shaping the official summits. The challenge for think tanks is thus to use the platforms opening up to think tanks to build solid research communities amongst G20 and BRICS countries and institutions. Indeed think tanks must make use of the track two diplomacy and realise that global politics is no longer the domain of government-to-government relations alone.


Dr Philani Mthembu is the Executive Director at the Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD), associated with the University of South Africa (UNISA) and a co-founder of the Berlin Forum on Global Politics, a non-profit organisation dedicated to the promotion of academic, expert, and public understanding of global politics.


This article was first published by the German Development Institute 02 May 2018


Will South Africa’s economic diplomacy in Southeast Asia strengthen under President Ramaphosa?

SAecondipSouth Africa’s bilateral relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states has always been described as of significance in navigating South Africa’s interests in the Global South. More important, the ASEAN economic bloc is one of the priority markets for South Africa’s Export Market Diversification Strategy.

So far trade in goods between South Africa and ASEAN is favourable to ASEAN, for example South Africa’s exports to ASEAN between 2014 and 2016 dropped from US$3.4 billion in 2014, to US$2.4 billion in 2015 and US$2.2 billion in 2016. On the other hand South Africa imported more from ASEAN in the same period, with US$6.9 billion in 2014, to US$5.4 billion in 2015 and US$4.9 billion in 2016.

What is needed from South Africa is to ensure that there are more formal institutional links, technical co-operation, the protection of regional stability and trade relations on the basis of reciprocity in its relations with the ASEAN community.

This was echoed by the Deputy Minister of Trade and Industry, Mr Bulelani Magwanishe in the ASEAN-Africa Business Forum that was held in 2017 in Sandton. The business forum was one of the initiatives attempting to increase ASEAN and Africa’s economic diplomacy by promoting business between the two regions.

With the newly elected President of South Africa, Cyril Ramaphosa promising to improve economic growth by increasing business confidence, wooing investors and expanding trade, which will translate into job creation and poverty reduction, ASEAN is also one of the regions that South Africa needs to navigate increasingly and have a strategic approach that will not only support South Africa’s business opportunities but also pave way for the promotion of inter-regional economic diplomacy between SADC and ASEAN.

At the same time this could be a start in the quest to institutionalize the New Asian-African Strategic Partnership (NAASP) as a driver of Asia-Africa relations. The creation of the NAASP was initiated in the 2005 Asia-Africa Conference golden jubilee to create institutional links and advances cooperation between the two continents, however NAASP is currently not operational. Thus, a closer economic engagement between ASEAN and SADC, will not only help to solidify relations between the regions, it also has the potential to boost trade between Africa and Asia.

The groundwork has already been started to channel South Africa’s economic interests in the ASEAN region, since 2013 South Africa has been active in promoting its foreign policy tracks in bilateral meetings with the ASEAN member states to strengthen relations. What needs to be done by President Ramaphosa’s government is to give necessary attention to how South Africa can better identify opportunities in the Southeast Asia region such as the role of state-owned enterprises in advancing economic growth and national developmental objectives. 

ASEAN is also stepping up its efforts to boost bilateral trade relations and investment with South Africa. South Africa, together with Nigeria and Egypt have the largest import markets in Africa for ASEAN goods, and  currently there are more than 300 companies from ASEAN operating in Africa, with trade growing at 15% between ASEAN and Africa since 1989.

Thus, to ensure a concrete strategy and to solidify South Africa’s economic diplomacy in the ASEAN region, South Africa must seek for the formalisation of relations with the ASEAN community, to be included in the ASEAN external relations which is the formal status of Dialogue Partner, Sectoral Dialogue Partner, or Development Partner with ASEAN. The formalisation for relations with ASEAN, as I suggested 3 years ago in ‘the prospects of South Africa’s engagement with ASEAN countries’ will enable the South African government to build a united and a strategic approach on what constitutes South African interests in the Southeast Asia region.

Mr. Kenny Dlamini holds a BA Hons in Political & International Studies from Rhodes University and is a research officer at the Institute for Global Dialogue associated with UNISA. His views do not necessarily reflect those of the IGD

BRICS: what role for civil society?

BricsroleforcivilsocietyElites and industry specialists, for example government departments, academic institutions, top businesses and other recognised organisations, as well as renowned individuals,  are the most common actors spreading information about BRICS, giving the partnership an allure of exclusivity and at times restriction. While the partnership indeed was created by governments to strengthen their cooperation in international relations, over the years, the growing need to focus on translating economic gains into human development has expanded and evolved the BRICS agenda. The continued expansion into varied areas of cooperation has been accompanied by the institutionalisation of Track II Diplomacy channels that incorporate think tanks and businesses, and the establishment of Track III Diplomacy that focuses on civil society. The growing focus on people to people relations, the inclusion of think tanks, businesses, civil society and now potentially labour, adds more supportive qualities to the partnership while deepening cooperation beyond the traditional state to state relations.  This was particularly evident during China’s chairship of the BRICS in 2017, whereby China included think tanks, academics, civil society, political parties, and combined these groups on several platforms.

Previously, civil society convened on the side lines of BRICS summits in a BRICS from Below counter movement since the 2013 Durban Summit. The movement advocates for critical societal inputs that acknowledge socio-economic, political and civil rights violations, and has argued that the BRICS partnership has overlooked these aspects in a bid to attain most enterprising trade, investment and development cooperation deals. Foreign policy scholars and practitioners have argued that this realm of international relations is still very restrictive in nature and content, and therefore civil society should not necessarily have such an input. However, the increasing interest from civil society to engage with foreign policy and in international relations, shows that there is an awareness and capacity to mobilize and drive foreign policy from a bottom-up approach. While civil society may not be vested in the ultimate international relations political process, their intent is to impact communities and contribute to a stronger country-system, which impacts on the country’s capacity in international relations.

Through their lobbying efforts, civil society was included in the BRICS proceedings through the Civil BRICS forum, which first convened in 2015 at the Ufa Summit. Currently, the Civil BRICS forum is still working towards attaining a formalized or institutionalized status, which would allow them to have a greater input in their programmatic inputs in the various tracks of diplomacy. The agenda of BRICS from Below is still pertinent to the forum discussions. Actors use those points, namely individual rights, welfare, cooperation, sustainability, inclusivity and others, to explore more people- and environment-centred options that promote the development of the partnership through the focus on the development and empowerment of human capital. However, a significant challenge that the Civil BRICS contingent is facing in the partnership is that civil society is interpreted differently among the BRICS members; Russia and China’s civil society is focused on solutions based formalised organisations that implement societal change for improvements, while India, Brazil and South Africa’s civil societies are predominantly grass-roots based that provide critical input and advocate for policy changes that provide unique solutions fitting distinct issues.

Traditionally, elites have been favoured in the decision-making process and often mass public opinion has been taken for granted, thus portraying civil society as a reactive factor, not a partner, to government and business sector decisions. It is important for civil society to contribute to the BRICS forums as it sets a precedent for the mode of cooperation that the world could employ.

BRICS has an ambitious agenda, each year adding innovative items to its agenda. While the actors seem to have a large capacity to achieve their projects, there is a concern that too many new items can shift the attention away from existing issues. The proposed BRICS Labour forum will add a facet of cooperation that reminds the partners to act in favour of workers’ rights, which would be a favourable development in the partnership and an example to other international investors. However, BRICS partners need to be cognizant of their commitments. This would be a good opportunity for South Africa’s contribution to its 2018 presidency and South Africa may use its strong civil society as a reminder for what it has pledged to achieve in terms of sustainability and developing human capital and incorporate forth coming policy recommendations into an active strategy for its geostrategic placing in the BRICS partnership. As the BRICS partnership approaches its second decade, the role of civil society could be a sobering voice for the partnership to balance its geostrategic aspirations while maintaining the inclusive development of societies through consultation and participation.

Ms Arina Muresan holds a Masters in Political Science from the University of Johannesburg and is a researcher at the Institute for Global Dialogue associated with UNISA. Her views do not necessarily reflect those of the IGD

South Africa’s 2018 foreign policy agenda: in pursuit of the national interest

saforpolThe beginning of 2018 came with what is possibly South Africa’s busiest diplomatic calendar year since 1994 as the country finds itself at the helm of various international and regional groupings that have strategic importance.  It thus chairs the Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa (BRICS) group, the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), while set to relinquish its rotational co-chairing of the Forum for China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and participate in the Group of 20 (G20) meeting as the only African representative.   South Africa assumes these leadership roles at a time when domestic politics are recovering from a leadership transition in the governing party, leading to the question of whether South Africa will be able to advance its national interest within both the African and global contexts.   

While trying to pursue its national interest of being people centred, including promoting the well-being, development and upliftment of its people, protecting the planet for future generations and ensuring the prosperity of the country; its region and continent as whole, South Africa’s post 1994 foreign policy has faced a number of challenges.  It has at times been characterised by inconsistencies and controversy, although there has been some continuity between the Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma administrations regarding their African agenda and international cooperation. Under Nelson Mandela, the focus was on championing human rights and re-joining the international community after South Africa had been isolated during the apartheid years. However, despite the more elevated human rights discourse during the Mandela years, he was also not immune to close scrutiny by various state and non-state actors about his choice of friends, which included close relations with Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi, Palestine’s Yasser Arafat, Cuba’s Fidel Castro and Indonesia’s Suharto.  When questioned about their human rights records, Mandela would often say that he was free to choose his friends. 

South Africa’s contradictory actions in relation to championing human rights have continued since the Mandela administration as the democratic government was confronted with the realities of global politics, where the pursuit of the national interest is not always aligned with one’s own internal values as a nation state.  In September 2014, the Dalai Lama’s application for a visa was denied, largely seen as South Africa putting its economic interests above human rights. Moreover, South Africa turned a blind eye to the widespread human rights violations in Zimbabwe leading up to the 2002 elections. A SADC Parliamentary Forum Observer Mission report on the Zimbabwe elections was suppressed by the Mbeki administration; the report had declared the elections unfair and unfree. From Mandela to contemporary times, all the administrations have been grappling with the complexity of advancing national interest and championing a human rights agenda that emanates from South Africa’s own internal struggle.

The Thabo Mbeki administration chose to elevate the African agenda, strengthening ties with other African countries and pushing for more recognition and benefits for Africa while promoting a more equitable global order. The Jacob Zuma administration was a continuation of this focus on South-South cooperation with South Africa’s membership of the BRICS grouping being a major accomplishment in advancement of the Global South agenda.

Furthermore, South Africa's position on the reform of the UN including its interest in a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and its participation in the G20 has added to the projected image of South Africa being the corporate and institutional gateway to the continent.  However, South Africa’s efforts in becoming a prominent power in the global South, such as its BRICS membership, its G20 participation and its UNSC ambitions, have also added to the negative perceptions of African countries about South Africa’s hegemony. African states have been sceptical of South Africa’s declarations that it will use its international representation to advocate for the issues plaguing the continent, as they do not necessarily share the view of South Africa as a continental leader.  Contradictions to the African agenda as a core tenet of South Africa’s foreign policy, including the outbreak of xenophobic attacks and its quiet diplomacy approach to the crisis in Zimbabwe, have also cast a shadow on its Afrocentric foreign policy orientation.

South Africa has stated that its Chair ship of IORA will be used to promote and attain its priorities including the African Union’s 2050 African Integrated Maritime Strategy (AIMS) and Agenda 2063.  National interests will also benefit from the IORA Chair ship as the Association’s seven priority areas align perfectly with South Africa’s own objectives under Operation Phakisa, which aims for the development of an ocean economy.

A key question remains whether South Africa has the capacity, both in financial and human resources, to meet all the stated foreign policy objectives or has South Africa bitten off more than it can chew, especially considering the many domestic challenges that need to be addressed before attempting to address external ones? This then highlights the importance of the consultations on the Foreign Service bill, which is meant to build a professional and competent foreign service that will be able to represent South Africa in the desired manner, pursue national interest as well as translate South Africa’s diplomatic presence into tangible results for both the country and its sub-region.

Although the election of the new president has ushered in what is being called a new dawn, it remains to be seen how President Ramaphosa will utilise these various multilateral leadership roles in addressing domestic challenges. In his State of the Nation Address, the President clearly articulated the importance of improving economic growth by increasing business confidence, wooing investors and expanding trade, which will translate into job creation and poverty reduction and making it clear that these objectives require a professional and dedicated foreign service that will promote and represent Brand South Africa internationally. The President also spoke on the need for an economically independent African Union that has competent institutions that will be able to try gross human rights violations and war crimes. This is important given the recent shielding of leaders accused of violations such as Burundi’s President Pierre Nkurunziza, Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir and DRC President Joseph Kabila.  If obtained, these objectives will see South Africa being able to use its 2018 foreign policy agenda to advance the national interest within both the African and global contexts.  

Ms Remofiloe Lobakeng holds a BA Hons in International Politics from UNISA and is a research assistant at the Institute for Global Dialogue associated with UNISA. Her views do not necessarily reflect those of the IGD

Iranian protests: What do they mean for Iran as an emerging power?

Iranian protestsIran was in recent months rocked by its largest wave of protests since the 2009 Green movement, when millions demanded the re-run of a disputed presidential election. From December 28, 2017 tens of thousands of Iranians took to the streets in a number of cities, to protest against economic hardship and political repression. These protests resulted in 21 deaths, hundreds of civilian arrests, blocking of social media apps and retaliation from the Iranian government. As evident, Iran has been projecting itself as a regional power in the Middle East region, however for years the country is facing significant domestic challenges. Thus, the question that should be asked, is: what does this turmoil mean for Iran’s emerging power position?

There is a long history of political protests in Iran. Generally, these protests are triggered by economic and other grievances, such as price inflation, the imposition of new taxes and duties. However, there have been instances where protests have occurred due to, the nationalisation of oil resources (1952) and land tenancy (1963-1978, “White Revolution”). The frequent nature of protests occurring in Iran can arguably be viewed as the Iranian people refusing to accept the legitimacy of the regime. In this regard, where people’s freedom of expression is restricted and retaliation ensues, the government has responded through violent means.

The recent protests in Iran have an economic and political dimension to it. Demonstrations were at first about the failure of President Hassan Rouhani's government to “revive Iran's struggling economy, address high unemployment, [inequality], inflation, and combat alleged corruption”. Under Rouhani there has been a few successes with regard to reducing inflation and improving economic growth. However, this has not been enough as he has failed to deliver the most pivotal change - reducing unemployment. According to the World Bank, unemployment is about 12.6% (roughly 3.2 million are unemployed), and in other parts of country it is more than 60%. Young and highly educated individuals are severely affected by this. In addition, under Rouhani poverty has increased along with gas prices, and in the past year prices of basic goods have increased by at least 40%.

Under Rouhani, the nuclear deal made in 2015 with the US, UK, Russia, France, China, and Germany, was perceived as a prospect to improve Iran economically. Sanction relief was supposed to benefit Iran domestically; however, it seems that the short-term benefits of the deal was used to assist Syria’s regime and fund groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas, instead of using this money to address the countries domestic issues. In turn leaving Iranian civilians suffering.

This above factor leads to the political dimension of the protests. Demonstrators were challenging leading figures, chanting “Death to Ayatollah Khamenei” (Supreme leader of Iran), “let go of Syria, think about us”, others have been burning the supreme leaders picture and some woman have removed their hijabs. This clearly exemplifies the dissatisfaction individuals have towards the regime, and some have even lauded the monarchy overthrown in 1979. As a result, the Iranian government has responded in violence and has even blamed outside powers such as the US for the recent protests.

Essentially, under Rouhani there has been a slight improvement in the country, however it is not what the Iranian people have hoped for. The country is plagued with high rates of unemployment, inflation and poverty. With the money the government does receive, it rather invests in strengthening its position in the Middle East. Therefore, the protests can be largely viewed as a result of Iran’s ambitious foreign policy in the region at the expense of its domestic needs.

The protests are unlikely to change the current regime or have an immediate political shift, and resentment towards the regime will remain and remerge again. With these protests, Iran’s’ position in the Middle East and the international arena will undoubtedly change. Time and again, the Rouhani regime has proven unrelenting, and now with the recent protests the government realises that it needs to change in order to remain in power. Therefore, it could be said that a change in system could occur in Iran in the future. Iran can be considered an emerging power, but does this hold any significance if the domestic needs of civilians are compromised?

Ms Negar Fayazi holds a BA Hons in International Relations from the University of Pretoria and is a research assistant at the Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD) associated with the University of South Africa (UNISA). Her views do not necessarily reflect those of the IGD.




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